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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the extent to which the
political ideology that formed the basis for the American
republic shaped American diplomacy, using John Adams, James
Madison and John Quincy Adams as case studies. American
statesmen drew on a variety of sources for republican
principles of diplomacy. The law of nations and the Scottish
political economists supplied the ideas of an international
balance of power and freedom of trade. English writers of
the Opposition Whig school provided concepts such as
political separation from Europe, reliance on a navy for
defense, abhorrence of a standing army and, indirectly, the
belief that the United States could use its economic power
to secure its diplomatic goals.
John Adams began his career with a high degree of
confidence in the virtue of the American people and the
coercive power of American trade. He combined a classical
martial ethic with an Opposition Whig strategic sense.
Adams's experience in Europe disproved these beliefs, and as
president he fell back on the republican realpolitik, based
on naval power and separation from Europe, suggested by the
Opposition Whig school.
James Madison never held out a classical model of
virtue and never lost faith in the coercive power of
American commerce. His combination of political economy with
Opposition thought led him to reject both an army and a navy
as monarchical tools of diplomacy. He saw the Constitution
as a vehicle for harnessing American economic power.
Madison's conception of a republican diplomacy led him, as
secretary of state and president, to rely on the Embargo and
similar economic measures.
John Quincy Adams combined republican realpolitik with
a sense of Christian purpose and saw American government and
diplomacy as a vehicle for moral improvement. Adams's
republic rested on a continental union and a diplomacy
directed against European colonization, as a manifestation
of monarchy. Non-colonization included removing Spain as a
neighbor in North America, preventing European political
encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, and securing a
hemisphere-wide consensus on neutral rights. As a
congressman and critic of slavery-driven expansion, Adams
demonstrated the persistence of Opposition Whig thought in
American politics.
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CHAPTER 1: THE REPUBLICAN WORLD

When

asked

at

the

conclusion

of

the

Constitutional

Convention what the convention had created, Benjamin Franklin
answered that the delegates had given the American people a
republic, "if you can keep it."1 Keeping the republic placed
a double

burden on the

founding

generation:

to

preserve

liberty and free institutions at home and to defend national
interests abroad. John Quincy Adams captured this duality in
1837 when he observed that "the Declaration of Independence
recognized the European law of nations, as practiced among
Christian

nations,

to

be

that

by which

they

considered

themselves bound, and of which they claimed their r i g h t s . I n
American thought, the liberties of individuals and nations
proceeded from the same source. American foreign policy would
therefore be conducted on the same principles that shaped
American government.
The study of republican thought and its impact on the
revolutionary era has generally focused on domestic issues
* James McHenry, anecdote, 18— , in Max Farrand, ed. The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1911-1937), 4:85.
^ John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A
Discourse Delivered at the Request of the New York
Historical Society (New York: S. Coleman, 1837), 73.
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such as constitution making and political economy.^ Students
of foreign relations have either denied or lamented that a
connection between domestic principles and diplomacy existed.
Hans

Morgenthau

argued

that

in

the

history

of

American

diplomacy "political thought has been divorced from political
action." He divided early American foreign policy into a
"realist" period (dominated by Alexander Hamilton), in which
diplomacy was conducted in terms of pure power politics, and
an "ideological" period (dominated by Thomas Jefferson), in
which diplomacy was formulated in moral terms but executed in

The survey of the "republican synthesis" in this study
derives from Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian
Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1978); and Drew R. McCoy, The
Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
Robert E. Shalhope's two articles, "Toward a Republican
Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of
Republicanism in American Historiography," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 29 no. 2 (January 1972), 49-80;
and "Republicanism and Early American Historiography,"
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 39 no. 2 (April
1982), 334-355, provide an overview of the literature of
republicanism. For the English and European background see
Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen:
Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of
English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II
to the WLr with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1959); Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke
and His Circle: the Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of
Walpole (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968);
and J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
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terms of power.4 George Kennan perceived a "legalist-moralist
approach" to American diplomacy which he blamed on "the memory
of the origin of our political system."-*
Foreign
republican

relations
government

provided
and

the

deserve

severest
equal

tests

treatment

for
with

constitutional issues. If the proper distribution of power
within the branches of government was the central question of
republicanism domestically, the distribution of power among
nations was even more so the ultimate diplomatic question.®
Furthermore,

a focus on republican ideology gives a truer

picture of early American diplomacy than the realist-idealist
dichotomy,

which assumes that one set of statesmen could

divorce political thought from diplomatic action while another
could

not.

Under

a

commitment

to

republican

government,

Americans in the founding generation saw no division between
foreign and domestic spheres.
Republican principles of diplomacy may be divided into
two groups: ideas drawn from the law of nations and political
economy

compatible

government,

and

with

ideas

but

not

derived

exclusive
directly

to

republican

from

republican

thought. A reliance on a balance of power and the precept that

4 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interests A
Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 7, 13.
5 George Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York:
Mentor Books, 1952), 82-83.
6 Wood, Creation, 21-22; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 55-59.
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neutral

ships

carrying

enemy

goods

were

not

subject

to

capture, usually known as "free ships make free goods," fall
into

the

first

category.

Royal

absolutists,

such

as

Metternich, embraced a balance of power primarily because it
promoted stability. American republicans saw a balance of
power abroad as a way to preserve liberty,

analogous to a

balanced government in domestic affairs. "Free ships make free
goods" was a principle common to powers with small navies,
from republican Netherlands to autocratic Russia. In American
thought, it too was an expression of liberty. Both principles
were certainly elements of "realist" diplomatic thought, but
also promised to limit the scale and scope of war, which was
generally believed to be fatal to republicanism.
The second group of ideas, taken from republican thought,
mainly concerned the methods by which a balance of power and
freedom of commerce might be achieved. The first diplomatic
rule

of

a

republican

government,

on which

all

American

statesmen agreed, demanded a political separation from Europe
and neutrality between European nations. Europe was, in Thomas
Paine's words, "too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long
at

peace."

7

Paine's

argument

combined

the

republican

assumptions that monarchies were prone to war and that wars,
which tended to augment executive power to the point of
tyranny, were fatal to republics. Neutrality would prevent

7 Thomas Paine, Common Sense [1776]. Isaac Kramnick, ed.
(New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 87.
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encroachments of monarchy from without.
Republicanism limited the tools available to enforce
neutrality

and

separation

from Europe. A

republic was

government of limited powers and could not,

a

for example,

establish standing armies, raise taxes at will, or conduct
wars by executive fiat. Such policies were hallmarks of royal
despotism. Thomas Paine spoke for millions when he wrote that
"in England a k

hath little more to do than to make war and

give away places.”® The United States had to find measures of
defense that did not endanger republican government. With a
permanent standing army ruled out the choice generally fell
between a navy or some sort of economic coercion. A navy paid
for itself by protecting commerce and avoided the danger of
standing

army.

Economic

coercion,

denying

American

agricultural exports to Europe and its colonies and closing
the American

market

for

manufactured

goods,

promised

to

substitute for any military system.
Disagreement over which choice was better is a main theme
of this study. If one believed that the United States could
manipulate the European balance of power in their favor (as
did John Adams during the Revolution and Madison throughout
his

career),

commercial

power

was

an

ideal

weapon

and

perfectly suited to a republic. If one believed that a largescale domestic shipping industry was improper for a republic,
as did Madison, a navy was largely a waste of resources and a
8 Ibid., 81.
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provocation to other nations. Conversely, those who favored
domestic shipping and did not believe the United States could
manipulate

other

nations

approved

of

the

navy

as

a

particularly republican form of defense.
Two

other

aspects

of

the

nature

of

a

republican

diplomacy, which appear sporadically in this study, concern
the idea of a republican style of diplomacy and the extent to
which

republics

had

a

common

interest.

The

question

of

republican style turned on whether or not Americans were more
virtuous than Europeans. If so, republican diplomacy would be
plain and straightforward, shorn of royal trappings. If not,
there would be little practical difference in the conduct of
American and European diplomats.
The question of whether there was a common interest among
republics depended on whether or not self-styled republics
such as revolutionary France and South America were republics
in fact as well as in name. Few suggested anything like a
republic league; that would violate the first republican rule,
that of political separation. There was, however, always a
large gray area between active alliance or opposition and an
inactive sympathy or hostility.
The United States existed in a world full of governments
that were not

limited in

actions.

Consequently,

American

leaders did not always have complete freedom to base diplomacy
on purely republican principles. The alliance with France
during the American Revolution, to cite an obvious example,
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was

a deviation

from the

idea

that the

American republic depended on a

survival

separation

of the

from European

politics. American statesmen had to strike a balance between
diplomatic

necessity

and

ideological commitment,

to

find

policies that would secure diplomatic goals abroad without
endangering liberty at home.
The careers of John Adams, James Madison and John
Quincy Adams are case studies, although certainly not the only
ones,

in

reconciling

republican

thought

with

diplomatic

practice. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin also claim a
place in a study such as this. For both pragmatic and thematic
reasons they have been omitted. John Adams and James Madison
were the two most systematic political thinkers and writers of
the early republic, and they provide more convenient templates
for this study than Franklin and Jefferson, who thought as
deeply about ideology and diplomacy but wrote less in the way
of

republican

treatises.

Neither

Franklin

nor

Jefferson

produced a body of writing similar to Adams's Thoughts on
Government, Defence of the Constitutions and Discourses on
Davila

or

Madison's

Furthermore,
dominated

by

Federalist

and

"Helvidius"

essays.

Adams's and Madison's executive careers were
maritime

crises

and

make

for

an

obvious

comparison. John Quincy Adams represents a second generation
of American statesmen, which was more assured of the survival
of republican government. As the most successful secretary of
state

in

American

history

and

the

sharpest

critic
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Jacksonian Democratic diplomacy, John Quincy Adams believed,
as had his father and James Madison, that foreign policy must
reflect a commitment to republican government.

Americans learned their republicanism from a variety of
sources. The classical authors of Greece and Rome were the
foundation

of

colonial

secondary

and college

preparatory

education and supplied many of the key concepts of American
republicanism. The idea of balanced government, for example,
derived from Aristotle and Polybius. Americans read classical
history not to understand the classical world on its own
terms, but to extract moral examples. Americans could adopt
classical models,

such as Cato or Cicero,

and condemn as

enemies of republicanism others such as Caesar or Catiline,
without sharing all of the assumptions of classical society.
For diplomacy, the most important difference between classical
and modern republicanism was that the classical state was
designed to wage war, and Americans generally sought to avoid
war

as

subversive

of

republican

government.

Furthermore,

American republicanism generally, although not unreservedly,
accepted commerce as a public good, whereas the classical
world feared commerce.9
9 Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical
Republicanism and the American Founding (Chapel Hills
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 57-59, 72-76,
324, 333-334; Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the
Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment
(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1994), 12-25,
55, 90-91, 126-127.
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The American republic was founded in war and as such used
the classical martial tradition when needed. In general, in a
republic war was to be avoided, but when war was inevitable
the classics served as a cultural reservoir to provide a
republican justification for war. John Adams, for example,
spent his executive career trying to avoid war. Yet in 1813 he
wrote that "Republicks have been the most Warlike of all
Governments." Adams also believed that if the United States
had remained at peace in 1812, "the American Nation would have
been, as timorous as a Warren of Hares.”10 John Quincy Adams
also exhibited the two republican views of war. In 1844 be
feared

war

with

Mexico

over

Texas

as

the

precursor

to

despotism at home. In 1846, he saw war with Great Britain over
Oregon as a show of virtue.11 James Madison never completely
embraced war, but in 1812 he did draw on the classical martial
tradition when he saw no other option.
For
between

ideas

concerning

nations,

Enlightenment

the

Americans

thinkers.

relations

turned

Three

to

between

four

categories

men

categories
were

and
of

mainly

10 John Adams to Richard Rush, August 11, 1813, in J.H.
Powell, ed., "Some Unpublished Correspondence of John Adams
and Richard Rush, 1811-1822," 3 parts. Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography, Vol. 60 no. 4, Vol. 61 nos. 1-2
(October 1936, January 1937, April 1937), 1:144; John Adams
to Richard Rush, July 14, 1813, Adams Family Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society, Letterbook, reel 95.
11 Diary entries, June 16, 1844 and March 25, 1846, in John
Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 vols. Charles
Francis Adams, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott and Co.,
1874-1877), 12:52, 254-255.
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theoretical: those writers who were primarily concerned with
the emerging law of nations, such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich
de Vattel; those who wrote on constitutional issues, such as
John Locke and Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu; and
those who were

political

economists,

such

as

the French

Physiocrats and the Scottish Common Sense school. All of these
theorists sought to discover and codify the natural laws that
governed human conduct. Authors such as Vattel represented a
foreign

policy

influenced
British

the

analog

to

the

revolutionary

politics,

in

both

constitutional
generation.

diplomatic

For

and

writers
a

who

guide

to

constitutional

matters, Americans turned to the fourth category, the works of
the

English

Opposition,

from

the

republicans

of

the

seventeenth-century Commonwealth to James Burgh in the 1770s.
Three of Robert Walpole's opponents, John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon, who wrote jointly as "Cato,” and Henry St. John,
Viscount Bolingbroke were the most important writers of this
group. Colonial experience in both politics and diplomacy
served to unite theory with practice.12
The law of nations emerged as a coherent body of thought
in the century after the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). with
the end of that war, the idea of a "universal monarchy" such
as the Holy Roman Empire as secular counterpart to a universal
12 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual
Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1985), 70-82; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 22-54;
Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 33-34, 167-168;
Robbins, Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen, 9-21.
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church gave way to recognition of multiple religions in the
wake of the Reformation and a corresponding

system of a

balance of power among competing nation-states,

no one of

which could be allowed to predominate. The survival of each
nation depended on the maintenance of a balance of power
system, and presumably no nation would risk upsetting that
system for fear of reprisal from other nations.
Treaty

of Utrecht,

by

separating

Bourbons, codified the new system,

the

French

The 1713

and Spanish

replacing transnational

dynasties with discrete nations as the fundamental diplomatic
units.*3
The law of nations that Americans read was the work of
many hands who worked in both

theory and practice.

Most

commentators, including James Madison and John Quincy Adams,
called the Dutch lawyer and diplomat Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
the father of the law of nations, based on his 1625 work, The
Rights of War and Peace.14 Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694),
the Saxon philosopher and diplomat, followed Grotius and later

13 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), 24-25, 45;
Daniel G. Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The
Law of Nations and the Balance of Power (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 2-10, 35-36; Peggy
K. Liss, Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and
Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins university Press,
1983), 1.
James Madison, "An Examination of the British Doctrine,
which Subjects to capture a Neutral Trade not Open in Time
of Peace," in The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols.
Gaillard Hunt, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 19001910), 7:210; Diary entry, April 2, 1835, in MJQA, 9:229.
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influenced the Genevans

Jean Jacques Burlamaqui and Jean

Jacques Rousseau.15 The dominant figure in framing the law of
nations was the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767).
Vattel was a native of Neuchatel, a Swiss canton that John
Adams later praised for its balanced constitution. Vattel
served as Saxony's minister to Bern and later as a member of
the Saxon privy council. His crowning achievement was his 1758
work The Law of Nations, which transformed Christian Wolff's
The Law of Nations treated according to a Scientific Method
into a handbook for diplomatic practice.1® The law of nations
was not an exclusively republican science; vattel's Law of
Nations went
language

in

through
western

dozens

of

Europe.17

editions
The

law

in
of

every

major

nations

was

compatible with American republicanism in two ways. First, the
two shared a similar theoretical basis, with an emphasis on
natural equality and contractual association. Second, the law
of nations protected the interests of small, neutral powers
and provided a justification for many American foreign policy

15 J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Political
Thought 1450-1700 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 690.
1® Lang, Foreign Policy, 15-16; John Adams, "Defence of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America,” Vol. 1, in The Works of John Adams, 10 Vols.
Charles Francis Adams, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1850-1856), 4:377.
17 Francis Stephen Ruddy, International Law in the
Enlightenment: The Background of Emmerich de vattel's "Le
Droit des Gens" (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1975), 280-285.
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goals.
The law of nations was built on the idea of natural law,
which

formed

the basis

for

both

individual

and national

rights. Because nations recognized no superior authority, they
could therefore be said to exist in a state of nature, which
gave each nation the right to pursue its own ends. In The Law
of Nations Vattel wrote that "nations art* free, independent
and equal," and each holds the right to judge its own actions.
The

state,

Jean

Jacques

Burlamaqui

argued,

person."*® The primacy of the individual,
whole,

emerged

in

the

law

of

nations

is

a

"moral

rather than the
as

in

modern

constitutional thought. In The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism,

C.

B.

Macpherson

argued that

the

idea of

possessive individualism, which emerged in the mid-seventeenth
century, posited that individuals owned themselves and their
capacities and did not owe their rights to the existence of a
larger

society.

individuals

Society itself was

rather

than

an

a collection of

organic

whole.19

free

Americans

19 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations [1758]. Joseph
Autty, ed. (Philadelphia: L. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 1876),
Preliminaries, lxiii, par. 21; Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The
Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 2 vols. 4th ed.
Thomas Nugent, trans. (Boston: Joseph Bumstead, 1792),
2:208; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order
in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1977), 48; Lang, Foreign Policy, 16-20; Peter S. Onuf and
Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: the Law of
Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (Madison, Wis.:
Madison House Publishing, Inc., 1993), 10-22.
19 Richard D. Brown, Modernization: The Transformation of
American Life, 1600-1865 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976),
12-14; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
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implicitly accepted the idea of possessive individualism as it
applied to diplomacy. Diplomacy may have paved the way for the
acceptance of possessive individualism in domestic politics,
as seen in John Adams's Defence of the Constitutions and James
Madison's Federalist #10.
Given that nations began in a state of nature, the next
question concerned the natural relationship among them. Thomas
Hobbes in Leviathan took the pessimistic view that the natural
state of both individuals and nations was war, or at least
potential war. without a central organ of control, there were
no

moral

or

legal

limits

to

any

state

action. 2®

Most

theorists, including Burlamaqui, Grotius and Pufendorf, took
the more optimistic stand that the state of nature was a state
of

peace

and that,

although

no positive

law of

a world

community governed nations, natural law and morality did.21
Republican government and natural law sprang from the same
roots,

they argued,

the free association of individuals.

Locke's argument that men in a natural state formed societies
for mutual safety found its counterpart in Vattel, who went so

Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1962), 1-3.
20 Bull, Anarchical Society, 24-25; Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan: or the Matter Forme and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil [1651]. Michael Oakeshott, ed* (New
York: Collier Books, 1962), 99-100.
21 Bull, Anarchical Society, 26-27; Burlamaqui, Natural and
Politic Law, 1:121; Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, The Law
of Nature and Nations, 5th ed. Basil Kennett, trans.
(London: J. & J. Bonwicke, 1749), 108.
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far as to call the European system "a kind of republic.”22
The law of nations provided a theoretical basis for many
American foreign policy goals, particularly concerning freedom
of trade. "It is necessary that there should be some law among
nations

to

serve

as

a

rule

for mutual

commerce,” wrote

Burlamaqui.23 The first rule was that the sea was free to all.
Grotius argued in The Rights of War and Peace that the sea was
too large for any one nation to control and was therefore the
common property of all.24 According to Vattel "the nation that
attempts

to

navigation]

exclude
does

her

another
an

from

injury,

that

and

advantage

furnishes

[free

her

with

sufficient grounds for hostilities.”25 Vattel extended natural
freedom of trade to cover the complete freedom of neutrals to
trade in non-contraband goods.25 The natural right to trade
became a cornerstone of American foreign policy.
Enlightenment
freedom

as

an

thought

expression

generally
of

celebrated

natural

law.

economic

The

French

Physiocrats, whose name meant "rule of nature," called for

22 Lang, Foreign Policy, 35, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book
III, ch. Ill, par. 47, 311; John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government [1690], Peter Laslett, ed. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1963), par. 134, 401.
23 Burlamaqui, Natural and Politic Law, 1:120.
24 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace [1625]. A. C.
Campbell, trans. (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), 389-390.
25 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, ch. XXII, par. 282, 125126.
26 Ibid.. Book III, ch. VII, par. 112, 336.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
free trade in reaction to long-established feudal and noble
restrictions on the French economy. The Physiocrats held that
private landed property and agricultural production were the
source of all wealth. Although the physiocrats advocated an
absolutist royal government to protect free trade from noble
interference,

physiocratic economic thought was compatible

with that of a major voice in English republican thought,
James Harrington, who held that power followed wealth,

by

which he meant landed property, and that widespread private
holding of landed property guaranteed freedom.2^ A century
later, on the eve of the American Revolution, the Scottish
philosopher Adam Smith called for complete economic freedom in
all fields in An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the
Wealth of Nations.

"To prohibit a great people . . . from

making all that they can out of every part of their own
produce, or from employing their own stock and industry in the
way that they judge most advantageous to themselves," Smith
wrote,

"is a manifest violation of the sacred rights

of

mankind."28
Smith took aim at three hundred years of British and
2^ Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy:
Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth Century
France (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976), 911, 306; James Harrington, "The Commonwealth of Oceana," in
The Political Works of James Harrington. J. G. A. Pocock,
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 167;
McCoy, Elusive Republic, 67-68.
28 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of
the Wealth of Nations, 2 vols. Edwin Cannan, ed. (Chicago:
university of Chicago Press, 1976), 2:95.
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European economic policy which he labeled "mercantilism."
Mercantilism was not a set policy but rather a cluster of
accumulated

policies

and

assumptions

regarding

trade

and

national power. Mercantilism assumed that world politics was
a zero-sum game, which no nation could win without another
losing. Winning was defined as maintaining a favorable balance
of trade by hoarding and preventing the export of gold, by
preventing the export of raw materials such as wool that were
needed for domestic industry, and by encouraging exports and
discouraging

imports.

Colonies

in

the

mercantile

system

existed to serve the mother country by providing raw materials
and

an

exclusive

market

for

exports.29

Smith

attacked

mercantilism in each of its assumptions and argued that free
trade was a surer way to wealth. At a certain point the amount
of gold stockpiled would exceed demand,

Smith argued,

and

nothing could prevent its export. Similarly, taxes designed to
prevent importation were counterproductive. Smith criticized
the mercantile conception of empire and wrote that the expense
of defending colonies far outweighed the economic benefit of
their markets.30

The

British

national

debt,

incurred

in

defense of the colonies, which spawned the Stamp Act and the
Townshend Acts, proved Smith correct.
29 Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American
History, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19341938), 4:13-20, 323; Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest:
The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1970), 5-6, 48-49.
30 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1:457, 495, 2:180.
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Economic theory was a part of the broader mid-eighteenth
century inquiry into the nature of human society. Scottish
thinkers, such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith,
believed that human society passed through four stages —
hunting, pasturage, agriculture and commerce. At each stage,
virtue consisted in the full use of natural talents,

with

commerce as the highest and most virtuous stage of society.
David

Hume

argued

manufacturing,
happiness,
Competition

that

the

including

refinement
among

and

nations

development

luxury
the

goods,
spirit

improved

of

commerce

promoted
of

and

wealth,

improvement.31

societies

as

economic

competition improved individuals, Adam Ferguson argued in
1752.3^ The

Scottish

analysis

of

societal evolution

held

tremendous implications for American diplomacy, which centered
on trade. The nature of American contact with the world would
be in part determined by the nature of American society.
Political writers in the colonial era generally supposed
luxury to be incompatible with republicanism. They believed
with Montesquieu that "a soul depraved by luxury has many
other desires [than the public good] and soon becomes an enemy
to the

laws that confine

it."33 The central problem

for

31 David Hume, "Of Commerce," in Writings on Economics.
Eugene Rotwein, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1955), 13-14; McCoy, Elusive Republic, 19-30.
32 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society
[1767] (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1971), 36.
33 Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the
Laws, 2 vols. [1749]. Thomas Nugent, ed. and trans. (New
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Americans was at what stage did republican government become
viable. American agrarians such as Jefferson,

Madison and

Franklin believed that the third stage as the Common Sense
thinkers defined it was best suited to republicanism, and saw
extensive manufactures as a sign of old age and decay. The
mercantile system and the Navigation Acts were the devices by
which a dying system prolonged its life at the expense of a
younger and more vigorous society. Land was relatively widely
distributed in America, making manufacturing inappropriate.
The commerce of the new nation would be based on agricultural
exports.3^ Thomas Jefferson summed up the agrarian creed in
his Notes on the state of Virginia: "Those who labor in the
earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen
people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for
substantial

and

genuine

virtue.”

As

for

manufacturing,

Jefferson proposed to "let our work-shops remain in Europe."35
Of the three figures in this study, Madison took the greatest
interest in political economy and linked his diplomacy to the
preservation of a republican economy. John Adams and John
Quincy Adams, who were

not

primarily economic

thinkers,

accepted and encouraged manufactures and domestic shipping in
their diplomacy, whereas Madison did not.
York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949), 1:96.
3^ McCoy, Elusive Republic, 46-49, 56-60, 66-69, 107-110.
35 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia [17871.
William Peden, ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1955), 164-165.
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For a guide to British politics, Americans turned to the
writings of the English Opposition school, particularly those
of "Cato" and Bolingbroke, who led the literary opposition to
Robert Walpole. These writers provided Americans with their
basic understanding of the workings of British politics and
diplomacy.

"Cato” shared much with natural rights thinkers

such as John Locke, writing that men "are naturally equal, and
none ever rose above the rest but by Force or Covenant."
"Cato" used natural law to defend

balanced government and

attack Walpole for exceeding the natural bounds of executive
authority.36 The South Sea Company and the political machine
that Walpole built on its ruins were the symbols of all that
was wrong in British politics. To the opposition, the attempt
to create a tyranny at home through the use of executive
patronage and a standing army led Walpole into a diplomacy
that embraced tyranny abroad and sacrificed Great Britain's
national interests to France and Spain.37
The accession to the English throne of the Dutch prince,
William of Orange,

in

1689 completely reoriented English

36 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 34-36; Michael P. Zuckert,
Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1994), 299-301; John Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters: Or essays on Liberty,
Civil and Religious, and other important Subjects, 4 vols.
[1733] (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), #45 (Sept. 16,
1721) and #60 (Jan. 6, 1721/22), 2:85, 229.
37 Rodger D. Parker, "The Gospel of Opposition: A Study in
Eighteenth Century Anglo-American Ideology," 2 vols.
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State university,
1975), 1:41, 281-282.
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foreign policy. In the second half of the seventeenth century
England thrice fought the Dutch over commercial and colonial
issues. After 1689 England and the Netherlands were allies,
and England became the primary opponent of French hegemony on
the continent. William's accession brought England directly
into the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) against
France, and shortly afterward England fought the War of the
Spanish Succession (1702-1713) to prevent the union of the
French and Spanish crowns. The accession of the Hanoverian
King

George

I

in

1714

made

continental

entanglements

unavoidable. Robert Walpole spent most of his first decade as
prime minister engaged in continental politics, constructing
alliances with France and Prussia to protect Hanover. Fear of
war with Spain and Austria in 1729 prompted Walpole to raise
taxes, build an army and pay for German mercenaries, leaving
the

government open

to the

charge

that

it allowed the

Hanoverian tail to wag the British dog. The 1730s were by
comparison a quiet decade. Walpole realized that his political
system

depended

on

peace

and

sought

to

limit

European

commitments. Opposition figures, however, attacked Walpole's
passive policy as vigorously as his active policy. French
commerce in America boomed in the 1730s, especially with the
Newfoundland fisheries, allowing France to challenge Great
Britain as a naval power. Worse still, Walpole acquiesced in
the Spanish crackdown on British smuggling in the West Indies.
Parliamentary outrage allowed Walpole's opponents to force him
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into war against Spain, and eventually out of office.38
Opposition Whigs perceived Ruling Whig foreign policy as
the diplomatic side of the corruption they saw at work in
domestic politics. The satirist and Tory pamphleteer Jonathan
Swift sketched out the beginnings of the Opposition critique
of Ruling Whig foreign policy in his 1711 pamphlet The Conduct
of the Allies. Swift attacked the Marlborough ministry for
pursuing a backward strategy.
sacrificed men

The ministry,

Swift argued,

and money on a continental war,

when the

correct strategy was to focus on the navy. Great Britain had
conquered

German

provinces

on

behalf

of

Austria,

Swift

continued, while Austria was slow to move against France.
Swift

concluded

that

Great

Britain

could

not

depend

on

continental allies for its safety.38 The outbreak of war with
Spain in 1739 fully revealed what the Opposition considered
the proper strategy: emphasis on the navy and on the colonies,
with no continental engagements. Opposition thought accepted
the idea of a balance of power among nations but interpreted
38 Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of
Walpole (Edinburgh, Scotland: John Donald Publishers, Ltd.,
1985), 112; J.R. Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, Inc., 1980),
189-197; Paul Langford, The Eighteenth Century 1688-1815
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 18-19, 32-33, 89-103;
J.H. Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1950), 60; Arthur McCandless Wilson,
French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal
Fleury 1726-1743: A Study in Commercial Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), 291-294.
39 Jonathan Swift, "The Conduct of the Allies", in Political
Tracts, 1711-1713. Herbert Davis, ed. (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1951), 19, 38.
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it to mean among continental nations while Great Britain stood
apart. In this position, the Opposition recognized its debt to
Queen Elizabeth, who strengthened the navy and sent the "sea
dogs" to raid Spanish commerce. In focusing on a war in the
colonies, the Opposition owed an unacknowledged debt to Oliver
Cromwell's Western Design. Cromwell assumed that an attack on
the Spanish colonies and plate fleet in 1655 would pay for
itself.40 Eighty years later, the Opposition saw the colonial
trade, rather than the plate fleet, as the main objective in
the West Indies and the basis for British naval power. Naval
power avoided the need for a standing army and paid for itself
by

protecting

commerce,

thus

providing

revenue,

and was

therefore the means of defense most compatible with free
government.
Lord Bolingbroke was the Opposition figure most connected
with foreign policy. He began his political career in 1700 at
age twenty-one, when he became Member of Parliament for Wooten
Basset. Tory leader and secretary of state Robert Harley chose
Bolingbroke

as

secretary

of war

in

1702,

but

both were

replaced when Marlborough and the Whigs came to power. Harley
and Bolingbroke returned to office in 1710 with the express
purpose of ending British

involvement in the War of the

Spanish Succession. The Tories were satisfied with French
defeats in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands and feared the
40 Bernard Capp, Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet in the English
Revolution, 1648-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), 87, 96-97,
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war would produce a fiscal burden that would increase the
influence of the Bank of England. Bolingbroke completed this
task as the principal British negotiator of the 1713 Treaty of
Utrecht. Bolingbroke's career in public office ended with the
death

of

Queen Anne

in

1714.

He

opposed

the

Hanoverian

succession and joined the Pretender's forces in 1715.4*
Bolingbroke spent the last thirty-six years of his life
as a critic of the course of British politics, producing a
body of work that John Adams began reading in the 1750s and
had read through five times by

1813.

Bolingbroke saw the

Glorious Revolution as the founding moment in modern English
history,

"a new Magna Charta" and a triumph over parties.

Parties soon re-emerged in English politics and according to
Bolingbroke

fell

into

three

groups:

opponents

of

the

government, opponents of the constitution, and opponents of
the constitution who supported the government. The third group
was

the

most

dangerous,

Bolingbroke

believed,

and

was

responsible for public debts and taxes that degraded the
nation's spirit and morals and threatened the independence of
Parliament, which Bolingbroke considered the "key-stone of
liberty. 1,4^
41 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and Bis Circle, 8-13.
42 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 25, 1813, in Lester
J. Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 410.
42 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, A Dissertation on
Parties: In Several Letters to Caleb D rAnvers, 9th ed.
(London: T. Davies, 1771), 10-12, 102-103, 137-139, 151,
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Bolingbroke

saw the

same spirit that

unbalanced the

constitution undermining British foreign policy as well. He
equated a belief in a balanced constitution with advocacy of
a balance of power among nations. Isaac Kramnick labels this
view realpolitik devoid of any other considerations.44 On the
contrary, Bolingbroke always based his view of the balance of
power on its relationship to balanced government at home. In
his

opinion,

the

safest

position

for

Great

politically, economically and diplomatically —

Britain

—

was to remain

apart from the alignments that formed the European balance.
Unlike

Walpole,

who

kept

a

hand

in

European

politics,

Bolingbroke believed that the European balance would take care
of

itself.

"Great

Britain,"

Bolingbroke

wrote

in

A

Dissertation on Parties, "should maintain such a dignity and
prudent

reserve

in

the

broils

of

Europe,

as become

her

situation, suit her interest, and alone can enable her to cast
the balance." in Letters on the Study and Use of History,
Bolingbroke criticized the "rage of warring," which created an
oppressive system of taxation, and the "rage of negotiating,"
which preserved it. Bolingbroke argued that Great Britain
"inhabits an island"

and was a neighbor to the continent

rather than a part of it.4-5 Such an isolation from European
298; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 26-28.
44 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 184-185; Parker,
"Gospel of Opposition," 1:270.
45 Richard Pares, "American versus Continental Warfare,
1739-1763." English Historical Review, Vol. 51 no. 204 (July
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involvement, he declared, would allow Parliament to "take all
Opportunities, by saving unnecessary Expenses, to pay off our
Debts, and ease the People of their taxes," cutting out the
roots of the Walpolean system.4^
Bolingbroke counted on trade to give Great Britain the
power to act as arbiter of the European balance of power. By
the early eighteenth century Great Britain began following a
Dutch economic model that focused on trade and shipping rather
than solely on production. "It is not the extent of territory
that

makes

a

country

powerful,"

the

English

political

economist Charles Davenant had written in 1699," but numbers
of men well employed, a good navy, and a soil producing all
sort

of

commodities."47

Bolingbroke,

like

later

Scottish

political economists such as Smith and Hume, linked trade with
freedom and wrote that British wealth depended on trade. The
most important facet of British trade was with the American

1936), 436-440; Bolingbroke, Dissertation on Parties, 14-15;
Henry St. John, viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study
and Use of History, 2 vols. [1752] (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1970), 2: 167, 169-170.
4^ Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Contributions to
the "C r a f t s m a n Simon Varey, ed. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1982), #511 (April 17, 1736), 206-207.
47 Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in
Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1978), 78-79; Charles Davenant, "An Essay
upon the Probable Methods of Making a People Gainers in the
Balance of Trade," in The Political and Commercial fforks of
that Celebrated Writer Charles D'Avenant, LL.D., 5 vols.
(London: R. Horsman, 1771), 2:192-193.
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colonies.40 Trade had its political uses. Bolingbroke inserted
an

Anglo-French

commercial

agreement

into

the

treaty

of

Utrecht, hoping that the promise of reciprocal trade would
gain a French alliance against Austria.

Parliament feared

French competition and rejected Bolingbroke's articles.49 The
navy was the foreign policy tool best suited to protecting
trade without risking British liberties. The army, Bolingbroke
and other opposition writers believed,

was a vehicle

for

tyranny and, if foreign policy was conducted correctly, an
unneeded expense.

"The sea is our barrier,

ships are our

fortresses," Bolingbroke wrote, "and the navies that trade and
commerce alone furnish, are the garrisons to defend them."50
Bolingbroke

tied

together

his

ideas

on

foreign

and

domestic policy in The Idea of a Patriot King, published in
1749.

Bolingbroke

had

largely

given

up

the

hope

that

Parliament would reform itself, virtue was not impossible to
achieve,
climb,

Bolingbroke believed,
and

the

way

of

but it was a slow,

corruption

was

much

uphill

easier.5*

48 "Craftsman" #114 (September 7, 1728), in Bolingbroke,
Contributions, 54, 64-65.
49 Jones, Britain and the World, 174-176; Charles Jenkinson,
Earl of Liverpool, A Collection of all the treaties of
Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other
Powers, 3 vols. [1785] (New York: August M. Kelley, 1969),
2:5-144 (whole treaty), 2:40-65 (Anglo-French articles).
50 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Idea of a
Patriot King [1749]. Sydney W. Jackman, ed. (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 65.
51 Parker, "Gospel of Opposition," 1:269-270; Bolingbroke,
Patriot King, 6.
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Bolingbroke struck a modern note regarding the presence of
political parties and factions in societies. "Thus factions
are in them, what nations are in the world; they invade and
rob one another: and, while each pursues a separate interest,
the common interest is sacrificed by all: that of mankind in
one case, that of some particular community in the other," he
wrote. "This has been, and must always be, in some measure,
the course of human affairs, especially in free countries,
where the passions of men are less restrained by authority.
The solution to factionalism and corruption was the rise
of a charismatic leader whom Bolingbroke called the Patriot
King, without whom the "way of salvation will not be open to
u

s

.

«53 T^e patriot King would defeat factions by transcending

them and by drawing the nation to the example of virtue. "As
soon as corruption ceases to be an expedient of government,
and it will cease to be such as soon as a Patriot King is
raised to the throne, the panacea is applied," Bolingbroke
wrote. "A Patriot King is the most powerful of all reformers;
for he is himself a sort of standing miracle," Bolingbroke
continued, "so rarely seen and so little understood, that the
sure effects of his appearance will be admiration and love in
every honest breast, confusion and terror to every guilty
conscience, but submission and resignation in all." "A new
people will seem to arise with the new king," Bolingbroke
Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 62.
53 Ibid., 7.
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believed.54 The Patriot King may favor one faction or another,
as the situation dictated,

"but he will espouse none, much

less will he proscribe any."55 Regarding specific policies,
the Patriot King "will not multiply taxes wantonly, nor keep
up those unnecessarily which necessity has laid, that he may
keep up legions of tax gatherers."5®
After the American Revolution, George Washington was the
closest equivalent to a Patriot King in American politics.
Bolingbroke's model for the Patriot King was Queen Elizabeth,
who "united the great body of the people in her and their
common interest, she inflamed them with one national spirit:
and,

thus armed,

she maintained tranquility at home,

carried succor to her friends

and

and

terror to her enemies

abroad."57 Bolingbroke credited Elizabeth with encouraging
English trade and giving "rapid motion to our whole mercantile
system";

he

attacked

James

I

for

squandering

England's

advantages.58 Elizabeth's reign offered further proof that
England was easily defended under the right monarch. As an
island, England had no powerful neighbors and did not have to
undertake continental engagements. Elizabeth recognized that
England was first and foremost a maritime power and cultivated
54 Ibid., 39; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 167-168.
55 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 52-53.
56 Ibid., 67-68.
57 Ibid., 62; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 33-34.
58 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 66-67.
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naval

power.

character.

She

"Like

knew
other

that

England

amphibious

had

an

amphibious

we

must

animals,

come

occasionally on shore; but the water is more properly our
element,

and

in

so

we

security,

it,

like them,

exact

our

as we

greatest

find our
force,"

greatest

Bolingbroke

wrote. 69
John Trenchard,

the senior author of Cato's Letters,

agreed with Bolingbroke that Elizabeth's reign was a golden
age. In his 1698 work A Short History of Standing Armies in
England, Trenchard contrasted the glory of Elizabeth with the
folly of James I, who soon blundered away most of Elizabeth's
gains.60 In Cato's Letters,

which ran from 1720 to

1723,

Trenchard and Gordon shared much with Bolingbroke. Like the
younger Bolingbroke, "Cato" saw a reformed Parliament as the
foundation

of

British

liberty.

In

Letter

#70

"Cato"

recommended the election of legislators "who are not already
pre-ingaged,

nor,

from

their

Circumstances,

Education,

Profession or Manner of Life are likely to be engaged, in a
contrary interest."61

"Cato"

did not last long enough to

become as disillusioned as Bolingbroke. Cato's Letters ended
with Trenchard's death in 1723, and Gordon later became one of

59 Ibid., 68-70.
60 John Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in
England (London, 1698), 3-4.
61 Letter #70 (March 17, 1721/22), in Cato's Letters, 3:1516; Parker, "Gospel of Opposition," 1:55-56.
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Walpole's propagandists.62
"Cato" fully agreed with Bolingbroke's view of foreign
policy, fearful of continental alliances and standing armies,
favoring trade and the navy. "What did England gain formerly
by their Conquests upon the Continent,
Slaughter and Poverty to themselves,

but constant Wars,

and to their Princes

precarious foreign Provinces at English Expense," Trenchard
and Gordon wrote in Letter #93, reflecting on recent British
experience in continental politics. Conquests bred armies,
"Cato" wrote in Letter #95, and "all the Parts of Europe which
are enslaved, have been enslaved by Armies."*’3
The navy was the proper weapon of a free people.
Letter #64 "Cato" argued that "despotick Monarchs,

In

though

infinitely powerful at Land yet could never rival Neptune, and
extend their empire over the Liquid World."6^ "Cato" drew a
direct

equation

between

freedom,

trade

and

naval

power.

Merchants naturally sought out free countries as trade "cannot
long subsist, much less flourish, in Arbitrary Governments."
Trade was the foundation of naval power, both as a training
ground for seamen and as a source of customs revenue. Commerce
had the added virtue of giving employment to those who might
become troublesome at home.65 Like Bolingbroke,

"Cato" gave

62 Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 118.
63 Letter #93 (September 8, 1722); Letter #95 (September 22,
1722), in Cato's Letters, 3:229, 251.
6^ Letter #64 (February 3, 1721/22), ibid., 2:274.
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the colonial trade a high priority, arguing in Letter #106
that, "our Northern Colonies do, or may if encouraged, supply
us most or all of the Materials of Navigation

. . . which

Management would soon make us Masters of most of the Trade of
the World."®6
The implication of Opposition thought on military and
diplomatic affairs was that Great Britain, separated from the
continent, had the best chance at freedom. The Netherlands had
escaped the fate of the rest of Europe but were constantly at
risk. "Almost all Europe are Witnesses of the brutish Havock
which the Conquerers make, and of the dismal Scenes of Ruin
that they leave behind them," wrote "Cato" in letter #93.67
The equation between isolation and liberty passed whole into
American thought. Thomas Paine recognized Britain's unique
place in Common Sense when he wrote that "Freedom hath been
hunted round the globe." "Asia, and Africa, have long expelled
her," Paine continued, "Europe regards her like a stranger,
and England hath given her warning to depart."66 Even though
England had turned against liberty, liberty had survived there
longer than anywhere else. Separation from European politics
was

at the center of John Adams's Model Treaty.

Madison

specifically compared the United States' physical situation to
65 Letter #64 (February 3, 1721/22), ibid., 2:271-272.
66 Letter #106 (December 8, 1722), ibid., 4:6.
67 Letter #93 (September 8, 1722), ibid., 3:231.
66 Paine, Common Sense, 100.
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Britain's

in

Federalist

#41.

John

Quincy

Adams,

in

his

contribution to the Monroe Doctrine, sought to codify and make
permanent that separation.
James Burgh (1714-1775) echoed many Opposition themes in
his

book Political Disquisitions: An Enquiry into Public

Errors, Defects and Abuses (1774-1775). Burgh also served as
a direct link between Opposition thought and its American
adherents,

personally

sending

a

copy

of

Political

Disquisitions to John Adams, who called the book "the best
Service, that a Citizen, could render to his Country."^ To
Burgh, the standing army was the ultimate tool of oppression.
"No nation ever kept up an army in times of peace, which did
not lose its liberties," Burgh wrote. Englishmen need look no
further than Cromwell, Burgh continued, for proof "that a man
of courage backed by an army, is capable of any thing."70
Burgh summed up Opposition military thought in Book Three: "A
Militia with the Navy, [is] the only proper Security of a free
people in an insular Situation, both against foreign invasion
and domestic Tyranny."71 Like Bolingbroke and "Cato," Burgh
emphasized the colonial contribution to British power. Burgh
^ Robbins, Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen, 364-365;
John Adams to James Burgh, December 28, 1774, in The Papers
of John Adams, 8 vols. to date. Robert J. Taylor, et al..
eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 2:205.
70 James Burgh, Political Disquisitions: An Enquiry into
Public Errors, Defects and Abuses, 3 vols [1774-1775] (New
York: Da Capo Press, 1971), 2:349, 379.
71 Ibid., 2:389.
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argued that the colonies consumed the most British-made goods
and were a general national benefit.72
Opposition

foreign

policy,

emphasizing

colonies

and

commerce over continental objects, enjoyed a brief and partial
ascendancy during the Seven Years' War under William Pitt.
Pitt's career as a symbol of reform and patriotism began in
1734,

ironically as

the

member

for Old

Sarum,

the most

notorious of Great Britain's rotten boroughs. Pitt soon joined
the Patriot group, which was influenced by Bolingbroke and
formed the parliamentary opposition to Walpole, particularly
to Walpole's Spanish policy. Pitt cemented his reputation as
a disinterested patriot in 1746 when he refused to use his
office as Paymaster of the Army

as a vehicle for personal

profit, contrary to accepted practice.73
Throughout his career Pitt

showed little

regard

for

Hanoverian interests and much regard for colonies and maritime
supremacy.

His appointment as secretary of state for the

southern department, covering France, Spain, and the colonies,
made him responsible for the main theaters of the Seven Years'
War and forced a partial shift in his opinion. Even though
obliged to protect Hanover, Pitt reversed the British strategy

72 Ibid., 2:281-290.
73 Peter Douglas Brown, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham: the
Great Commoner (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1978),
33, 46-47, 61, 79-80; Carol Lynn Holmsky Knight, "The
Political Image of William Pitt, First Earl of Chatham, in
the American Colonial Press, 1756-1778" (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1973), 41-42.
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of the War of the Austrian Succession by putting continental
strategy in the service of his American strategy, rather than
using

the

colonies

as

bargaining

chips

over

European

objectives. Pitt sent troops to Hanover and subsidized Prussia
to tie France down and prevent it from mounting an effective
counteroffensive in America. Pitt's policy bore fruit with the
fall of Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759, leading Pitt to
proclaim in 1761 that "America had been conquered in Germany."
In America, Pitt was a hero because he was the first high
official who gave primacy to colonial interests.74 Pitt soon
ran into conflict with the new King George

III and his

favorites, who feared pushing France too hard would bring
Spain into the war. By April 1761, Pitt was committed to
holding all of the newly-won American territories and pushing
on to absolute victory over the Bourbon powers. Faced with
stiff opposition in the cabinet, Pitt resigned in October
1761. The colonial press generally sided with Pitt.75
To

many

British

and

American

commentators,

British

foreign policy in the post-Pitt era sank back into a Walpolean
pattern of meekness in the face of Spanish and French action.
The Royal Navy captured the Philippines in October 1762 and
74 Stanley Ayling, The Elder Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London,
Collins, 1976), 197-198, 230-231; Knight, "Political Image
of William Pitt," 68-72; Richard Middleton, The Bells of
Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the
Seven Years' War, 1757-1762 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 10-11, 148.
75 Knight, "Political Image of William Pitt," 88; Middleton,
Bells of Victory, 184, 196-198.
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accepted the Spanish governor's offer of four million Spanish
dollars not to sack Manila. The Manila Ransom, as it became
known, was never paid,
Anglo-Spanish
Fran^ois,

and remained a stumbling block in

relations. French Foreign Minister Etienne-

due de Choiseul offered mediation in 1765.

The

British government refused but also consistently lowered its
monetary demands. The Manila Ransom merged with the Falkland
Islands controversy. In 1766 Great Britain established a post
at Port

Egmont on West

Falkland,

which

Spain protested.

Choiseul again offered mediation of the Manila Ransom if Great
Britain withdrew from the Falklands. British hesitancy to go
to war encouraged Choiseul to press the Spanish case and may
have encouraged Spain's abortive attack on Port Egmont in
1770.76
Choiseul
interests

also

saw

the

opportunity

to

boost

French

in the Mediterranean by taking Corsica.

France

purchased the island from the Republic of Genoa on May 15,
1768, without consulting either the Corsican people or their
leader, Pasquale Paoli. Popular British sentiment, encouraged
by the author James Boswell, who publicized the Corsican
cause,

supported Paoli,

and Paoli himself actively sought

British help. Lord Shelburne concluded that Corsica was not a
vital British interest and stood by as France completed its
conquest in 1769. Not only had Shelburne sacrificed Great
7® H. M. Scott, British Foreign Policy in the Age of the
American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), 91-94, 104-107, 141-146.
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Britain's strategic position and continental reputation, he
also appeared to let a free people be absorbed by the ancient
symbol of absolute monarchy.77
British policy toward Corsica was complicated by the
domestic

political

situation

caused

by

the

John

Wilkes

controversy. Wilkes was the publisher of the Pittite journal
North Briton and was prosecuted for seditious libel over #45,
which

attacked the

1763

Treaty of Paris

and accused the

ministry of having the king lie when the king stated the
treaty was beneficial to Great Britain. The government issued
a warrant for Wilkes's arrest, even though he was a member of
Parliament and therefore immune from arrest in most cases,
including seditious libel. Wilkes's expulsion from the House
of Commons in 1764 removed his immunity, and Wilkes fled to
Paris. He returned in 1768 seeking a pardon that was not
granted. Wilkes was elected an alderman in London and was
returned as member for Middlesex in two by-elections. The
House of Commons refused to seat him both times. By 1769,
Wilkes became a cause celebre and a champion for parliamentary
reformers.78
Opposition thought drew no distinction between foreign
and domestic policy. Americans who absorbed that thought also
77 Ibid., 115-122; Thadd E. Hall, France and the EighteenthCentury Corsican Question (New Yorks New York University
Press, 1971), 206.
7ft

Ian R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain, 1760-1815
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 63-66,
75-78.
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saw British foreign, domestic, and colonial policy as a single
broad-gauged plot against liberty. The Sons of Liberty in the
northern colonies saw Paoli as a hero, and John Hancock named
one of his ships after the Corsican. Benjamin Franklin linked
American and Corsican liberty and saw the Townshend Acts and
the French conquest of Corsica as a "horrid Spectacle to Men
and Angels."79 The American resistance championed Wilkes's
cause with equal fervor as their own, and Wilkes returned the
favor. Arthur Lee,

a Virginia doctor and future diplomat,

lived in London in the 1760s and worked closely with Wilkes.
Lee was ultimately disappointed that more Englishmen did not
see their liberty linked to colonial liberty. Wilkes was a
hero to American radicals, who saw him as fighting for their
cause in Great Britain.80
Americans believed the spirit that produced the Wilkes
persecution,

a

spirit of opposition

to

liberty,

was

the

determining factor in colonial policy as well. The Stamp Act
and Townshend Duties themselves were nothing short of an

79 George P. Anderson, "Pasqual Paoli, an Inspiration to the
Sons of Liberty," Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts, Vol. 26 (1927), 182, 200; Pauline Maier, From
Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the
Development of American Opposition to Great Britain, 17651776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 180-182; Benjamin
Franklin, "A Horrid Spectacle to Men and Angels," in The
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 30 vols. to date. Leonard W.
Labaree, William B. Wilcox, Claude A. Lopez, et al, eds.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 16:18-19.
80 Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 162-165, 199-200; Louis
W. Potts, Arthur Lee: A Virtuous Revolutionary (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 59-65.
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attempt to create a Walpolean fiscal machine in America. The
army sent to America, which many feared would be quartered in
American homes, provided a variety of constitutional horrors
and completed the Walpolean machine. Americans well read in
the Real Whig works believed that an army designed to combat
a foreign adversary (in this case the Indians on the western
frontier) would inevitably be turned against domestic liberty.
The Boston Massacre in 1770 confirmed fears of such British
intentions. 81
Opposition writers taught the colonists to oppose the new
Parliamentary actions and, without directly recommending a
course of action, suggested a power Americans might possess,
inasmuch as Bolingbroke, "Cato” and other writers emphasized
the colonial contribution to British power. The colonists
hoped

to force repeal

of

the Stamp Act by exploiting

a

supposed British dependence on American markets through non
importation.

Non-importation

seemed to solve a number of

constitutional problems. It allowed Americans to strike a
significant blow without committing treason. Also, conspicuous
non-consumption increased the Americans' sense of their own
superior virtue. The success of the resistance in securing the
repeal of the Stamp Act convinced many American leaders that
8* Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 99-102; Richard H. Kohn,
Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the
Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: The
Free Press, 1975), 2-6; John W. Shy, Toward Lexington: The
Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American
Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1965), 140-143, 376, 380-381.
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the colonies were the linchpin of the empire. By the eve of
the Revolution, some Americans saw all British regulations as
attempts to stunt American growth.
calling
outbreak

for

complete

free

trade

Boston merchants began

by

1772,

and

after

the

of war American writers lumped the Navigation Acts

with all other forms of British taxation.82
Non-importation was not the cure-all that many Americans
believed it to be. The idea of American taxation, if not the
exact form,

was widely accepted in British politics. The

British merchants who traded with America were too few in
number to form an effective lobby. Caution by merchants on
both sides of the Atlantic assured that non-importation would
be less effective against the Townshend Duties. In 1775 non
importation

failed

to

prevent

armed

conflict.88

However,

82 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Fall of
the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American
Independence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982), 56-57; John E. Crowley, This Sheba, SELF: The
Conceptualization of Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century
America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1974), 127-131; John W. Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots:
Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 22-23, 172;
Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 137-138; McCoy, Elusive
Republic, 94-95.
83 Tucker and Hendrickson, Fall of the First British Empire,
50-56; Kammen, Empire and Interest, 129; Robert Middlekauff,
The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 153-154; P. D. G.
Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First
Phase of the American Revolution, 1763-1767 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1975), 31-32; Jack M. Sosin, Agents and
Merchants: British Colonial Policy and the Origins of the
American Revolution, 1763-1775 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1965), 89.
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Americans

continued

to believe

for

a half-

century

that

commerce could secure American goals without recourse to large
military establishments.

Most saw commercial diplomacy as

particularly suited to republican government. Trade was not
just a lure, as Bolingbroke depicted it, but the ultimate
weapon. Americans held the upper hand, Thomas Paine wrote,
"while eating is the custom of Europe."84
A commitment to republican government shaped the way
Americans viewed the world, and consequently the course of
American foreign policy. When the Continental Congress took up
the question of foreign policy in 1775, its members looked to
the political thought and experience that had led them to
rebellion

for

guidance.

Over

the

next

75 years

changing

circumstances and differing experiences led John Adams, James
Madison
questions

and

John

Quincy

concerning

the

Adams

to

different

relationship

between

answers

republican

government and foreign policy.

04

to

Paine, Common Sense, 83.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DIPLOMACY OF INDEPENDENCE

If the elderly John Adams is to be believed, it would
appear that he always believed in the first rule of republican
diplomacy, that American liberty depended on a physical and
political separation from Europe. Adams remembered listening
to his father discuss the return of Louisbourg to France in
1748, from which Adams "received very grievous impressions of
the injustice and ingratitude of Great Britain towards New
England." British military failure in the Seven Years' War
convinced Adams "that we could defend ourselves against the
French, and manage our affairs better without, than with, the
English."^-

Adams's youth and early adulthood were shaped by

his early exposure to foreign relations through his reading of
the republican texts, both classical and whig, and through the
events of his

day.

From English Opposition thought Adams

learned that liberty at home and independence abroad depended
on a balance of power among branches of government and among
nations.

Furthermore,

separation

from

Europe

could

be

maintained only by means compatible with a limited government,
specifically a navy. Adams's experience in politics before the

1 John Adams to Skelton Jones, March 11, 1809, in WJA,
9:611-612.
i2
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American Revolution taught him that, in the absence of a navy,
economic

power

could

secureAmerican

diplomatic

goals.

Resistance to British taxation convinced Adams that Americans
were an especially virtuous people and could expect a quick
triumph over a corrupt Britain. Adams's diplomacy during the
American Revolution combined these elements of republican
theory.
Adams's diary and autobiography reveal a mind steeped in
the classics of English Opposition thought. "I carried with me
to Worcester, Lord Bolingbroke's Study and Use of History, and
his Patriot King,” Adams later recalled.2 Adams recorded in
his diary that he spent much time reading not only Bolingbroke
but also

Cato's Letters,

and

Montesquieu's

Spirit of the

Laws.3 These authors taught Adams that the central question of
politics was the distribution of power. Power was a natural
and necessary element in society, but it was too dangerous to
be left uncontrolled. To maintain liberty, both within a state
and among nations,
possible,

so that

power must be dispersed

as widely as

no one received an overly large share.For

Adams, power was the ability

to control others. Power was

necessarily aggressive and expansive, and it gained at the

2 "Autobiography," in John Adams, Diary and Autobiography of
John Adams, 4 vols. L.H. Butterfield, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1961), 3:264.
3 Diary entries for Jan. 16, Feb. 15 and July 19, 1756 and
June 26-27, 1760, ibid., 1:2, 35, 40, 142-143.
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expense of liberty and right.4 In A Dissertation on the Canon
and Feudal Law, Adams described power as the "Desire for
Dominion,

that

encroaching,

grasping,

restless,

and

ungovernable Principle in human Nature, that Principle which
has made so much Havock and Desolation."5 "No simple Form of
Government, can possibly secure Men against the Violence of
Power," Adams wrote in a 1763 essay.®
Only a balanced government could contain power, but Adams
believed
balanced.^

that

a

"The

republic

must

Preservation

of

be

virtuous

Liberty

as

well

as

on

the

depends

intellectual and Moral Character of the People," Adams wrote
in his notes for a speech in March 1772. "As long as Knowledge
and virtue are diffused generally among the Body of a Nation,
it is impossible they should be enslaved."® A people that
remained virtuous and vigilant kept its liberty. Americans
generally praised the British constitution for its ability to
balance the forces of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy,
represented by the crown, lords and commons. However, by

the

4 Wood, Creation, 21-22; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 55-59.
5 John Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,"
February 1765, in DAJA, 1:255-256.
® John Adams, "An Essay on Men's Lust for Power," post Aug.
29, 1763, in PJA, 1:83.
^ Peter Shaw, The Character of John Adams (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 92; John R. Howe,
Jr., The Changing Political Thought of John Adams
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 88.
8 Notes for an oration at Braintree, March 1772, in DAJA,
2:58.
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1760s it seemed that the British had lost their virtue. The
degradation of the British people allowed the crown to grow
too powerful and corrupt Parliament, disturbing the balance of
power. Drawing on classical history, Americans noted that in
Greece and Rome the loss of freedom followed the loss of
virtue.9
British
power,

corruption

and

British

jealousy

of

American

for Adams, were the foundations of colonial policy

after 1763. According to legend, the pilgrims carved the poem,
"The eastern nations sink, their glory ends/ An empire rises
where the sun descends,” on Plymouth Rock. Adams believed the
sentiment,
Benjamin

if not the legend.*® He had accepted the theory
Franklin

put

forth

in

1754,

that

the

American

population would double every twenty years. The next year he
observed that Rome and Great Britain rose to power from humble
origins, and speculated that "the great seat of Empire" might
cross the Atlantic to America.

"For if we can remove the

turbulent Gallicks, our own people according to the exactest
computations, will in another Century, become more numerous
that England itself," Adams wrote. "Should this be the Case,
9 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 65-77; Wood, Creation, 52; H.
Trevor Colboum, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and
the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 25.
*° James H. Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the
American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1980), 1-8; John Adams to Benjamin Rush, May 23,
1807, in Alexander Biddle, ed. Old Family Letters: Copied
from the Originals for Alexander Biddle (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippencott and Company, 1892), 143.
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since we have (I may say) all the naval stores of the Nation
in our hands it will be easy to obtain mastery of the seas,
and then the united force of all Europe will not be able to
subdue us."11
Great Britain would not permit American power to match
its own. In 1774 Adams wondered how to date the history of the
conflict

between

Great

Britain

and

the

colonies.

After

considering various events such as the accession of George III
and the administration of Governor Francis Bernard, Adams
concluded that the conflict began with the American articles
of the

1763

Treaty of Paris

—

"The Cession

of Canada,

Louisiana, and Florida to the E n g l i s h . " More specifically,
the fall of Canada led the British government, like Cronos, to
devour its young to maintain power. "Suffice to it say, that
immediately upon the Conquest of Canada from the French in the
year 1759, Great Britain seemed to be seized with a jealousy
against

the

colonies,"

Adams

wrote

in

1780,

using

an

Opposition Whig framework of analysis, "and then concerted the
plan of changing their forms of government, of restraining
their trade within narrower bounds,

and raising a revenue

within them by authority of parliament,
pretended

H

purpose

of

protecting,

for the avowed or

securing

and

defending

John Adams to Nathan Webb, Oct. 12, 1755, in PJA, 1:5.

12 Diary entry, March 31, 1774, in DAJA, 2:95.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48
13

them."-LJ American liberty depended on both a constitutional
and

an

international

balance

of

power.

The

Congress sought to redress the international

Continental
(or at least

transatlantic) balance of power through the use of American
trade and the conquest of Canada.
John Adams shared the common belief that through the use
of trade, denying it to Great Britain and offering it to the
rest of the world, Americans could manipulate the European
balance of power and achieve their diplomatic goals without
submission to any power and without involving themselves in
European politics. On September 30,

1774, the Continental

Congress approved a Continental Association that banned the
importation of British and Irish goods after December 1, 1774,
and banned exports to Great Britain, Ireland and the British
West Indies as of September 10, 1775.14 At heart Adams was a
free trader. "I am against all shackles upon Trade,” he wrote
to James Warren in 1777. "Let the Spirit of the People have
its own Way, and it will do something."15 Adams feared that
non-exportation would hurt America more than Great Britain.16

13 John Adams to Hendrik Calkoen, Oct. 4, 1780, in WJA,
7:266.
14 Gerard Clarfield, "John Adams: The Marketplace and
Foreign Policy." New England Quarterly, Vol. 52 no. 3
(September 1979), 348-350; Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of
National Politics: An Interpretive History of the
Continental Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 49.
15 John Adams to James Warren, April 6, 1777, in PJA, 5:145.
16 John Adams to James Warren, July 17, 1774, ibid., 2:110.
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"Can the Inhabitants of North America live without foreign
trade?" he asked.*7 Adams did recognize that commerce was the
only real weapon America had, and in October of 1775 he called
the

non-importation

and

non-exportation

agreements

a

"formidable Shield of Defense."*®
"The Battle of Lexington on the 19th of April, changed
the Instruments of Warfare from the Penn to the Sword," Adams
wrote in his autobiography.19 To secure continental union,
Congress authorized an attack on Canada. The Canada expedition
falls into a gray area between military and foreign policy.
Radicals in Congress saw the Canadians as fellow victims of
British oppression, theoretically no different from residents
of Massachusetts. Partially at John Adams's insistence, the
congressional committee that drafted a list of grievances
cited

the

Quebec

Act,

"establishing

the

Roman

Catholick

Religion in the Province of Quebec, abolishing the equitable
system of English laws, and erecting a tyranny there."20 In
his own notes Adams described the Quebec Act as "Danger to us
all. An House on fire."2* In practice, the invasion was a

*7 John Adams to James Warren, Oct. 20, 1775, ibid., 3:216.
*® John Adams to James Warren, Oct. 28, 1775, ibid., 3:254255.
*9 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:314.
20 H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental
Congress (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1974), 40-41;
List of Grievances, Oct. 14, 1774, in PJA, 2:162.
21 Notes of Debates, Oct. 17?, 1774, in DAJA, 2:154.
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measure of foreign policy. Unlike Massachusetts, Canada did
not

ask the

Continental Army to

come to

its aid.

Also,

Congress eventually sent a special delegation to sway the
Canadian people, a measure not used to bring in any of the
thirteen colonies.
Adams fully supported the 1775 invasion of Canada, writing
in

his

autobiography

that,

being

a

member

of

several

committees related to the invasion, he was "wholly occupied"
by

its

conduct.22 Adams

emphasized

strategic

as well

as

ideological reasons for taking Canada. For 150 years, New
France had been a dagger aimed at New England. Adams fully
expected Great Britain to use Canada the same way. "In the
Hands of our

Enemies

it

[Canada]

would enable them

[the

British] to influence all the Indians upon the Continent to
take up the Hatchet," Adams warned James Warren, "and commit
their Robberies and Murder upon the Frontiers of all the
Southern Colonies as well as pour down Regulars Canadians and
Indians together upon the borders of the Northern."23
Two different and uncoordinated American forces attacked
Canada

in

Schuyler

1775.
to

In July Congress

invest

Fort

ordered General

Ticonderoga

and

Philip

eventually

take

Montreal. Schuyler linked up with General Richard Montgomery
at Lake Champlain in September. General George Washington, on
his own accord,

sent a force through Maine under Colonel

22 DAJA, 3:327.
23 John Adams to James Warren, Feb. 18, 1776, in PJA, 4:28.
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Benedict Arnold. Montgomery captured Montreal in November and
met Arnold twenty miles from Quebec on December 2. Although
short on supplies,

the Americans attacked on December 30,

hoping to take Quebec before losing Arnold's troops, who were
due to go home the next day. The attack failed, with General
Montgomery among the dead.
In planning the invasion, Congress operated under the
fatal assumption that no one would live under the French
system of government if given a choice. Congress sent its
"Letter Addressed to the

Inhabitants

of

the Province

of

Quebec" in 1774, which praised representative government and
denounced the Quebec Act as a violation of the rights of
Englishmen.^5

The

French

Canadians

held

the

opposite

assumption, that the Quebec Act was a genuine attempt by Great
Britain to accommodate the new province. Even if the French
Canadians had not completely embraced their new rulers by 1774
(attempts to raise French-speaking royal regiments generally
failed), they could not forget that their supposed liberators,
mainly New Englanders, represented the most virulent strain of
anti-Catholicism in the British colonies. The siegneurs, the
feudal landholding class, rallied behind the British governor,
and enough habitants followed to insure that Canada would

24 Higginbotham, War for Independence, 109-114.
25 Gustave Lanctot, Canada and the American Revolution 17741783. Margaret M. Cameron, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1967), 27-28, 247-256.
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remain British.26
Adams shared Congress's assumptions, and in February of
1776, he proposed a commission be sent to Canada. Congress
selected Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase of Maryland, who had
supported the invasion, and two Catholics, Charles Carroll of
Carrollton, a member of the Maryland safety committee, and his
cousin

John

Carroll,

a Jesuit priest.27 Adams

served

as

chairman of the committee drafting instructions, completing
his work on March 20, 1776. Adams took great pains to show
that

French

Catholics

would

be welcome

in a union

with

American Protestants. "You are to . . . declare, that we hold
sacred

the

rights of conscience,"

Adams wrote,

"and may

promise the whole people, solemnly in our name, the free and
unfettered exercise of their religion; and to the clergy, the
full, perfect, and peaceable possession and enjoyment of all
their estates."2®
Even a well-chosen commission bearing a carefully worded
message of friendship could not convince the French Canadians
that the Americans who had vilified them so long and so
recently were now their protectors. Upon reaching Canada, the
commissioners

realized that the political mission was

as

26 Sir Reginald Coupland, The Quebec Act: A Study in
Statesmanship (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 123124, 165-168.
27 Thomas O'Brien Hanley, Revolutionary Statesman: Charles
Carroll and the War (Chicago: Loyola University Press,
1983), 101-103, 109.
28 Instructions of March 20, 1776, in PJA, 4:8.
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hopeless as the military effort had been. Franklin noted that
the French Catholics were hostile to America and that at least
half of the English Canadians were Loyalists. Franklin saw no
reason to continue the mission and left Canada on May ll.2^
Before he left, the commissioners reported to Congress that
"it would be advisable, in our opinion, to withdraw

our army

and fortify the passes on the lakes to prevent the enemy, and
the Canadians, if so inclined, from making irruptions into and
depredations on our f r o n t i e r s .

Charles Carroll wrote in his

journal of the "bad prospect of our affairs in Canada."31
Congress learned of the failure of the Canadian mission in
June.

Adams

indecision,
situation,
death,

and

blamed

the

loss

of

Canada

on

congressional

lack of information on the Canadian political
lack of a competent general after Montgomery's
a

general

lack

of

supplies,

money,

men

and

medicine.32
As the Continental Congress

learned of the military

failure in Canada, it was beginning to consider what Adams
later called "three Measures, Independence, Confederation and

2® Carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (New Yorks The Viking
Press, 1938), 546.
3® Commissioners to John Hancock, May 6, 1776, in Franklin,
Papers, 22:418.
31 Charles Carroll, Journal of Charles Carroll of
Carrollton. Brantz Meyer, ed. (Baltimore: Maryland
Historical Society, 1876), 93.
32 John Adams to Samuel Cooper? June 9, 1776, in PJA, 4:242243.
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Negotiations with foreign powers [which] ought to go hand in
hand."33 Radicals in and out of Congress demanded quick action
on all fronts. "I expect soon to hear that the Continental
Congress have published the Confederacy of the Colonies —
compleated the Republic of America —

and formed a commercial

Alliance with France and Spain," Joseph Ward wrote Adams in
late 1775.34 Adams was a central figure in all three measures.
He wrote Thoughts on Government to guide the formation of new
colonial governments, which Adams saw as the precondition for
independence and confederation. He drafted the Model Treaty as
the basis for American relations with the world. Both the
foreign and domestic halves of Adams's plan of 1776 proceeded
from

the

same

principles

and

drew

on

a

combination

of

classical and English Opposition republicanism.
"I had read Harrington, Sydney, Hobb[e]s, Nedham, and
Lock[e], but with very little Application to any particular
views: till those debates in Congress . . . turned my thoughts
to those Researches which produced the Thoughts on Government,
the Constitution of Massachusetts, and at length the Defence
of the Constitutions of the United States and the Discourses
on Davila,"

Adams

later

recalled.35

opposition

thought

suggested

government

was

uncorrupted

an

that

In domestic
the

version

model
of

the

affairs,
for

free

British

33 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:327.
34 Joseph Ward to John Adams, Oct. 23, 1775, in PJA, 3:237.
35 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:358-359.
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constitution. Adams believed that the British constitution
represented "a government of laws and not menf" and as such
was "nothing more or less than a republic, in which the king
is the first magistrate."3® Adams hoped to preserve the best
elements of the British constitution, even if the British
themselves chose to abandon it. "A Legislature, an Executive,
and a Judicial Power," comprehend all of what is meant and
understood by Government," Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee.
"It is by balancing each of these Powers against the other
two, that the Effort in humane Nature towards Tyranny, can
alone be checked and restrained and any degree of Freedom
preserved in the Constitution."37
For his model citizen, whether on the foreign or domestic
scene, Adams turned to classical martial virtue. He wrote in
January

1776

that,

"I

am

so

tasteless

as

to

prefer

a

Republic," that would "produce Strength, Hardiness Activity
Courage Fortitude and Enterprise." "Under a well regulated
Commonwealth," he continued,

"the people must be wise and

virtuous and cannot be otherwise."38 If the people did not
already possess a virtuous spirit, Adams hoped that the war
would force such a spirit on them.
Heaven

that

America

should

suffer

"It May be the will of
Calamities

still

more

36 "Novanglus" VII, March 6, 1775, in PJA, 2:314.
37 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 19; John Adams to Richard
Henry Lee, Nov. 15, 1775, in PJA, 3:307.
38 John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, Jan. 8, 1776, ibid.,
3:398.
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wasting and Distresses yet more Dreadfull," Adams wrote to his
wife after Congress voted for independence. "If this be the
Case, it will have this good Effect, at least; it will inspire
Us with many Virtues, which We have not, and correct many
Errors,

Follies,

and

Vices,

which

threaten

to

disturb,

dishonour and destroy Us."3** The enemy of republican virtue
was the "Spirit of Commerce" which was "incompatible with that
purity of Heart, and Greatness of Soul, which is necessary for
a happy Republic."*®
Adams expanded on these ideas in his first theoretical
work,

"Thoughts on Government," which began as a letter to

George Wythe and emerged as a pamphlet in April of 1776.41
Adams

implied that virtue was necessary to implement his

model, writing that, "the noblest principles and most generous
affections in our nature then, have the fairest chance to
support the most generous models of government." Adams linked
his ideas of the republican nature of the British constitution
to his theory of government and emphasized the rule of law. He
wrote, "that form of government, which is best contrived to
secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the
3** John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, in L.H.
Butterfield, Marc Friedlaender and Richard Allen Ryerson,
eds., Adams Family Correspondence, 6 vols. to date
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963),
2:28.
40 John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 16, 1776, in PJA,
4:125.
43 John Adams, "Thoughts on Government," editorial note,
ibid,, 4:65-66.
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best of Republics."42
On constitutional matters, Adams's suspicion of human
nature led him to advocate a bicameral legislature. "A single
assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties of
an individual," he wrote, "subject to fits of humour, starts
of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice,
and

consequently

productive

of

hasty

results

and

absurd

judgement." However, a properly balanced government could act
as a guarantor of virtue. Adams advocated laws to promote
education, and sumptuary laws to keep the spirit of luxury
under control. "Frugality is a great revenue," wrote Adams,
"besides curing us of vanities, levities, and fopperies which
are antidotes to all great, manly and warlike virtues."43 A
constitution, Adams concluded, could be a great inspiration to
a people. A properly designed constitution could, "make the
common people brave and enterprizing. That ambition which is
inspired by it makes them safer, industrious and frugal."44
Adams knew that men often acted on their passions and
interests

rather

than

for

the

public

good.45

This

characteristic could also work for the public good. The desire
for fame and honor implied some contribution to the public

42 Ibid., 86-87.
43 Ibid., 88, 91.
44 Ibid., 92.
45 Howe, Political Thought of JA, 16-18.
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good, regardless of motive.4® "Ambition in a Republic, is a
great Virtue, for it is nothing more than a Desire, to Serve
the

Public,

to Promote

increase the wealth,

the

Happiness

the Grandeur,

of

the

People,

and Prosperity of the

Country," Adams wrote.47 "The utility of Medals,
impressed Strongly

upon

my

to

Mind," he

informed

has been
Nathanael

Greene, "Pride, Ambition, and indeed what a Philosopher would
call Vanity, is the strongest Passion in human Nature, and
next

to

Religion,

the

most

operative

Motive

to

great

Actions."48
The second half of Adams's plan of 1776, the question of
foreign alliances, also emerged in the midst of the Canada
debacle.

On

November

29,

1775,

Congress

established

the

Committee of Secret Correspondence "for the sole purpose of
communicating with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and
other parts of the world."

Great Britain forced the issue of

foreign

Parliament

involvement

when

passed

the

American

Prohibitory Act, which declared American ships subject to
capture and declared the colonies beyond the protection of the
law. The act arrived in the Continental Congress on February
27, 1776. In response, Congress opened American ports to the

Douglass Adair, "Fame and the Founding Fathers," in Fame
and the Founding Fathers. Trevor Colboum, ed. (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1974), 8.
47 John Adams to unknown, April 27, 1777, in PJA, 5:163.
48 John Adams to Nathanael Greene, May 9, 1777, ibid., 186.
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world on April 6 . ^
Both

moderates

and

radicals
powers

recognized

presupposed

that

formal

alliances

with

foreign

Moderates

who

opposed

alliances.

In February 1776 Robert Morris feared that making

independence

independence.

naturally

opposed

an agreement with France would prevent a reconciliation with
Great Britain.

"When we have bound ourselves to an eternal

Quarrel with G.B. by a Declaration of Independence," John
Dickinson

argued

independence,

in

his

July

1,

1776

speech

against

"France has nothing to do but hold back and

intimidate G.B. till Canada is put into her hands, then to
intimidate Us into a disadvantageous Grant of our Trade."5®
Even some who favored independence shared Dickinson's concerns
that an alliance should come first.

Patrick Henry, whose

radical credentials were unquestioned, opposed resolutions in
the Virginia Assembly calling for independence, believing that
confederation

and

foreign

alliances

should

precede

independence.5*
AQ

Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution, rev. ed. (Bloomington: University of Indiana
Press, 1957), 32; Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics,
81, 96.
50 Robert Morris to Charles Lee, Feb. 17, 1776; John
Dickinson's speech notes of July 1, 1776, in Paul H. Smith,
ed. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, 22 vols. to
date (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976),
3:270, 4:354.
51 Patrick Henry to John Adams, May 20, 1776, in PJA, 4:201;
John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783
(Williamsburg, Va.: Colonial Williamsburg, dist. university
Press of Virginia, 1988), 95-98.
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John
alliances

Adams

argued

to declare

that,

its

instead

independence,

of

needing

foreign

America needed to

declare independence before any nation would sign an alliance.
Merely opening the ports was not enough.52 "Foreign powers
could not be expected to acknowledge Us," Adams wrote, "till
We had acknowledged ourselves and taken our Station, among
them as a sovereign Power, and an Independent Nation."53 Adams
dismissed Dickinson's

fears of French domination,

because

America did not seek a political or military alliance. "I wish
for nothing but Commerce," Adams wrote.54 In March of 1776,
Adams argued in Congress, "is any Assistance attainable from
F[rance]? What Connection may We safely make with her? 1st. No
Political Connection. Submit to none of her Authority —
receive no Governors, or Officers from her. 2d. No Military
Connection Recieve no Troops from her. 3d. Only a Commercial
Connection."55 A treaty based on trade, Adams believed, would
gain

French

support

without

violating

separation from European politics.

the

principle

of

His policy temporarily

matched that of the moderate- dominated Committee of Secret
Correspondence,

which

commissioner to France,

instructed

the

congressional

Silas Deane, acting the part of a

52 John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 12, 1776, in AFC,
1:377.
53 DAJA, 3:327.
54 John Adams to John Winthrop, June 23, 1776, PJA, 4:331332.
55 Diary entry, March 1, 1776, ibid., 2:236.
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private merchant so as not to give the impression that the
colonies had already decided on independence, to emphasize to
the French that British wealth came from American trade.56
Adams believed that American commerce would exploit a
balance between Great Britain and France that would allow the
United States to remain independent. The constant demand for
grain

on

the

European

continent,

aggravated

by

endemic

warfare, would guarantee American independence and commerce
without requiring the United States to make any political
commitments

to

other

nations.

"We

have

always

said

in

America," Adams wrote in 1781, "'By and by will come a scarce
year for grain in Europe, and then the nations there will
begin

to

think

us

of

some

consequence.'"57

Furthermore,

American commerce would strike a blow for the principle of
freedom of the seas, as set down by writers on the law of
nations and endorsed by American republicans.
throughout the world sees,

"Every body

that a renewal of the English

monopoly of the American trade, would establish an absolute
tyranny upon the ocean, and that every other ship that sails
would

hold

its

liberty

at

the

mercy

of

those

Lordly

Islanders," Adams wrote in 1780. Adams wanted to break the
British monopoly on American commerce,

opening markets to

56 Committee of Secret Correspondence to Silas Deane, March
2, 1776, in Letters of Delegates to Congress, 4:321.
57 John Adams to C.F.W. Dumas, Jan. 31, 1781, in John Adams,
Correspondence of the Late President Adams, Originally
Published in the Boston Patriot (Boston: Everett and Munroe,
1809), 366.
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France

and

other

countries,

eventually

including

Great

Britain. Both Great Britain and France would benefit from
American commerce, and neither of them would allow the other
to attack the United States.5® Adams later recalled that the
Americans hoped to "annihilate all Domination at Sea, and
establish a universal and perpetual Liberty for all Nations
Neutral and belligerent on that element."59
Congress placed John Adams in charge of a committee to
draft a treaty of alliance that would serve as the model for
American treaties with European powers. In July of 1776, Adams
presented his draft of the Model Treaty. He was influenced in
framing it by the Anglo-French articles of the 1713 Treaty of
Utrecht, which gave France and Great Britain limited mostfavored-nation status and established free navigation in each
other's European possessions.60

Whereas the architect Lord

Bolingbroke attempted to use trade as a prelude to a political
alliance, Adams intended to use trade as a substitute for one.
The Model Treaty's 30 articles guaranteed reciprocal trade,
protection for each signatory's ships in the other's ports,
58 John Adams to Edmund Jennings, published Jan. 17, 1782,
in James H. Hutson, ed, Letters from a Distinguished
American: Twelve Essays by John Adams on American Foreign
Policy, 1780 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1980),
4-5; Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 28-31.
59 John Adams to Benjamin Rush, April 18, 1813, in Old
Family Letters, 450-451.
60 Model treaty, editorial note, in PJA, 4:263; Max Savelle,
The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History
of Angloamerica (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967),
150-151.
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and, by excluding food and ships' stores in the definition of
contraband, took a step toward the principle of "free ships,
free goods." The only military concessions included merely a
commitment that the United States would remain neutral (rather
than ally with Great Britain) if Great Britain declared war on
the allied nation, and that in the present conflict the United
States would not seek a separate peace with Great Britain.
Furthermore, the treaty barred a signatory from taking over
any British colonies in North America.

Congress adopted a

slightly modified version on September 17, 1776.61
The Model Treaty revealed the connection between ideology
and diplomacy, as it reflected the fear of foreign engagements
inherited from the English Opposition and made a careful
distinction between commercial and political treaties.62 The
treaty showed that Adams viewed the European balance of power
as Bolingbroke had, as an external system that could preserve
national liberty without political or military commitments.
Adams believed that the "Spirit of Commerce," the pursuit of
self-interest rather than a common good, which he deplored in
domestic

politics,

was

the

organizing

principle

of

international relations.63 Like his domestic system, Adams's
diplomatic

system depended on

the martial

virtue

of the

61 Model treaty, in PJA, 4:265-277, 290-300.
62 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early
American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1961), 43, 46-48.
63 "Autobiography," in DAJA, 3:329.
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American people. Like his radical colleagues, Adams believed
that

a combination

British

corruption

of

divine

would

favor,

bring

a

American

quick

virtue

victory,

and

making

permanent foreign alliances unnecessary. "The Officers drink
a long and moderate War,” Adams wrote in 1777. "My toast is a
short and violent War."6^
Adams hoped to avoid a political treaty well into 1777.
"I have often been ashamed to hear, so many Whiggs groaning
and Sighing with Despondency, and whining out their Fears that
we

must

be

subdued

unless

France

should

step

in,”

he

complained to James Warren. "Are We to be beholden to France
for our Liberties?"**5 However, military necessity and French
interests

intervened.

On

September

24

Congress

gave

the

American envoys in Paris more leeway to agree explicitly not
to ally with Great Britain against France.66 The moderates who
had held out against independence rushed forward to embrace a
full

French

December
authorize

military

led
the

Congress
envoys

intervention.
to
in

abandon
Paris

to

Military
the
agree

Model
to

collapse
Treaty

in
and

whatever was

6^ Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The
Continental Army and the American Character, 1775-1783
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 1223; John Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 2, 1777, in AFC,
2:336.
65 John Adams to James Warren, May 3, 1777, in PJA, 5:174.
66 Sept. 24, 1776, in Worthington C. Ford, ed. Journals of
the Continental Congress 1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), 5:815.
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necessary to bring France into the war.67 The French foreign
minister, the Comte de Vergennes, intended to use the united
States to increase French power relative to Great Britain, and
would not commit French resources without greater assurances
that the Americans would continue to fight.66
On November 7, 1777, Congress appointed John Adams to
replace Silas Deane as a commissioner to France, and Adams set
sail on February 13, 1778.69 He accepted the appointment at
the urging of such congressional allies as Henry Laurens,
Richard Henry Lee and James Lovell, hoping to implement his
ideas of a proper foreign policy.70 However, Adams did not get
that chance. He arrived at Bordeaux on April 1, 1778, only to
learn that Franklin,

Deane and Arthur Lee had signed two

treaties on February 6; a commercial treaty based on the Model
Treaty, and a military alliance that the Model Treaty had been
designed to prevent.71
Although Adams did not originally believe a political
commitment to France was either desirable or necessary, he did
support the treaties for two practical reasons. First, as long
67 Committee of Secret Correspondence to the commissioners,
Dec. 30, 1776, in Franklin, Papers, 23:97; Rakove,
Beginnings of National Politics, 115.
68 Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign
Policy (Chicago: University Press, 1954), 136-140.
69 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 33-34.
70 Charles Francis Adams, The Life of John Adams, 2 vols.
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott and Co., 1871), 1:389-390.
7* Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 37.
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as Great Britain occupied a foot of ground in North America,
the United States would need French support. "Will it ever do
to think of Peace, while G. Britain has Canada, Nova Scotia
and the Floridas, or any of them?" he asked James Warren.
"Such a peace will be but Short." "We . . . have the surest
Ground to expect the Jealousy and Hatred of Great Britain,"
Adams

wrote

to

Samuel

Adams,

"[therefore]

We

have

the

Strongest Reasons to depend upon the Friendship and Alliance
of France."^
Second,

the treaties, once signed,

held the force of

American and international law. If the United States did not
fulfill its obligations under the law, it could expect no
further help

from Europe.

"This

faith

[in upholding the

treaty] is our American Glory, and it is our Bulwark," Adams
wrote to James Warren, "it is the only Foundation on which our
Union can rest secured, it is the only Support of our Credit
both in Finance and Commerce, it is our only Security for the
Assistance of Foreign Powers."72 Adams believed that French
support was solid, informing Samuel Adams

that,

"Every

suspicion of a wavering disposition in this court concerning
the support of America is groundless."74
72 stourzh, Franklin and Foreign Policy, 154-155; John Adams
to James Warren, July 26, 1778 and John Adams to Samuel
Adams, July 18, 1778, in PJA, 6:321, 326.
73 John Adams to James Warren, Aug. 4, 1778, in PJA, 6:347.
74 John Adams to Samuel Adams, Fed. 14, 1779, in Francis
Wharton, ed. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of
the united states, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government
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Once in Europe, Adams had to translate the republican
theory

that

shaped

his

foreign

policy

in

Congress

into

diplomatic practice. The problem fell into three overlapping
questions. The first question related to the personal conduct
of republican diplomats, and more generally to whether or not
there was a specifically republican style of diplomacy. The
second question was what military strategy was best suited to
a republic. The third question was the degree to which the
United States shared a common interest with other republics,
or with other nations sharing similar diplomatic goals.
Upon arriving, Adams was immediately forced to deal with
the first question, concerning personal conduct. Congress had
recalled Adams's predecessor, Silas Deane, on August 5, 1777,
on the grounds that Deane had issued too many commissions to
non-English-speaking French officers. Soon afterward, Arthur
Lee

accused

commercial

Deane

of

using

interests.

In

his

1776,

position

to

further his

Pierre Augustin

Caron

de

Beaumarchais had organized Rodrigue Hortalez et Cie, a trading
firm to serve as a vehicle for sending military supplies to
America. Louis XVI gave the company one million livres in
starting capital,
merely

a

front

leading Lee to believe the company was
for

a

royal

subsidy.

Because

the

king

authorized the company to sell stock to private investors,
both

Beaumarchais

and

Deane

treated

the

company

as

a

legitimate business. Deane invested heavily and expected a
Office, 1889), 3:48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
personal

return,

often

mixing

his

private

and

official

financial accounts in the process. Lee, by nature suspicious
of those around him, spent 1778 accusing Beaumarchais and
Deane of defrauding Congress. Deane responded with an essay in
the

December

attacked

the

5,
Lee

1778,

Pennsylvania

family

in

general

Packet,
and

in which

Arthur

Lee

he
in

particular, charging them with disloyalty to the alliance and
outright treason. The story reached Paris in February of 1779,
causing an immediate rift between Adams,

the Lee family's

ally, and Franklin, who did not believe Deane was guilty of
any wrongdoing.75 Adams wrote

in

his diary,

"that there

appeared to me no Alternative left but the Ruin of Mr. Deane,
or the Ruin of his Country. That he appeared to me in the
light of a wild Boar, that ought to be hunted down for the
Benefit of Mankind."76
Although the Deane affair was in Adams's mind a fairly
straightforward case of corruption, it was in a more important
sense an obvious example of how a republican should not
conduct

himself.

complicated

Franklin's

problem.

Adams,

conduct
a

was

an

self-described

even

more

"stern

and

haughty Republican," objected to Franklin's lifestyle, calling
it "a Scene of continual dissipation." Arthur Lee had earlier
formed the same opinion.77 More important, Adams criticized
75 C. F. Adams, Life of JA, 1:395; Rakove, Beginnings of
National Politics, 249-255; Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of
Revolution, 42-43; Potts, Arthur Lee, 154-159, 185-186.
76 Diary entry, Feb. 8, 1779, in DAJA, 2:345.
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Franklin's approach to diplomacy. Just as Adams called for a
government of laws and not men, he called for a diplomacy
based on national interests and not diplomats. Interest was
the only firm basis for a long-term policy in Adams's opinion,
whereas

Franklin

based

his

diplomacy

on

his

personal

relationship with the French, playing on Louis XVI's ego as
much as on French interest. Franklin expressed his gratitude
toward

France

for

its

generous

help

in

effusive

public

displays that Adams found distasteful for a republican.7®
"Franklin, while in France, was very French," according to one
Franklin biographer, unlike Adams and Lee, Franklin did not
conceive of a republican style of diplomacy. For Adams that
was the problem. Adams advocated a blunter style of diplomacy.
"He [Adams] thinks . . . that America has been too free in
Expressions of gratitude to France," Franklin wrote in 1780,
"I apprehend he mistakes his ground, and that this court is to
be treated with Decency and Delicacy."79 Adams believed the
American cause needed no embellishment. "The dignity of North
America does not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or any of

77 John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 12, 1778, in AFC, 3:9;
DAJA, 4:118; Potts, Arthur Lee, 200-201.
78 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 11; Stourzh,
Franklin and Foreign Policy, 164-165.
79 Claude-Anne Lopez, Mon Cher Papa: Franklin and the Ladies
of Paris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 10; Shaw,
Character of JA, 137-138; Benjamin Franklin to Samuel
Huntington, Aug. 9, 1780, in Benjamin Franklin, The Writings
of Benjamin Franklin, 10 vols. Albert Henry Smyth, ed. (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1907), 8:127.
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the subtleties of etiquette;1' he wrote to Vergennes in 1781,
"it consists solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of
mankind and the interests of the nations of Europe, all of
which, well understood, are clearly in her favor."®0
Despite

his

feelings

toward

Franklin,

Adams

fully

recognized Franklin's talents as a publicist and believed it
would do more harm than good to remove the doctor. "Franklin
is a Wit and a Humorist, I Know. He may be a Phylosopher, for
what I know, but he is not a sufficient Statesman. He knows
too little of American Affairs or the politics of Europe, and
takes too little Pains to inform himself of either, " Adams
wrote to Thomas McKean in 1779. "Yet such is his Name on both
Sides of the Water, that it is best, perhaps, that he should
be

left

there."8^

Congress

agreed

and

reorganized

the

diplomatic corps on September 14, 1778, naming Franklin as
sole minister. Adams received the news on February 12, 1779,
and learned that he had not been sent even a formal letter of
recall. For several weeks he waited at Nantes for passage
home, spending his time nursing his resentment of Franklin and
Congress. He finally left on June 17, arriving at Boston on
August 2.82
John Adams spent the summer and fall of 1779 writing the
80 John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 18, 1781, in
f/JA, 7:445.
81 John Adams to Thomas McKean, Sept. 25, 1779, in PJA,
8:162.
82 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 41, 49-51.
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Massachusetts constitution before returning to the world of
diplomacy. Once again, the battle between pro-Lee and proDeane forces, in conjunction with French political interests,
shaped Adams's career. Conrad Alexander Gerard, the French
minister to the United States, shared the American desire to
draw Spain into the war, and used the divisions in Congress to
make American peace demands more acceptable to Spain.83
Initially, the United States presented a fairly ambitious
list of peace demands.

On February 23,

1779,

a committee

created to draft the peace ultimata recommended that the
United States demand absolute independence, control of all
territory to the Mississippi River,

British evacuation of

American territory, access to the Newfoundland fisheries, free
navigation

of

the

Mississippi

below

Mississippi,

the

American

free

commerce

boundary,

and

on

either

the
the

cession or the independence of Nova Scotia. Gerard hoped to
moderate these demands to make them more acceptable to Great
Britain and less threatening to Spain, which entered the war
as a French (but not an American) ally on April 12, 1779.
Gerard used his influence to have Congress drop the issue of
the fisheries, and on August 14, Congress settled on absolute
independence and control of territory west to the Mississippi
and south to 31 degrees north latitude as its demands. The

83 Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics, 255-256.
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fisheries were not to hold up negotiations.84
Gerard lobbied for John Jay, then linked with pro-Deane
forces, to be peace commissioner and to replace Arthur Lee as
minister to Spain. Gerard achieved only a partial victory.
Pro-Lee

members,

led

by

Samuel

Adams,

opposed

Jay

and

abandoned Arthur Lee in favor of John Adams, whose election
would secure the fisheries even without specific instructions.
Congress deadlocked until both sides agreed to divide the two
jobs, electing John Adams peace commissioner and John Jay
minister to Spain on September 27.85
John
surprise,

Adams

learned of

his

appointment,

much to his

in October of 1779. Elbridge Gerry urged him to

accept, and Adams agreed that the commission was too important
to turn down. However, Adams believed that Franklin would
attempt to frustrate the mission,

and asked that Congress

order Franklin to authorize payments to him. Adams sailed once
more for Europe on November 13, 1779. En route, the ship began
leaking, and put in at El Ferrol, Spain, on December 8.86
Neither Vergennes nor John Adams looked forward to seeing
the other again. In the summer of 1779, Gerard had reported to

84 Journals of the Continental Congress, 14:456-460; Richard
B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American
Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 15-18;
William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the
French Alliance (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1969), 65.
85 Stinchcombe, French Alliance, 66, 73-76.
88 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 51-55.
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Vergennes that John and Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee
were part of a pro-British faction, and Adams and Vergennes
had clashed at their first meeting over whether or not to
inform London of Adams's powers to treat for peace. Adams's
insistence on advising the British of his commission served to
convince Vergennes that Adams was indeed pro-British.®7 Adams
believed that revealing his commission to the British, "would
. . . draw out from them some proofs of their present designs,
and it is always important to discover early the intentions of
the enemy.”®® Vergennes considered such a move premature.
Great Britain had made no peace overtures, and offering peace
and

commerce

Americans

would

would cave

only

convince

into

the

any demands

British
the

that

the

British might

make.®9
Adams's

insistence

on

a

frank

style

of

diplomacy

overlapped with the second great question he faced in Europe,
what military strategy was appropriate to a republic. The
question put Adams for much of his time in Paris in the
position of offering Congress

and France unsolicited and

unwanted advice on how to run the war. English Opposition
thought and his own experience taught Adams that a navy was
the means of defense best suited to a republic; for him a navy
87 Ibid., 56-59.
®® John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 17, 1780, in
WJA, 7:228-229.
89 Observations on Mr. J. Adams' Letter of July 17, 1780, in
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 4:3-6.
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was "our only natural and adequate defense." With a tiny navy
itself, the United States had to rely on France. Like many
Americans, Adams believed that French sea power would prevent
the re-supply of British troops in America,

allowing the

United States to win without relying on French ground troops.
This belief supplied the strategic assumptions of the Model
Q A

Treaty. u However, France and Spain concentrated on British
rather than American waters, planning an invasion of Great
Britain. The allied fleet joined on July 22, 1779, but fell
victim to delays
British

and

shipboard illness,

fleet to escape

and allowed

to Portsmouth on August

31.

the
The

Franco-Spanish fleet withdrew from the English Channel on
September 8.9*
"Yet I must own to you, that I think France and Spain are
yet to be convinced of the true Method of conducting the War,”
Adams

wrote

to

Benjamin

Rush.

"It

is

not

by

beseiging

Gibraltar nor invading Ireland, in my humble opinion, but by
sending a clear Superiority of naval Power into the American
Seas."92 Adams reported to the president of Congress in March
Qfi

John Adams to Samuel Huntington, Oct. 14, 1780, in Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101, Massachusetts
Historical Society; Stinchcombe, French Alliance, 151; R.
Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army
in America, 1775-1783 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1975), 93, 123-124.
91 Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American
Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 154-157.
92 John Adams to Benjamin Rush, Sept. 19, 1779, in PJA,
8:153.
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of 1780 on the strength of the French fleet, writing, "one
would think that there was force enough in them to protect Us
and quiet all our Fears but the Battle is not always to the
strong and we must wait for Time to decide Events.1,93 Adams
criticized allied naval action in Europe, especially after he
learned of Admiral Rodney's victory on January 16,

1780,

against the Spanish at Gibraltar. Adams complained that vast
fleets were wasted on Gibraltar,

"which is but a Trifle,"

while even a smaller fleet would triumph off America.9^ Adams
took these themes up with Vergennes on July 13, warning that
some in the united States were still suspicious of the French.
A show of naval force in American waters would reassure the
country and force the British out of Philadelphia, isolating
them in New York City.95 Vergennes, with a smaller fleet than
the

British,

accommodate

and
Adams,

a reluctant

ally

who concluded

in

that

Spain,

could

not

although Vergennes

wanted to see America independent, he did not want it to grow
strong.9**
On July 27, 1780, John Adams left for the Netherlands, to
deal

with

the

third

question

regarding

diplomacy

and

93 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, March 4, 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
9^ Dull, French Navy, 178-179; John Adams to Samuel
Huntington, March 10, 1780, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook,
reel 98.
95 John Adams to the Compte de Vergennes, July 13, 1780,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
9** Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 68-70.
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republicanism, to what degree were American fortunes linked to
other republics and maritime states. This question raised
issues regarding both Adams's opinion of the Armed Neutrality
and his dealings with the Dutch government. On September 16,
Adams received permission to negotiate with the Dutch until
Henry Laurens, former president of the Continental Congress
and member of the Adams-Lee faction, arrived. The British had
captured Laurens at sea on September 3, leaving Adams as de
facto minister.®7 While Adams was in the Netherlands, American
interests seemed to coincide with Dutch entry into the Armed
Neutrality. The chain of events leading to the formation of
the Armed Neutrality began in July of 1778, when an American
privateer

attacked

Archangel,

Russia.

eight

British

ships

sailing

out

of

Empress Catherine II proposed a treaty

between Russia and Denmark in August,

calling for mutual

protection of neutral ships and British ships trading with
neutrals in the North Sea. Denmark countered with an offer of
mutual protection in all seas, which Russia rejected for fear
that

such

Russian

an

agreement would

expense,

when

protect Danish

shipping

at

Spain entered the war

in 1779,

it

claimed the right to seize and condemn as lawful prize all
ships bound for the Mediterranean, on the grounds that any
such ships might in reality attempt to land at Gibraltar. The
Spanish

capture of a Dutch

ship carrying Russian

cargo,

followed by the capture of a Russian ship, revived the project
97 Ibid., 71-73, 78-79.
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of an agreement among the northern neutrals. Catherine II
issued the Declaration of Armed Neutrality on February 28,
1780. Of the five principles of the Armed Neutrality, the
first three —
free

freedom of neutrals to trade with belligerents,

ships make

contraband

—

free goods,

appeared

in

and a limited definition of
the

Model

Treaty.

The

fourth

principle stated that only an effective blockade could be
legal, and the fifth set the first four as the basis for
judging the legality of prizes.98
Adams was happy to take partial credit for the agreement,
calling it "one of the most brilliant events which has yet
been produced by the American Revolution."99 Adams hoped that
the northern powers could tie up the British fleet in Europe
and make up for the lack of French naval cover. He reported
that

"either the War will be pushed this year with more

vivacity than ever, both by Land and by Sea, or that Peace
will

be

made without

delay."100

Congress

shared

Adams's

enthusiasm, and sent Francis Dana, Adams's secretary, to apply
for membership in the Armed Neutrality.101
98 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution, rev. ed. (Bloomington: University of Indiana
Press, 1957), 150-156.
99 John Adams to the President of Congress, Feb. 1, 1781, in
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 2:244-247.
100 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, April 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
101 David M. Griffiths, "American Commercial Diplomacy in
Russia 1780 to 1783." William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
series, Vol. 27 no. 3 (July 1970), 382-383.
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Adams was not sure if the United States would be admitted
to the Armed Neutrality. "Has there been any deliberation or
Consultation," Adams asked his diary, "between the maritime
Powers

in

forming

the

armed

Neutrality,

concerning

the

American Question?"102 However, it seemed certain that the
Dutch would join. When the British captured Henry Laurens,
they also captured evidence of Dutch-American cooperation. The
Dutch joined the Armed Neutrality for their own protection on
November 20, 1780, and the British authorized attacks on Dutch
shipping on December 20. The Dutch appealed to Russia for help
on January 12, 1781. Adams hoped that Armed Neutrality would
then join the war,

forcing Great Britain to negotiate for

peace and reducing American dependence on France. Adams's
hopes, along with the Armed Neutrality itself collapsed when
Russia refused to go to war for the Dutch.103 Adams's hopes
for

the

Armed

Neutrality

reflected

his

belief

that

all

maritime powers formed a natural common interest with the
United States.
Like his Opposition forebears, Adams believed that the
Netherlands was the only modern continental nation that had
achieved liberty, resulting in part from its maritime nature.
He assumed that, in addition to a common maritime interest
with the Armed Neutrality, America had a common political
interest with the Netherlands, the sole republican member of
102 Diary entry, Jan. 14, 1781, in DAJA, 2:455.
103 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 79-82, 93.
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the League. That assumption shifted the basis of his diplomacy
from an emphasis on strategic interest, the foundation of the
American

appeal

to

France

and

Spain,

to

an

ideological

consideration, the common interest of republics. Adams opened
a question that would resurface during the French Revolution
and again during the Latin American wars for independence: to
what

degree

does

a

similarity

in

government,

real

or

perceived, dictate relations among nations?
"The permanent friendship of the Dutch may be easily
obtained," Adams wrote to Franklin in June 1782.104

The basis

for that friendship was to be republicanism and commerce. On
April 19,

1781,

Adams presented a memorial to the States-

General of the Netherlands, outlining the American case, and
the Dutch interest in it. "If there ever was among nations a
natural

alliance,

republics,"

Adams

one

may

wrote.

be

Adams

formed
went

on

between
to

the

two

discuss

the

Pilgrims' residence at Leyden and parallels in the origins of
both

countries,

as

well

as

similarities

in

religion,

government and commerce. Adams concluded that "in all the
particulars the union is so obviously natural that there has
seldom been a more distinct designation of Providence to any
two

distant

nations

to

unite

themselves

together. " ^ 5

Unfortunately for Adams, republicanism was not a sufficient

104 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, June 13, 1782, in
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:491.
Memorial of April 19, 1781, in ffc/a, 7:399-401.
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bond. The Dutch simply wished to trade with all belligerents
and were not interested in schemes to remake the law of the
sea. Fear of British reprisals prevented Dutch recognition of
the United States until after the American victory at Yorktown
and the British Parliament's decision to suspend offensive
action in America.106
Adams's Dutch negotiations reflected his general approach
to

diplomacy,

that

the

United

States

should

not

become

dependent on any power. "It seems to me of vast importance to
us to obtain an acknowledgement of our independence from as
many other sovereigns as possible, before any conferences for
peace should be held,"

he wrote to Benjamin Franklin.107

Adams's system of appealing to every nation that might listen
to American claims conflicted with Franklin's more cautious
approach.

Like Adams,

Franklin wished to keep the United

States out of European politics as much as possible. He wrote
in 1777 that the United States should not "go suitering for
Alliances, but wait with decent Dignity for the applications
of others." Once the alliance with France was signed, Franklin
believed that no other nation could offer as much help as
France, and that American interests would be best served by
relying on France rather than introducing more powers and
deeper American commitments to European nations.108 Adams
106 Dull, Diplomatic History, 124-125; Hutson, JA and
Diplomacy of Revolution, 110-114.
107 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, May 23, 1781, in WJA,
7:422.
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certainly agreed that "France deserves the first Place, among
those Powers with which our Connections will be the most
intimate."109 in Adams's mind, Franklin's system rested on two
things

that

Adams

did

not

trust;

Franklin's

personal

relationship with Vergennes, and the basic goodwill of the
French.
Vergennes's actions seemed to confirm Adams's distrust.
The failure of American arms in 1780 and growing strain on the
French treasury, led Vergennes to look for a quick end to the
war, even if that meant limiting American territorial claims.
Russia and Austria

seemed to offer a way out when

proposed to mediate at Vienna in May 1781.

they

Neither power

recognized American independence, but Vergennes accepted the
offer nonetheless. John Adams was the American authorized to
attend such a conference, but he balked at going, objecting to
the fact that recognition of the United States was not a
prerequisite. The mediation ultimately came to nothing, as
Great Britain refused to negotiate with the Americans under
any circumstances.110

108 Benjamin Franklin to Arthur Lee, March 21, 1777, in
Franklin, Papers, 23:511; Stourzh, Franklin and Foreign
Policy, 160-161.
109 John Adams to the President of Congress, Aug. 4, 1779,
in PJA, 8:109.
110 John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 19, 1781,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 105; Morris,
Peacemakers, 178-181, 185-186, 207, 209; Jonathan R. Dull, A
Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1985), 131.
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Vergennes always considered Adams a loose cannon and
tried to convince Congress to control Adams or recall him.
Military

failure

and

congressional

panic

operated

in

Vergennes's favor. In the spring of 1781 the Chevalier de la
Luzerne, Gerard's replacement as minister, complained about
Adams's conduct, and asked Congress to do something about it.
Leaders

in Congress

shared the French belief that Adams,

acting alone, might prolong the war by insisting on access to
the Newfoundland fisheries as a condition of peace. In a show
of anti-Adams and anti-New England sentiment, Congress revoked
Adams's

peace commission on June

delegation comprised of Adams,
Jefferson.

15 and instead named

Franklin, Jay,

a

Laurens and

Only Connecticut and Massachusetts opposed the

measure. Congress instructed the new commission to be guided
by France in negotiating peace. Congress delivered the coup de
grace on July 15, revoking Adams's commission to negotiate a
commercial treaty with Great Britain.
Adams received his new commission on August 24, 1781, and
saw the first sign of the decay that eventually came to all
republics. On that day Adams concluded he could no longer
count on the virtue of the American people. The instructions
were both a personal insult and a dereliction of duty. They
were

a

symbol

of

Congress's

abandonment

of

its

agents

comparable to its lack of support for the winter camp at

111 Stinchcombe, French Alliance. 153-154, 157-159, 162,
174.
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Valley Forge.112 In any case, Adams wrote Franklin, "I am very
apprehensive that our new commission will be as useless as my
old one." The optimism of 1776, based on a belief in American
virtue, had faded, and after years of disappointment Adams
warned his wife, "not to flatter yourself with hopes of Peace.
There will be no such thing for several years."113 Not even
the British surrender at Yorktown changed Adams's mood.
congratulate you,

"I

on the glorious news contained in these

dispatches,"

Adams

wrote

secretary of

foreign

to

affairs,

Robert
"but

R.

Livingston,

I cannot

be of

the
your

opinion, that, great as it is, it will defeat every hope that
Britain entertains of conquering a country so defended."114 At
best, Adams warned his wife, there would be no peace before
1784.115 He was thus surprised when on September 28, 1782,
John Jay informed him that Great Britain was prepared to
negotiate and that he should come to Paris.116
By the time Adams arrived in Paris, a war that had begun
as a colonial rebellion had ballooned to involve several major
112 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 97-98; Howe,
Political Thought of JA, 120; Royster, Revolutionary People
at War, 190.
113 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, Aug. 25, 1781, in WJA,
7:459; John Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 2, 1781, in AFC,
4:382.
114 John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, Feb. 19, 1782, in
WJA, 7:513.
115 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 24, 1782, in AFC,
4:382.
116 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 116.
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European powers, whose war aims were not necessarily those of
the United States.

"The Political Machine that is now in

Motion is so vast, and comprehends so many nations, whose
Interests are not easy to adjust," Adams observed in 1780,
"that it is perhaps impossible for human understanding to
forsee what events might occur to disturb it." *^7 The United
States wanted its independence and possession of all territory
to the Mississippi River. France wanted American independence,
as it would weaken Great Britain, but did not wish the United
States to become so strong as to not need French aid, or
become

so

large

as

to

threaten

Spanish

interests.

Spain

naturally could not openly side with a colonial rebellion, but
saw the war as an opportunity to retake Minorca and Gibraltar
from Great Britain. The Dutch merely wished to trade and avoid
destruction at the hands of the Royal Navy.

By 1782 that

machine had two differing effects: to divide the alliance and
make the British more conciliatory. Jay and Franklin met with
Vergennes on August 10. While Jay objected to the fact that
the instructions of British peace negotiator Richard Oswald
did not recognize American independence, Vergennes did not.
Joseph-Matthias Gerard de Reyneval, an advisor to vergennes,
added that the American claim of the lands

east

of

the

Mississippi was extravagant, and Vergennes agreed. The meeting
convinced Jay that the Americans might have to violate their

H 7 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, Dec. 6, 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101.
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instructions

and

sign

a

separate

peace. 118

The

earl

of

Shelburne, the British prime minister, was ready to give the
Americans much of what they wanted. Great Britain had enough
enemies and wanted to split the alliance. Shelburne believed
the territory north of the Ohio River was lost. Better to give
it to the Americans, who would continue to trade with Great
Britain, than to France or Spain.119
Jay submitted a draft treaty on October 5. It called for
recognition of American independence and British evacuation of
American

territory.

It

Mississippi on the west,

set

American

boundaries

at

the

31 degrees north latitude on the

south, the St. Lawrence River and 45 degrees north latitude on
the northwest, and the St. John's River to the Bay of Fundy on
the northeast. The draft gave the United States the right to
catch and dry fish off Newfoundland, and granted the United
States and Great Britain free navigation of the Mississippi.
Oswald

approved

of

the

treaty,

but

the

British

cabinet

rejected it on October 17. The cabinet wanted to exclude the
Americans from the fisheries, establish a Maine boundary more
advantageous to Great Britain, and make some provision for
American Tories.120
John Adams arrived in Paris on October 26. He was still
suspicious of Franklin, but discovered that Jay, previously
118 Morris, Peacemakers, 307-310.
119 Dull, Diplomatic History, 145-147.
120 Morris, Peacemakers, 346-350.
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connected with the pro-Deane moderates, was now fully antiFrench. "Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as Mr. Lee and Mr.
Izard did," Adams noted with some satisfaction in his diary.
"Our Allies dont play fair, he told me."121 Adams joined the
negotiations on October 30, and sessions ran daily until
November

4 when

Great

Britain

accepted

the western

and

southern boundaries that Jay proposed and both sides agreed on
the St. Croix rather than the St. John's River as the Maine
boundary. They could not agree on which of the three St. Croix
Rivers, however. Adams offered in a partial concession

to

have Americans pay debts they incurred to Britons before 1775.
Adams also proposed an article granting the Americans the
right to fish off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.122
Fish and Tories remained the sticking points. By November
11, the British had accepted the loss of the Northwest and
were willing to exclude the most outspoken American Tories
from compensation for lands the rebels seized, but still the
British insisted on compensation for neutrals. Adams opposed
any compensation, fearing that it would create British and
French parties in the United States. The British watered down
their demand for compensation to an official request, to which
the Americans agreed.123
121 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 117-119; Diary
entry, Nov. 5, 1782, in DAJA, 3:46-47.
122 Morris, Peacemakers, 361-363; Diary entry, Nov. 4, 1782,
in DAJA, 3:45-46.
123 Morris, Peacemakers, 367-369, 372-373.
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The last sessions began on November 25. The fisheries,
perhaps the main reason John Adams was in Europe, remained the
final problem.

Adams, of course, was long familiar with the

issue. "My Practice as a Barrister in the Counties of Essex
Plymouth and Barnstable had introduced me to more Knowledge
both of the Cod and the whole fisheries and their importance
both to the commerce and the Naval Power of this Country than
any other man possessed," Adams wrote in his autobiography.*24
Adams connected access to the fisheries to the survival of
republican government in two ways. First, both the origins of
the republic and its right to the fisheries rested on the same
principles of natural law. Second, Adams believed that the
United States was destined to be a great naval power and, like
the

Opposition writers

before him,

he believed

that the

fisheries formed the training ground for the sailors who would
defend the republic. For the next three days, Adams defended
American rights to the fisheries the same way that he gave
advice to Vergennes —

he buried Oswald in an avalanche of

fact and argument. He also lavishly added his opinions on what
was

in

Britain's

interest.

Adams's

main

point

was

that

acknowledging the united States' rights to the fisheries was
safer for Britain than making concessions to France.
fisheries were a training ground for sailors. Was

The

it not

safer, he asked, to allow the United States to add to its tiny
navy than the French to theirs? Since the fisheries were a
124 DAJA, 4:5.
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source of great profit, moreover, if the Americans shared in
the fisheries, much of their profits would end up in London in
trade. Could the British expect the same from the French? The
fisheries were a potential source of naval conflict. Would it
not be better to remove sources of Anglo-American conflict
than

to

drive

the

Americans

closer

to

France?125

Adams

presented a draft article on November 28 that gave the United
States the right to fish on the Grand Banks and wherever else
Americans traditionally fished. Americans would also have the
liberty to dry fish on Cape Sable and the unsettled parts of
Nova Scotia.12®
Adams turned the pressure up a notch on November 29,
claiming a natural, if not a divine right, to the fisheries.
"When God Almighty made the Banks of Newfoundland at 300
Leagues Distance from the People of America and at 600 Leagues
distance from those of France and England, did he not give as
good a Right to the former as to the latter," Adams thundered
at Oswald. "If Heaven in the Creation gave a Right, it is ours
as much as yours. If Occupation, Use, and Possession give a
Right, We have it as clearly as you." Allyne Fitzherbert,
Oswald's secretary, conceded the point, but saw no way around
Oswald's instructions, which prohibited any such agreement.
Adams vowed that he would never sign a peace that kept the
Americans out of the fisheries and Henry Laurens and John Jay
125 Diary entry, Nov. 25, 1782, ibid., 3:72-74.
12® Morris, Peacemakers, 376.
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quickly agreed.127 Oswald realized that the negotiations had
come too far to collapse over the fisheries.

He proposed

reducing

the

the

Americans'

claimed

"right"

to

coastal

fisheries to a "liberty," and yielded on drying privileges but
only

in

uninhabited

areas.

The

Americans

agreed

to

the

compromise, and signed the Provisional Treaty on November 30,
1782.128
Adams was

pleased with

the

treaty,

even

though

the

American commissioners had to violate their instructions to
obtain it. "The great Interests of our Country in the West and
in the East are secured, as well as her independence. St.
Croix is the boundary against Nova Scotia. The Fisheries are
very safe, the Mississippi and the Western Lands to the middle
of the Great Lakes are as well secured to Us as they could be
by

England,"

Adams

wrote

to

James

Warren.

"All

these

Advantages we could not have obtained if we had literally
pursued our Instructions."129 Adams also acknowledged that the
treaty was mainly the work of John Jay. Although the French
had called Adams the "Washington of Negotiation," Adams wrote
in his diary, that title belonged to Jay.128
The

treaty

presented

Congress

with

an

embarrassing

127 Diary entry, Nov. 29, 1782, in DAJA, 3:79-81.
128 Morris, Peacemakers, 377-381.
129 John Adams to James Warren, Dec. 12, 1782, in Warren
Adams Letters, 2 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical
Society, Collections, 1917-1925), 2:186.
120 Diary entry, Nov. 30, 1782, DAJA, 3:85.
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problem. It could not repudiate a treaty that met and even
exceeded Congress's demands. Neither could Congress ignore the
fact

that

the

commissioners

instructions.

Robert

commissioners

on March 25,

criticizing

the

R.

openly

Livingston
1783,

commissioners

sent

violated

their

a letter

to the

praising the treaty but
for

not

consulting

the

French.131
The commissioners defended their stroke for independence
in violation of their June 15, 1781 instructions. "Since we
have assumed a Place in the Political System of the world,"
they averred "let us move like a Primary and not a Secondary
Planet."132 in his diary and private correspondence, however,
Adams was far more bitter. "Congress will not cutt off our
Heads for making Peace, and that is some comfort," he wrote
sarcastically to his wife. Adams blamed congressional weakness
for preventing a commercial treaty. "It is a Glory to have
broken such infamous Orders," Adams wrote in his diary.133
The Americans had hoped for better terms, particularly
regarding American trade with the British West Indies, in the

131 Robert R. Livingston to the Peace Commissioners, March
25, 1783, in Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:338340.
13^ John Jay, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin to Robert R.
Livingston, July 18, 1783, in John Jay, The Correspondence
and Public Papers of John Jay, 4 vols. Henry P. Johnston,
ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1890-1894), 2:556.
133 John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 9, 1783 and Feb. 17,
1783, in AFC, 5:198, 102; Diary entry, Feb. 18, 1783, DAJA,
3:108.
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final treaty. "The commerce of the West Indies is part of the
American

system

of

commerce,"

Adams

wrote

to

Secretary

Livingston, "They can neither do without us, nor us without
them."^-3^

However,

the

British

would

make

no

further

concessions to the Americans. The Provisional Treaty brought
down the Shelburne ministry. The succeeding government, under
Lord North and Charles James Fox, appointed David Hartley as
Oswald's

replacement.

granting

the Americans

Although

Hartley

extensive

favored

privileges

in

a

treaty

the

West

Indies, neither the new government nor British public opinion
would approve such a treaty. An Order-in-Council issued on
July 2, 1783, excluded American ships from the British west
Indies.

The

himself

left

order
soon

essentially
afterward

ended
to

negotiations.

negotiate

loans

Adams
in

the

Netherlands. Adams returned in mid-August, and with Franklin,
Jay and Hartley, signed a final treaty that repeated the terms
of the November 30, 1782, provisional treaty. On September 3,
1783, the negotiators read the November 30, 1782, agreement
into a general peace settlement, ending the war.135 "Ours is
a Simple Repetition of the provisional Treaty," Adams wrote
his wife, "So we have negotiated here, these Six Months for

^-3^ John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, June 23, 1783, in
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:500.
135 Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 249-250;
Dull, Diplomatic History, 159-160.
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nothing." 13 ^
Having

spent

five years

in

Europe,

and eight

years

involved in the formation of American foreign policy, John
Adams

believed

as

firmly

as

ever

that

the

survival

of

republican government in the United States depended on a
balance of power in Europe and limited political contact
between America and that continent.

Diplomatic experience

therefore confirmed for him many English Opposition theories
on foreign policy and strengthened his conviction that the
United States was well rid of any political connection with
Europe.

"For my own Part I thought America had been long

enough involved in the Wars of Europe. She had been a Football
from the Beginning, and it was easy to see that France and
England both would endeavour to involve Us in their future
Wars," Adams wrote in his diary. "I thought [it] our interest
and Duty to avoid

[them]

as much as possible and

to be

completely independent and have nothing to do but in Commerce
with either of them."137 Adams hoped to expand commercial
connections all over Europe in order to avoid dependence on
France.

1 OQ

Only by an impartxal conduct toward all nations

could the United States preserve the balance of power. "If We
13® John Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 4, 1783, in AFC,
5:233.
137 Diary entry, Nov. 11, 1782, DAJA, 3:52; Adams wrote a
similar letter to Robert R. Livingston on the same day,
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:877-878.
13® John Adams to Thomas Mifflin, Sept. 5, 1783, in WJA,
8:146.
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give

exclusive

priviledges

in

Trade,

or

form

perpetual

Alliances offensive and defensive with the Powers in one
Scale," he warned James Warren, "We infallibly make enemies of
those in the other.” Adams argued in his diary that "it was
not in our interest to hurt Great Britain any further than was
necessary to support our Independence and our Alliances."139
However, Adams came to believe that republican theory did
not, and perhaps should not, dictate diplomatic style. "It may
be said that Virtue, that is Morality applied to the Public is
the Rule of Conduct in Republicks, and not Honor," Adams wrote
his

wife;

"True.

But

American

Ministers

are

acting

in

Monarchies, and not Republicks."1^0 This opinion was a subtle
but significant shift in Adams's thought. He did not follow it
to the logical conclusion that Franklin had been right about
how to approach the French.

In later diplomacy,

however,

particularly during the Quasi-War with France, Adams accepted
European practices that he did not accept in 1777.
Adams continued to believe that foreign policy was a
crucial test of republican government and that it was a test
the United States was in danger of failing. Adams told Robert
R. Livingston that the United States would have to strengthen
the confederation or

"Great Britain will take advantage of it

139 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of Revolution, 142-143; John
Adams to James Warren, March 20, 1783, in Warren-Adams
Letters, 2:142; Diary entry, April 30, 1783, DAJA, 3:115116.
John Adams to Abigail Adams, Feb. 27, 1783, in AFC,
5:103.
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in such a manner as will endanger our peace, our safety, and
even our very existence."141 In a letter to Elbridge Gerry on
the day of the signing of the final treaty, Adams outlined
what American policy should be.
protect the liberties of

The United States

should

its citizens and strengthen the

confederation. It should depend on Europe for nothing, send
ministers that could be trusted and support them to the
fullest.142 Adams's

program

still,

to

a

certain

extent,

depended on the republican virtue of the American people. The
events of the 1780s revealed how much and how little virtue
remained and led Adams to rethink the basis for republican
government. As during the revolution, the conduct of foreign
policy played a key role in that rethinking.

141 John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, July 16, 1783, in
WJA, 8:103.
142 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 3, 1783, in
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 6:667-670.
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CHAPTER 3: THE DISILLUSIONING OF A REPUBLICAN

Republican government in the united States had survived
the war, but it faced a far more difficult task in surviving
the peace. Without an external threat —
loomed internationally —

although several

support for the central government

under the Articles of Confederation collapsed. For John Adams,
the decade after the end of the American Revolution was the
shakedown

cruise

of

American

republicanism,

revealing

weaknesses in both the ship and its crew. By the end of the
decade, John Adams had lost two key illusions at the center of
the system of diplomacy he advocated during the revolution.
First, he came to see that the American people were not more
virtuous than any other people. He began to doubt American
virtue in 1781 and lost all faith in it by 1787.
diplomacy,

specifically

failure

to

combat

Failures in

British

trade

restrictions, contributed to his disillusionment. The second
illusion, which Adams held throughout the revolution, was that
the United States could use trade to manipulate the European
balance of power. Balanced government, as in 1776, was the
solution to a lack of virtue. By the 1780s Adams saw balanced
goverment as a replacement for the virtue that Americans did
not possess. Such a belief mirrored Adams's view of diplomacy,
9!
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in which he expected balance, rather than virtue, to restrain
nations.

In diplomacy,

Adams

fell back on the republican

realpolitik of the English Opposition school; a neutrality
from European politics and aloofness from the balance of power
defended by a navy.
Since 1776, Adams based his diplomacy on the premise that
all nations would open trade with the United States because it
was in their interest to do so. Adams, like most Americans,
tended to view British interest in terms of American interests
and expected the two to coincide and prompt Great Britain to
allow the United States back into the West Indian trade as if
no war had occurred. Chancellor of the Exchequer William Pitt
was prepared to offer such trade, until a severe nationalist
backlash in Parliament, bent on punishing the United States
for its independence, forced the Fox-North ministry to act
otherwise. On July 2, 1783, the Privy Council approved an
order barring American ships from the British West Indian
trade. The normally powerful West Indian lobby, who like the
United States favored a quick return to business as usual,
assumed the measure was temporary and did not protest.1 The
order became permanent with the Limiting Act of 1788. British
shipping replaced American ships in the West Indian carrying

1 Frederick W. Marks, III, Independence on Trial: Foreign
Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 54-56; Charles R.
Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward
the United States 1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press, 1969), 6-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

trade, and the British government groomed Nova Scotia as the
new focal point of trade.2 To John Adams,

the new policy

sacrificed British interest to wounded pride.

"The liberal

sentiments in England, respecting the trade, are all lost for
the present," Adams warned Secretary Livingston. When Adams
learned of the Order-in-Council passed on July 2, 1783, he
wrote Livingston that ”a jealousy of American ships, seamen,
carrying trade, and naval power, appears every day more and
more conspicuous." Four days later Adams added that

"the

present ministry swerve more and more from the true system,
for the prosperity of their country and ours."3
British policy was most clearly explained in the earl of
Sheffield's

Observations on

the Commerce of the American

States, which appeared just before the July 2 Orders-inCouncil.

Sheffield's pamphlet reflected the resumption of

British West India policy since 1651, and set policy for the
next 50 years. Sheffield first reminded his readers of the
outcome of the American Revolution, writing that, "it is in
the light of a foreign country that America must henceforth be

2 S. Basedo and H. Robertson, "The Nova Scotia-British West
Indies Commercial Experiment in the Aftermath of the
American Revolution, 1783-1802," Dalbousie Review, vol. 61
no. 1 (Spring 1981), 53-54; Herbert C. Bell, "British
Commercial Policy in the West Indies, 1783-1793," English
Historical Review Vol. 31 no. 123 (July 1916), 440.
3 John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, July 9, 14 and 18,
1783, in WJA, 8:86, 97, 107.
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viewed."* To preserve British shipping, and the rest of the
empire, the Americans could not be allowed back into the West
Indies.
the

Great Britain could not allow American shipping into

West

advocated

Indies

without

developing

destroying

Nova

Scotia

its
and

own.

Sheffield

Newfoundland

as

substitute granaries, and using only British ships to carry
the merchandise. "Rather than give up the carrying trade of
our islands, surely it would be better to give up the islands
themselves," Sheffield wrote.

"It is the advantage to our

navigation which in any degree,

countervails the enormous

expense of their protection."5 Great Britain did not have to
make any concessions to win American trade. Sheffield believed
that "British manufactures will for ages ascend the great
rivers of that continent."6 In the end, the United States
could do nothing to influence British policy. "It will not be
an easy matter to bring the American States to act as a
nation," Sheffield argued, "they are not to be feared as such
by us."7
Exclusion from the British West Indian trade was only
the beginning of the united States' diplomatic problems. From
the end of the war the United States were surrounded by
* John Holroyd, earl of Sheffield, Observations on the
Commerce of the American States, rev. ed. [1784] (New York:
August M. Kelley, 1970), 2.
5 Ibid., 59-60, 86, 174-175, 152.
6 Ibid., 188.
7 Ibid., 198.
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troublesome if not hostile nations. Great Britain refused to
evacuate the northwestern forts or sign a commercial treaty as
long as pre-war debts went unpaid. In addition, Great Britain
kept a hand in the Northwest through missionary work and
contact with Mohawk Chief Joseph Brant. Spain supported Creek
Chief Alexander McGillivray in the Southwest, and closed the
lower Mississippi to American shipping in 1784.

The

1778

commercial treaty with France was of little use in replacing
British

commerce.

On

August

30,

1784,

France

shut

all

foreigners out of the French West Indian trade. Furthermore,
France did not produce the sort of tools and textiles that
American consumers preferred, and Americans desired to return
to pre-war patterns of trade.® Congress's failure to meet its
financial commitments abroad was already taking its toll on
the United States's international reputation. Adams observed
that by early 1784, American credit in the Netherlands was,
"dead, never to rise again, at least until the United States
shall agree on some plan of revenue, and make it certain that
interest and principle will be paid."9
As minister to Great Britain,

John Adams endured the

8 Marks, Independence on Trial, 10-14, 19-24; Ritcheson,
Aftermath of Revolution, 49-52; Vernon G. Setser, The
Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States 1774-1829
(Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), 8689; Doron S. Ben-Atar, The Origins of Jeffersonian
Commercial Diplomacy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993),
70-71.
Q

John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, Jan. 24, 1784, in WJA,
8:171.
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highest level of diplomatic frustration in Europe. Adams had
two goals to his mission; to sign a commercial treaty and to
ensure British adherence to the peace

treaty,

especially

regarding British evacuation of the northwestern forts. Adams
expected that the British anger that blocked a commercial
treaty in 1783 would still shape British policy. "The popular
pulse seems to beat high against America," Adams observed
early in the mission. "The people are deceived by numerous
falsehoods industriously circulated in the gazettes and in
conversation, so that there is much reason to believe that, if
this nation had another hundred millions to spend, they would
soon force this ministry into a war against us.”10 Adams's
first meeting with the foreign secretary, Lord Carmaerthen, on
June 17, 1785 set the tone for Adams's three-year mission.
Adams brought up British violations of the peace treaty and
Carmaerthen

responded

with

complaints

about

American

violations, specifically interference with the collection of
pre-war debts and the return of confiscated estates.11
Adams's

hope

of

signing

a

commercial

treaty

soon

vanished. Adams wrote to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay
on June 26 that "we shall have no treaty of commerce until
this nation is made to feel the necessity of it."12 A little

1{^ John Adams to John Jay, July 19, 1785, ibid., 8:282.
11 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 42; John Adams to
John Jay, June 17, 1785, in WJA, 8:269-271.
12 John Adams to John Jay, June 26, 1785, ibid., 8:274.
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over a month later Adams reported that "the boast is that our
commerce has returned to its old channels, and that it can
follow no other." Adams believed that British policy was
rooted in the fear that a trade treaty would build American
maritime

power

at

Britain's

expense."This

nation

is

strangely blinded by prejudice and passion," Adams wrote in
November. Although Adams was mistaken in seeing British policy
as rooted in anger rather than interest, he was correct in
believing that maritime power was the central issue.14 Adams
gave up on a commercial treaty in December 1785, informing Jay
that the king and ministry were completely committed to the
present

navigation

system

and

had

no

fear

of

American

retaliation.15
Adams believed that the United States had justice on
their side in pursuing a commercial treaty. The issue of
violations of the peace treaty was not as clear cut, as both
sides were in the wrong. Whenever Adams asked when the British
planned on evacuating the forts, the British responded by
asking when pre-war debts would be paid.

Adams met with

William Pitt on August 24, 1785, and the prime minister told
him that the problems of the debts and posts were linked and
would have to be solved together. Adams met with Carmaerthen

13 John Adams to John Jay, Aug. 6, 1785, ibid., 8:289-290.
14 John Adams to John Jay, Nov. 4, 1785, ibid., 8:337;
Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 17.
13 John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 3, 1785, in WJA, 8:350-356.
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on October 20, when the foreign secretary informed him that
nothing could be done regarding the posts until the debts had
been repaid. Adams protested that the treaty did not require
that the debts be paid, only that the United States place no
legal impediments on their collection.18 The distinction was
for all practical purposes meaningless. On February 26, 1786,
Lord Carmaerthen presented Adams with a report showing that,
although

Congress

Pennsylvania,

had

Virginia,

not,

Massachusetts,

Maryland,

North

New

York,

Carolina,

South

Carolina and Georgia had all passed laws interfering with the
collection of debts. Secretary Jay conducted his own study and
concluded that "there has not been a single day since it [the
peace treaty] took effect, on which it has not been violated
in America, by one or other of the States."17 Adams believed
that the British used the debt issue merely as a pretext to
hold the forts; yet it was a pretext that the United States
had provided. He criticized Massachusetts action against debt
collection as "a direct Breach of the Treaty."18
Adams had no answer for British complaints about debt
16 John Adams to John Jay, Aug. 25 and Oct. 21, 1785, ibid.,
8:303, 326-327.
17 Lord Carmaerthen to John Adams, Feb. 28, 1786, in The
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1783-1789, 3
vols. (Washington, D.C.: Blair and Rives, 1837), 2:581-591;
John Jay to John Adams, Nov. 1, 1786, in Jay,
Correspondence, 3:214.
18 John Adams to John Jay, May 25, 1786, in WJA, 8:394-396;
John Adams to Cotton Tufts, May 20, 1786, Adams Family
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 368;
Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 63-67, 77-78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
collection, as the Americans themselves were at fault and the
states

would

continue

confederation

to

act

government was

independently

unless

strengthened."Our

Government is incompetent to its objects,"

the

Federal

JaywarnedAdams.

In turn, Adams wrote Jay that "it is now with the states to
determine whether there is or is not a union in America. If
there is they may easily make themselves respected in Europe,
if there is not, they will be little regarded."19
Adams

saw

the

Eden

Treaty,

concluded

between

Great

Britain and France on September 26, 1786, as further evidence
that the United States were little respected in Europe. The
treaty granted
Europe.

Both

each nation most-favored nation

France

and Britain

encourage trade and ease

hoped

the

status

in

treaty would

domestic fiscal problems.20

Since

1782, Adams had argued that American trade was more valuable
to Britain than French trade, and could not believe that the
Eden Treaty was economically motivated. In reality, it was a
hostile move against the United States. "The time may not be
far distant, however, when we may see a combination of England
with the house of Bourbon against the United States," Adams

19 John Jay to John Adams, Oct. 14, 1785, in Diplomatic
Correspondence, 2:420; John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 6, 1785,
in ffJA, 8:356.
20 Jeremy Black, British foreign policy in an age of
revolution, 1783-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 111; W.O. Henderson, "The Anglo-French Commercial
treaty of 1786." The Economic History Review, 2nd Series,
Vol. 10 no. 1 (August 1957), 105-106.
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warned Jay.21 Adams expected no settlement with Great Britain
concerning the posts, and told Jay that the United States "had
never

more

reason

to

be

upon

their

guard."

Before

his

departure in 1788, Adams observed that he, and by extension
his nation,

had been treated with

"dry decency and cold

civility. ”22
What was to be done? The first order of business was
to abandon one of the key assumptions of the plan of 1776,
that the United States could use national interest, which John
Adams

defined

as European desire

for American

trade,

manipulate the European diplomatic system to work

to

in the

interest of the united States. Adams believed that the promise
of trade would shield the United States from the effects of
European diplomacy.

His vision of free trade assumed that

American navigation as well as agriculture would be protected.
Yet no one nation could carry out a policy of free trade in a
mercantile world. "We have hitherto been the bubbles of our
own philosophical and equitable liberality," Adams warned John
Jay in August 1785. six months later Adams issued a direct
attack on the French Physiocrats, writing to Jay that a policy
of free trade would eliminate the need for diplomacy. That
would not be the only effect. "The consequence nevertheless
would be the sudden annihilation of all their manufactures and

21 John Adams to John Jay, Oct. 27, 1786, in FfJA, 8:416.
22 John Adams to John Jay, Nov. 30, 1787 and Feb. 14, 1788,
ibid., 8:463-464, 476.
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navigation,"

Adams

continued.

"We

should

have

the

most

luxurious set of farmers that ever existed, and should not be
able to defend ourselves against the insults of a pirate."23
"I hope our Countrymen will learn Wisdom, be frugal,
encourage their own Navigation and Manufactures and Search the
Globe for a Substitute for British Commerce,” Adams wrote his
son.24 Wisdom, to Adams, clearly meant building a navy, the
politically

safest

method

of

protection,

and

passing

commercial legislation to match British policy. Adams wrote
the marquis de Lafayette that "our Timber and Masts will very
soon, vindicate themselves from all English slanders." "The
United

States

have

nothing

to

do

but

go

on with

their

Navigation Acts," Adams advised Rufus King.26 Furthermore, as
the French had been no more friendly than the British to
American shipping, Adams

advocated a strict neutrality.26

Adams cheered congressional attempts to pass an impost aimed
at British ships, writing that such a measure would "instantly

23 Clarfield, "John Adams: The Marketplace and American
Foreign Policy," 345-347; Gilbert, To the Farewell Address,
65-66; John Adams to John Jay, Aug. 10, 1785 and Feb. 26,
1786, in WJA, 8:299, 380-381.
24 John Adams to John Quincy Adams, Sept. 9, 1785, in AFC,
6:355.
25 John Adams to the Marquis de Lafayette, Jan. 21, 1786,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 113; John Adams to
Rufus King, Feb. 14, 1786, in Rufus King, The Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King, 6 vols. Charles R. King, ed.
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894-1900), 1:161.
26 John Adams to Samuel Adams, Jan. 26, 1786, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 113.
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raise the United States in the consideration of Europe, and
especially England."27
Adams believed that the states should act if Congress did
not. In June of 1785, Massachusetts passed a navigation act
which prohibited exports in foreign bottoms after August 1,
levied

tonnage

commercial

duties

treaty with

and

tariffs

on

nations

the united States,

with

no

and restricted

foreign trade to Boston, Falmouth and Dartmouth. Adams fully
approved of the act and hoped other states would copy it. "Go
on," Adams urged his brother-in-law Richard Cranch. "Lay on
heavy Duties upon all foreign Luxuries especially British and
give ample Bounties to your own Manufactures. You will of
course, continue to do all these Things upon the condition to
continue in force only untill they shall be altered by a
Treaty of Commerce, or an Ordinance of Congress."28
Congress could not and did not follow the example of
Massachusetts, and by 1789 Great Britain controlled 60 percent
of

the

American

foreign

trade.29

For Adams,

failure

to

strengthen the national government and stand up to Great
Britain showed the same lack of national character that led
Congress to give France control of the peace negotiations. If

27 John Adams to John Jay, May 16, 1786, in WJA, 8:391.
no

Van Beck Hall, Politics without Parties: Massachusetts
Politics 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1972), 123-125; John Adams to Richard Cranch, Aug.
22, 1785, in AFC, 6:294.
29 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 129.
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John Adams had any faith in American virtue after 1781, it was
gone by 1788.3®
Shays's

Rebellion was

one

more

symptom

of American

decline. "To talk of liberty in such a state of things!” Adams
exploded. "Is not a Shattuck or a Shays as great a tyrant,
when he would pluck up law and justice by the roots, as a
[Governor Francis] Bernard or a [Governor Thomas] Hutchinson,
when he would overturn them partially?"3* Adams's political
intimates warned him of moral decay at home. "I fear we are
already too

far

advanced

in

every

species

of

Luxury

to

Recede," Mercy Otis Warren wrote.32 on the tenth anniversary
of independence Adams himself wrote that the United States had
passed from their youth to an early decline. Adams observed
that the United States had failed to carry out their end of
the 1783 peace treaty or made any move to defend themselves
against British commercial attacks. ”0ur Country is grown, or
at least it has been dishonest," Adams lamented to a family
friend. "She has broke her faith with Nations & with her own
Citizens.”33
Adams's frustrations in London brought him to a final
30 Howe, Political Thought of JA, 106-107, 125-126, 130-131,
152-153.
31 Ibid., 133-134; John Adams to Benjamin Hichbom, Jan. 27,
1787, in WJA, 9:551.
32 Mercy Otis Warren to John Adams, April 27, 1785, in
Warren-Adams Letters, 2:252.
33 John Adams to Cotton Tufts, July 4, 1786, Adams Family
Papers, Letters Received and other Loose Papers, reel 386.
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disillusion regarding the virtue of the American people. Adams
believed that the United States could not have declined from
the height of virtue to the depths of depravity in only ten
years. Therefore, the Americans could not have been especially
virtuous to begin with. As Adams had suspected in 1776, the
war created virtues the Americans would not always possess.
Whatever Americans

were,

Adams

concluded,

they

were

not

Spartans, and perhaps that was for the better. "It is most
certain that our Countrymen, are not and never were, Spartans
in their Contempt of Wealth, and I will go farther and say
they ought not to be," Adams wrote to James Warren. "Such a
Trait in their character would render them lazy Drones, unfit
for the Agriculture Manufactures Fisheries, and Commerce, and
Population of their Country; and fit only for War."34 This
admission resolved the contradiction of holding a political
belief that feared commerce and pursuing a foreign policy that
encouraged it. Adams was

fully capable of portraying the

United States as a simple agrarian nation to Europeans who
might be threatened by a commercial and manufacturing nation.
"Agriculture ever Was, and ever will be the dominant interest
in America," Adams wrote to a Dutch sympathizer in 1780.35

34 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 71-72; Wood, Creation, 104; John
Adams to James Warren, July 4, 1786, in Warren-Adams
Letters, 2:277.
35 John Adams to Hendrik Calkoen, Oct. 27, 1780, in WJA,
7:309. See also to John Luzac, Sept. 15, 1780, ibid., 7:255,
and John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, July 26, 1780, in
C.F. Adams, Life of JA, 1:460.
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Adams needed look no further than his native New England and
its diversified economy to see the future course of economic
development. "Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce with one
another will soon make us flourish,” Adams wrote in 1786.3® In
the mid-1780s Adams moved the "Spirit of Commerce" from the
fringe of his

political philosophy,

as a side effect of

liberty mitigated by a balanced constitution, to the center,
as the mainspring of human action, to be channelled for the
good of all in a balanced government. Luxury was a part of the
American future,

and American thinkers had to fit it into

their systems of republican government. "It is in vain, then
to amuse ourselves with the thought of annihilating commerce,
unless as philosophical speculations," Adams wrote to John
Jay.

"We

are

to

consider

men

and

things

as

practical

statesmen, and to consider who our constituents are and what
they expect of us.”37
Adams's three-volume work, A Defence of the Constitutions
of Government of the United States of America, appeared in
1787 and 1788 and represents his attempt to come to terms with
a republic not founded on virtue. Adams intended to defend
balanced government in response to the French philosopher Anne
Robert Turgot, who attacked the Americans for copying British
3® John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of
British North America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1980), 92; John Adams to Rufus King,
June 14, 1786, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 113.
37 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 97-100; Wood, Creation, 569-574;
John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 6, 1785, in WJA, 8:357.
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forms too closely. Adams went beyond this goal, moving into an
analysis of human motivation as well.38 J. G. A. Pocock has
called Adams's Defence of the Constitutions the last major
work

of

classical

however,

republicanism.38

From

the

beginning,

Adams noticed the gap between the classical and

modern worlds.

"The inventions

in the mechanic

arts,

the

discoveries in natural philosophy, navigation and commerce,
and the

advancement of

civilization

and humanity," Adams

wrote, "have occasioned changes in the condition of the world,
and the human character, which would have astonished the most
refined nations of antiquity.” 48 "The love of poverty is a
fictitious virtue, that never existed," Adams wrote later in
the work,

adding that,

"frugality

. . .

is admired and

esteemed more than beloved."41- A free people was inevitably
drawn to luxury. "In a country like America, where the means
and opportunities for luxury are so easy and so plenty," Adams
wrote, "it would be madness not to expect it, be prepared for
it,

and

provide

against

the

dangers

of

it

in

the

constitution."42 With a balanced constitution at home, Adams
could fully accept a diplomacy centered on commerce.

38 Anne Robert Turgot to Richard Price, March 22, 1778, in
WJA, 4:278-281.
38 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 526.
40 "Defence of the Constitutions," Vol. 1, in WJA, 4:283.
41 "Defence," Vol. 2 and Vol. 3, ibid., 5:289, 6:209.
42 "Defence," Vol. 3, ibid., 6:95-96.
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The love of distinction was another theme in Adams's
book.

"Every man hates to have a superior, but no man is

willing to have an equal,” Adams wrote, "every man desires to
be superior to all others."43 Natural inequalities in wealth,
ability, appearance, intelligence and the like, led some to
seek social or legal distinction. Americans were as likely to
seek

honors

distinctions

and

awards

as earnestly

as

Europeans.

"Are

desired and sought,

there
as

not

titles,

garters, and ribbons are in any nation in Europe," Adams
asked. "We may look as wise, and moralize as gravely as we
will; we may call this desire of distinction childish and
silly," Adams wrote, "but we cannot alter the nature of man;
human nature is thus childish and silly."44
"It is weakness, rather than wickedness, which renders
men unfit to be entrusted with unlimited power," Adams argued,
and this

belief led Adams

to reject Turgot's

model of a

government in a single assembly, and argue for a balanced
government.45 In a republic governed by a single assembly,
aristocrats or those who aimed at aristocracy would either
destroy or be destroyed by the commons. The result would be,
"no order, no safety, no liberty, because no government of
law."45 Similarly, a single popular assembly was incompetent
43 "Defence,"

Vol. 3, ibid., 6:209.

44 "Defence,"

Vol. 1 and Vol. 3, ibid., 4:391-392, 6:488.

45 "Defence,"

Vol. 1, ibid., 4:406.

46 "Defence,"

Vol. 2, ibid., 5:288-289.
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to exercise executive power. "When a popular assembly or a
senate have the management of the executive power, disputes
forever arise concerning every step in foreign affairs, and
discords

and

factions

have

full

play."47

constitution was the only solution.

A

balanced

"A constitution formed

upon the nature of man, and providing against his discontented
temper

instead

of

trusting

moderation and contentment

to what
in power)

is

not

in

him

(his

may preserve union,

harmony, and tranquility, better than any despotism," Adams
argued.4®
In

surveying

the

historical

wreckage

of

republican

governments, Adams found two that worked; Great Britain and
the United States. Adams's definition of a republic was fairly
loose but typical. "A limited monarchy therefore, especially
when limited by two independent branches, an aristocratical
and a democratical power in the constitution, may with strict
propriety be called by that name [republic]." Adams explained
in 1814 that he used the word "monarch" in the strict sense of
"one who rules." Montesquieu had used the same definition.4®
With a clear conscience, Adams could argue that the British
constitution was, "both for the adjustment of the balance and
the prevention of its vibrations, the moststupendous fabric
47 "Defence,"

Vol. 2, ibid., 5:69.

48 "Defence,"

Vol. 2, ibid., 5:89.

49 "Defence," Vol. 2, ibid., 4:296; John Adams
to John
Taylor of Caroline, Letter XIII, 1814, in ibid, 6:173;
Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 1:156.
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of

human

invention;

and

that

the

Americans

ought

to

be

applauded instead of censured for imitating it as far as they
have

done."

Adams

went

on

to

argue

that

the

British

constitution "has still preserved the power of the people by
the equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial by jury,
and by constantly refusing a standing army.”50 That is, Great
Britain had prevented the tools of foreign policy from turning
against domestic liberty. Of course, the American version of
the balanced government differed from the British, especially
regarding elected senates and executives. "Here they differ
from the English constitution,

and with great propriety,"

Adams wrote, adding that sovereignty "must reside in the whole
body of the people."

5* "In America,

there are different

orders of officers, but none of men," Adams observed.52
The outward form of Adams's republicanism, as outlined in
Defence of the Constitutions was not new. Adams had classified
Great Britain as a republic in the "Novanglus" letters in
1775, and his conception of balanced government was central to
"Thoughts

on

Government"

in

1776

and

the

Massachusetts

Constitution in 1780. Adams had previously discussed the use
of medals and rewards to encourage virtue. The true change in
50 "Defence," Vol. 1, in WJA, 4:358, 381-382.
51 "Defence," Vol. 1, ibid., 4:359. Gordon Wood argues that
"Adams could not understand that in America by 1787 the
magistracy and senators had become somehow as representative
of the people as the houses of representatives," Creation,
586.
52 -Defence," Vol. 1, in WJA, 4:380.
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Adams's thought was in his view of the American people. Adams
never had absolute faith in American virtue, but by 1787 his
view of the American people had darkened. He concluded, based
on the political and diplomatic failures of the 1780s that the
Americans lacked classical republican virtue, and he shaped
his conception of republicanism accordingly.

In 1787 Adams

formed a theory of republicanism around the reality of a nonSpartan American people. In doing so, he replaced classical
virtue with

the

"Spirit of Commerce"

he had attacked in

C O

1776. ° "The best republics will be virtuous, and have been
so; but we may hazard a conjecture that the virtues have been
the effect of a well-ordered constitution, rather than the
cause," Adams wrote near the conclusion of his work.

"And

perhaps it would be impossible to prove that a republic cannot
exist even among highwaymen, by setting one rogue to watch
another; and the knaves themselves may in time be made honest
men by the struggle."54 When John Adams decided that virtue
was not needed to found a republic, he left the classical
world behind. The proper constitution may lead people into
virtuous behavior, but one could not take classical virtue for
granted. Adams scaled virtue down to mean support for balanced
government.55
Adams

did

not

discuss

diplomacy

in

Defence

55 Howe, Political Thought of JA, 147.
54 "Defence," Vol. 3 in WJA, 6:219.
55 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 188-199.
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Constitutions. However, it is clear that Adams's mission to
Great Britain played a significant role in his thinking. Adams
had seen that nations, like men, lust after distinction, and
are governed as much by pride as by interest, by emotion as by
reason. His descriptions of human characteristics in Defence
of the Constitutions and of British actions in his dispatches
to Jay are strikingly similar. Adams had long accepted the
idea that the clash of interests could create a common good
where none existed as the organizing principle of diplomacy;
it was a key assumption of the Model Treaty. Adams applied the
principle as vigorously to domestic constitutions only later.
The balance of power that controlled men, and channelled their
energies, could also be used to control nations. Adams already
believed that the international system set one rogue to watch
another,

with

little

hope of complete

success.

By

1787,

diplomatic experience helped bring his political thought to
the same conclusions.
Adams

received

a

copy

of

the

proposed

federal

Constitution in November 1787, and pronounced it "admirably
calculated to preserve the union, to increase Affection, and
to bring us all to the same mode of thinking.” Although Adams
questioned the senate's involvement in executive power and the
lack of a bill of rights, he welcomed ratification.5** Adams
wrote that the federal Constitution allowed him to conclude A

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Nov. 10, 1787, in AdamsJefferson Letters, 210.
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Defence of the Constitutions, "with unexpected dignity."-*7 in
a more

pessimistic moment,

Adams

suspected that the

new

Constitution was, "an attempt to divide a sovereignty; a fresh
essay at imperium in imperio, which would prevent us for a
time from drawing our swords," but would ultimately fail.-’®
For the time being at least,
internal

threats

to

the Constitution quelled any

republican

government

in

the

United

States.
Adams took office as vice president in 1789, and soon
found himself ill at ease presiding over the Senate. "I feel
a great difficulty how to act," Adams told the Senate on April
25. "I am Vice President, in this I am nothing, but may be
everything, but I am President also of the Senate."-*9 Adams
devoted his first month in office to the debate over the
proper title for the president.

Adams's preference for a

royal-sounding

open

monarchism,

title

left

him

but in reality Adams

to

the

charge

of

hoped to use titles

to

harness the desire for distinction in support of republican
government and to gain the respect of other nations.**®
57 "Defence," Vol. 3, in WJA,

6:219.

58 John Adams to Richard Price, April 19, 1790, ibid.,
9:564; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 98-99; Wood,
Creation, 567-569, 581.
59 William Maclay, diary entry, April 25, 1789, in Kenneth
R. Bowling and Helen E. Veit, eds. The Diary of William
Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 6.
60 James H. Hutson, John Adams'
Quarterly, Vol. 41 no. 1 (March

Title Campaign." New England
1968), 35-37.
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In Adams's view, republican government suffered from two
difficulties; finding disinterested leaders and ensuring that
those leaders would be respected abroad. Ideally, republican
government would attract men who would serve solely from a
sense of duty. By 1785, Adams believed that "although there
are disinterested men, there are not enough in any age or any
country to fill all the necessary o f f i c e s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
republican simplicity was lost on a diplomatic world of titled
aristocrats.
Vergennes.

Adams

learned this

lesson doing battle with

"It is etiquette that governs the World," Adams

wrote to Benjamin Lincoln in 1789.62
"The President

[of the Senate]

rose in the Chair &

repeated twice , with more Joy in his face than I had ever
seen

him

assume

before,"

Senator

William

Maclay

of

Pennsylvania observed on May 7, "he hoped the Government would
be supported with dignity and Splendor." The next day Adams
"repeatedly helped the speakers for Titles."63 On May 9, a
Senate committee settled on "His Highness, the President of
the United States, and Protector of Their Liberties" as the
president's title. The Senate postponed consideration of the
report on May 11. The House of Representatives refused to
consider any titles, and within a few days the title campaign
6* John Adams to John Jebb, Aug. 21, 1785, in WJA, 9:535.
62 John Adams to Benjamin Lincoln, May 26, 1789, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 115.
63 William Maclay, diary entry, May 7 and 8, 1789, in Diary
of Maclay, 27-28.
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ended in defeat.®4
For Adams, a suitable title for the president would solve
the problems of disinterestedness and foreign respect. "Has
the national Govt at this moment attractions enough to make a
seat in it,

an Object of desire,

to the Men of greatest

Fortune, Talents, Birth or Virtue?" Adams asked William Tudor.
"If the People would give Titles or marks of Distinction, this
would go a great Way."®5 A proper title would draw men to
office without resorting to the promise of material gain that
characterized the Walpolean system. A title would also place
the American president on an equal footing with European heads
of

state.

federal

Adams believed that any European who read the

Constitution

would

correctly

conclude

that

the

president possessed the powers of a limited monarch. As such,
the

title

of

"Majesty"

was

the minimum

title

needed

to

demonstrate national dignity.®® That Adams was willing to
adopt European diplomatic practice, such as titles, marked the
end of any idea Adams had of a republican style of diplomacy.
Not long after Adams took office as vice-president, the
United States faced an external problem that bore directly on
the nature of republican government, the French Revolution. On
May 4, 1789, the Estates-General met for the first time in 175
64 Hutson, "Title Campaign," 32-33.
®5 John Adams to William Tudor, June 14, 1789, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 115.
®® John Adams to William Tudor, June 28, 1789, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 115.
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years, in an attempt to rebuild French finances. The Third
Estate proposed that the three estates, commons, nobles and
the

clergy,

meet

together,

giving

the

Third

Estate

the

numerical advantage. The nobles responded by locking the Third
Estate out of Versailles, forcing the Third Estate to meet in
the tennis court and proclaim themselves the National Assembly
of France. Revolt spread to the people at large, and on July
14 the Paris mob stormed the Bastille in a show of defiance to
royal authority. On August 4, the National Assembly abolished
the last vestiges of feudalism and cut ecclesiastical ties
with Rome.

On August 26 the National Assembly issued its

"Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen," which stated,
among other things, that "men are born and remain free and
equal in their rights. ”67
Most Americans were initially sympathetic to the French
Revolution. Vice-President Adams was not among them. He took
one look at the National Assembly —
of

a

unicameral

legislature

—

a government consisting
and

concluded

that

the

revolution was doomed to failure. "My opinion of the French
Revolution has never varied from the first assembly of the
Notables to this day," Adams wrote in 1805. "I always dreaded
it and never had any faith in its success or ability."68
67 Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 2
vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19591964), 1:479-487.
68 Edward Handler, America and Europe in the Political
Thought of John Adams (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1964), 4-5; John Adams to Benjamin Rush, Sept. 30,
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Senator William Maclay noted that Adams despised all of the
pamphlets written on the French Revolution, except for Edmund
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France,

"and this

same Mr. Burke despises the French Revolution.”®9
Adams had occasion to comment on the French Revolution in
his last theoretical work on politics, Discourses on Davila,
published in 1790 and 1791. It began as a critique of Henrico
Davila's History of the Civil Wars of France but quickly
became an exposition of Adams's two favorite political topics,
the human desire for distinction and the need for balanced
government to control it. "There is in human nature, it is
true, simple Benevolence,

or an affection for the good of

others," Adams wrote, but alone it is not a balance for the
selfish affections."70 "As no appetite in human nature is more
universal than that for honor, and real merit is confined to
a very few," Adams continued,

"the numbers who thirst for

respect are all out of proportion to those who seek it only
for merit."7* Nations were no different from individuals. "As
long as there is patriotism, there will be national emulation,
vanity and pride," Adams wrote, making no distinctions between
republics and monarchies. "It is national pride which commonly

1805, in Old Family Letters, 82.
69William Maclay, diary entry, April 27, 1790, Diary of
Maclay, 254.
70 "Discourses on Davila," in WJA, 6:324.
71 Ibid., 250.
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stimulates kings and ministers."7^
Having

restated

the

basic

tenets

of

his

political

philosophy, Adams went on to consider the progress of the
French Revolution. "We are told that our friends the National
Assembly of France have abolished all distinctions," he wrote.
"But be not deceived,

my dear countrymen.

Impossibilities

cannot be p e rformed."7-* a government in a single assembly was
doomed

to

end

in tyranny,

Adams

argued,

and he

praised

Americans for establishing a balanced government instead of
resorting to "whimsical and fantastical projects."74 "If the
people have not the understanding and public virtue enough,
and will not be persuaded of the necessity of supporting an
independent executive authority, an independent senate, and an
independent judiciary power, as well as an independent house
of representatives," Adams concluded,

"all pretensions

to

balance are lost, and with them all hopes of security to our
dearest, and all hopes of liberty."75
The

French

influence
idealistic

Revolution

in American

soon

politics.

republicans,

came

became

a more

The Girondins,
to

dominate

the

immediate
young and
National

Convention, and abolished the monarchy on September 22, 1792.
The National Convention executed Louis XVI on January 21,
72 Ibid., 257.
73 Ibid., 270.
74 Ibid., 273,
75 Ibid., 399.
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1793, as punishment for his attempted flight to Austria. On
February 1, 1793, France declared war on Great Britain. The
Girondins assumed they would have American support based on
ideological sympathy and the 1778 treaties. On February 20,
1793,

Edmond Genet

set sail as the

new republic's

first

minister to the United States. Genet's main goal was to bring
the United States into the war against Great Britain, and he
tried to stir up public support as a counter to the official
neutrality of the Washington administration.76
Adams was not among Genet's admirers.

"A declamatory

Style, a flittering, fluttery Imagination, an Ardour in his
Temper, and a civil Deportment are all the Accomplishments or
Qualifications I can find for his place," Adams wrote his
wife.77

More

important,

Adams

approved

of

Washington's

Proclamation of Neutrality and resisted any attempt to bring
the

United

States

into

the

war.

Having

renounced

any

ideological community with France in Discourses on Davila,
Adams went on to deny any strategic connection. "A Neutrality
absolute total neutrality is our only hope," Adams wrote to
Tench Coxe. Circumstances absolved the United States of its
obligations to defend the French West Indies.

One could find

76 R.R. Palmer, Age of Democratic Revolution, 2:36-44; Harry
Ammon, The Genet Mission (New York: w.w. Norton and Company,
1973), 12-31, 44-45; Albert Hall Bowman, The Struggle for
Neutrality: Franco-American Revolution during the Federalist
Era (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), 41-44.
77 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 20, 1793, Adams Family
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 376.
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justification in Vattel,

but "reading is not necessary to

instruct us what to do."^®
By 1793 John Adams's disillusionment was complete. He
scaled public virtue down to mean no more than adherence to a
balanced government at home and a strict neutrality abroad as
the only way to preserve republican government. In neither
case did Adams presume that the United States could reform the
rest of the world through its actions.
republican

realpolitik,

Opposition

writers,

separation

from

first

based

Europe

on

sketched
naval

that would

Adams embraced a
out

power
preserve

by

and
the

English
political
physical

survival and republican constitution of the nation. The Wars
of the French Revolution made neutrality all the more critical
to the survival of the republic. This view was confirmed by
Adams's long experience in diplomacy and formed the bedrock of
his presidency.

John Adams to Tench Coxe, April 25, 1793, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 116.
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CHAPTER 4: THE BOLINGBROKEAN MOMENT

When John Adams became the second president of the United
States in 1797, he had already spent more than thirty years in
public life in a variety of roles. However, he had never
served as a chief executive, and for him the president's role
was a matter of theory rather than practice. Bolingbroke,
especially his Idea of a Patriot King,

served as Adams's

guide. "I have read him [Bolingbroke], more than fifty years
ago, and more than five times in my Life, and once within five
Years past," Adams wrote in 1813.* Adams fully agreed that the
executive should "espouse no party," and "govern like common
father of his people."2 Adams's debt to Bolingbroke on the
desirability of presidential non-partisanship is generally
ackowledged.3 However, Adams expanded Bolingbroke's
1 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 25, 1813, in AdamsJefferson Letters, 410.
2 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 45-46.
3 Shaw, Character of JA, 247-248; Ralph Ketcham, Presidents
above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 9497; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of
Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 536-537; Alexander
DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the
Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801 (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1966), 4-6; Bruce Minhoff, "John Adams
and the Presidency," in Thomas E. Cronin, ed., Inventing
124
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teachings,

reinforced

by Adams's

practical

experience

in

foreign policy, to encompass a Bolingbrokean sense of foreign
policy. John Adams's conduct of the Quasi-War was a successful
attempt

to

apply

Opposition

Whig

thought

to

diplomatic

practice, in essence a Bolingbrokean moment. During the QuasiWar with France, Adams pursued a policy of strict neutrality
combined with vigorous defense of American commerce,

both

enforced by the navy and executed by a president who stood
above party. Such a policy, Adams believed, was the only way
to preserve the republic.4
Adams, in recording the events of his inauguration day,
noted the coming difficulties, and Washington's happiness at
being rid of them. "He seemed to me to enjoy a Tryumph over
me," Adams wrote his wife. "Methought I heard him think Ay! I
am fairly out and you are fairly in! See which of Us will be
happiest."5 One source of difficulty was the French reaction
to the Jay Treaty. When the British seized American ships
trading with

the French West Indies under the Orders-in-

Council of November 6, 1793, and January 8, 1794, Washington
had appointed Jay as a special envoy to stave off Republicansponsored bills in the House of Representatives threatening
commercial warfare,

which Washington believed would bring

American Presidency (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1989), 304.
4 John Adams to James Lloyd, March 29, 1815, in WJA, 10:147.
5 John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 5, 1797, Adams Family
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 383.
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war.** Even though Adams believed "the British have treated us
very ill," Adams agreed with Washington that war would be
fatal to the republic. Adams warned Jefferson that "Another
War would add two or three Millions to our Debt, raise up a
many-headed and many bellied Monster of an Army to tyrannize
over

Us,

totally

disadjust

our

present

government

and

accelerate the Advent of Monarchy and Aristocracy by at least
fifty years." Adams cheered Jay's appointment, writing to his
wife that "Mr. Jay is to immortalize himself over again by
keeping peace."^
Jay

concluded

the

Treaty

of

Amity,

Commerce

and

Navigation that bore his name on November 19, 1794. Jay had to
abandon, at least temporarily, the doctrine that free ships
make free goods. However, the treaty did secure commerce for
twelve years, and preserved the peace. The Senate ratified the
treaty in June 1795. In early 1796 Republicans in the House of
Representatives tried to defeat the treaty by refusing to
approve the appropriations needed to carry it out.8 Adams
6 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 278-287, 299-301.
^ John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 22 and May 5, 1794,
Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and other Loose
Papers, reel 377; John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, May 11,
1794, in Adams-Jefferson Letters, 255.
8 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 330-331; Elkins and
McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 410-413; Jerald A. Combs, The
Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 147-153,
180-183; Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics
and Diplomacy under George Washington (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1958), 107-110; Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's
Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New
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never doubted that the House of Representatives would approve
the appropriations. "We scold at Treaties for the Sake of
Mauling a Minister," he wrote to John Quincy Adams,

"but

acknowledge them to be obligating on the national faith." John
Adams's attitude in 1796 was the same as it had been in 1778;
once the treaty was signed and ratified, debate was over. The
alternative was war, "and if the nation solemnly determines
upon War and Confusion,

they ought not charge it to the

Government."9
The

House

of

Representatives

barely

approved

the

appropriations on April 30, 1796. A settlement with Great
Britain, however temporary, naturally brought conflict with
France.

French Foreign Minister Charles Delacroix advised

Pierre Adet, the French minister to the united States, to stir
up anti-British feeling and bring the United States into war
on the French side.
American

minister

to

Delacroix informed James Monroe,
France,

that

France

considered

the
the

alliance ended the moment the Senate ratified the Jay Treaty.
Threats turned into action on July 2, 1796, when the Directory
decreed that France would treat American ships the same way
Great Britain did, subjecting American commerce with Great

Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 358-359.
9 John Adams to John Quincy Adams, March 25, 1796; John
Adams to Abigail Adams, April 16, 1796, Adams Family Papers,
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 381.
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Britain to French capture.10
A second source of difficulty was the cabinet that Adams
inherited from Washington. The political giants who served in
the first cabinet were gone by 1797,

replaced by Timothy

Pickering as secretary of state, James McHenry as secretary of
war, Oliver Wolcott as secretary of the treasury, and Charles
Lee as attorney-general. Adams retained all of these men,
partly because there was no precedent for the cabinet to
resign upon a change of administration, and partly because of
the difficulty in finding men willing to serve. To varying
degrees,

Pickering,

Wolcott and

McHenry were

politically

closer to Hamilton than Adams, and consulted with the former
secretary of the treasury on public affairs. Pickering was too
stubborn

and

independent to be

anyone's subordinate,

and

looked to Hamilton as a kindred spirit rather than as a
superior. Wolcott had served as Hamilton's deputy in the
treasury

department, and was his

closest ally. McHenry was

completely out of his depth as secretary of war, and relied on
Hamilton for answers to presidential queries.11
"Pickering and all his colleagues are as attached to me
10 Combs, Jay Treaty, 186-188; Bowman, Struggle for
Neutrality, 237-244.
11 C.F. Adams, Life of JA, 2:214-216; Stephen G. Kurtz, The
Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 238,
269-280; Leonard D. White, The Federalists: An
Administrative History (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1948), 238-241. Pickering, McHenry and Lee were each last on
Washington's list of candidates for their respective posts.
Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 414-415.
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as I desire," Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry.
jealousies

from that quarter."12 Adams

"I have no

believed he could

afford to retain a cabinet that he did not appoint for the
simple reason that he was the president, and as such would
make the final decision on policy matters. "Here, according to
the practice,

if not the Constitution,

the ministers

are

responsible for nothing, the President for every thing," Adams
later wrote in the Boston Patriot.^

Adams no doubt believed

that the cabinet members would either accept his decisions or
resign, as had been the case under Washington. Unfortunately
for Adams, Pickering considered himself independent of the
president, and would oppose the president if he deemed it
desirable. This difference over the role of the cabinet lay at
the heart of Adams's difficulties.14
Throughout his administration, Adams followed a policy of
strict neutrality toward Great Britain and France. He later
wrote to Thomas Truxton that "my system has been, for nine and
twenty years at least, to do justice and maintain friendship
with all nations as long as we

possibly could,

and have

12 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Feb. 13, 1797, in WJA,
8:523.
1^ Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 539; Letter X to
the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:270.
14 Gerard Clarfield, Timothy Pickering and American
Diplomacy, 1795-1800 (Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1969), 90-92; Peter Shaw is incorrect in seeing
Adams's retention of the cabinet "as setting a selfdestructive pattern of abrogating power," Character of JA,
255.
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alliances with none if we could avoid it.” To maintain a
neutral course, Adams needed to avoid war with France, which
he hoped to accomplish through negotiation and preparation for
war.*-*

Alexander

Hamilton

generally

agreed

with

Adams's

policies at the start of the Quasi-War, and supported the idea
of sending a special bi-partisan and sectionally balanced
commission

to

France.

"I

would

appoint

extraordinary to consist of M. Jefferson,

a

commission

or Mr. Madison,

together with Mr. Cabot & Mr. Pinckney," Hamilton wrote to
Pickering.16
Adams had not forgotten that Hamilton had tried to sneak
vice-presidential candidate Thomas Pinckney ahead of Adams in
the 1796 election, and he described Hamilton as ”a proud,
conceited, aspiring mortal, always pretending to morality.”*7
However, Adams had reached the same conclusion regarding a
peace commission. He met with Thomas Jefferson on March 3, and
asked the vice-president-elect if he would consider joining
*■* Ralph Adams Brown, The Presidency of John Adams
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), 38-41; John
Adams to Thomas Truxton, Dec. 13, 1803, Adams Family Papers,
Letterbook, reel 118.
16 William Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1980), 23; Alexander Hamilton to Timothy
Pickering, March 22, 1797, in Alexander Hamilton, The Papers
of Alexander Hamilton, 27 vols. Harold C. Syrett, ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1979), 20:545-546. See
also Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Jan. 25-31,
1797; to Theodore Sedgwick, Feb. 26, 1797; to James McHenry,
March 1797; and to William L. Smith, April 5, 1797, in
Hamilton, Papers, 20:480, 522, 571, 575.
17 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 9, 1797, Adams Family
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 383.
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Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, whom the French had rejected as
Monroe's
refused,

replacement,

on

a

peace

commission.

Jefferson

arguing that it was inappropriate for the vice-

president to serve as minister, and Adams agreed. Adams then
suggested

a commission

of

Pinckney

and James Madison

or

Elbridge Gerry. Jefferson agreed to ask Madison but did not
expect him to accept, and when Adams suggested Madison to the
cabinet the members unanimously opposed the appointment. On
March 6, Jefferson told Adams that Madison would not serve.
Adams then suggested Gerry as an independent member of the
commission.

The cabinet preferred Massachusetts Federalist

Francis Dana. Adams relented, at least temporarily, and in May
named Pinckney, Dana, and General John Marshall of Virginia as
the peace commission. Adams knew that Dana hated ocean travel,
and "was always apprehensive he would decline.'’ In June, when
Dana

declined

the

appointment,

Adams

replaced

him

with

Gerry.18
On March

25, Adams

called

for a special

session of

18 This account is based on a variety of sources, including
Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 228-229; and DeConde, Quasi-War,
13-28. Adams described his meeting with Jefferson in John
Adams to Elbridge Gerry, April 6, 1797 and Letter XIII to
the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 8:538, 9:286-287;
Jefferson's version is in the ’’Anas," in Jefferson,
Writings, 1:334-336. McHenry later recalled that he was the
only member to criticize Gerry, in James McHenry to Timothy
Pickering, Feb. 23, 1811 in Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and
Letters of George Cabot (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1877), 204-205. Adams discussed Dana in John Adams to
Elbridge Gerry, June 20, 1797, in WJA, 8:546. John Marshall
appears second to James Madison on a list of proposed
envoys in John Adams's hand, Adams Family Papers, Letters
Received and other Loose Papers, reel 386.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132
Congress to meet on May 15 to discuss defense measures. In the
intervening period Adams received word of the French decree on
March 2, 1797, declaring enemy goods on American ships to be
lawful prizes, and condemning American ships not carrying a
role d'equipage, the proper crew manifest. France intended to
inflict

as much

damage

as

possible

on American

shipping

without a formal war.*9 As the French threat came from the
sea, Adams advocated building a navy, combining his reading of
Opposition Whig thought with his own experience. "The trident
of Neptune is the scepter of the world," he wrote to Thomas
Truxton. In an unused fragment of his speech to the special
session, Adams argued that,

"it is a maxim among maritime

people that with wood, iron, and hemp and ships to employ them
any nation may do itself justice." The United States was a
natural seapower, and its commerce demanded protection.2® By
"commerce", Adams always meant the carrying trade as well as
agricultural exports. "Commerce has made this Country what it
is," Adams wrote in a draft of his first annual message.2 1

19 R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 39-40; Bowman, Struggle
for Neutrality, 276-277.
2® John Adams to Thomas Truxton, Nov. 30, 1802, in Dudley W.
Knox, ed. Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between
the United States and France, 1 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1935-1938), 5:174-175; Draft of
speech of May 16, 1797, Adams Family Papers, Letters
Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 387; Frederic H.
Haynes, "John Adams and American Sea Power." American
Neptune, Vol. 25 no. 1 (January 1965), 38-43.
2* Speech fragment, November 22, 1797, Adams Family Papers,
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 387.
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Aside from being politically dangerous, an army was of no use,
as the French could not mount a land invasion. "Where is it
possible to send thirty thousand Men here & we are double the
number we were in 1775," Adams explained to Elbridge Gerry.
"We have four times the military skill and eight times the
munitions of war. What would 30,000 men do

h e r e ? " 2 2

Adams addressed the special session an May 16, outlining
the diplomatic situation and his policy. Adams blamed the
French for the poor relations between the United States and
France, citing the French rejection of Pinckney as minister
and French attempts to influence the presidential election.
"They have inflicted a wound in the American breast," Adams
told Congress. "It is my sincere desire, however, that it may
be healed." Adams announced the new mission but also advised
defensive preparations. "A naval power, next to the militia,
is the most natural defence of the United States," Adams
argued, echoing Bolin g b r o k e .23 Reaction to Adams's speech was
predictable.

Republicans

blamed Adams

for the crisis

believed the speech was a call for war.

and

Federalists were

generally pleased. In June, William L. Smith of South Carolina
submitted a program along Adams's lines, increasing the navy
and providing for the arming of 80,000 militia, which Congress
approved. In July, Congress voted to build twelve new frigates

22 John Adams to Elbridge Gerry. May 3, 1797, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 117.
23 Speech of May 16, 1797, in WJA, 9:113-115.
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and improve coastal fortifications but defeated a motion to
create a 15,000-man army.24
Congress and the president left Philadelphia on July 19,
1797, in order to escape the summer heat and a yellow fever
epidemic. Marshall sailed from Philadelphia the next day, and
Gerry sailed from Boston on July 23. Before the envoys sailed,
France underwent a policy shift, when the Directory replaced
the anti-American Foreign Minister Charles Delacroix with
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord. Talleyrand had little
influence on European policy, but was the chief architect of
the Directory's American policy.25
Despite the changes, Adams expected nothing from the
mission. "It will be spun out into an immeasurable length,
unless quickened by an embargo," Adams complained to Oliver
Wolcott. "Talleyrand, I should suppose, could not be for war
with this country," Adams wrote to Pickering.

"A continued

appearance of umbrage, and continued depredations on a weak
defenceless commerce, will be much more convenient for their
views."26 Matters were further complicated with the coup of 18
Fructidor (September 4, 1797), in which the anti-American Jean
Francois Reubell took control of foreign policy. John Marshall
advised his government to take no solace from the political
24 Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 234-235; DeConde, Quasi-War, 2631; R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 42-45.
25 DeConde, Quasi-War, 35; Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 32-35.
26 John Adams to Oliver Wolcott, Oct. 27, 1797; John Adams
to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 31, 1797, in WJA, 8:558-559.
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instability in France.
produce

no

external

"The internal commotions of France

weakness,

no

diminution

of

exertion

against her enemies," Marshall informed Pickering.27
Marshall,

Pinckney and Gerry met with each other on

October 6, and called on Talleyrand two days later. Talleyrand
asked the Americans to wait for official reception until he
finished his report to the Directory. Official reception never
came. Talleyrand sent four of his agents, Nicholas Hubbard,
Jean Hottinguer, Pierre Bellamy and Lucien Hauteval, labeled
W, X, Y and Z in the American dispatches, to negotiate. On
October

18,

Hottinguer

presented

Talleyrand's

price

for

negotiation: an apology for Adams's speech of May 16, American
assumption of American shipping claims against France, help in
floating a loan in the Dutch money market and a £50,000 bribe
for

Talleyrand.

The

only

other

option,

Hottinguer

later

argued, was war, which would end in American defeat.28
Napoleon Bonaparte's victories in Italy buoyed the French
spirit. In the Treaty of Campo Formio France gave Venice to
Austria as part of a peace settlement, and Bellamy suggested
that the United States would meet a similar fate if it allied

27 Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 310-314; John Marshall
to Timothy Pickering, Sept. 9, 1797, in John Marshall, The
Papers of John Marshall, 8 vols. to date. Herbert A.
Johnson, et al., eds. (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974), 3:134.
28 Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 54-57; Marshall's journal, Oct.
22, 1797, and American Envoys to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 22,
1797, in Marshall, Papers, 3:173, 255-267.
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with Great Britain against France.29
Over the next five months,

negotiations proceeded no

further. "From our first arrival there has been a continuing
effort

to

operate

on

our

fears,"

Marshall

wrote

in

his

journal. "We have been threatened with a variety of ills, and
among others with being ordered immediately to quit France."30
French tactics began to work on Gerry, who was willing to
discuss making a loan at the end of the war.
seeing his

opportunity,

asked for one

Talleyrand,

"impartial” envoy,

namely Gerry, to remain in Paris, and for the other two to
leave. Marshall was more than happy to comply,

and he and

Pinckney left Paris in April of 1798. Gerry remained behind,
believing that only he stood between war and peace.2*
"We are waiting with great Patience for News from Paris,"
John Adams wrote to John Quincy Adams on March 1, 1798. "We
have not received a Line from our Envoys since their arrival
in that City."32 The first group of dispatches,

including

29 Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 58-59, Oct. 30 meeting with
Talleyrand described in American Envoys to Timothy
Pickering, Nov. 8, 1797, in Marshall, Papers, 3:284.
30 Marshall's journal, Feb. 4, 1797, in Marshall, Papers,
3:195-196.
31 Stinchcombe, XYZ Affair, 109-113; Marshall's journal,
March 14, 1798, in Marshall, Papers, 3:229-231; George Athan
Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican
Statesman (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976),
274-275.
32 John Adams to John Quincy Adams, March 1, 1798, Adams
Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel
386.
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documents dated as recently as January 8, 1798, arrived soon
after. Adams was willing to accept the etiquette of European
diplomacy,
surprised

but not outright extortion.
and

Talleyrand's

upset
agents.

that

the

envoys

The
had

president was

even

talked

to

"Pinckney's answer to X, should have

been We will not Say one Word in Answer to Propositions till
We are reed, and meet a Minister on equal ground," Adams wrote
in

his

personal

notes.33 Convinced

that

the mission

had

failed, Adams addressed Congress on March 19 in order to set
policy. Adams did not ask for a declaration of war, but did
ask

for

increased

defensive

preparations.

Despite

French

insolence and vague talk of invasion, the main French threat
came from the sea, and that was where Adams intended to meet
it. Adams asked Congress to increase the navy, improve coastal
fortifications, and allow merchant ships to arm. "In all your
proceedings, it will be important to manifest a zeal, vigor,
and concert, in defence of the national rights proportional to
the

danger

with

which

they

are

threatened,"

Adams

told

Congress.34 Republicans in Congress suspected that the crisis
was a Federalist invention, and on March 30 Representative
William Branch Giles of Virginia demanded the president submit
the XYZ papers to Congress. The Federalists joined in, and
33 R. A. Brown, Presideacy of JA, 48-49; Paper in John
Adams's hand titled "Remarks/ No. 1 Oct. 22, 1797," Adams
Family Papers, Letters Received and other Loose Papers, reel
386. The date refers to the date of the first dispatch
describing the meeting with Hottinguer.
34 Speech of March 19, 1798, in WJA, 9:156-157.
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approved the demand on April 2. Adams immediately released the
papers, embarrassing the Republicans and creating a backlash
against both the French and the Republicans.35
President Adams himself contributed to the backlash,
spending most of the spring and summer denouncing French
action in his public addresses.
conduct

of

our enemies

more

"There is nothing in the

remarkable

than

their

total

contempt for the people," Adams wrote to the inhabitants of
Burlington County, New Jersey,

"and of all real republican

governments, while they screen themselves under some of their
names and forms."38 "As to the French, I know of no government
ancient or modern that ever betrayed so universal and decided
a contempt of the people of all nations, as the present rulers
of France," Adams wrote to the Cincinnati of South Carolina.37
Despite his rhetoric, Adams refused to rule out a peaceful
settlement. "I will never send another mission to France
without assurances that they will be received, respected and
honored as the representatives of a great, free, powerful and
independent nation," Adams told Congress on June 2l.38
In the meantime, Adams hoped to build up the navy. The
president was, of course,

a lifelong advocate of a navy,

35 R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 50-52.
38 John Adams to the Inhabitants of Burlington County, New
Jersey, May 8, 1798, in WJA, 9:191.
37 John Adams to the Cincinnati of South Carolina, Sept. 17,
1798, ibid., 9:232-233.
38 Message of June 21, 1798, ibid., 9:159.
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believing it to be "the most powerful, the safest and the
cheapest

National

defence

for

this

Country."39

Like

Bolingbroke, Adams believed that a navy paid for itself by
protecting commerce and could not endanger domestic liberties.
"To arms then, my young friends, —

to arms, especially by

sea," Adams wrote in response to an address from the young men
of Boston.*0 On April 27 Congress authorized the president to
obtain twelve 24-gun ships. On April 30, Adams signed the bill
creating the Department of the Navy. He nominated George Cabot
of Massachusetts, who declined. Adams then offered the post to
Maryland merchant Benjamin Stoddert, whom the Senate confirmed
on May 21. The navy's first task was to sweep the Atlantic
coast of French privateers. The 24-gun ship Ganges and the 36gun

frigate

Constellation largely completed this

task by

November 1798. Through most of 1798, however, the navy relied
on ten- to sixteen- gun revenue cutters for defense.4^"My hobby-horse was

a navy;

Alexander Hamilton's

army," Adams recalled in retirement.
France,

involved

as

she

was

in

an

"I had no idea that

Europe,

could

send

any

formidable invasion to America."*^ Like Bolingbroke, Adams
39 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 15, 1822, in Adams Jefferson Letters, 585.
40 John Adams to the Young Men of Boston, May 22, 1798, in
WJA, 9:154.
4* DeConde, Quasi-War, 90-91; Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert's
War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France,
1798-1801 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1987), 7-10, 18-19, 52-53.
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preferred to fight a limited naval war, over maritime issues,
and avoid foreign entanglements. Hamilton, playing Marlborough
to Adams's Bolingbroke,

advocated a continental land war.

Hamilton did agree that the navy should be increased, but he
also advocated creating a 20,000-man

standing army and a

30,000-man provisional army, which Adams did not approve.
Hamilton assumed that a conflict with France would bring a
conflict with Spain and would provide an opportunity for the
United States to conquer Louisiana. Throughout the first half
of 1798, Hamilton was in steady contact with the Venezuelan
revolutionary Francisco de Miranda, who had met with Prime
Minister Pitt and hoped for Anglo-American cooperation against
Spain.43 Adams greeted Miranda's plans with silence and later
wrote that Hamilton's designs on Spanish territory, requiring
a large army and an alliance with Great Britain were "in
direct opposition to my system, and wholly subversive of it.”
Adams blamed French revolutionary excesses in part on French
military aggression against other nations. "Could Mr. Pitt and
Mr. Miranda believe me so fascinated, charmed, enchanted with
what had happened in France,” Adams asked James Lloyd, "as to
be

desirous

hazardous

of

engaging

myself

and

my

country

and expensive and bloody experiments

in

most

to excite

4^ John Adams to James Lloyd, Feb. 21, 1815, in WJA, 10:127.
43 Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 293-294; DeConde, Quasi-War,
116-118; Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1953), 145-150, 172-180.
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similar horrors in South America?"44
Congress took up defensive measures in the summer of 1798
and favored Hamilton's program, although also approving the
president's

naval

program.

Federalists

in

the

House

of

Representatives came close to a declaration of war, when Peleg
Sprague

of

New

Hampshire

proposed

attacking

all

French

commerce. This motion failed on June 30, and a similar motion
failed on July 2. The House modified this act to permit the
seizure of armed French vessels anywhere in the world, which
Congress and the president approved. On July 16, Congress
authorized the president to recruit a 50,000-man provisional
army, which he had not asked for and did not want.45
Nor did Adams ever intend to ask for a declaration of
war. He believed that the naval campaign was a sufficient
response until French policy changed, one way or the other.
"Congress has already in my Judgement as well as

in the

opinion of the judges at Phyladelphia declared War, within the
meaning of the Constitution,

against that Republic,

under

certain restrictions and Limitations,” Adams later explained
to John Marshall, referring to the naval actions authorized in
July

1798.46 Adams

intended to conduct the

limited war

44 John Adams to James Lloyd, March 29, 1815, in WJA,
10:147, 149.
45 R. A. Brown, Presidency of JA, 58; DeConde, Quasi-War,
96-107; Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 321-324.
46 Ferling, JA: A Life, 355-356; John Adams to John
Marshall, Sept. 4, 1800, in Marshall, Papers, 4:255. In the
case of Bas v. Tingy, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled
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authorized by Congress at sea, and for that a large army was
useless. 47
The Federalist program had a domestic component as well.
Both

Federalists and Republicans tended to see political

opposition

as

something

close

to

treason.

Fearful

of

Republican sympathy for the French Revolution, the Federalists
moved to quiet opposition.48 The Alien and Sedition Acts
included

the

political

Naturalization

influence

Republican

ranks

of

by

Act,

designed

immigrants
extending

who

the

to

tended

waiting

limit
to

the

augment

period

for

citizenship from five to fourteen years. The Alien Enemies Act
allowed the president to expel aliens from hostile nations as
he saw fit, and the Alien Friends Act allowed him to expel
aliens from friendly nations he deemed dangerous. Finally, the
Sedition

Act

punished

"false,

scandalous

and

malicious"

statements against the president. Congress, or officers of the

that the naval legislation of July 1798 constituted a
limited declaration of war against France. James Scott
Brown, ed. The Controversy over Neutral Rights between the
United States and France 1797-1800: A Collection of American
State Papers and Judicial Decisions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1917), 106-115.
47 Reginald C. Stuart, War in American Thought: From the
Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine (Kent, Ohio: Kent State
University Press, 1982), 88; William J. Murphy, Jr. notes
that utility outweighed ideology in Adams's thinking on the
army, in "John Adams: The Politics of the Additional Army."
New England Quarterly, Vol. 52 no. 2 (June 1979), 246.
48 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 215-218; John R. Howe, Jr.,
"Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the
1790s." American Quarterly, Vol. 19 no. 2 (Summer 1967),
150.
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government in general.4^ Adams attempted to shift the blame
for the enactments to Hamilton. "Nor did I adopt his idea of
an

alien

and

sedition

law,"

Adams

wrote

in

1809.

"I

recommended no such thing in my speech." However, even if
Adams did not specifically ask for such legislation, he did
not veto it.5®
Congressional support for a large army and the Alien and
Sedition Acts showed that Adams did not have the loyalty of
his own party. The issue of who would command that army proved
to Adams that his cabinet was disloyal. George Washington was
the obvious choice, and Adams nominated the former president
on July 4. Washington accepted, but on the condition that he
be allowed to choose his major-generals and that he not be
called to active duty unless Congress declared war. Until that
time, the inspector-general would command the army. Washington
leaned toward either Henry Knox or Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
as his deputy. However, Pickering, Wolcott and McHenry lobbied
heavily for Hamilton.5^ Pickering wrote to Washington in an
anxious, almost conspiratorial tone, telling him that "the

4^ James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and
Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1956), 22-34, 47-48, 51-52, 94-95.
5® Letter XIII to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:291;
Ferling, JA: A Life, 366; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of
Federalism, 588.
51 DeConde, Quasi-War, 96-97; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 234237; Douglas Southall Freeman, The Life of George
Washington, 7 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1948-1957), 7:518-523.
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appointment of Colo. Hamilton, in the manner suggested appears
to me to be of such vast importance to the welfare of the
country, that I am willing to risque any consequences of my
frank and honest endeavours to secure it."52
Washington chose Hamilton as his deputy. But Adams, who
did not trust Hamilton with the command of an army, insisted
that Knox was legally entitled to the inspector-generalship.55
What followed was a comedy of error. Washington did not know
why Adams opposed Hamilton's appointment,
explained himself to Washington.

and Adams never

"General Knox is legally

entitled to rank next to General Washington and no other
arrangement will give satisfaction," Adams informed McHenry.
Adams openly resented the cabinet's interference, complaining
to McHenry that "there has been too much intrigue in this
business with General Washington and me."54 Washington grew
tired of the conflict, and on September 25 he wrote to Adams
threatening to resign if the president did not comply with
their agreement.55 When John Adams received this letter, he

52 Timothy Pickering to George Washington, July 6, 1798,
Timothy Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society,
reel 9.
55 DeConde, Quasi-War, 97-98.
54 John Adams to James McHenry, Aug. 14 and 29, 1798, in
WJA, 8:580, 587-588.
55 George Washington to John Adams, Sept. 25, 1798; see also
George Washington to James McHenry, Sept. 16, 1798, in
George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, 39
vols. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1931-1944), 36: 456, 447.
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knew he had lost. He could not afford an open rift with the
hero

of

the

revolution.

On

October

9,

Adams

wrote

to

Washington, telling him that he would date the commissions of
Knox, Pinckney and Hamilton on the same day, and Washington
could settle the matter as he saw fit.^®
A man Adams did not trust was in effective command of an
army Adams did not want. At the same time Adams was forced to
surrender on the question of the major-generals, he began to
receive

information

indicating that

the

army was,

as

he

believed all along, unnecessary. There were three sources of
diplomatic information that Adams trusted most. The first was
his son, John Quincy Adams, the American minister to Prussia.
The second was Elbridge Gerry, Adams's personal friend and one
of the few "1775 men" still active in public affairs.-57 The
third was William Vans Murray, the American minister to the
Netherlands.

Murray,

a Maryland Federalist,

was

a strong

supporter of John Adams and a close friend of John Quincy
Adams.-5® Dispatches from these men, along with the president's
own analysis of the military situation,

brought about the

shift from a war footing to appointment of a second peace
mission.

56 John Adams to George Washington, Oct. 9, 1798, in WJA,
8:600-601.
®7 Dauer, Adams Federalists, 89; John Adams to Elbridge
Gerry, Feb. 13, 1797, in WJA, 8:525.
5® Peter P. Hill, William Vans Murray, Federalist Diplomat
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 1-45.
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John Quincy Adams spent much of his time observing French
actions and reported in early 1798 that France was approaching
the limits of its military capacity. France was preparing an
invasion of Great Britain, but preparations "are made with so
much ostentation,
serious."

that I have some doubts of their being

"The preparations

for the french expedition

to

England continue," Adams wrote to his father in May, "though
the length of time which they have taken and their not having
formed any junction of forces, an opinion has lately been
spreading, that it would eventually be abandoned."59 Adams
believed that if the United States resisted French action,
"the terrible Republic can hurt us little by sea." Adams
applauded the American reaction to the XYZ Affair, noting that
the French "are alarmed at the spirit which the publication
raised in our country."66 "The spirited & decisive measures on
our part have brought down the tone of Talleyrand to a degree
of modesty, which he has rarely discovered," Adams wrote to
Rufus King, the American minister to Great Britain.61 Adams
believed the United States had gained the respect of Europe
and reported to Pickering that the king of Prussia believed
59 John Quincy Adams to William L. Smith, Jan. 10, 1798:
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, May 8, 1798, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reels 130 and 133.
66 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, March 6 and
June 19, 1798, in John Quincy Adams, The Writings of John
Quincy Adams, 7 vols. Worthington C. Ford, ed. (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1913-1917), 2:266, 310.
61 John Quincy Adams to Rufus King, Aug. 10, 1798, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 133.
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that, "the whole conduct of the American government was such
as must command the esteem and ought to obtain the friendship
of all other nations."62
Elbridge Gerry did not similarly approve of American
actions. He had remained in Paris after Marshall and Pinckney
left,

for fear that his departure would bring war.

Gerry

continued to meet with Talleyrand, who told Gerry that peace
could still be achieved, but also warned him not to leave.
Pickering finally ordered Gerry home in July. Gerry arrived at
Boston on October 1 and went almost immediately to Quincy to
meet with the president. Gerry had convinced himself that he
had prevented war, and hoped to convince the president of the
same thing.62 In later years John Adams credited Gerry for
providing the evidence that France was willing to meet the
conditions Adams set in his speech of June 21, 1798.6^
Adams may have exaggerated Gerry's immediate influence.
In an effort to buy time, Talleyrand may have told Gerry
exactly what the envoy wanted to hear,

knowing that Gerry

would immediately report to the president.65 Adams had more
official information from William Vans Murray. In July 1798,
Talleyrand ordered Louis Pichon, the French minister to the
62 John Quincy Adams to Timothy Pickering, Aug. 22, 1798, in
ftTJQA, 2:354.
62 Billias, Gerry, 285-286, 294-295; DeConde, Quasi-War,
146-147; Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 340-344.
6^ Letter III to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:246.
65 DeConde downplays Gerry's influence in Quasi-War, 161.
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Netherlands,

to

begin

informal

negotiations

with

Murray.

Murray wrote to Adams on July 17, describing his interview
with Pichon. Murray believed that France was afraid of fullscale war with the United States. Murray's letters to Adams
arrived at Pickering's office on October 2. Pickering sent the
letters on to Quincy the next day, and they arrived on October
9.66 Adams responded that the letters "made a great impression
on me."6^ On October 20, Adams wrote to Pickering, asking his
opinion on whether the president should request a declaration
of war, or appoint a new minister to France.6® In any case,
Murray's

letters

convinced Adams

that there would be no

invasion and offered a vindication of Adams's
republican diplomacy.
maintain,

version of

"If this nation sees a great army to

without an enemy to fight,

there may

arise an

enthusiasm that seems little forseen," Adams warned McHenry.
"At present there is no more prospect of seeing a French army
here, than there is in Heaven."69
Adams also received information from an unexpected and
unwelcome source. George Logan, a Pennsylvania Republican whom
66 DeConde, Quasi-War, 147-148, 162-163; William Vans Murray
to John Adams, July 1 and 17, 1798, in WJA, 8:677-680, 680682; Timothy Pickering to John Adams, Oct. 3, 1798, Adams
Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel
391.
6^ John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 29, 1798, in WJA,
8:614-615.
6® John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Oct. 20, 1798, ibid.,
8:609.
69 John Adams to James McHenry, Oct. 22, 1798, ibid., 8:613.
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John Quincy Adams described as a "Philadelphia Jacobin," had
left for France on a private peace mission in June 1798 and
had met with Talleyrand and the Directory in August.70 The
president did not expect Logan's mission to help and openly
wondered

if

such

a

mission

was

constitutional.7*

Logan

returned to the United States in November and reported to
Adams on November 26 that France would receive any minister he
sent.

Adams

suspected

that

Logan's

mission

was

an

electioneering trick, and the only concrete result was the
Logan Act of January 30, 1799, which prohibited such private
diplomacy.72
Adams

no doubt paid more

attention

to the military

situation than to Logan's report. By the fall of 1798, the
United States navy was fully deployed, with between ten and
fifteen

ships

independent
American

on

station.

British

losses

to

action
the

American
in

the

French.

action,
West

Navy

along

Indies,

Secretary

with

reduced
Stoddert

believed the best policy was "to lay the foundation now, for
an

increase

of

the

navy

to

that

size,

which

shall

be

70 DeConde, Quasi-War, 155-156; John Quincy Adams to William
Vans Murray, Aug. 11, 1798, in WJQA, 2:347.
71 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, Aug. 14, 1798,
in WJQA, 2:349; John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Nov. 2,
1798, in WJA, 8:615.
72 DeConde, Quasi-War, 165-166, 172; Frederick B. Tolies,
George Logan of Philadelphia (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1953), 179-180; John Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 10,
1799, Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose
Papers, reel 393.
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sufficient

both

for

the

defense

of our coasts,

and

the

protection of our trade."7^ British victories also worked in
the United States' favor. On August 1, 1798, Admiral Horatio
Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile,
stranding Napoleon Bonaparte's army in Egypt and curtailing
French naval action in the Atlantic. Adams celebrated the
"magnificent victory of Nelson," writing Francis Dana that the
victory was "without a precedent or parallel."7^ "The English
have exhibited an amazing Example of Skill and Intrepidity,
Performance and Firmness at Sea," Adams later wrote his wife.
"We are a Chip off that Block."75
By December 1798, Adams clearly believed that the French
would not, and could not, escalate the war. Whether or not
they would make

peace was

an entirely different matter.

Despite the various hints that France wanted to reach a
settlement, there was still no official word, at least that
would satisfy the conditions set forth in Adams's message of
June 21, 1798. Adams therefore announced no policy changes in
his

annual

observed

message

that

the

to

Congress

French

laws

on December
subjecting

8,

1798.

neutral

He

ships

75 M. Palmer, Stoddert's War, 72-81; Benjamin Stoddert to
John Adams, Nov. 23, 1798, in George Gibbs, ed. Memoirs of
the Administrations of Washington and John Adams, 2 vols.
(New York: 1846), 2:116.
74 DeConde, Quasi-War, 161; John Adams to Francis Dana, Dec.
3, 1798, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 117.
75 John Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 1, 1799, Adams Family
Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 393.
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carrying enemy goods to capture were still in operation, and
that such legislation was, "an unequivocal act of war on the
commerce of the nations it attacks.” "Hitherto, therefore,"
Adams continued, "nothing is discoverable in the conduct of
France

which

defence."

ought

Adams

to

change

reminded

or

relax

Congress

our

that

measures

"an

of

efficient

preparation for war can alone insure peace." "It is peace that
we have uniformly and perserveringly cultivated," he told
Congress, "and harmony between us and France may be restored
at her option." However, he would not send another minister,
"without more determinate assurances."76
Such assurances came in William Vans Murray's letters.
Murray continued to meet with Pichon, who delivered messages
from Talleyrand. On August 20, Murray reported that the French
would agree to a Dutch mediation. It was a meaningless offer,
as the Netherlands was a French protectorate, but it at least
indicated that American actions were having an effect on
French

policy.

Talleyrand wrote

to Pichon

on August

28,

arguing that American prosperity "is more at the expense of
Great Britain than us." Pichon passed this letter on to Murray
on September 6. On October 7, Murray received a copy of a
letter Talleyrand wrote on September 28, in which Talleyrand
promised that

any minister Adams

sent would

be

properly

received. Murray thought Talleyrand's method unorthodox but
believed that the letter satisfied Adams's conditions, and
76 Speech of Dec. 8, 1798, in WJA, 9:129-130.
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sent it to the president. Adams received Murray's letters in
January and February 1799.77 Probably on the basis of these
letters, Adams ordered Pickering to draft a treaty to be
proposed to France.78 Adams had sufficient information from
"regular diplomatic sources" to make his decision. On February
1, 1799, George Washington forwarded a letter to him from the
poet Joel Barlow, who argued that France wanted peace with the
United States. Washington added that he would support any
honorable peace that Adams made. Adams gave no weight to
Barlow's

letter,

but Washington's

letter seemed

to

offer

political cover for a new mission. On February 18, 1799, Adams
nominated William Vans Murray as minister to France.78
"I desire no other inscription over my gravestone than:
'Here

lies

John

Adams,

who

took

upon

himself

the

responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800,'"
Adams wrote in 1815.88 Adams had seen that the military fervor
of

1798

was dead by 1799,

and that his administration's

actions had brought France back to the bargaining table. Adams
believed that his diplomacy allowed him to remove the army as
77 DeConde, Quasi-War, 151-152, 159-160, 178-179; William
Vans Murray to John Adams, Aug. 20 and Oct. 7, 1798, in WJA,
8 :688, 688-690; Letter VII to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in
WJA, 9:262.
78 John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Jan. 15, 1799, ibid.,
8:621.
79 DeConde, Quasi-War, 178-179; Letter I to the Boston
Patriot,
1809, in WJA, 9:241-242; George Washington to John
Adams, Feb. 1, 1799, in Washington, Writings, 37:119-120.
80 John Adams to James Lloyd, Jan. 1815, in WJA, 10:113.
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a domestic threat to republican government. "I never think of
our means without shuddering,” Adams wrote to McHenry on July
27, 1799. "All the declamations, as well as demonstrations, of
Trenchard and Gordon, Bolingbroke, Barnard and Walpole, Hume,
Burgh and Burke rush in upon my memory and frighten me out of
my wits." Opposition writers had always warned of the danger
of debts and armies, and Walpole learned in the late 1720s
that

the

government

could

not

maintain

a

war

footing

indefinitely.8*
Although

Adams

political gain,

did

not

nominate

Murray

solely

for

it is clear that Adams believed, in Albert

Hall Bowman's words,

"good policy was good politics."82 jn

execution, Adams's policy married his Bolingbrokean conception
of the presidency, as a leader acting alone for the general
good, to Bolingbrokean conception of the proper goals and
methods

of

foreign

policy.

88

In

substance,

the

Murray

nomination reflected Adams's long experience in diplomacy and
his acceptance that American diplomats in Europe must act
according to European rules. He accepted Talleyrand's use of
Murray and Pichon as standard diplomatic practice.

It is

unlikely that the John Adams of 1778 would have approved of

8* John Adams to James McHenry, July 27, 1799, ibid., 9:4-5.
82 Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 368; Kohn, Eagle and
Sword, 258-259; Kurtz, Presidency of JA, 308-309, 335-336.
88 Ketcham, Presidents above Party, 99.
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such a roundabout approach.84
Adams did not consult Pickering, and Pickering let his
imagination run wild as to the reason Adams nominated Murray.
"That capital error of Mr. Adams, in instituting the mission
to France in 1799, I have long thought originated with Mr.
Jefferson, or his agents," Pickering wrote in 1815.®^ "But for
this," Pickering wrote in 1823, "the system of administration
which had been established under Washington, and until then
continued

under Adams,

would

have

remained."®**

Pickering

viewed Washington's system as using close relations with Great
Britain as bulwark against French radicalism.

Adams did not,

and he acted to preserve, "a system of eternal neutrality, if
possible, in all the wars of Europe," which he believed was
the only proper policy for a republic, and was Adams's system
long before it was Washington's.®7
"You will be shocked, as we all were, by the President's
nomination of Mr. Murray minister plenipotentiary to negotiate
84 Stephen G. Kurtz, "The French Mission of 1799-1800:
Concluding Chapter in the Statecraft of John Adams."
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 80 no. 4 (December 1965),
598.
®-* Timothy Pickering to John Lowell, Jan. 24, 1815, in Henry
Adams, ed. Documents relating to New-England Federalism,
1800-1815 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1877), 426.
88 Timothy Pickering, A Review of the Correspondence between
the Hon. John Adams, late President of the United States,
and the Late William Cunningham, Esq., Beginning in 1803 and
Ending in 1812 (Salem, Mass.: Cushing and Appleton, 1823),
108.
87 Letter II to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 9:242;
Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 367-368.
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a treaty with the French Republic," Pickering wrote to George
Cabot.

"I beg you to believe it is the sole act of the

President."

"We shall recover from the shock of Murray's

nomination; no preparation for war is lessened," Pickering
assured Rufus King.®® Pickering's sentiments were typical of
the pro-war wing of the Federalist party. Five Federalist
senators —

Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, James Ross and

William Bingham of Pennsylvania, Jacob Reed of South Carolina
and Richard Stockton of New Jersey —

met with Adams on

February 23, hoping to talk him out of the peace mission. When
Adams refused, the senators asked for a commission rather than
a single envoy, to which Adams reluctantly agreed. Two days
after the meeting, Adams named Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth
and Patrick Henry, both Federalists, as Murray's colleagues.®9
The cabinet met at the president's house on March 10 to
draft instructions.

The president and cabinet unanimously

agreed on three requirements

for a treaty.

should indemnify American citizens

First,

France

for spoliation claims.

Second, France should compensate shipowners for ships seized
for lack of a r&le d'equipage. Third, the United States would
offer no

guarantee

for French

territory.

As the cabinet

88 Timothy Pickering to George Cabot, Feb. 21, 1799, in
Lodge, Life of Cabot; Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, March
6, 1799, in King, Correspondence, 2:549.
89 Letter IV to the Boston Patriot, 1809, in WJA, 8:248-250;
DeConde, Quasi-War, 185; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Theodore
Sedgwick, Federalist: A Political Portrait (Middleton,
Conn.: Wesleyan university Press, 1965), 187-189.
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drafted instructions, Patrick Henry declined his appointment,
and Adams named Governor William R. Davie of North Carolina as
his replacement.90
Congress

adjourned

in mid-March,

and Adams

left

for

Quincy soon after, without having ordered the new envoys to
sail. The delay was not an accident but was tied directly to
American sea power in the Caribbean, as Opposition thought and
Adams's own diplomatic experience dictated that it should be.
In March 1799, twenty American ships were on station in the
Caribbean, but most were due to rotate out for repairs. By
June, only five ships remained, none with more than 24 guns.
Adams pursued a twin policy of preparation and negotiation and
would not launch a new mission without sufficient sea power to
defend American shipping in the event of failure.

In the

meantime, Adams could read dispatches and issue orders as
easily from Quincy as from Philadelphia.91
Pickering did his best to have the mission cancelled.
Adams later recalled that Pickering "opposed, obstinated, and
embarrassed me to the utmost of his power."92 On June 18 (30
Prarial on the French calendar) most of the Directory fell
Q0

Account of March 10, 1799, meeting in Pickering Papers,
reel 10; DeConde, Quasi-War, 186-187.
91 Brown, Presidency of JA, 102-107; Kurtz, "French
Mission," 555; M. Palmer, Stoddert's War, 108-109.
92 John Adams to William Cunningham, Nov. 7, 1808, in
William Cunningham, Correspondence between the Hon. John
Adams, late President of the United States, and the Late
William Cunningham, Esq., Beginning in 1803 and Ending in
1812 (Boston: E.M. Cunningham, 1823), 46.
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from power. Several weeks later Talleyrand resigned and was
replaced by his ally, Karl Reinhard.93 Pickering believed the
coup to be a sufficient reason to suspend the mission, as "the
men lately in power, who gave the assurances you required,
relative to the mission, being ousted in a manner indicative
of a revolution in the public mind."94
Adams

advised

Pickering

to

maintain

defensive

preparations but to make no changes in policy. Adams did not
intend to provoke a war.

"If the spirit of exterminating

vengeance ever arises," Adams wrote to Pickering, "it shall be
conjured up by them, not me."9^

However, Adams did not wish

to send the mission prematurely. "I have no reason or motive
to precipitate

the mission,"

Adams

wrote

to Stoddert

on

September 4. On September 16, Adams wrote Pickering that it
would be better to wait until after hurricane season to send
the

envoys.9^ By

restored

September,

in the Caribbean.

American

naval

In October,

strength

Adams

arrived

was
at

Trenton, where the government had moved after a yellow fever
epidemic

in

Philadelphia.

On

October

16,

Adams

ordered

93 Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality, 384-387.
94 Timothy Pickering to John Adams, Sept. 11, 1799, Adams
Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel
396.
95 John Adams to Timothy Pickering, Aug. 6, 1799, in WJA,
9:11.
9t* John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, Sept. 4, 1799; John
Adams to Timothy Pickering, Sept. 16, 1799, ibid., 9:20, 30.
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Ellsworth and Davie to sail, and the envoys left for Europe on
November 3.97
Ellsworth and Davie arrived in Lisbon on November 27 and
spent several weeks gathering intelligence before proceeding
to Paris. When the envoys arrived on March 2, 1800, they found
a different government from the one they had intended to meet.
Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory on 18 Brumaire
(November 9,

1799),

establishing himself as First Consul.

Bonaparte had his reasons for settling with the United States.
He wanted better relations with the neutral powers of northern
Europe, and a settlement with the United States would improve
his image. To establish the groundwork, Bonaparte repealed the
law of January 18, 1798, which subjected American vessels to
capture. On February 9, 1800, Bonaparte declared two weeks of
mourning

in honor of George Washington,

December

14,

1799.

who

had died on

Bonaparte appointed Talleyrand as his

foreign minister, but turned negotiations over to a three-man
commission of Joseph Bonaparte, Pierre Louis Roederer, and
Charles Pierre Claret Fleurieu.98
For

six

months

negotiations

made

no

progress.

The

Americans insisted on indemnities for shipping losses and an
end to the 1778 treaties. The French argued that the 1778
treaties were still in force and refused to pay indemnities.

97 DeConde, Quasi-War, 219-222; M. Palmer, Stoddert 's War,
241.
98 DeConde, Quasi-War, 223-231.
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On

September

Americans,

11,

Pierre

the most

Roederer

important

observed

goal was

to

that
end

to
the

the
1778

alliance and the guarantee of French territory. The French
were willing to grant this concession but only at the price of
giving up the indemnities.

On September 13,

the American

envoys agreed to postpone discussion of the indemnities and
the 1778 treaties and simply restore normal relations. In the
meantime, the 1778 treaties would be suspended. The two sides
completed

a draft on September 27 and signed the Provisional

Treaty of

Amity andCommerce on October 1. Bonaparte asked

that the agreement be downgraded to a convention, signed in
the name of the Premier Consul of the French Republic and the
President

of

Mortefontaine,

the United

States.

The Convention

named after Joseph Bonaparte's

signed on October

3,

1800.99

The treaty did

of

estate, was
not exactly

conform to the instructions, but as Murray explained to the
secretary of state,

"it was

our duty & for the honor &

interest of the government & people of the United States, that
we should agree to that treaty, rather than make none."100
Thetreaty

was

concluded

too

late to

affect

the

presidential election of 1800. The Republicans, in support of
Thomas Jefferson, used the Alien and Sedition Acts to good
political advantage. On May 1, the Republicans secured all of

99 Ibid., 237-257.
100 William Vans Murray to John Marshall, Oct. 1, 1800, in
Marshall, Papers, 4:310.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
New York's

twelve electoral

votes.

Adams

learned of

results on May 3 and acted to distance himself

the

from the

Hamilton program. Adams cut off Hamilton's influence over
military

policy

resignation,

by

demanding

replacing

him

and

with

receiving

moderate

McHenry's

Massachusetts

Federalist Samuel Dexter. On May 10 Adams asked Pickering to
resign. Pickering refused, and on May 12, 1800 he became the
first cabinet member ever to be fired.101 Adams appointed John
Marshall

as

Pickering's

replacement.

This

may

have

been

Adams's attempt to distance himself from the domestic program,
which

fell

under

the

secretary

of

state's

jurisdiction.

Marshall opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts, writing that
they would do more harm than good.102 By 1800, Marshall was
exactly the

type of Federalist John Adams wanted in his

cabinet.103
The cabinet purge angered Hamilton to the point where he
almost preferred to elect Jefferson than to re-elect Adams.
"If we must have an enemy at the head of the Government, let
it be one whom we can oppose," Hamilton wrote to Theodore

101 DeConde, Quasi-War, 269-272; Ferling, JA: A Life, 393394; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 264; White, Federalists, 252.
102 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 729-730; John
Marshall to "A Freeholder," Sept. 20, 1798, in Marshall,
Papers, 3:505.
103 Kurtz also makes this connection in Presidency of JA,
358-359.
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Sedgwick.10^ Hamilton's true object was to swing the election
to

Adams's

running

mate,

Charles

Cotesworth

Pinckney.

Throughout the summer, Hamilton distributed a private letter
to Federalist leaders, cataloguing Adams's supposed faults.
Republican resurgence and a Federalist split combined to deny
Adams a second term. On December 3, South Carolina gave its
eight votes to Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, putting the
two Republicans in a first place tie.*®5
On December 11, Davie arrived in the United States with
a copy of the Convention of Mortefontaine. Adams sent it to
the Senate five days later. The convention stalled in the
Federalist-controlled

Senate,

and

was

rejected

16-14

on

January 23, 1801. Political pressure from merchants led the
Senate to reconsider. The Senate expunged Article II, which
stated that the 1778 treaties were suspended,

and finally

approved the convention 22-9 on February 3, 1801, bringing the
Quasi-War to a formal end a month before Adams left office.106
To a keen student
Adams,

the end of the

federalists

are

Bolingbroke

and

much

of British political history such as
administration looked familiar. "We
in

Harley,

the

situation

after

the

of

treaty

the
of

party

Utrecht,

10^ Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, May 10, 1800,
in Hamilton, Papers, 24:475.
105 DeConde, Quasi-War,

of

277-285.

106 DeConde, Quasi-War, 288-292; Richard C. Rohrs, "The
Federalist Party and the Convention of 1800." Diplomatic
History, Vol. 12 no. 3 (Summer 1988), 250-251.
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completely and totally routed and defeated," Adams wrote to
Benjamin Stoddert a few weeks after leaving office.107 Adams
advised his youngest son to read The Idea of a Patriot King to
see another instance where one party sought a war with France,
"for the pretext to raise a regular army . . . for the purpose
of Patronage and Influence."108 As the Bolingbrokean moment
ended, Adams could himself take some solace in a passage from
The Idea of a Patriot King. "It is true that a prince, who
gives just reasons to expect that his reign will be that of a
Patriot King, may not always meet, and from all persons, such
returns as such expectations deserve," Bolingbroke wrote, "but
they must not hinder either the prince from continuing to give
them, or the people from continuing to acknowledge them."109
John Adams

believed he

had acted

the part

of a patriot

president; the people, however, had not acknowledged it.
John

Adams

left

office

believing

he

had

kept

the

republic. "I shall leave the State with its coffers full, and
the fair prospect of a peace with all the world smiling in its
face," Adams remarked in his final months in office. 110 Adams
concluded

that

peace

and

neutrality

depended

on

naval

107 John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, March 31, 1801, in WJA,
9:582.
108 John Adams to Thomas Boy Iston Adams, Jan. 15, 1801,
Adams Family Collection, Library of Congress.
109 Bolingbroke, Patriot King, 26.
110 John Adams to Francis A. Vanderkemp, Dec. 28, 1800, in
WJA, 9:577.
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preparation.

"We

cannot,

without

committing

a

dangerous

imprudence, abandon those measures of self-protection, which
are adapted to our situation,” Adams told Congress in his last
annual message.111 As Adams left public office, he abandoned
any hope that foreign policy based on the more idealistic
elements of republican ideology could reform the world; for
example, the small-navy principle that free ships make free
goods had become part of republican ideology. If all nations
adopted this principle, theoretically all naval wars would
come to an end. "However desirable this may be to Humanity,
how much soever Phylosophy may approve of it, and Christianity
desire it,"

Adams wrote to John Marshall,

"I am clearly

convinced that it will never take place." The United States
could not rely on the good will of other nations, the justice
of its policies or the nature of its government, but only on
the strength of its navy.11^ In the end, Adams abandoned the
grandiose hopes (but not the ideals) of the Model Treaty for
the

more

dependable

Bolingbroke

and

republican

confirmed

by

realpolitik described
Adams's

own

by

diplomatic

experience. Adams left office convinced he had found a way to
act within an international balance of power compatible with
the preservation of republican government at home.

111 Speech of Nov. 22, 1800, ibid., 9:145.
11^ John Adams to John Marshall, Oct. 3, 1800, in Marshall,
Papers, 4:313.
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CHAPTER 5: EXTENDING THE SPHERE

Like John Adams, James Madison grew up in a time and
place dominated by diplomatic issues. Among Madison's earliest
childhood memories were General Braddock's defeat on the road
to Fort Duquesne in 1755 and constant fear of Indian attack.
More

important,

as

a

westerner

he

looked

toward

the

Mississippi valley. As Ralph Ketcham writes, "James Madison
lived his life, private and public, in the presence of this
vast struggle for world power.”1 As a Virginian, Madison came
to political maturity at a time when the factors of Scottish
mercantile houses dominated the tobacco trade.^ In Madison's
mind, the great issues of trade with Great Britain and control
of the Mississippi River linked foreign policy and republican
government in America. The survival of the American republic
depended on a republican political economy, which depended on
diplomatic success, which Madison defined as an equitable
trade relationship with Great Britain and free use of the

1 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1971), 3; Irving Brant, James Madison, 6
vols. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941-1961),
1:45-49.
^ T.H. Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great
Tidewater Planters on the Eve of the Revolution (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 38-39.
164
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Mississippi River. Diplomatic success in turn depended on a
durable

republican

government

which

could secure

those

interests by means compatible with a government limited power,
specifically through the use of American trade.
Madison received much of his political education under
the

influence of John Witherspoon

Jersey.

Witherspoon

derived

at the College of New

many

of

his lectures

from

Aristotle, and added works of the Enlightenment, including the
emerging republican canon: John Locke, James Harrington, Baron
de Montesquieu and Algernon Sidney. Witherspoon also belonged
to the Scottish Common Sense school
emerging law of nations, especially

and lectured on the

the works of David Hume,

Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius andSamuel von

Pufendorf. The

heavy

the

Scottish

influence,

along

with

economic

circumstances of Madison's Virginia, probably account for the
role of political economy in Madison's thought and in turn for
his policies regarding trade and the Mississippi.3
Throughout

his

career,

Madison

sought

to

reconcile

republican thought with political and diplomatic practice. He
did not always succeed as, for example, when he lost a race
for a state senate seat in 1777.
freeholders

Traditionally,

Virginia

gathered in the county court house and voted

orally.

Candidates

keeping

an

open

were

house

expected
and

to

offering

"treat"

the

hospitality

voters,
to

all,

3 Brant, JM, 1:76; Ketcham, JM, 42-50; Henry F. May, The
Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1976), 62-65.
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supporters

and

opponents,

to

avoid

corruption.

Madison refused to treat,

the

appearance

of

on the ground that

treating was incompatible with republicanism. "The consequence
was

that

the

election

went

against

him," Madison

later

recalled, "his abstinence being represented as the effect of
pride or parsimony.”4
The independent yeoman farmer, whom Madison had refused
to corrupt in 1777, lay at the center of Madison's political
system and by extension his diplomacy. Madison's faith in the
virtue of the American people never fell as far as John
Adams's,

because Madison,

unlike Adams,

never held out a

classical model for virtue. Madison's model of yeoman virtue
depended more on the plowshare than the sword. Furthermore,
Madison's relationship with Jefferson served as a moderating
influence

on

Madison's

own

suspicions

of

human

nature.

Jefferson had no such effect on Adams.5
Madison generally concurred with Jefferson on issues of
political

economy.

Free

trade,

liberated

from

colonial

shackles, would preserve a republican political economy by
promoting agriculture and discouraging domestic manufactures.

4 Charles S. Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders: Political
Practices in Washington's Virginia (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1952), 19-26, 51-58; Douglass
Adair, ed. "James Madison's Autobiography." William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 2 no. 2 (April 1945), 199-200.
5 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1948-1981), 2:169; Ralph Ketcham,
"James Madison and the Nature of Man," Journal of the
History of Ideas, Vol. 19 no. 1 (January 1958), 63-67.
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"The general policy of America is at present pointed at the
encouragement of Agriculture,

and the

importation of the

objects of consumption. The wid[er] therefore our ports be
opened

and

the

more

extensive

the

priviliges

of

all

competitors in our Commerce the more likely we shall be to buy
at cheap & sell at profitable rat[es]," he wrote to Edmund
Randolph

in 1783.

settled,

and

"But in proportion as our lands become

spare

hands

for

manufactures

&

navigation

multiply, it may become our policy to favor these objects."®
In the late 1780s, Madison opposed protective tariffs and
discounted the idea that a lack of domestic manufactures would
leave the united States dependent on other nations. Madison
believed

that

European

desire

for

American

agricultural

products would overcome all obstacles to trade, including war.
"Neutral nations, whose rights are becoming every day more &
more

extensive,"

Madison

wrote,

"would

not

now

suffer

themselves to be shut out of our ports."7
Madison believed the United States could manipulate the
European balance of power to their own advantage. Trade gave
the United

States a strategic invulnerability that would

remove the need for a dangerous and unrepublican military

6 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, May 20, 1783, in James
Madison, The Papers of James Madison, 17 vols. date. William
T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal, et al., eds.
(Chicago and Charlottesville: University of Chicago Press
and University Press of Virginia, 1959), 7:59-60.
7 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Jan. 9, 1787, ibid.,
9:244-245.
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establishment. His view was not dissimilar to that of John
Adams in drafting the Model Treaty, but while Adams gave up on
economic coercion in the 1780s, Madison never did. Madison
unwittingly staked the survival of republican government on
the actions of other nations. Madison's system demanded that
European nations

see their interests as he saw them,

in

equitable trade arrangements and recognizing an American claim
to navigate the Mississippi. Madison's great fear was not that
European nations would act other than as he supposed they
would but that diplomats from the eastern states would sell
out Virginia's interests in favor of their own section.
For Madison, navigation of the Mississippi was vital to
American

independence

and

the

preservation

of

republican

government. When Madison entered the Continental Congress in
1779, he became one of the more vocal defenders of American
claims on the Mississippi. He argued that under natural law,
usage and mutual benefit gave the United States a natural
claim to the right to navigate

the entire course of the

Mississippi.® In a long letter to John Jay concerning Jay's
instructions as minister to Spain, Madison listed five reasons
why the United States should insist on its rights on the
Mississippi: the Mississippi formed a natural boundary, the
United

States

could

not

prevent

western

settlement,

the

territory east of the Mississippi fell within the colonial
charters, the territory already included American citizens,
8 Brant, JM, 1:82; Ketcham, JM, 96-98.
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and the United States needed the river more than Spain did.
"An innocent passage (says Vattel) is due to all nations with
whom a state is at peace," Madison continued, "and this duty
comprehends troops equally with individuals."9 The Virginia
delegates in Congress advised Governor Jefferson to instruct
the delegation not to give up the right to the Mississippi in
exchange for a Spanish alliance unless absolutely necessary.1®
In defending the American claim to the Mississippi,
Madison

acted,

in

Lance

Banning's

term,

Continentalist." He sought the Mississippi

as

a

"Virginia

as a Virginia

interest but also as an interest of the whole nation.11 In
November 1780 Madison attacked the notion that the United
States should give up the Mississippi to gain

peace and

implicitly criticized the idea that the Mississippi and the
fisheries were equivalent interests. "Obsticles enough will be
thrown in the way of peace, if [it] is to be bid for at the
expense of particular members of the union," Madison wrote.
"The Eastern States must on the first suggestion take alarm
for their fisheries. If they will not support the other states
in their rights, they cannot expect to be supported themselves

9 James Madison to John Jay, Oct. 17, 1780, in PJM, 2:130132.
10 Virginia Delegates to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 13, 1780,
ibid., 2:242.
11 Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison
& the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1995), 42. See also McDonald,
N o w s Ordo Seclorum, 204-205.
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when theirs come into question.1,12 Unlike John Adams, Madison
believed a navy and a large merchant marine were incompatible
with republican government. Madison therefore considered the
fisheries merely the special interest of New England, rather
than

a

national

interest.

Madison

advocated

southern

participation in a navy only as a hedge against disunion,
which would leave a well-armed North to prey on a rich and
defenseless southern commerce.15
Military disaster in the South generally and particularly
in

Virginia

moderated

Virginia's

demands.

The

American

surrender at Charleston and defeat at Waxhaw in May 1780 wiped
out most of the Virginia Continentals. British advance agents
appeared in Virginia in the spring of 1780 and some 2200
British troops landed in October. On January 5, 1781, British
troops

seized Richmond,

barely missing the

fleeing

state

government.^ The Reverend James Madison notified his namesake
and cousin of the disaster on January 18, writing, "by this
time I suppose you have heard thro' many Channels of ye. Loss
of our Capitol, & ye. Disgrace of Virginia."15 On February 1,
1781, Madison moved in Congress that the United States give up

^ James Madison to Joseph Jones, Nov. 25, 1780, in PJM,
2:203.
15 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, Feb. 25, 1783, ibid.,
6:287.
^

Selby, Revolution in Virginia, 213-224.

15 The Rev. James Madison to James Madison, Jan. 18, 1781,
in PJM, 2:293.
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the right to navigate the lower Mississippi, where it flowed
between Spanish banks,

if that concession would secure a

Spanish alliance.16
Fear of defeat and that Adams would prolong the war over
the fisheries led Madison to support the instructions of June
15,

1781

that

revoked

Adams's

peace

commission.

Madison

himself sponsored the motion of July 12, 1781, to strip Adams
of his power to negotiate a commercial treaty with Great
Britain.

17

To Madison, the new instructions were a concession

to military necessity. "It is impossible to expect that France
should maintain the war by her own treasury," the Virginia
delegation informed Governor Thomas Nelson in October 1781.1®
More

than

a

year

later Madison

instructions of June 15,

1781.

continued

to

On July 24,

defend

1782,

the

Madison

opposed a motion to reconsider those instructions. On August
8 Madison conceded that the instructions were, "a sacrifice of
national
dignity

dignity,” but defended
to

policy."

"The

them as

situation

of

"a sacrifice
our

affairs

of
and

circumstances of that time rendered this sacrifice necessary."
Madison dismissed any suspicions of France, arguing that "our
interests are as safe in her hands now as they were before or
16 Motion on the Navigation of the Mississippi, Feb. 1,
1781, ibid., 2:302-303.
17 Stinchcombe, French Alliance, 174; Ketcham, JM, 93-94;
Brant, JM, 2:137-144; Motion on John Adams's Commission and
Instructions, July 12, 1781, in PJM, 3:188.
1® Virginia Delegates to Thomas Nelson, Oct. 9, 1781, ibid.,
3:281.
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as

if

the

ministers

were

left

wholly

to

their

own

discretion.1,19
When the provisional treaty of
Congress,

peace

arrived before

Madison objected to the commissioners's blatant

violation of their instructions. He suspected the worst of
Adams, noting that Adams's dispatches from Europe were mainly
"a display of his vanity, his prejudice against the French
Court & his venom against Doctr. Franklin."20 jn debating the
treaty Madison noted that "many of the most judicious members"
objected to the fact that the commissioners had not consulted
the

French.

The

separate

article,

written

by

Jay,

that

promised the British more territory in West Florida if they
held it at the end of the war "was most offensive."2* "In this
business Jay has taken the lead ... Adams has followed with
cordiality.

Franklin

has been

dragged into

it,"

Madison

explained to Edmund Randolph.22 on the floor of Congress,
Madison expressed surprise that the commissioners should blame
their problems on the instructions of June 15, 1781.23
With the conclusion of the war, the United States hoped

1Q

Comments on Instructions to Peace Commissioners, July 24
and Aug. 8, 1782, ibid., 4:437, 5:33-34.
20 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 11, 1783
(partially in code), ibid., 6:221.
21 Notes on Debates, March 12-15, 1783, ibid., 6:328.
22 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, March 18, 1783
(partially in code), ibid., 6:355.
23 Notes on Debates, March 19, 1781, ibid., 6:363-364.
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to resume trade with Great Britain as quickly as possible, but
on a more equal level than in the colonial era. On May 6,
1783, Secretary Livingston submitted a draft treaty that re
established direct trade between the United States and the
British West Indies, and allowed the United States into the
carrying trade between the British West Indies and Europe. In
exchange British merchants were allowed to trade in the United
States on an equal footing with Americans. Madison believed
the price for the West Indian trade was too high, warning
Jefferson that the result would be a relapse into a state of
dependency

to

Great

Britain

and

revival

of

the

"scotch

monopoly." in the absence of a central government capable of
making a better agreement, Madison suggested that the southern
states encourage their own

shipping.

"The monopoly which

formerly tyrannized over it [Virginia's commerce] has left
wounds which are not yet healed," Madison wrote to Edmund
Randolph on May 20, 1783. Four days later Randolph replied to
Madison, "our ports are fully open to British ships: and I am
sorry to see a general ardor after those commodities which
public acts have so lately proscribed."24 Two years later
Madison complained to James Monroe that "our trade was never
more completely monopolized by G.B. when it was under the
direction

of

the

British

Parliament

than

it

is

at this

24 Setser, Commercial Reciprocity, 65-67; James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1783; James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, May 20, 1783; Edmund Randolph to James Madison,
May 24, 1783, in PJM, 7:39, 61, 73.
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moment."25
The "scotch monopoly” that Madison referred to was the
Scottish factor system and Scottish control of the Virginia
tobacco trade.

The

1707 Act of Union between England and

Scotland admitted Scottish merchants into the colonial trade.
As Virginians moved into the piedmont, resident factors of
Scottish mercantile houses followed them, selling goods on
credit based on the next year's tobacco crop. Large tidewater
planters dealt directly with Glasgow and Edinburgh. The net
effect was that all planters, large and small, were deeply in
debt, amounting to two million pounds sterling by the eve of
the revolution. The end of a brief export boom in 1772 led to
the collapse of banks in Scotland and London, which in turn
caused a contraction of credit. The credit collapse, combined
with a glut on the tobacco market, drove Virginians deeper
into debt. The crash of 1772 re-emphasized the dangers of debt
and luxury, which according to Whig thought undermined the
personal independence required for political virtue.2^
Madison did not wish to restrict trade but rather to
remove it from a neo-colonial state. Madison's system required

25 James Madison to James Monroe, June 21, 1785, ibid.,
8:307.
2® Breen, Tobacco Culture, 38-39, 89-95; Selby, Revolution
in Virginia, 27-30; Emory G. Evans, "Private Indebtedness
and the Revolution in Virginia, 1776 to 1796," William and
Mary Quarterly, 3rd series. Vol. 28 no. 3 (July 1971), 349;
Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas
Trade: The view from the Chesapeake, 1700-1776 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 135-137.
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that the British and other nations bid for American trade. In
the

absence

of

national

commercial

regulations, Madison

believed that Virginia would have to act on its own. On June
8, 1784, the Virginia House of Delegates took up the "Bill
Restricting Foreign Vessels to Certain Virginia Ports,” better
known as the Port Bill.

"Whereas the Trade and Commerce

carried on between the Citizens of this Common Wealth and
forreign Merchants would be placed on a more equal foundation,
and expedition & dispatch thereby the better promoted if the
Vessels

of

forreign

Merchants

trading

to

this

State

be

restricted to certain Ports," the bill began. The bill stated
that all ships other than Virginian would be restricted to
Norfolk,

Alexandria,

York,

Tappahannock,

and

Bermuda

H u n d r e d . "We made a warm struggle for the establishmt. of

Norfolk & Alexandria as our only ports," Madison informed
Jefferson,

"but we were forced to add York, Tappahannock &

Bermuda Hundred in order to gain anything & to restrain to
these ports foreigners only."^®
Madison hoped to end the British monopoly that subverted
a republican political economy by inviting in competitors and
by denying British merchants direct access to the planters, in

^7 Bill restricting Foreign Vessels to Certain Virginia
ports, June 8, 1784, in PJM, 8:64-65; Drew R. McCoy, "The
Virginia Port Bill of 1784," The Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography, Vol. 88 no. 3 (July 1975), 291-292.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 3, 1784, in PJM,
8:93.
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the hope of replacing British middlemen with Virginians.29
Madison "meant to reduce the trade of G.B. to an equality with
that of other nations" and would not discriminate against
merchants from other states. Only then could Virginia turn its
supposed economic advantages over Europe into an effective
diplomatic tool.39 Madison preferred free trade, but that did
not mean unregulated trade. He believed that before free trade
could be established the United States had to be out of debt,
and all other nations had to adopt a free system. 3-*- He did not
make

the

encouragement

of

Virginia

shipping

a

priority.

Madison wrote to James Monroe that if the southern states "are
not their own carriers I shod, suppose it no mark either of
folly or of incivility to give our custom to our brethren [in
the eastern states] rather than to those who have not yet
entitled themselves to the name of friends."32 Revisions of
the Port Bill in 1786 and 1788 expanded the number of ports of
29 Richard S. Chew III, "A New Hope for the Republic"
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, College of William and Mary,
1992), 16-17.
30 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 20, 1784, in PJM,
8:102-103.
3^ James Madison to James Monroe, Aug. 7, 1785, ibid.,
8:333-335.
32 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781; James
Madison to Edmund Randolph, Feb. 25, 1783; James Madison to
James Monroe, Aug. 7, 1785, in PJM, 3:72, 6:287, 8:335; Drew
McCoy has called the Port Bill "a classic mercantilist
measure in that it specifically encouraged the development
of a native (i.e. Virginian) seamen." "Port Bill," 293.
Richard Chew is closer to the mark in arguing that
encouragement of seamen was a minor part of the bill, "New
Hope," 51-52.
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entry for foreign and domestic shipping, essentially defeating
the purpose of the original bill. Virginia's ratification of
the

Constitution

in

1788

made

the

Port

Bill

unconstitutional.33
Peace did not make the achievement of Madison's second
goal,

securing the right to navigate the Mississippi,

any

easier. In fact, Congress's inability to act may have made
Spain more intransigent. In the summer of 1785, Spain sent Don
Diego de Gardoqui to the United States to negotiate with
Secretary Jay. The Count de Floridablanca, the Spanish foreign
minister,

forbade Gardoqui from making any concessions on

Spain's claim of absolute control over the navigation of the
lower Mississippi. However, Gardoqui could offer commercial
concessions,

including most-favored-nation status,

and was

willing to give up Spanish claims to territory north of 31
degrees north. Gardoqui even offered Spanish naval protection
against the Barbary pirates. Jay, almost desperate to find a
way out of the commercial depression, was anxious to bargain.
By 1786 Jay was prepared to compromise on the Mississippi,
which he had refused to do five years before. Jay would not
give up the right to the lower Mississippi, but would agree to
forbear the use for 25 years, enough time for the west to fill
up with Americans. On August 3, Jay asked Congress to approve
his actions, putting the choice as one between accommodation,

33 McCoy, "Port: Bill," 299-303.
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war or disgrace.3^
In the West,

settlement continued with or without an

agreement with Spain. In the early 1780s, Virginians and nonVirginians alike poured into Kentucky. By 1784, all political
groups within Kentucky agreed on separation from Virginia, in
order to escape Virginia taxation and better organize defense
against Indian attacks. Virginia leaders generally approved,
but set conditions insuring that Kentucky would pay its share
of the Virginia public debt. The Jay-Gardoqui negotiations
complicated

matters,

leading

some

Kentuckians

to

favor

independence from the United States as well as Virginia.
General James Wilkinson secretly met with Spanish officials
and urged them to hold the line against the United States,
promising

that

Spain

could

reach

an

agreement

with

an

independent Kentucky.35
To Madison, the use of the Mississippi was central to the
preservation of the republic. Free access to the Mississippi
would promote the settlement of the west, which in turn would
prevent

the

development

of

American

manufactures,

while

3^ Marks, Independence on Trial, 25-32.
35 Norman K. Risjord, Chesapeake Politics 1781-1800 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 235-238; Patricia
Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 17791792 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1972), 89-93; Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty:
America's Advantage from Europe's Distress, rev. ed. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 118-124.
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producing a large market for foreign manufactures.38 In May of
1786, James Monroe informed Madison of the progress of the
Jay-Gardoqui negotiations, warning that Jay might agree to the
closure of the lower Mississippi. Madison replied that it was
a

"dishonorable

policy"

ultramontane brethren"

to

sell

the

"affection

of

in a treaty with a nation,

our

"whose

government religion & manners unfit them, of all the nations
in Christiandom for a coalition with this country.”37 Monroe
had worse news in August. "It is manifest here that Jay & his
party in Congress are determin'd to pursue this business as
far as possible," Monroe wrote,

"either as the means

of

throwing the western people & territory without the Govt, of
the U.S. and keeping the weight of population & govt, here, or
dismembering the govt, itself, for the purpose of a separate
confederacy."38

In

response

to

the negotiations,

Madison

submitted a resolution to the House of Delegates, claiming a
natural right to the Mississippi and calling on the Virginia
delegates in Congress to reject any attempt to surrender it.
Madison returned to the Continental Congress in January 1787
and on April 18 proposed that negotiations with Spain be moved

36 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 20, 1784, in PJM,
8:107.
37 James Monroe to James Madison, May 31, 1786; James
Madison to James Monroe, June 21, 1786 (partially in code),
ibid., 9:68-69, 82.
38 James Monroe to James Madison, Aug. 14, 1786, ibid.,
9:104.
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to Madrid and entrusted to Thomas Jefferson.39
The Mississippi question

led Madison to rethink

the

nature of the union. On March 20, 1785, Madison wrote a letter
to the Marquis de Lafayette concerning the Mississippi which
reveals Madison's thinking on the problem, and stands at the
beginning

of

a

line

of

argument

he

would

complete

in

Federalist #10. As usual, Madison asserted a natural right to
the Mississippi. "If the United States were to become parties
to the occlusion of the Mississippi they would be guilty of
treason against the very laws under which they obtained and
hold their national existence." Furthermore, Spain had its
policy backward. If Spain wanted peace, it should allow the
Americans to cultivate their lands and use the Mississippi.
Otherwise, the Americans who would have gone west would go to
sea, where they could do Spain the most harm.

"As these

[settlements] become extended the members of the Confederacy
must be multiplied, and along with them the wills which are to
drive the machine. And as the wills multiply so will chances
against a dangerous union of them," Madison explained.

"We

experience every day the difficulty of drawing thirteen states
into the same plans. Let the number be doubled & so will the
difficulty. In the multiplicity of our Counsellors, Spain may
be told, lies her security," Madison wrote, no doubt thinking

39 Resolution Reaffirming American Rights to Navigate the
Mississippi, Nov. 29, 1786; Resolution to Transfer
Negotiations with Spain to Madrid, April 18, 1787, ibid,,
9:182-183, 388.
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of Kentucky as he did.40 Here is an early indication of
Madison's thinking on faction. "Extending the sphere," that
is, increasing the number of interests in society, was of no
use

unless

extension.

the

government

was

capable

of

absorbing

the

If such competence was the test of republican

government, it was a test the confederation was failing.4*
Whereas Adams's writings on the failure of the 1780s
turned on the virtue of the people as reflected in the state
governments,

Madison's turned on the power of the states

relative to the union. The American people, in Madison's view,
had sufficient yeoman virtue

(if not classical virtue) to

sustain

weakness

the

republic.

The

of

the

government

threatened to force the United States prematurely into largescale domestic shipping and manufactures. The problems of the
United States could only be saved by a stronger national
government. State solutions, such as the Port Bill, were no
longer sufficient, if they ever were. "The states are every
day giving proofs that separate regulations are more likely to
set them by the ears than to attain the common object,"
Madison wrote to Jefferson.

"When Massts.

set on

foot a

retaliation of the policy of G.B. Connecticut declared her

40 James Madison to the Marquis de Lafayette, March 20,
1785, ibid., 8:251-252.
41 Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interests:
Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 60-66.
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ports free."4^
For answers, Madison looked to history. Between April and
June of 1786,

Madison composed his

"Notes on Ancient and

M o d e m Confederacies," intended for his private use. After
surveying the history of confederacies, Madison came to one
inescapable conclusion — all confederacies fail. Furthermore,
the failure of a confederation was often the result of a
failure in diplomacy. The Achaean League fell when "the Romans
seduced the members of the League by representing that it
violated their sovereignty."43 Madison devoted the longest
section to a discussion of the United Netherlands,

which

seemed to offer the most lessons for the United States. The
Netherlands' problems included a jealousy among the provinces
and an extreme difficulty in getting anything accomplished.
The United States had experienced both. Madison also noted
that "Grotius has sd. that the hatred for his Countrymen agst
the H. of Austria kept them being destroyed by the vices of
their Constitution." Madison no doubt was thinking that war
with

Great

Britain

had

overshadowed

the

defects

of

the

Articles of Confederation. Peace had made those defects all
the more obvious.44
Madison attended the Annapolis Convention in September
42 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 18, 1786, in
PJM, 8:502.
43 "Notes on Ancient and M o d e m Confederacies," April-June,
1786, ibid., 9:8.
44 Ibid., 9:16-17.
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1786, one of only twelve delegates to appear. The convention
only

issued

Philadelphia

a

call

in May

for

another

convention

1787,

which

the Virginia

to

meet

at

legislature

unanimously approved.45 Despite this small progress toward
finding a solution, the union seemed closer to collapse. "We
hear that great commotions are prevailing in Massts." James
Madison

informed

suddenly

convince

his

father.

anyone

Shays's

that

the

Rebellion

did

confederation

was

not
in

trouble, but to Madison and other nationalists it was a symbol
of all that had gone wrong.45 Madison's mood seemed to worsen
as

the

Philadelphia

convention

drew

nearer.

"Indeed

the

present System neither has nor deserves advocates; and if some
strong props

are not applied will

quickly tumble

to the

ground," Madison complained to Edmund Pendleton. "The bulk of
the people will probably prefer the lesser evil of a partition
of the Union into three or more practicable and energetic
Governments," Madison continued.47
However, partitioning the union would only invite foreign
interference and endanger republicanism. For Madison, the only
acceptable

solution

was

to

create

a

balanced

national

45 Ketcham, JM, 185; James Madison to George Washington,
Nov. 8, 1786, in PJM, 9:166.
45 James Madison to James Madison, Sr., Nov. 1, 1786, in
PJM, 9:154; David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making
of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1980), 123.
47 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Feb. 24, 1787, in PJM,
9:294-295.
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government.
government
judiciary

Madison
under

explained

the

branches,

to

Washington

confederation

and the power

against each other or against

lacked

that

the

executive

and

to protect the

states

internal enemies.48 Unlike

Adams, Madison focused on the balance of power between the
states

and

the

central

government.

fundamental

point that an individual

States,

utterly

is

irreconcilable

"I

hold

it

for

a

independence of the

with

the

idea

of

an

aggregate sovereignty," Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph. "I
think at the same time that a consolidation of the States into
one simple republic is not less unattainable than it would be
inexpedient."48 Madison suggested two remedies to Jefferson,
proportional representation and a veto over state laws. Both
would free the central government from dependence on the
states, and prevent the states from "thwarting and molesting
each other,

and even from oppressing the minority within

themselves by paper money and other unrighteous measures which
favor the interest of the majority."50
In April 1787, Madison prepared a memorandum entitled,
48 James Madison to George Washington, April 16, 1787,
ibid., 9:383-385.
48 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, ibid.,
9:369.
50 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 19, 1787, in
ibid, 9:318-319; Charles F. Hobson argues that the negative
on state laws was central to Madison's solution to the
republican crisis. "The Negative on State Laws: James
Madison, the Constitution and the Crisis of Republican
Government," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 36
no. 2 (April 1979), 218, 221-223.
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"The vices of the Political System of the United States,"
which he used in his speeches and copied for other members of
the Constitutional Convention. Madison blamed most of the
United States problems on the unchecked power of the states.
The states had prevented the United States from meeting its
obligations by failing to meet

their tax quotas,

and

by

passing laws preventing the execution of the peace treaty of
1783. The states had trampled on the rights of their own
citizens and of each other.51 People and elected officials
acted out of private interest rather than the public good.
Madison

recognized that

a division

into various

interest

groups was inevitable and could not be stopped by religious or
personal influence.52 The only solution was to increase the
number of interests that the central government acted upon, or
rather to increase the scope of the government to contain the
interests that already existed.

"If an enlargement of the

sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it
is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is
less predominant in this case with the majority," Madison
wrote, "but because a common interest or passion is less apt
to be felt and the requisite combinations become less easy to
be formed by a great than a small number. The Society becomes
broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits, of

51 "Vices of the Political System of the United States,"
April-June, 1787, in PJM, 9:348-355.
52 Ibid., 9:353-355.
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passions,

which check each other."53 Like Adams,

Madison

seemed willing to substitute a balance for virtue. Madison was
no doubt influenced by David Hume's 1752 essay,

"Idea of a

Perfect Commonwealth." Hume also recognized the inevitability
of faction and opposing interest, and proposed that the people
be

divided

However,

into

as

many

Madison's

and

smaller
Hume's

divisions

solutions

as

possible.

were

slightly

different. Hume hoped to reorganize Parliament for more equal
representation,

but

he

could

assume

the

existence

of

a

national government. Madison had to create one.54
Madison arrived in Philadelphia on May 3,
nearly

two weeks

Convention

met

in

of

anxious

waiting,

Independence

Hall

the
on

and after

Constitutional

May

14.

In

his

"Character Sketches" Georgia delegate William Pierce wrote
that "in the management of every great question," Madison,
"took the lead in the Convention, and tho' he cannot be called
an Orator he is a most agreeable, eloquent, and convincing
Speaker."55 Madison set the convention's

agenda

from the

beginning. He drew up a set of proposals that became the
53 Ibid., 356-357.
54 Ketcham, JM, 186-187; David Hume, "The Idea of a Perfect
Commonwealth," [1752], in David Hume, Moral and Political
Philosophy. Henry D. Aiken, ed. (New York: Hafner Publishing
Company, 1948), 380-383. Douglass Adair was the first to
point out the connection between Hume and Federalist #10.
See "'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," in Fame and
the Founding Fathers, 93-106.
55 Ketcham, JM, 190-192; William Pierce, "Character
Sketches," in Farrand, Records, 3:94.
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Virginia

Plan,

which

Edmund

Randolph

submitted

to

the

convention on May 29. The fifteen-point plan maintained the
fiction that the delegates intended to have the Articles of
Confederation "corrected & enlarged," and then moved on to
propose an entirely new government. The Virginia Plan called
for a bicameral legislature, with the lower house elected by
the people and the upper house by the lower house, and each
branch elected in proportion to each state's population. Each
branch could originate legislation and veto state laws. The
national legislature would choose an executive who would act
with a national judiciary as a council of revision. The new
government would provide for the admission of new states and
guarantee

republican

government

in

each

state.

The

plan

provided for amendments, required an oath of loyalty to the
union, and would be submitted to the states for ratification.
Until the new government took effect, the Continental Congress
would continue to function as the central government.56
For a while,

the convention

seemed to fall in with

Madison's hopes. On May 30 the Committee of the Whole voted to
postpone discussion of the Virginia Plan in order to consider
the nature of the union, and whether a federal union or a
national government was needed. To Madison this issue was old
56 "Virginia Plan," in PJM, 10:15-17; Madison's notes for
May 29 in Farrand, Records, 1:18-23; Forrest McDonald has
argued that Madison's reputation as an influential member of
the Convention is inflated. While the final Constitution did
bear little resemblance to the Virginia Plan, much of the
debate was essentially a reaction to the Virginia Plan.
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 205-209.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188
ground, and he argued that a national government was needed to
prevent

dependence

convention
legislature,

took

up

on

the

states.57

Randolph's

The

proposal

next

for

a

day

the

bicameral

with the lower house elected by the people.

Madison argued that "the great fabric to be raised would be
more

stable and durable

if it should rest on

the

solid

foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand
merely on the pillars of the Legislatures." Both measures
passed.5® Within two weeks, Madison set the Convention on a
path

to create a national

government.

Despite

two

later

defeats for Madison, the vote against the negative on state
laws (June 8) and the vote for representation by state in the
Senate (July 16), the debate was largely over the powers of a
national government,

rather than over a choice between a

national government and a loose confederation.59
The foreign policy questions of the convention centered
on the power to make war and the power to regulate commerce
and reflected the Opposition Whig fear that war augmented
executive power. The debate over war powers directly involved
the relationship between the executive and the legislature. On
June 1 the Committee of the whole began discussion of the
57 Madison's notes, May 30, in Farrand, Records, 1:33, 37.
58 Madison's notes, May 31; journal, May 31, ibid., 1:49-50,
47-48.
59 Madison's notes, June 8; journal, July 16, ibid., 1:164168, 2:13; Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of
the united States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913),
96-105.
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composition and powers of the executive. Charles Pinckey of
South Carolina "was for a vigorous Executive," but feared that
its powers "might extend to peace & war &c which would render
the Executive a Monarchy." Roger Sherman of Connecticut added
that he "considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more
than an instrument for carrying the will of the Legislature
into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed
by and accountable to the Legislature only."60 Madison, along
with James Wilson of Pennsylvania, argued that the executive
powers "do not include the Rights of war & peace &c."61 On
June 4, the convention approved a single executive with a
partial veto over legislation. The next day the convention
rejected the idea of legislative appointment.62
Madison,

like many Americans of the revolutionary era

shared the Opposition Whig fear of executive power, which
influenced

his

thinking

on

the

war

powers

of

the

new

government. "In time of actual war, the great discretionary
powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate,"
Madison told the convention on June 29. "Constant apprehension
of War has the same tendency to render the head too large for
the

body.

A

standing

with

an

overgrown

safe companions

to

liberty."

Madison concluded with the classic Whig thesis,

that the

Executive will

not

military

long

be

force,

60 Madison's notes, June 1, in Farrand, Records, 1:64-65.
6^ Rufus King's notes, June 1, ibid., 1:70.
62 Journal, June 4-5, ibid., 1:93-94, 116.
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"means of defence agst. foreign danger have always been the
instruments of tyranny at home."63 In Great Britain, the power
to make war, that is, to decide on war and to wage it, rested
with the king, although Parliament gained greater influence
over foreign policy during the eighteenth century. On August
17, Madison and Gerry divided the two aspects of the war
power, giving Congress the decision, in the power to declare
war

and

giving

the

executive

the

power

to

repel

sudden

attacks. The motion passed 7-2.64
The debate over commercial regulations threatened to stir
up sectional conflict. Madison opposed a prohibition on export
duties, arguing that one day they might be necessary to raise
revenue

or

to

force

"equitable

regulations

from

other

nations." However, a solid bloc of southern states and two
shipping

states,

Massachusetts

and Connecticut,

voted

to

prohibit export duties.66 The debates also developed how the
new government

could contain

sectional

disputes. General

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney

of South Carolinacaptured

spirit of mutual concessions

best when he told theconvention

that

it

was

not

in

the

southern

interest

to

have

the

any

regulation of commerce, but northern concessions on the slave
trade demanded a generous response. The rich but weak southern
states needed the support of the northern, and to get it,
63 Madison's notes, June 29,

ibid., 1:465.

64 Madison's notes, Aug. 17,

ibid., 2:318-319.

66 Madison's notes, Aug. 21,

ibid., 2:361-364.
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Pinckney was willing to give Congress complete control of
commercial policy.66 Madison also noted that a navigation act
would

harm

the

South

by

raising

shipping

rates,

but

congressional power to regulate commerce would remove a major
source of interstate conflict.67 In a sense, the debate over
commercial regulation showed how each section was willing to
use the other.

The

South

was

willing

to

allow

national

commercial regulation as long as population growth seemed to
favor the South.

The North was willing to protect staple

exports

possibility

for

the

of

protecting

shipping

and

manufacturing. The point of the new government was that it
could protect the interests of all sections.68
The convention spent the last few weeks on the exact
wording of the Constitution, which the convention unanimously
approved on September 17.68 Madison intended the Constitution
to solve several problems. First, it would create a government
that would

protect

national

interests.

Second,

it

could

achieve the two foreign policy goals Madison believed vital to
the survival of republican government. The constitution would
form a government strong enough to keep open the Mississippi
thereby keeping the West in the union, preventing European
interference in American politics, and preserving a republican
66 Madison's notes, Aug. 29, Ibid., 2:449-450.
67 Madison's notes, Aug. 29, ibid., 2:451-452.
68 Matson and Onuf, Union of Interests, 119.
68 Journal, Sept. 17, in Farrand, Records, 2:641.
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political economy. The new government could also more fully
regulate

commerce and pass

Britain

into

preserving

an

Mississippi,

a

more

designed

equitable

outlet for
and

laws

creating

trade

western
a

to

relationship.

products

freer

force Great

trade

By

through the

system

on the

Atlantic, the United States could preserve and exploit its
agriculture as a diplomatic tool. Therefore, Madison believed
that the Constitution prevented the United States from being
driven

into

domestic manufactures.It

would

create

a

government that would protect sectional as well as national
interests.70 Moreover, Madison helped create what Gordon Wood
calls, "a new and original sort of republican government," one
that

did not

require virtue

for

its

success.7^ However,

Madison's defeats on state representation in Congress and the
negative on state laws made him pessimistic.

"I hazard an

opinion that the plan should it be adopted will neither
effectively answer its national objects nor prevent the local
mischiefs which every where excite disgusts agst. the state
governments," Madison wrote to Jefferson.72
Madison

further explained

his

views

on

the new

Constitution in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on October 24,
70 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 121-124, 131-134; Forrest
McDonald correctly points out that Madison's nationalism was
always tempered by his concern for Virginia's interests,
Novus Ordo Seclorum, 204-205.
7* Wood, Creation, 475.
72 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Sept. 6, 1787 (partly
in code), in PJM, 10:163-164.
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1787.

Early

on,

the

convention

abandoned

the

idea

of

a

confederation and "embraced the alternative of a Government
which instead of operating on the States,

should operate

without their intervention on the individuals composing them."
The convention had four goals; to provide for an executive and
a stable legislature, to draw a line between federal and state
power,

to

safeguard

sectional

interests,

and

to

settle

disputes between the large and small states.73 The delineation
of federal and state power was the most difficult. The only
solution was a federal negative on state laws. "Without such
a check in the whole over the parts, our system involves the
evil of imperia in imperio," Madison argued. "If a compleat
supremacy some where is not necessary in every Society,

a

controuling power at least is so."74 The negative was also
necessary for the protection of individual rights. For proof,
Madison turned to his now-familiar analysis of faction. All
civilized societies developed various interests in religion,
politics and economics. In such a state, simple majority rule
would

easily

required

a

become
more

tyranny.

complex

Such

government

an

"extended

that

could

sphere"
prevent

interests from combining to oppress the minority.75 "Divide et

73 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid.,
10:207-208.
74 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid.,
10:209.
75 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid.,
10:212-214.
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imperia, the reprobated axiom of tyranny," Madison argued, "is
under certain qualifications,

the only policy by which

a

republic can be administered on just principles.”76 Madison
had never based his republicanism on a classical model of
citizenship. In 1787 he also reversed the classical idea that
a republic had to be small and homogeneous. Madison,
Adams,

reached

the

conclusion

that

balance

could

like
be

substituted for classical virtue as the theoretical basis for
the American republic.
Whatever its flaws, Madison believed the Constitution was
"the best that could be obtained from the jarring interests of
States, and the miscellaneous opinions of Politicians."77 "It
is not necessary that the former should be perfect," Madison
wrote in Federalist #38, comparing the proposed new government
to

the

old,

"it

is

sufficient

imperfect."78 Ratification

was

that
by

no

the

latter

means

is

assured,

more
and

Madison's own early tally showed New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey and Maryland for ratification, with
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and Virginia badly split.78 Madison
76 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, ibid.,
10:215.
77 James Madison to Philip Mazzei, Oct. 8, 1788, ibid.,
11:278.
78 James Madison, Federalist #38, in Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist. Jacob E. Cooke,
ed. (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961),
246.
79 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in PJM,
10:216-217.
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helped gain ratification in two ways;

as coauthor of The

Federalist

Virginia

and

as

a

member

of

the

ratifying

convention. In October of 1787, Madison met with Alexander
Hamilton
written

and John Jay to collaborate
under

the

pseudonym

on

"Publius."

The Federalist,
Jay

fell

ill

in

November, leaving Hamilton and Madison to write most of the
essays. The result, as Irving Brant put it, was to "admit a
larger proportion of Madison's philosophy into a commentary
destined to become a political guidebook."88
Madison's

first

effort,

Federalist

#10,

appeared

on

November 22, 1787. It is generally seen as the most important
among

the

essays,

and

is

the most

prone

to

conflicting

interpretations. William Appleman Williams, for example, has
argued that Madison used the term "extend the sphere," in the
literal sense of physical expansion,

and that continental

expansion

preserve

was

the

only

way

to

republican

government.8* Portraying Federalist #10 as a forward-looking
document takes it out of its political context. Federalist #10
can be read as a summation of the influence of the Mississippi
question on Madison's thinking, specifically forcing Madison
to explain how an extended republic would work.
defense of past expansion rather than a call

It was a

for future

80 Brant, JM, 3:171; Ketcham, JM, 239.
81 William Appleman Williams, "The Age of Mercantilism: An
Interpretation of the American Political Economy, 17631828," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 15 no. 4
(October 1958), 424-426.
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expansion.
Madison began with what had become his standard analysis
of faction. "By a faction I understand a number of citizens
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole,
who

are

united

and

activated

by

some

common

impulse

of

passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of the other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community," Madison explained.82 Madison learned from the
Scottish

common

sense

school

that

factionalism

was

an

inevitable and unchanging feature of human behavior. Factions
sprang

from any number of causes,

including

"a zeal for

different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government
and

many

other

practice."82

points,

as

"But the most

well
common

of

speculation

and durable

as

of

source of

factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of
property," Madison wrote, guaranteeing that civilized society
contained a multitude of different interests. "The regulation
of these various and interfering interests forms the principle
task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operation of the
82 Federalist #10, Nov. 22, 1787, in The Federalist, 57.
82 Federalist #10, ibid., 58-59; Douglass Adair "'That
Politics May be Reduced to a Science:' David Hume, James
Madison and the Tenth Federalist," in Fame and the Founding
Fathers, 95-97; Gordon S. Wood, "Interests and
Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution," in
Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein and Edward C. Carter II, eds.
Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and
American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1987), 71-74.
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Government."84
Next, Madison moved on to the advantage of a republic
over a democracy. Arguing against Montesquieu's theory that a
republic could exist only in a small territory, Madison wrote
that the chief advantage of a republic was "the greater number
of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the
latter may be extended.1*®5 in a simple democracy, which would
necessarily be a smaller society, it would be easier to form
a majority that could control the government.
sphere,

"Extend the

and you take in a greater variety of parties and

interests," Madison wrote, "you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of the other citizens."®5 "The influence of factious
leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but
they will be unable to spread a general conflagration through
the other States" Madison concluded, "a religious sect, may
degenerate
Confederacy,

into

a

political

faction

in

a

part

of

the

but the variety of sects dispersed over the

entire face of it, must secure the national Councils against
any danger from that source."87 The threats of division that
accompanied the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations forced Madison to

84 Federalist #10, in The Federalist, 59.
85 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 1:120; Federalist #10,
in The Federalist, 62.
86 Federalist #10, ibid., 63-64.
87 Federalist #10, ibid., 64-65.
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explain how a republic could exist over a territory that some
already considered too large. The only way was to split the
thirteen state interests into a myriad of individual interests
by

creating

a

government

that

acted

directly

on

those

individual interests, and contained them within a balanced
structure.
Two

later

Federalist

essays

shed

further

light

on

Madison's thinking in Federalist #10. Madison returned to the
size of the republic in Federalist #14, and argued that the
natural limit of the republic was the furthest distance a
representative could travel.

The thirteen original states

clearly fell within those limits. The average distance from
the Atlantic to the Mississippi was 750 miles which still fell
within

the

revisited

natural
the

specifically

boundaries

problem

addressing

of

a

of

faction

the

issue

republic.88
in

of

Madison

Federalist

religious

#51,

freedom.

Madison compared political to religious liberty, arguing that
"the degree of security in both cases will depend on the
number of interests and sects." The number of interests and
sects, in turn, "may be presumed to depend on the extent of
country and number of people comprehended under the same
government.”89 Although Madison wrote that economic factions
were the most "common and durable," it seems clear that he
regarded

political

and

religious

conflicts

as

the

88 Federalist #14, Nov. 30, 1787, ibid., 85-86.
89 Federalist #51, Feb. 6, 1788, ibid., 351-352
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immediately dangerous, as shown in the Virginia politics of
the

1780s.

Madison

certainly

did

not

rule

out

future

expansion. However, Federalist #10 did not demand it. Madison
wrote primarily to defend expansion that had already taken
place.90
Madison devoted much of his effort to explaining the two
chief balances of the Constitution —
government

and

government.

the

between

the

between the branches of

states

and

the

central

"The novelty of the undertaking immediately

strikes us," Madison wrote in Federalist #37.9^ "Experience
has instructed us that no skill in the science of Government
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient
certainty

its

three

great

Executive

and

Judiciary,"

provinces,
Madison

the

wrote,

Legislative,
"or

even

the

privileges, and powers of the different Legislative branches."
The "interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller states"
only complicated matters.92 Part of the problem was that in
republics,

the

lower house

of

the

legislature tended to

dominate affairs, which Madison noted in Federalist #48 and
Federalist #49.93 Madison defended an independent,

single

executive and a bicameral legislature on these grounds. "In
90 Paul Rahe advances a similar argument in Republics
Ancient and Modern, 586-591.
91 Federalist #37, Jan. 11, 1788, in The Federalist, 233.
92 Federalist #37, ibid., 235, 237.
93 Federalist #48, Feb. 1, 1788 and Federalist #49, Feb. 2,
1788, ibid., 333-334, 341.
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republican government the legislative authority, necessarily,
predominates,” Madison wrote in Federalist #51. "The remedy
for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into
different branches; and to render them by different elections,
and different principles of action." The relative "weakness of
the executive may require on the other hand,

that it be

fortified. "94
The balance between the states and the central government
was more difficult, perhaps because Madison himself was slow
in accepting any state role in the central government.95
Madison used the first half of Federalist #39 to argue that
the Constitution did form a republican government, and the
second half to outline its national and federal aspects. "But
if the Government be national with regard to the operation of
its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it
in relation to the extent of its powers," Madison argued. "The
proposed Constitution therefore is in strictness neither a
national nor a federal constitution,

but a composition of

both."9® Madison used Federalist #40 to ease the shock of the
new

government,

arguing

that

the

principles

of

the

Constitution were merely "the expansion of principles which
94 Federalist #51, ibid., 350.
95 Lance Banning, "The Practicable Sphere of a Republic:
James Madison, the Constitutional Convention, and the
Emergence of Revolutionary Federalism," in Beeman, et al.,
eds. Beyond Confederation, 186-187.
96 Federalist #39, Jan. 16, 1788, in The Federalist, 256257.
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are found in the Articles of Confederation,” and that the new
government

was,

as

stated

in

the

Virginia

Plan,

an

"enlargement" of the old.97 Madison hoped to allay fears of
the central government. "The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined,"
Madison wrote in Federalist #45. "Those which are to remain in
the

State

Governments

are

numerous

and

indefinite."9®

Responding to accusations that the Constitution would wipe out
the state governments, Madison wrote in Federalist #46 that
the

state and

federal

governments

were merely

"different

agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different
powers and designated for different purposes."99
Madison did not focus on the foreign policy implications
of the Constitution in The Federalist, but did agree with John
Jay

that

the

new

government

would

solve

the

nation's

diplomatic problems. Madison touched on the subject, and his
writings give an insight to his thinking on future diplomatic
problems. Federalist #41 is the key to Madison's conception of
a republican foreign policy.
writers,

Madison

believed

Like
a

the English Opposition

large

peacetime

military

establishment was incompatible with liberty at home. Madison
wrote that "the liberties of Rome proved the first victim of
her military

triumphs, and that the liberties of Europe, as

97 Federalist #40, Jan.

18, 1788, ibid., 262-263.

98 Federalist #45, Jan.

26, 1788, ibid., 313.

99 Federalist #46, Jan.

29, 1788, ibid.,

315.
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far as they ever existed, have with few exceptions been the
price of her military establishments."^-00 Madison believed
that the proper form of government, such as the Constitution
provided,

combined with a physical separation from Europe

provided

all

invasion,

and eliminated the need

the

protection

necessary
for

against

foreign

a large military.

"America united with a handful of troops, or without a single
soldier,

exhibits

a

more

forbidding

posture

to

foreign

ambition, than America disunited, with an hundred thousand
veterans ready for combat," Madison wrote. Furthermore, the
union "will be the only source of our maritime strength. "*■01
Madison's

public

enthusiasm

for

a

navy

fluctuated

depending on his audience. As he wrote The Federalist to sway
New York, he played up the naval angle more than usual. In
addition, Madison doubtless realized that within a few days
his essay would appear in the Boston newspapers, where the
Massachusetts

convention

was

at

that

moment

considering

ratification.*02 The bedrock of Madison's diplomacy was not a
navy, but a strong union that would prevent foreign powers
from playing one state off another, and effectively regulate
commerce. That way, the United States could avoid the fate of
continental Europe.
In

considering

the

powers

of

the

House

100 Federalist #41, Jan. 18, 1788, ibid., 271.
101 Federalist #41, ibid., 271-272, 274-275.
102 Federalist #41, ibid., 275.
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Representatives,

Madison

wrote

in

Federalist

#53

that,

although the House did not directly participate in foreign
negotiations,

''from the

necessary

connection

between

the

several branches of public affairs, those particular branches
will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of
legislation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative
sanction and

c o o p e r a t i o n . " * ^

Madison did not elaborate on

this point, but Madison's actions in the 1790s suggest that
the "ordinary course of legislation" most likely included
commercial regulations and war.
There was still the matter of Virginia's ratification.
Madison returned to Virginia from Philadelphia in March 1788
and was promptly chosen to represent Virginia in the ratifying
convention. He arrived in Richmond on June 2.*04 Patrick Henry
led the antifederalist assault, attacking the Constitution, in
an

apocalyptic

tone,

for

giving up Virginia's

power

and

security, and for abandoning a government that had led the
United

States

to

independence.105 Madison

responded

that

Virginia's liberty was safe under the Constitution and that a
strong central government was the defense against foreign

103 Federalist #53, ibid., 364.
104 Ketcham, JM, 250-253.
105 Patrick Henry, speech of June 5, 1788, in John P.
Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saledino, eds. The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Virginia, 3
vols. (Madisons State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 19881993), 2:593.
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d a n g e r . 6 After three weeks of debate, Virginia approved the
Constitution on June 25, 1788, becoming the tenth state to do
so.107
Students of political thought have noted that John Adams
and

James

Madison

shared

a

commitment

to

balanced

government.I®® They also shared at least a grudging acceptance
of the modern world. These similarities, however, mask a large
gap between the two. Both were prepared to abandon the need
for classical martial virtue as the theoretical basis of the
republic.

However,

Madison did

cling to the belief

that

republican foreign policy could manipulate the conduct of
other nations, whereas Adams did not. The Constitution was for
Madison an instrument designed to harness the commercial power
he believed would shield the republic from European politics
and secure diplomatic goals without recourse to a military.
Madison

did

not

share

Adams's

vision

of

a

republican

realpolitik; instead, Madison embraced a commercial diplomacy
that represented a hybrid of Opposition fear of military power
with his vision of a republican political economy.

James Madison, speech of June 9, 1788, in PJM, 11:82.
107 Ketcham, JM, 263-264.
108 Both Charles Beard and Robert Brown credit Adams and
Madison jointly for the ideas behind the Constitution.
Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1913), 314; Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the
Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1956), 189.
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CHAPTER 6: ENGINES OF THE EXECUTIVE

"The Country persuasion was an ideology of suspicion and
resistance, tough and serviceable for purposes of revolution,
though less of an asset when it came to nation-building,"
Stanley

Elkins

and

Eric

McKitrick

wrote

in

The Age

of

Federalism. James Madison disagreed, believing that English
Opposition thought was the key to American nation-building and
its outward expression, the making of foreign policy.1 Unlike
John Adams, James Madison saw an independent legislature as
the prime mover in foreign affairs. Madison did not trust the
executive with sole control over the war power, concluding
that such a grant of power was too similar to monarchical
practice.^ Madison interpreted the events of the 1790s within
the framework of English Opposition thought. Madison believed
that republicanism was under assault from two fronts; at home,
from Alexander Hamilton's fiscal plans, which threatened to
undermine agrarianism and a republican political economy, and
abroad,

from

a

Federalist

diplomacy

controlled

by

the

1 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 24.
2 Ketcham, Presidents Above Party, 116-119. Ketcham argues
that Madison also accepted the "Patriot King" as the model
for the executive. However, Madison hoped for an independent
president that would carry out rather than initiate policy.
20^
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executive

that

favored

British

monarchy

over

French

republicanism.
As a member of the House of Representatives, Madison
immediately planned to use the new government to raise a
public

revenue

and

free

American

trade

from

British

domination. He introduced a proposal on April 8, 1789, to
revive the impost of April 18, 1783. He proposed higher duties
on such items as rum, wine, molasses, sugar, coffee and tea
and called for staggered duties on tonnage. Madison proposed
that American-built and owned ships pay the lowest tonnage
duties, followed by ships from nations in a commercial treaty
with the United States (specifically French ships). Ships from
other nations (especially Great Britain) would pay the highest
duties.3 Madison had learned from the French Physiocrats and
the

Scottish

restrictions

Common
in

Sense

principle,

school

to

oppose

telling

the

commercial
House

of

Representatives that, "if industry and labor are left to take
their own course they will be directed to those objects which
are the most productive, and this is a more certain and direct
manner than the wisdom of the most enlightened legislature
could point out.” However, American ships would disappear from
the sea if the United States kept its ports open while other
nations maintained closed systems.4 Furthermore, the United
3 Ketcham, JM, 280-282; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of
Federalism, 69-74; Speech of April 8, 1789, in PJM, 12:6566 .
4 Speech of April 9, 1789, in PJM, 12:71-72.
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States could not afford free trade as long as American trade
to foreign ports was "restrained to an artificial channel."6
Madison's

plan for commercial discrimination and his

entire system of republican diplomacy through the War of 1812,
rested on his almost unshakable faith in the power of American
commerce, specifically the export of agricultural goods, to
break down the British mercantile system. Economic power as
tool of diplomacy avoided the use of a military and would
prevent the means of diplomacy from turning against domestic
liberty.

"It

would

be

proper

to

consider

the

means

of

encouraging the great staple of America, I mean agriculture,"
Madison told the House of Representatives on April 9, 1789,
"other nations can and do rival us [in manufactures] but we
may be said to have a monopoly in agriculture."6 "The produce
of this country is more necessary to the rest of the world
than that of other countries is to America," Madison added on
April 25.7 Great Britain needed the United States as an export
market;

and the British West Indies were virtual economic

hostages to America. "The supplies of the United States are
necessary to their existence, and their market to the value of
her islands," Madison explained to Jefferson. Trade also gave
the united States a military advantage. "In time of war, which

5 Speech of April 21, 1789, ibid., 12:100.
6 Speech of April 9, 1789, ibid., 12:71; Rahe, Republics
Ancient and Modern, 733.
7 Speech of April 25, 1789, in PJM, 12:112.
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is generally decided in the West Indies, friendly offices not
violating the duties of neutrality," Madison continued, "might
effectually turn the scale in favor of an adversary."® "As to
the British West-Indies, it had been fully shewn, that they
could neither prosper nor subsist without the market of the
United States," Madison argued a year later, "they were fed
from our granaries."®
Madison's main goal was to break the British stranglehold
on American trade by encouraging other nations to compete to
buy

American

manufactured

exports
goods

and
and

sell

the

shipping

United

States

services.

their

Commercial

discrimination would preserve republicanism by preventing the
development of domestic manufacturing industries and a largescale shipping industry existing independently of agricultural
production. Also, commercial diplomacy would secure American
diplomatic goals without war,

which

Madison

believed was

republicanism's greatest enemy.Unfortunately for Madison,
the New England
forcing

Madison

congressmen
to

shift

opposed Madison's

his

argument

to

proposals,

appease

them,

emphasizing results which he believed New Englanders would

8 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 30, 1789, ibid.,
12:269-270; Combs, Jay Treaty, 78-79.
9 Speech of May 4, 1790, in PJM, 13:218.
10 Drew McCoy argues that Madison, in addition to breaking
the British hold on American trade, did hope to develop a
domestic shipping. However, McCoy has ignored Madison's view
of sailors in "Republican Distribution of Citizens." McCoy,
Elusive Republic, 137-145.
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favor.11 Madison told the House of Representatives on April
21, 1789, that his proposals were needed "to form a school for
seamen, to lay the foundation for a navy."12 "I am a friend to
the navigation of America, and shall be always ready to go as
great lengths in favor of that interest as any gentlemen on
this floor," Madison declared on May 4.13

Speaking on trade

regulations a year later, Madison argued that if the British
maintained their

trade practices

"our own navigation

and

manufactures would in the meantime be encouraged."14
Madison certainly believed that shipping and manufactures
could increase as a result of commercial discrimination, but
he left the New Englanders with the false impression that he
himself favored those ends. Madison hoped and believed that
Great

Britain

Throughout

the

would
1780s,

alter

its

Madison

navigation

system

argued against

first.

encouraging

manufactures as being incompatible with a republican political
economy. In his 1792 essay, "Fashion," Madison used the plight
of Great Britain's shoe buckle manufacturers, left destitute
by the increased use of laces, as a cautionary tale.

"The

condition of those who receive employment and bread from the
precarious source of fashion and superfluity, is a lesson to
11 Paul A. Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 17891850 (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1983),
11-17.
12 Speech of April 21, 1789, in PJM, 12:101-102.
13 Speech of May 4, 1789, ibid., 12:126.
14 Speech of June 25, 1790, ibid., 13:256.
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nations as well as individuals," Madison wrote. "In proportion
as a nation consists of that description of citizens, and
depends

on

external

commerce,

it

is

dependent

on

the

consumption and caprice of other nations." Madison agreed with
Thomas Paine that food never went out of style.*®
Neither did Madison view shipping as an unquestioned
good.

In

his

March

3,

1792,

National

Gazette

article,

"Republican Distribution of Citizens," Madison wrote that the
"life of the husbandman is pre-eminently suited to the comfort
and happiness of the individual." On the other hand,

"the

condition to which the blessings of life are most denied is
that

of

the

sailor."

"How

unfortunate,

that

in

the

intercourse, by which nations are enlightened and refined, and
the

means

of

safety

immediate agents

extended," Madison

continued,

"the

should be distinguished by the harshest

condition of humanity."*® It seems unlikely that Madison would
have actively supported the expansion of a class he clearly
believed to be unfit for republican government. Madison saw
shipping as beneficial only if it were kept subordinate to
agriculture. He did not seek to create an American shipping
monopoly

or,

in contrast to

his

New England

colleagues,

encourage the carrying trade as a separate endeavor. Madison
believed that commercial discrimination would promote American

15 "Fashion," March 20, 1792, ibid., 14:258.
*® "Republican Distribution of Citizens," March 3, 1792,
ibid., 14:245.
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shipping to the point of breaking the British hold on the
American

economy

without

creating

a

domestic

rival

to

agriculture.17
Madison's diplomacy was realistic in that it rested on an
accurate

assessment of West

Indian economics. The United

States provided 90 percent of the flour and meal consumed in
the British West Indies, as well as two-thirds of the grain
and half of the salt meat and dried fish. The United States
was Great Britain's largest export customer,

importing 90

percent of its manufactured goods from Britain.18 However,
West Indian economics did not dictate British policy. The
navigation system was politically popular at home and did no
economic damage. Furthermore, no other nation produced the
manufactured

goods

that

Americans

wanted.

Therefore,

commercial diplomacy was unable to bend British policy to
American wishes. "For What Advantage Can they expect to derive
from a Treaty that they are not already possessed of?" one
merchant complained to Madison.19
Madison was not the only statesman concerned with public
finance. As secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton bore

17 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 156-158. McCoy does not mention
Madison's passage on sailors in his discussion of the
National Gazette essays.
18 Combs, Jay Treaty, 25-28; Bradford Perkins, The First
Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), 12-14.
19 Combs, Jay Treaty, 87-89; Thomas Pleasants, Jr. to James
Madison, July 10, 1790, in PJM, 13:271.
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primary responsibility for putting the nation's fiscal affairs
in order. Like Madison, Hamilton assumed a high volume of
trade

with

Great

Britain,

but

unlike

Madison,

Hamilton

believed that restoring public credit was more important than
forcing trade concessions. Revenue from imports and excise
taxes could fund the entire national debt. On January 9, 1790,
Hamilton submitted his Report on Public Credit to Congress. He
proposed creating a sinking fund that would pay off the $52
million national debt and allow the assumption of the $25
million in state debts as part of the national debts, with
public credit restored, Hamilton hoped to develop American
fiscal and manufacturing power.

On December 14,

1790,

he

proposed the creation of the Bank of the United States, which
would provide a medium of exchange. Finally, on December 5,
1791, Hamilton submitted his Report on Manufactures, calling
for

protective

tariffs

and

other

measures

designed

to

encourage the development of American manufacturing.20
To Madison, Hamilton's fiscal plans represented nothing
short of an attempt to impose a Walpolean system on the United
States, which in Madison's opinion would inevitably lead to
corruption and tyranny. In addition, Madison saw a threat to
Virginia's interests from northern states replacing the pre-

20 Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979), 149, 168-171, 192-194,
232-236; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 123-131.
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war obstacles Britain posed to managing Virginia's credit.2*
Madison

objected to the assumption of state debts on

grounds

that,

Virginia had

using its great holdings

already

paid

its

public

the

in western lands,
debt and

that,

by

increasing the national debt, assumption forced Virginia to
pay toward the other states' debts. More important, Madison
believed that debt itself was a political evil. "I am of the
opinion also that the measure is not politic," Madison told
the House of Representatives on April 22, 1790, "because, if,
the public debt is a public evil, an assumption of the state
debts will enormously increase, and, perhaps, perpetuate it."
Madison moved on to his practical objections later in the same
speech, noting that Virginians already suffered from a huge
private debt. "If, sir, the state debts should be assumed,
Massachusetts
Madison

will

argued,

then
"but

get
what

rid

of

would

her
be

embarrassments,"

the situation

of

Virginia?"22 Hamilton's supporters dismissed such objections
as the special pleading of local interests. Madison "is so
much a Virginian; so afraid that the mob will cry out, crucify
him; [he] sees Patrick Henry's shade at his bedside every
night," Fisher Ames of Massachusetts observed.23 Madison was
21 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 152-155; Ketcham, JM, 312-315;
Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 146-150; Richard R.
Beeman, The Old Dominion and the New Nation, 1788-1801
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972), 67-71.
22 Speech of April 22, 1790, in PJM, 13:167, 171.
23 Fisher Ames to William Tudor, March 8, 1790, in Fisher
Ames, Works of Fisher Ames, 2 vols. W.B. Allen, ed.
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willing to trade one local interest for another, and agreed to
support

assumption

in

exchange

for the

promise

that

the

capital would eventually be moved to a site on the Potomac.24
Madison saw Hamilton's proposals for a bank and for
American manufactures as additional threats to republicanism.
"The

construction

of

the

constitution

which

have

been

maintained on the occasion [of introducing the proposal for a
bank]," Madison argued, "go to the subversion of every power
whatever

in

the

several

States."2"’ "if

Congress

can

do

whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will
promote the general welfare, the Government is no longer a
limited one possessing enumerated powers," Madison complained
privately to Edmund Pendleton, "but an indefinite one subject
to

particular

exceptions."2® Madison

attacked

Hamilton's

reports on the bank and manufactures publicly in a series of
articles in the National Gazette. He criticized Hamilton's
attempts to increase the power of the central government under
the topic "Consolidation." "Let it be the patriotic study of
all to maintain the various authorities established by our
complicated system, each in its own respective constitutional

(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1983), 1:729.
24 Ketcham, JM, 307-310.
25 Speech of Feb. 2, 1791, in PJM, 13:386.
26 James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Jan. 21, 1792, ibid.,
14:195.
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sphere,"

Madison wrote.27 Madison specifically attacked the

Report on Manufactures under "Fashion," arguing that

"the

mutability of fashion" made manufacturing an unsuitable and
unrepublican occupation for Americans.28 in "The union. Who
are

its

Real

Friends?"

Madison denounced the Hamiltonian

program as a whole. "In a word," he wrote,

"those are real

friends to the Union who are friends to that republican policy
throughout,

which is the only cement for the Union of a

republican people in opposition to a spirit of usurpation and
monarchy."29 Hamilton's reports, and Madison's opposition to
them, opened up the divisions that created the first party
system. "Virginia moves in a solid column, and the discipline
of party is as severe as the Prussian.

Deserters are not

spared," Fisher Ames observed in January of 1793. "Madison is
become a desperate party leader, and I am not sure of his
stopping at any ordinary point of extremity."30
It was the question of foreign policy, shaped by the wars
of the French Revolution, that locked the division between
Federalist

and

Republican

parties

into

place.

In

the

beginning, the French Revolution did not affect the United
States, except as a matter of speculation. Most Americans,
27 "Consolidation," Dec. 3, 1791, ibid., 14:139.
28 "Fashion," March 20, 1792, ibid., 14:259.
29 «The Union. Who are its Real Friends?" March 31, 1792, in
ibid., 14:275.
30 Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, Jan. 1793, in Ames, Works,
2:960.
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including Madison, were sympathetic, hoping France would join
the United States in the family of republics. The National
Assembly in turn looked to the United States for guidance. "It
is impossible to desire better dispositions toward us, than
prevail in this assembly," Jefferson reported from Paris. "Our
proceedings have been viewed as a model for them on every
occasion; and tho' in the heat of debate men are generally
disposed

to

contradict

every

authority

urged

by

their

opponents, ours has been treated like that of the bible, open
to explanation but not to question."31
Four years later revolution turned to Anglo-French war,
which Edmond Genet symbolically brought to the United States.
American reaction hardened and sharpened the divisions that
had emerged over Hamilton's reports.32 Hoping to have policy
set

before

Jefferson

Genet

arrived,

for their

Washington

opinions,

and

asked

received

Hamilton

and

diametrically

opposed answers. Hamilton believed that the 1778 treaties died
with Louis XVI, and recommended that Washington suspend them.
Jefferson

believed

the

treaties

were

still

in

force.

Washington did not want to repudiate the treaties outright,
but he did not have any intention of adhering to the articles

31 Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 158-159; Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison, Aug. 28, 1790, in Jefferson,
Papers, 15:366.
32 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 273-275; Richard
Buel, Jr. Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American
Politics, 1789-1815 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1972), 52.
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pledging American defense of the French West Indies. Hamilton
gained only a tactical advantage when Washington issued the
Proclamation of Neutrality on April 22, 1793.33 The president
did not use the word "neutrality" in the brief statement, but
rather said that "the duty and interest of the United States
require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt
and

pursue

a

conduct

belligerent powers."34

friendly

and

impartial

Jefferson complained

toward

the

that Hamilton

wanted to nullify the French treaty based on what Jefferson
called "an ill-understood scrap of Vattel," which appeared to
support the idea that a change in government voided treaties
concluded by the previous government. Madison responded that
"the attempt to shuffle off the Treaty altogether by quibbling
on Vattel is equally contemptible for the meanness & folly of
it."35
Citizen

Genet

did

not want American

neutrality

but

American help, and he was prepared to use any means to obtain
it. He landed at Charleston, South Carolina, on April 8 and
began

stirring up crowds

commissions.

and handing out blank military

He slowly worked his way north,

arriving in

33 McDonald, Hamilton, 265-266; Bowman, Struggle for
Neutrality, 52-54; Combs, Jay Treaty, 109-113; Alexander
DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under
George Washington (Durham, N.C.s Duke University Press,
1958), 151-153, 205-206.
34 Richardson, Messages and Papers, 1:156.
35 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 28, 1793; James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 8, 1793, in PJM, 15:10, 13.
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Philadelphia in May, where he continued to encourage proFrench sentiment. Worse still, he commissioned Americans as
French privateers aboard the Petite Democrate. This action
forced Jefferson to ask for his recall in August.36
Hamilton himself led the Federalist charge against Genet
and for the Proclamation of Neutrality in the newspapers,
writing as "Pacificus" in the Gazette of the United States in
the summer of 1793. In "Pacificus" #1, Hamilton defended the
president's right to issue the Proclamation of Neutrality on
the basis of the president's power to

negotiate and execute

treaties. He called the president the "organ of intercourse"
with foreign nations, and therefore the branch of government
with the right to interpret treaties.3^ In the course of his
argument, Hamilton gave the president the right of initiative
in foreign relations. He moved on to the specifics of the
Franco-American relations

in

"Pacificus"

#2. The military

treaty of 1778, Hamilton argued, was purely defensive. The
French decree of November 19, 1792, which called for a general
revolt against all monarchies and promised French aid, proved
that the current war was offensive on the French part.3®
Hamilton discounted the idea that the United States owed
France military and commercial help out of gratitude. Such a

36 Ammon, Genet Mission, 44-45, 65-73, 86-91, 108-110.
3^ "Pacificus" #1, June 29, 1793, in Hamilton, Papers,
15:38, 40, 43.
38 "Pacificus" #2, July 3, 1793, ibid., 15:56, 59-60.
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policy, he argued, "will have a natural tendency to lead us
aside from our own true interest, and to make us the dupes of
foreign influence."39
Republicans saw Federalist policy as further evidence of
monarchism and as the diplomatic consequence of Hamilton's
fiscal policies. Jefferson read Hamilton's essays in that
light and urged Madison to "take up your pen, select the most
striking heresies, and cut him to pieces in the face of the
public."40 Madison was
policy

toward

grounds.4* He
declare

France,

a strong opponent of Washington's
both

denied the

neutrality

on

constitutional

president had the

without

congressional

and

policy

authority to
approval.

The

president could not go further than a statement that the
United States was at war or peace. "The right to decide the
question [of peace or war] . . .," Madison wrote to Jefferson,
"seems to me to be essentially & exclusively involved in the
right of the Legislature, of declaring war in a time of peace,
and in the P[resident]. & S[enate]. of making peace in time of
war."4^
Madison responded to Hamilton in the

Gazette of the

39 "Pacificus" #3, July 17, 1793, ibid., 15:106.
40 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, July 7, 1793, in PJM,
15:43; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 209-212.
41 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 8, 1793, in PJM,
15:13.
4^ James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 13, 1793, ibid.,
15:29.
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United States, writing as "Helvidius." These essays, although
somewhat labored and legalistic in tone, come close to being
a definitive treatise on the republican theory of foreign
relations. The Constitution left the question of control of
foreign policy vague. Madison, who clearly favored a prominent
role

for

the

Federalist,

legislature

resolved

that

in

the

convention

question

in

and

favor

in
of

the
the

legislature. As Madison pointed out in Federalist #41, the
United States was physically removed from European politics.
Therefore, the president's power to repel sudden attacks would
not figure into the power to conduct foreign policy. He sought
to reverse the British formula of diplomatic initiative. In
Great Britain, the war power belonged to the king. Parliament
only entered the discussion at the end of the process, voting
up or down, just in the sense of expressing public opinion on
policy decisions that were already made. Madison placed the
power to decide on war with Congress and then expanded the war
power to include all matters that could affect the decision
between war

and peace,

that is,

every aspect of foreign

policy. Madison's formulation placed Congress at the beginning
of the policy process,

reducing the

president's

role

to

administration rather than formation of policy. Madison also
linked legislative control to a reliance on international
law.43 Madison had not expected the rise of the executive. "I
43 Lang, Foreign Policy, 133-135; Edward Keynes, Undeclared
War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 33; Samuel
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see, and politically feel that will be the weak branch of the
Government,” Madison wrote in 1789. Events had since proven
otherwise.44
In his first "Helvidius" essay, Madison argued that a
declaration of war was a law, and as such was the province of
the legislature.

"It is," Madison wrote,

"one of the most

deliberative acts that can be performed, and when performed,
has the effect of repealling all the laws operating in a state
of peace, so far as they are inconsistent with a state of
war." According to the Constitution, Madison continued, this
power

rested

with

Congress.

Madison

discounted

the

presidential power over the military as having no bearing on
the questions of foreign policy. "Those who are to conduct a
war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges,
whether

a

war

ought

to

be

commenced,

continued,

or

concluded.”45 In his second essay, Madison followed this theme
to its logical conclusion. Not only did Congress have the
right to declare war, but also "to judge the causes of war,"
which implied that Congress, and not the president,

should

lead in making foreign policy. "The executive has no other
discretion

than

to

convene

and

give

information

to

the

legislature on occasions that may demand it," Madison wrote,
Flagg Bemis has noted that "international law itself was in
a state of flux." Bemis, Jay's Treaty, 185.
44 James Madison to Edmund Randolph, May 31, 1789, in PJM,
13:190.
45 "Helvidius" #1, Aug. 24, 1793, ibid., 15:69-71.
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"and whilst this discretion is duly exercised the trust of the
executive is satisfied, and that department is not responsible
for the consequences."46
Madison directly attacked Hamilton's views regarding the
French treaties in his third essay. Citing such authorities as
Vattel and Burlamaqui in his defense, Madison argued that the
1778 treaties remained in force despite the change in the
French

government.47

Madison

returned

to

the

issues

of

legislative and executive power in his final two essays. "In
no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in
the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the
legislature, and not to the executive department," Madison
wrote in "Helvidius" #4. He repeated the argument "that the
executive has no right, in any case to decide the question, to
decide whether there is or is not cause for declaring war."
Madison also repeated a central tenet of Whig ideology when he
wrote that "the executive is the department of power most
distinguished by its propensity to war."48 Madison attacked
the

Proclamation

of

Neutrality

in

his

final

essay.

"In

exercising the Constitutional power of deciding a question of
war, the Legislature ought to be as free to decide, according
to its own sense of the public good, on one side or the other
side,"

Madison

wrote.

Washington's

proclamation,

46 "Helvidius" #2, Aug 31, 1793, ibid., 15:82, 86.
47 "Helvidius" #3, Sept. 7, 1793, ibid., 15:98-99.
48 "Helvidius" #4, Sept. 14, 1793, ibid., 15:108-109.
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continued, was improper in that light.49
However

much

Madison

disagreed

with

Washington's

policies, neither he nor his fellow Republicans could abide
Genet's conduct. "Your acct. of G

is dreadful," Madison

wrote to Jefferson in July of 1793. Two months later, Madison
wrote James Monroe that Genet's "conduct has been that of a
madman." Jefferson himself concluded that Genet "will sink the
republican interest if they do not abandon Aim."50 In the end,
Genet's country abandoned him as well. On June 2, 1793, the
Jacobins, led by Maximilien Robespierre, took control of the
Convention. Beginning in the fall the new government sent its
opponents,

including

Genet's

political

patrons,

to

the

guillotine. The Jacobins feared that Genet had alienated the
United States, and on November 17 Robespierre denounced Genet
and generally accused the Girondins of treason. Jean Fauchet
arrived at Philadelphia as the new French minister on February
21, 1794. Genet, knowing the guillotine awaited him in Paris,
retired to permanent exile in New York.51
Despite

Genet

and

despite

the

Terror,

Republicans

retained a basic sympathy for what they believed to be the
republican ideals of the French Revolution. "Genet is a madman

49 "Helvidius" #5, Sept. 18, 1793, ibid., 15:116.
50 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 18, 1793; James
Madison to James Monroe, Sept. 15, 1793; Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison, Aug. 15, 1793, ibid., 15:45, 110-111, 50;
Ketcham, JM, 343-344.
51 Ammon, Genet Mission, 112, 155-159, 171.
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but do not let us quarrel with his nation," George Nicholas
wrote to James Madison.52 Jefferson himself hoped for a French
landing in Great Britain, writing that, "I should be tempted
to leave my clover for awhile, to go and hail the dawn of
liberty & republicanism in that island."53 Conversely, the
Republicans hated Great Britain, and Great Britain provided a
reason in the Orders-in-Council of June 8 and November 6,
1793, and January 8, 1794. Long before Congress received word
of the November 6 Order, Madison had decided on the proper
policy toward Great Britain. Indeed, it was the same policy
that he had advocated in 1789. On January 3, 1794, Madison
introduced resolutions recommending commercial discrimination
against Great Britain, using the same arguments he had used
five years before.
exporting

those

"We stand with

luxuries

in

the

respect to the nation
relation

of

an

opulent

individual to the labor in producing the superfluities, for
his accommodation," Madison told the House of Representatives,
"the former can do without those luxuries, the consumption of
which gives bread to the latter."54 Madison discounted the
possibility of war,

arguing that

"every consideration of

52 George Nicholas to James Madison, Feb. 9, 1794, in PJM,
15:256.
53 Thomas Jefferson to William Branch Giles, April 27, 1795,
in Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 12
vols. Paul Leicester Ford, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1904-1905), 8:172.
54 Speech of Jan. 3, 1794, in PJM, 15:169.
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interest must
Representatives

prevent
moved

it."55 On
to

March

stronger

25,

the

measures,

House

taking

of

up

a

sequestration of British debts and a non-importation act. The
Committee of the Whole approved non-importation on April 15.55
Madison complained that the appointment of John Jay as envoy
extraordinary "has had the effect of impeding all legislative
measures for extorting redress from G.B."57
Madison opposed the Jay Treaty from the beginning, but as
a member of the House of Representatives, there was little he
could do beyond public criticism. By signing the treaty the
United
Britain,

States

"relapsed

Madison

into

some

in

his

argued

dependence"
pamphlet

on

Great

"Political

Observations."5® Madison continued to oppose the treaty after
its ratification in June of 1795. He summed up Republican
anger in a draft petition, writing that the treaty "is in its
present

form

Independent

unworthy

people,

and

the
is

voluntary
not

acceptance

dictated

to

of

an

them by the

circumstances in which providence has kindly placed them."59
Madison attacked the treaty both as bad policy and as a
violation of the Constitution. He drafted a petition to the

55 Speech of Jan. 23, 1794, ibid., 15:206.
56 Combs, Jay Treaty, 121-122.
57 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 1794, in PJM,
15:327.
58 "Political Observations," April 20, 1795, ibid., 15:516.
59 Draft of a Petition, Sept. 1795, ibid., 16:75-76.
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Virginia General Assembly in which he argued that the treaty
interfered with Congress's power to regulate commerce.60 When
the House of Representatives convened in December, Madison
observed to James Monroe that there was, "a clear majority who
disapprove the treaty but it will dwindle under the influence
of causes well known to you.”6* Hoping to soften opposition,
Washington

submitted

Pinckney's

Treaty with

Spain,

which

secured the right of deposit at New Orleans, to the Senate at
the same time the House took up the appropriations needed to
carry out the Jay Treaty. In the House, the Federalists played
on the fear of war if the United States did not approve the
appropriations.62
In March

1796,

Madison began to attack the treaty's

constitutionality. The congressional power over appropriations
placed the treaty before the House of Representatives, but
Madison continued to base his arguments on the congressional
war power. He joined in the demand that Washington deliver all
of

the

papers

connected

president refused,
interfered

with

with

the

treaty,

and

when

the

Madison complained that Washington had
Congress's

right

to

ask

for

such

60 Petition to the General Assembly, Oct. 12, 1795, ibid.,
16:102.
61 James Madison to James Monroe, Dec. 20, 1795 (partly in
code), ibid., 16:170.
62 Combs, Jay Treaty, 180-183; DeConde, Entangling
Alliances, 133; Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 267-281.
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information.65 Madison believed that the Jay Treaty made the
treaty making power of the Senate and president superior to
the war powers of Congress. The Constitution, he asserted,
made the treaty power subordinate to the war power. The Jay
Treaty was essentially an alliance with

a power at war,

Madison argued, and the treaty could drag the United States
into the war without congressional approval. The United States
could send troops around the world, or keep a standing army at
home in peacetime, all as a result of the abuse of the treaty
making power. "Under this aspect," Madison argued, the Treaty
power would be tremendous indeed."64 Madison attacked the
provisions of the treaty in April.

The treaty endangered

American interests in the northwest by allowing the British to
take

part

in

the

Indian

trade,

and

completely

reversed

American policy by acceding to the British interpretation of
neutral rights, and rejecting, "free ships, free goods." In
the end Madison urged the House of Representatives to reject
the appropriations needed to implement the treaty.65
Madison

met

his match

in Federalist

Fisher Ames

of

Massachusetts. On April 28, 1796, Ames rose in defense of the
Jay Treaty. In a lengthy speech, Ames declared that rejection
of the appropriations meant war with Great Britain and then

65 Speech of March 7 and April 6, 1796, in PJM, 16:254, 292293.
64 Speech of March 10, 1796, ibid., 16;258-259.
65 Speech of April 15, 1796, ibid., 16:316-325.
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listed every imaginable calamity that would come as a result.
"If, however/ the vote should pass to reject/ and a spirit
should rise, as it will with the public disorder, to make
confusion worse confounded/” Ames told the House, "even I,
slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive
the

government

and

Constitution

of

my

country.”66

The

Committee of the Whole voted 50-49 in favor of implementation
on April 29. The next day the House passed the appropriations
51-48.67
Madison was not surprised that settlement with Great
Britain brought conflict with France; nor did he have much
confidence that John Adams could resolve it successfully.
Madison wrote Jefferson that "an awful scene appears to be
opening upon us." Jefferson expressed some optimism that war
could be avoided. "I do not believe Mr. A. wishes war with
France," he wrote Madison, "nor do I believe he will truckle
to England as servilely as has been done." Madison, however,
expected

that

war

would

be

"the

fruit

of

the

British

Treaty.”66
Madison retired from the House of Representatives in
March

1797,

and

from

his

home

watched

events

with

an

66 Speech of April 28, 1796, in Ames, Works, 2:1182.
67 Combs, Jay Treaty, 186-188.
66 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Jan. 22, 1797; Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison, Jan. 22, 1797; James Madison to
James Madison, Sr., March 12, 1797, in PJM, 16:471, 474,
500-501.
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increasing

sense of doom.

Since

the

late

1780s,

believed that Adams was at heart a monarchist,

Madison

and viewed

Adams's diplomacy accordingly. Madison fully expected that
Adams would "go indirectly to war, by using the frigates as
convoys and arming private vessels of which the owners &
mariners

will

often

be

British

subjects

under

American

colours." Madison compared Adams unfavorably to Washington,
with

Adams

"taking

as

great

pains

to

get

into war,

as

[Washington] took to keep out of it."®9
The aftermath of the XYZ Affair, particularly Adams's
speech of March 19, 1798, only heightened Madison's fears. The
speech was a product of the president's well-known "violent
passions," and further proof of the Whig doctrine that, "the
Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war & most prone
to it." With the president and the Senate in complete control
of foreign policy, "it is evident that the people are cheated
out of the best ingredients in their Govt, the safeguards of
peace

which

is

the

greatest

of

their

blessings."

The

particulars of the XYZ Affair had no influence on Madison's
thinking, as he believed the Federalists had manufactured the
French crisis out of the Jay Treaty. Talleyrand's actions were
no cause for war, Madison wrote to Jefferson, but he fully
expected the Federalists to use them as such. Furthermore, the
emphasis on naval action threatened to shift the basis of

69 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 12 and 18, 1798,
ibid., 17:78, 82.
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American political economy from agriculture to the carrying
trade. By 1800 Jefferson believed the United States had gone
"navigation mad, and commerce mad,

and navy mad, which is

worst of all."70
"Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty
at home is to be charged to provisions agst. danger real or
pretended from abroad," Madison wrote

in response to the

Federalist program. Viewing events through the lens of English
Opposition thought, Madison saw the military buildup and the
Alien

and

Sedition

Federalist

attempt

Acts
to

as

the

create

logical
a

conclusion

British-style

Madison

and

Jefferson

helped

the

a

corrupt

parliamentary government.71 As a private citizen,
could do little except offer advice.

of

Madison

In the fall of 1798,
Virginia

and

Kentucky

legislatures draft responses to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions declared the
acts

null

and

void

and

proposed

creating

committees

of

correspondence.

Madison's Virginia Resolutions did not go

quite

Madison

as

far.

did

declare

that

the

acts

were

unconstitutional, but advocated no action beyond sending the

70 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 2 and 22, 1798,
ibid., 17:104, 118; Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly,
January 18, 1800, quoted in McCoy, Elusive Republic, 174.
71 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 13, 1798, in PJM,
17:130; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 259-263; Lawrence
Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in
American Society to the Mar of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1982), 137-139.
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resolutions to other states.72
As the Quasi-War continued, Madison stepped up his public
activity.

He

Reflections,"

published
which

an

anonymous

reiterated

his

essay

private

of

"Political

opposition

to

Federalist policy. He again argued that "the fetters imposed
on liberty at home have ever been forged out of the weapons
provided for defence against real, pretended, or imaginary
dangers from abroad."7^ As a member of the Virginia House of
Delegates, he wrote the Report of 1800, which reaffirmed and
expanded on the principles of the Virginia Resolutions. "The
constitution of the United States was formed by a sanction of
the states, given by each in its sovereign capacity," Madison
asserted, using an argument he had rejected thirteen years
before. The states therefore had a right to determine whether
or not the Constitution had been violated,
whether or not,

"such questions

and to decide

as may be of

sufficient

magnitude as to require their interposition." "Consolidation
of the states into one sovereignty, would be to transform the
republican system of the United States into a monarchy,"
Madison continued, and he opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts
on those grounds. The acts concentrated power in the hands of
the president. The states not only had a right to declare acts

72 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Nov. 17, 1798;
Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798, in PJM, 17:178-181,
188-190.
73 "Political Reflections," Philadelphia Aurora and General
Advertizer, Feb. 23, 1799, ibid., 17:242.
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unconstitutional, but also a right to coordinate efforts among
the several states.74 By 1800, Madison was willing to give the
states a greater role in national affairs than he had favored
in 1787, a shift dictated by the need to preserve republican
government. The doctrine of state interposition may be seen as
the reverse side of the negative on state laws.7^
Federalist diplomacy confirmed for Madison the tenet of
Opposition Whig thought that the tools of foreign policy could
easily be turned against domestic liberty. Madison's approach
to foreign policy in the 1790s reveals a duality in his
thought regarding the connection between republicanism and
diplomacy. Madison's long political experience showed him that
republican

theory

did

political practice.

not

always

However,

explain

Madison's

or

theories

conform
of

to

how a

republican diplomacy should work were unmodified by diplomatic
practice.

Unlike John Adams,

Madison never abandoned the

reformative aspects of republican diplomacy. It had not failed
for Madison in the 1790s; it merely had not been tried. As
secretary of state

and president,

Madison

fully expected

American agricultural produce to act as the republican sword
and shield against monarchy at home and abroad. Madison's
difficulties

came

when

other nations

did not

act

as

he

believed they would.

74 "Report of 1800," ibid., 309-310, 315-316, 324-328, 348.
75 Hobson, "Negative on State Laws," 234-235.
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CHAPTER 7: THE REPUBLICAN CRISIS

Like John Adams, James Madison came to executive office
with little direct executive experience. Unlike Adams, Madison
also had no direct experience

in the conduct of diplomacy,

apart from those elements of foreign policy that came before
Congress. When he became secretary of state in 1801, Madison
had spent twenty years in national politics determining the
connection between republican government and foreign policy.
In many ways,

Madison's approach to the problem,

strengths and weaknesses,

and his

were revealed in two Federalist

essays, the famous Federalist #10 and the less well-known but
for diplomacy equally important Federalist #41. In Federalist
#10 Madison accepted as a fixed feature of human nature that
people split into factions for a myriad of reasons. Federalist
#10

provided

a

theory

that

fit

around

the

fact

of

a

territorially large and potentially larger American republic.
Federalist #41, however, showed the extent to which Madison
tried to force diplomacy to fit republican theory. Federalist
#41 presumed that distance would shield the United States from
Europe's wars,

and that

an effective union

and

national

government would provide greater protection than any military
organization.

Madison's

reaction

to

Federalist

diplomacy

23:
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revealed what Madison considered a republican foreign policy.
Madison emphasized the yeoman virtue of economic independence
rather than classical martial virtue. Commercial coercion,
Madison

believed,

was

a far

safer course

for

republican

government than military preparation, agreeing with Gallatin
and

Jefferson

that

"pretended

tax-preparations

and

army-

preparations against contingent wars tend only to encourage
wars."*
Madison's combination of Opposition Whig thought and
agrarian

political

economy

led

him

to

a

belief

in

the

omnipotence of American commercial power and an abhorrence of
what the Federalists considered normal military preparation.
Madison

therefore

unwittingly

staked

the

survival

of

republican government on events he could not control. Madison
assumed

that national

interests,

like human

nature,

were

fixed, and fixed in a way that benefitted the United States.
Britain needed the United States to buy its manufactured goods
and feed its West Indian colonies. France and Spain, to a
lesser extent, required American supplies for their colonies,
and would presumably want to cultivate American political
friendship

as

a

counterweight

to

Great

Britain.

Madison

expected greater reason from nations than he did from the
American people. He had no direct experience, as John Adams

* Ketcham, JM, 425; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, c.
Nov. 16, 1801, in Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert
Gallatin, 3 vols. Henry Adams, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippencott and Company, 1879), 1:71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

235
had,

to make him believe otherwise;

there was no foreign

policy equivalent of his electoral defeat of 1777. Madison's
success in constitutional matters came when he shaped theory
to match American practice. His failures as secretary of state
and president came from his attempts to force the vagaries of
diplomacy to conform to a theoretical model.
The two issues that shaped Madison's early exposure to
foreign policy, control of the Mississippi River and trade
with

Great

Britain,

best

reveal

the

connection

between

republican ideology and Madison's diplomacy. Pinckney's Treaty
had temporarily settled the Mississippi question in 1795, and
promised to do so as long as Spain owned Louisiana. In Rufus
King's words, the Spanish were "quiet neighbours," and posed
little threat to American interests.2 Then Napoleon Bonaparte
decided to use Louisiana in combination with the reconquest of
St. Domingo as the basis for a new French empire in North
America. French and Spanish negotiators concluded the Treaty
of St. Ildefonso on October 1, 1800, which ceded Louisiana and
six warships to France in exchange for an Italian kingdom for
the Duke of Parma.

France was not to take possession of

Louisiana

delivered

until

it

the

Italian

territory.

The

retrocession of Louisiana, combined with the signing of the
Peace of Amiens between France and Great Britain on March 27,

2 Rufus King to James Madison, April 2, 1803, in King,
Correspondence, 4:24.
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1802, promised to give France a free hand in North America.-*
Soon after the secret Treaty of St. Ildefonso was signed
rumors of its conclusion circulated among European diplomats.
In late March 1801 Rufus King wrote from London that Spain had
ceded Louisiana and the Floridas to France.4 Two months later
Madison

wrote

that

"intelligence

has

come

thro'

several

channels, which makes it probable that Louisiana has been
ceded to France."5 President Jefferson
Jefferson

called

New

Orleans

the

"one

feared the worst.
single

spot,

the

possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. "The day
that France takes possession of N. Orleans," Jefferson wrote
to Robert R. Livingston, minister to France, would be the day
on which the United States must ally with Great Britain.5 To
Jefferson, the Floridas were as important as the port of New
Orleans itself. "Whatever power, other than ourselves, holds
the

country east of

the Mississippi becomes

our

natural

enemy," the president warned.7 Spain suspended the American

3 Alexander DeConde. This Affair of Louisiana (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 97-102.
4 Rufus King to James Madison, March 29, 1801, in James
Madison, The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State
Series, 3 vols to date. Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds.
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986),
1:55.
5 James Madison to James Monroe, June 1, 1801, ibid., 1:245.
5 Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, April 18, 1802,
in Jefferson, Writings, 7:364-365.
7 Thomas Jefferson to Pierre S. Dupont de Nemours, Feb. 1,
1803, ibid., 9:439.
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right of deposit at New Orleans on October 18, 1802, leading
the Jefferson administration to conclude that neither France
nor Spain was a safe neighbor.8
Madison

agreed

with

Jefferson

that

anything

that

threatened American access to the Mississippi threatened the
survival of a republican political economy, and therefore the
vital interests of the union.8 Officially, Madison argued that
the West was fully attached to the union and would not throw
in with France to protect its interests. Madison also believed
that all sections agreed on the importance of the Mississippi,
with the only dispute over "the degree of patience which ought
to

be

exercised

during

the

appeal

to

friendly modes

of

r e d r e s s . T h e union had come too close to collapse over the
same

issue

in

the

1780s

for

Madison

to

be

completely

confident. "We are fully aware of the tendency of the reported
Cession of Louisiana, to plant in our neighbourhood troubles
of different kinds, and to prepare the way for very serious
events," Madison wrote to Rufus King in London.** "A mere
neighbourhood could not be friendly to the harmony which both
8DeConde, Louisiana, 119-121; Arthur P. Whitaker. The
Mississippi Question 1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics
and Diplomacy (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934),
189-192.
8 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 197-198.
10 James Madison to James Monroe and Robert R. Livingston,
March 2, 1803; James Madison to Charles Pinckney, January
10, 1803, in WJM, 7:13-14, 2.
11 James Madison to Rufus King, May 1, 1802, in PJMzSS,
3:173.
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countries

[France and the United States]

have so much an

interest in cherishing,” Madison wrote to Livingston on May 1,
1802, "but if a possession of the mouth of the Mississippi is
to be added the other causes of discord, the worst events are
to be apprehended." Madison instructed Livingston to "spare no
effort" to determine the extent of the retrocession, and to
convince France to cede New Orleans and the Floridas to the
United

States.^

Madison

issued

similar

instructions

to

Charles Pinckney, minister to Spain, in case Spain still owned
the Floridas. Madison proposed the make the Mississippi "a
common boundary, with a common use of its navigation, for [the
United States] and Spain.
For Madison, some sort of purchase was a policy better
suited to republican government than the military solution
advocated by some Federalists, including Alexander Hamilton.
On February

16,

1803,

Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania

sponsored a resolution authorizing the president to call up
the militia and appropriate $5 million for an expedition
against

New

Orleans

whenever

the

president

deemed

it

necessary. Madison believed that the resolution "drove at war
thro'

a

delegation

of

unconstitutional

power

to

the

Executive." Madison was as unwilling in 1803 as he was in 1793
to use the president's role as commander-in-chief to formulate
12 James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, May 1, 1802,
ibid., 3:175-176.
James Madison to Charles Pinckney, May 11, 1802, ibid.,
3:215-216.
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foreign policy.^
As long as France was at peace with Great Britain,
Bonaparte

was

intent

on

building

his

American

empire.

Livingston reported that his attempts to discuss New Orleans
were "premature" and that France planned to take possession of
Louisiana.15 The defeat of the French army in St. Domingo and
the ice-choked French ports

that prevented resupply made

Bonaparte more willing to sell. The prospect of renewed war
with

Great

Livingston

Britain
sought

further motivated

to take

the

French

advantage of the

consul.

situation

in

January 1803, when he again offered to buy New Orleans and the
Floridas. He added a buffer zone north of the Arkansas River,
becoming the first negotiator to suggest a cession of land
west of the Mississippi.16
In January
special

envoy

1803 Jefferson

to

assist

in

appointed James Monroe

negotiations.

Madison

as

issued

instructions on March 2, directing Monroe and Livingston to
purchase New Orleans and the Floridas, with no mention of
acquiring land to the west of the Mississippi. As a fallback
position,

if France would not

sell New Orleans,

Madison

^ McDonald, Hamilton, 357-358; DeConde, Louisiana, 140;
James Madison to James Monroe, March 1, 1803, in James
Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, 4
vols. William C. Rives, ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott
and Co., 1865), 2:178.
15 Robert R. Livingston to James Madison, September 1, 1802,
in American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 6 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1833-1861), 3:525.
lf> DeConde, Louisiana, 130-131, 149-154.
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advised the envoys to secure free navigation of the rivers of
West Florida.*7 By mid-April, Bonaparte was prepared to sell
all of Louisiana, which he believed to be worthless without
New Orleans, in order to prevent an Anglo-American alliance.
On May 2, 1803, French and American negotiators concluded an
agreement in which the United States paid $15 million for all
of French Louisiana. Borders were not precisely defined; nor
were the Floridas

specifically mentioned,

although Monroe

later recalled that the Americans understood the cession to
include territory west of the Perdido River.18 In any case,
the French project for an American empire was at an end.
"The annexation of Louisiana was an event so portentous
as to defy measurement; it gave a new force to politics, and
ranked in historical importance next to the Declaration of
Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, —

events

of which it was the logical outcome," wrote Henry Adams,
himself no admirer of Jefferson or Madison.19 More recent
commentators have also seen the Louisiana Purchase as the end
result of Madison's political philosophy. Ralph Ketcham wrote
that by doubling the size of the nation, Madison provided more

17 Ibid., 135-136; James Madison to James Monroe and Robert
R. Livingston, March 2, 1803, in WJM, 7:17-19, 28-29.
18 DeConde, Louisiana, 167-172; James Monroe. The
Autobiography of James Monroe. Stuart Gerry Brown, ed.
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959), 164.
19 Henry Adams, The History of the United States during the
Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 9
vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889-1891), 2:49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241
land for yeoman farmers. The Louisiana Purchase was therefore,
"perfectly

suited

[to]

Republican

political

and

social

theory."2° Such an analysis, however, reads history backward,
by assuming that Federalist #10 was a call for expansion, and
that Madison intended to acquire all of Louisiana. Certainly
Madison approved of the purchase, but for him the main problem
was securing the navigation of the Mississippi River.
Reaction to the unexpected result of the negotiations
varied by party and section. Sectionalist-minded Federalists
such as William Plumer of New Hampshire
Louisiana

Purchase

made

an

already

too

feared that the
large

country

ungovernable and vulnerable at the frontier.2* The Republicans
and some Federalists supported the treaty, but policy-makers
were at a loss as to what to do with the excess territory.
James Monroe believed it would be best to move slowly into the
western

country.22 william

C.

C.

Claiborne,

governor

of

Mississippi Territory and later governor of Orleans Territory,
believed that Spain might trade East and West Florida for an
American cession of lands between the Sabine River and the Rio
Grande. Claiborne advised, however, that the United States
20 Ketcham, JM, 420.
2* Speech of October 24, 1803, in William Plumer, William
Plumer's Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States
Senate 1803-1807. Everett Somerville Brown, ed. (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1923), 6.
22 James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, September 25, 1804, in
James Monroe, The Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols.
Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1898-1903), 4:256.
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should make

no concessions to gain territory between

the

Perdido River and New Orleans.22 Jefferson was reluctant to
give up any new territory,

for fear of allowing Spain to

regain access to the Mississippi.2^ Jefferson was willing to
delay settlement, but would only give up territory east of the
Rio Grande for East Florida. Madison instructed James Monroe
and Charles Pinckney to purchase the Floridas and forbade
American diplomats from making any agreement that allowed
Spain back onto the banks of the Mississippi.25
Madison shared Jefferson's desire to secure the Floridas
as well as

his

reluctance to give up

Mississippi

River.

Spanish possessionof

lands west of the
West

Florida,

bordering New Orleans, threatened American control of the
mouth of the Mississippi. Madison's instructions to Monroe of
July 29,

1803, fifteen days after receipt of the purchase

treaty, listed the Floridas as the main objective. Madison
wrote Monroe that he should not trade western territory, as it
was potentially too valuable to the United States, and West
Florida

was

worthless

to

France

or

Spain

without New

2^ William C. C. Claiborne to James Madison, January 24,
1804, in William C. C. Claiborne, Official Letter Books of
William C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816. Dunbar Rowland, ed.
(Jackson, Miss.: State Department of Archives and History,
1917), 1:347.
2^ Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, August 9, 1803, in
Jefferson, Writings, 10:28-29.
25 James Madison to James Monroe, April 15, 1804; James
Madison to James Monroe and Charles Pinckney, July 8, 1804,
in WJM, 7:141-152, 153-155.
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Orleans.26
The

Jefferson

administration

was

convinced

that

the

United States already owned West Florida according to the
terms of both the retrocession to France and the American
purchase.

In 1762 France ceded its territory east of the

Mississippi River, excluding the island of New Orleans, to
Great Britain. At the same time, France ceded New Orleans and
the land west of the Mississippi River to Spain. The British
had divided Florida into two provinces at the Perdido River.
The British cession of the Floridas to Spain in 1783 reunited
the old French province of Louisiana. Under the treaty of St.
Idefonso, Spain ceded Louisiana as it existed in 1762, which
the Americans understood to include territory extending to the
Perdido River. The French government did not explicitly say
whether or not the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida.27
For the rest of Madison's term as secretary of state and
his first term as president the Floridas were the main focus
of his Spanish diplomacy. As long as Spain owned territory
bordering New Orleans, American use of the Mississippi and a
republican

political

economy were

not completely

secure.

Furthermore, possession of the Floridas by any European power
threatened to intrude European politics upon North America, an

2® James Madison to James Monroe, July 29, 1803, ibid.,
7:53-54, 57-58.
27 Isaac Joslin Cox, The West Florida Controversyf 17981813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1918), 84-85.
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event which would also be hazardous to the republic.
Madison revived the arguments he had used against Spain
in the 1780s, that the rise of American power could not be
stopped. Madison was unable to understand why Spain did not
see that its best interests were to give up the Floridas. "The
Spanish Government must understand in fact that the United
States can never consider the amiable relations between Spain
and them as definitively and permanently secured, without an
arrangement on this subject," Madison wrote to Monroe on July
29, 1803. Madison's instructions to Pinckney, written on the
same day, are similar in tone, arguing that the United States
would eventually possess the Floridas, and Spain would be wise
to bow to the inevitable.28 The Floridas revived Madison's
twenty-year quarrel with what he saw as Spanish stubbornness.
"What is it that Spain dreads?" Madison wrote to Charles
Pinckney, using the same language and arguments as his 1785
letter to Lafayette. "She dreads, it is presumed, the growing
power of this country, and the direction of it against her
possessions within her [the United States]
annihilate this power? No. —
growth? No. —

reach. Can she

Can she sensibly retard its

Does not common prudence then advise her, to

conciliate by every proof of friendship and confidence the
good will of a nation whose power is formidable to her;

28 James Madison to James Monroe, July 29, 1803, in WJM,
7:54; James Madison to Charles Pinckney, July 29, 1803,
Diplomatic Instructions, All Countries, Vol. 6, Record Group
59, General Records of the Department of State.
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instead of yielding to the impulses of jealousy, and adopting
obnoxious precautions, which can have no other effect than to
bring on prematurely the whole weight of the Calamity which
she f e a r s . when France took Spain's

side on its West

Florida claim, Madison could not understand why France would
pursue a policy that "might end in placing the United States
on the side of Great Britain."30
Republican fear of executive power left Jefferson and
Madison with few alternatives beyond waiting for France and
Spain

to

see

reason,

which

they

defined as

acceding

to

American wishes. In November 1803, Congress passed the Mobile
Act, which extended American revenue laws to the territory
acquired from France and gave the president the power to
create a customs district for Mobile, even though that port
fell within the disputed area with Spain.31 In February 1806
Congress passed the Two Million Dollar Act, which officially
provided $2 million for unspecified diplomatic expenses. In
reality,

the money was intended to buy the Floridas from

Spain. The act passed by a wide margin, but created a rift in
the Republican party. John Randolph of Roanoke, hitherto one
of

Jefferson's

staunchest

supporters,

become

one

of

his

sharpest critics, charging that the act was little more that
James Madison to Charles Pinckney, October 12, 1803, in
WJM, 7:74.
30 James Madison to John Armstrong, June 6, 1805, ibid.,
7:184.
31 DeConde, Louisiana, 214-216; Brant, JM, 4:192-193.
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a bribe and beneath the dignity of a republic.33
Florida

remained

an

unanswered

question

well

into

Madison's presidency, although external events promised to
work in Madison's favor. The Spanish Empire collapsed in 1810,
and

most

of

Spain's

American

provinces

moved

toward

independence. West Florida was among them. American settlers
dominated the West Florida legislature, and on September 26,
1810, proclaimed the Republic of West Florida. On October 10
the new republic asked to be annexed by the United States.
Madison had watched the developments of the summer of 1810
closely. On July 17 the president advised Secretary of State
Robert

Smith

that

Governor

David

Holmes

of

Mississippi

Territory should monitor events. "It would be well for him
also to be attentive to the means of having his Militia in a
state for any service that may be called for," Madison wrote,
believing

that

European

danger. 33

When

the

annexation,
without

west

interference
Florida

was

the

government

greatest
asked

it seemed to give Madison the chance

appearing

to

overstep

the

bounds

of

for

to act

executive

authority. Madison wrote on October 19 that he expected the

3^ Ibid., 233; Norman K. Risjord. The Old Republicans:
Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1965), 46-50.
33 Henry Adams, History, 5:306-308; Cox, west Florida
Controversy, 416-417; James Madison to Robert Smith, July
17, 1810, in James Madison, The Papers of James Madison:
Presidential Series, 3 vols. to date. Robert A. Rutland, J.
C. A. Stagg, et al., eds. (Charlottesville: University Press
of Virginia, 1984), 2:419.
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West Floridians to call for help from either Great Britain or
the United States. After receiving communications from Baton
Rouge, Madison issued a secret proclamation on October 27,
1810,

informing Congress of his intention to occupy West

Florida from the Mississippi to the Perdido.34
Madison hoped that the same circumstances that delivered
West Florida into American hands would work in East Florida as
well. On

January 3, 1811 Madison asked Congress for the power

to annex East Florida if the residents of that province asked
him to do so. Congress, complying with Madison's request,
authorized George Mathews
Florida

under

certain

and

John McKee

circumstances,

to occupy

specifically

East

if

an

insurgent movement overthrew the Spanish government and asked
for

American

intervention;

or

in

response

to

British

interference. In March 1812 Mathews responded to an uprising
on Amelia Island by invading it. Madison believed that Mathews
had acted prematurely, and disapproved of Mathews's attempts
to stir up a revolt, writing that "Mathews has been playing a
strange comedy, in the face of common sense, as well as of his
instructions." Madison disavowed Mathews's conduct, and had
Secretary of State Monroe send official notification.3^
34 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 19, 1810;
Proclamation of October 27, 1810; in PJM:P, 2:585, 595-596.
35 Henry Adams, History, 6:237-240; Brant, JM, 5:442-444;
Cox, West Florida Controversy, 522-524; Rembert W. Patrick,
Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border
1810-1815 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954), 4950, 68, 120-122; J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War:
Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American
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The Florida episode revealed two elements of Madison's
diplomacy; that in dealing with European power his version of
republican diplomacy limited executive action and tended to be
overtaken by events,
nations

and that Madison's conception of how

should act had not moved beyond the belief

that

nations would act purely in their own interests. Madison
defined those interests

in terms of acceding to American

wishes, leading him to overestimate the diplomatic value of
American friendship to France and Spain. Fortune had turned in
favor of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase, but
was of little help in acquiring the Floridas.
The maritime crisis with Great Britain revived the second
issue that shaped Madison's early career. To Madison, British
claims to sovereignty of the high seas were as dangerous to
republican government in the United States as foreign control
of

the

Mississippi

River

had

been.

British

claims

grew

stronger in 1805. That spring the Lords Commissioners of
Appeals

handed

down

the

Essex decision

which

tightened

restrictions under the Rule of 1756, which stated that trade
considered illegal in peacetime could not be made legal in
wartime, on neutrals plying the French and Spanish colonial

Republic 1783-1830 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1983), 98-100; James Madison to Congress, Jan. 3,
1811, in PJM:P, 3:93-94; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson,
April 24, 1812, in James Morton Smith, ed., The Republic of
Letters: The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison 1776-1826, 3 vols. (New York: W.W Norton & Company,
1995), 3:1694; James Monroe to George Mathews, April 4,
1812, in ASP:FRr 3:572.
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trades. The Essex decision revised the Polly decision handed
down by the Admiralty Court in 1800, which permitted a "broken
voyage," that is, it allowed neutral participation in the
colonial trades if broken by a stop at a neutral port. The
Essex decision closed that loophole and upheld the doctrine of
continuous voyage. A theoretical domination of the ocean was
made more real by Lord Nelson's victory over the combined
Spanish and French fleets at Trafalgar on October 21, 1805,
assuring British naval supremacy for the rest of the war.36
The same day as Trafalgar, James Stephen, a pro-ministry
writer who received a seat in the House of Commons for his
efforts on behalf of the Orders-in-Council, published War in
Disguise; or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags, a quasi-official
defense of the British crackdown on neutral trade in the West
Indies.

War

in

Disguise

was

similar

to

Sheffield's

Observations on the Commerce of the American States, in that
both works reflected popular and official British anger with
the United States, and both portrayed control of the West
Indian trade as vital to preserving British naval supremacy.
Stephen's thesis was that the so-called neutral trade with the
West Indies was in fact French and Spanish trade carried on
under American flags.37 Neutrals had always carried at least
36 Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United
States 1805-1812 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1961), 76-80.
37 Ibid., 77-78; James Stephen. War in Disguise; or the
frauds of the Neutral Flags, 2nd American ed. (New York: I.
Riley and Co., 1806), 57.
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some of the French and Spanish trade, but by 1805 the United
States

carried

almost

all

of

it.

Stephen

had

a

simple

solution; Great Britain should seize all ships involved in the
French and Spanish colonial trade.38 After Trafalgar, Great
Britain seemed to be able to make good on that threat.
The trade that Stephen attacked, and Madison sought to
defend, was fraught with ideological tangles, stemming from
drastic changes in world politics. Madison's diplomacy, formed
in the 1780s and 1790s, presumed the existence of shippers
from the colonial powers taking their share of the colonial
trade and a bloc of northern European powers acting as a
counterweight to Great Britain on the continent. By 1805 the
Netherlands had been absorbed into Napoleon's empire,

and

after Trafalgar non-American neutral shipping disappeared from
the

Atlantic.

The

northern

powers

to

whom

Americans

occasionally appealed for help would provide none. On June 17,
1801, Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia signed an agreement
denouncing
denying

the British

use of paper blockades,

the doctrine that

free

ships make

free

but

also

goods.38

Madison did not adjust his ideas on diplomacy, and as late as
1806 he hoped that peace between France and Russia would aid

38 Stephen, War in Disguise, 103, 148.
39 W.P. Cresson, The Holy Alliance: The European Background
of the Monroe Doctrine (New York: Oxford University Press,
1922), 10.
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the

cause

of

neutral

rights.40

As

the

neutral

nations

disappeared, the United States assumed more of the world's
carrying trade. American freight values jumped from $6 million
in 1790 to over $40 million on the eve of the Embargo. The
value of the re-export trade, the trade at the heart of the
British

crisis,

increased

between

four

and

ten

times.4*

Madison supported an American shipping industry only large
enough to carry American goods to market; most of the new
carrying trade was in John Randolph's words a "fungus of war,"
which put the agricultural mass of the country at the mercy of
the port cities of the east coast.43
Jefferson

and Madison no doubt cringed upon

reading

Randolph's remarks, as their position on the carrying trade
was not far from his. In 1785 Jefferson wrote John Jay that in
a perfect world he would prefer the United States not engage
in large-scale shipping while there was land to be tilled.
Jefferson realized that Americans had already claimed their
share of the ocean and feared the inevitable result would be
"frequent wars." In the event of war, Jefferson believed the
United States

should withdraw from the sea completely.43

Twenty years later Jefferson was still torn over how to handle
40 James Madison to John Armstrong, March 14, 1806, James
Madison Papers, Library of Congress, 2nd series, reel 25.
41 North, Economic Growth, 28, 44.
4^ b. Perkins, Prologue to War, 112.
43 Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, Aug. 23, 1785, in
Jefferson, Papers, 8:426-427.
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the carrying trade.

British diplomat Augustus John Foster

wrote that Jefferson, "more than once told me that he wished
the United States had never possessed a single ship." "He
would," Foster continued, "have laid the American ports open
to all the world, let foreigners dispute, if they liked it,
which

should

supply

at

the

cheapest

rate

the

richest

agricultural market in the universe."44
Madison

was

not

as

given

as

Jefferson

was

to

philosophical speculations, nor did he have Randolph's luxury
of saying exactly what he believed at all times. All his
career Madison had straddled a line between what he could
write in an anonymous newspaper essay and what he could say on
the floor of the House of Representatives or in diplomatic
instructions.
suspicions

He

that

fully

shared

shipping

was

Randolph's
gaining

at

and

Jefferson's

the

expense

of

agriculture, and that shipping was sending American diplomacy
and political economy far off course. As in 1780, Madison
believed that New England was putting its interest above that
of the nation. "In truth, the only obstacles to [a commercial
treaty] between the United States and that Nation [Britain]
arise wholly from the patronage by the former of the maritime
rights and interests of the Eastern States, as a portion of

44 Sir Augustus John Foster, Jeffersonian America: Notes on
the United States of America Collected in the Years 1805-6-7
and 11-12 (San Marino, Ca.s The Huntington Library, 1954),
81.
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the Confederacy,” Madison wrote to William Pinkney in 1808.45
Defense of this trade could lead to war, resulting in taxes,
debts, armies and navies, all fatal to republican government.
Furthermore, the carrying trade was only partially linked to
American

produce,

and

a threat

to

the

agrarian

base of

Madison's republicanism. Abandonment of the West Indian trade
meant an equally unrepublican submission to Great Britain as
mistress

of

the

seas.

Madison

hoped

to

resolve

his

ideological quandary, and steer a middle course between war
and submission, by asserting the American right to the West
Indian

trade,

and

conducting

a

policy

that

assumed

the

American carrying trade was more valuable to Europe than to
the United States. Madison returned to the argument at the
center

of

his

diplomatic

thought,

that

the

West

Indies

depended on the United States "for the supplies essential to
their existence."46
Madison wrote Jefferson on September 15, 1805 that the
Rule of 1756 "threatens more loss and vexation to neutrals
than all the belligerent claims put together." Three weeks
later Madison noted that he was working on his refutation of
the

Rule

of

1756.47

The

fruit

of

Madison's labors,

An

45 James Madison to William Pinkney, Dec. 5, 1808, in LOWJM,
2:427-428.
46 James Madison to James Monroe, March 6, 1805, in WJM,
7:174-175.
47 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, September 14 and
October 5, 1805, in James Morton Smith, ed. Republic of
Letters, 3:1386, 1390.
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Examination of the British Doctrine, which subjects to Capture
a Neutral Trade, not open in a Time of Peace, appeared in
January

1806. The Examination served to confirm the link

between republican government and the law of nations, which
had always been present in Madison's thought.48
Madison started by attacking the central thesis of the
Rule of 1756, that trade between a colonial port and a foreign
port was in principle different from direct trade with the
mother country. Madison wrote that "a trade between a colony
and a foreign port is, in a like manner, precisely the same
with the trade between a foreign port and the parent country;
which is only a more considerable, as a colony may be less a
considerable,

part of the

same country or empire.”48 The

counter to the Rule of 1756 was the principle that "free ships
make free goods,” which Madison based on the law of nations.
Madison cited Hugo Grotius as the father of the law of nations
and argued that nothing in Grotius's work could justify the
Rule of 1756, and most of Grotius's work supported neutral
rights.^8

Vattel

concurred

"in

establishing

the

general

freedom of commerce, with the exception of things relating to
the war.
Having to his satisfaction demolished British claims
48 Onuf and Onuf, Federal Union, 208-209.
49 "Examination," in WJM, 7:206.
50 Ibid., 209-215.
51 Ibid., 230.
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according to the law of nations, Madison proceeded to examine
the Rule of 1756 according to British practice. Great Britain
"cannot surely demure to the example of her own proceedings,"
Madison wrote. "And it is here, perhaps, more than anywhere
else, that the claim ought to shrink from examination.”52 No
precedent for the Rule of 1756 existed before the Seven Years'
War, and the Rule of 1756 was not even a fixed feature of
British practice. Great Britain opened its West Indian trade
to the United States under article 12 of the Jay Treaty (the
article rejected by the Senate) and in the Orders-in-Council
of June 27,

1805.55 The practice of other nations was no

support for current
Long's

British policy.

History of Jamaica.,

Madison cited Edward

noting that

Spain opened

its

colonial trade to the Dutch to alleviate a shortage of Spanish
ships and sailors.54
What was Great Britain's real intention? Madison argued
that

Great

Britain

aimed

at

nothing

less

than

complete

domination of the west Indian trade, and the United States was
the only remaining obstacle. The British government invented
the Rule of 1756 as legal cover for a power grab.55 "And thus
we arrive at the true foundation of the principle which has so

52 Ibid., 268.
53 Ibid., 272-273.
54 Ibid., 7:235; Madison's extracts, James Madison Papers,
Library of Congress, 2nd series, reel 25.
55 "Examination," in WJM, 7:299-300.
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often varied its attitudes of defense, and when driven from
one stand,

has been so ready to occupy another," Madison

wrote. "Finding no asylum elsewhere, it at length asserts, as
its true foundation, a mere superiority of f o r c e . Madison
argued nothing "was more disrespectful to neutral nations, or
more fatal to the liberty and interests of neutral commerce,"
than the Rule of 1756. Madison concluded,

"if she will not

answer for herself all the world will answer for her," he
wrote,

"that she would not [accept the capture of British

ships under laws similar to the Rule of 1756], and what is
more, she ought not."57
Madison's work did not sway his critics, contemporary or
historical. Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire wrote that
the

Examination

showed

consulted more books,

that

Madison,

"has

read

many,

&

upon the law of nations." The book,

however, suffered from two defects, "that no end is stated for
writing the work [and] no system intimated by which we- are to
obtain redress for the wrongs committed by Great Britain."58
Henry Adams called the rights Madison defended,

"worthless

unless supported by the stronger force."59 The Examination
revealed

that Madison

had

failed

to make

republican theory to diplomatic practice.

the

leap

from

The Examination

56 Ibid., 346.
57 Ibid., 374-375.
58 entry for January 22, 1806, in Plumer, Memorandum, 388.
59 Henry Adams, History, 2:327.
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seems to rest on the assumption of the diplomacy of the
American Revolution, that the United States had justice on its
side, and all the United States needed to do was make its
claims known to the world. Madison wrote an effective answer
to Stephen's theory in War in Disguise. He had no effective
answer for the reality of Trafalgar.
Great Britain sought to bolster its control of the high
seas by declaring French-controlled Europe under a state of
blockade on May 16, 1806. To maintain naval supremacy Great
Britain needed seamen, prompting the second sore point with
the United States, impressment and the right of search. Better
pay and milder discipline on American ships led many British
sailors

to

desert.

Also,

the

British

did

not

recognize

American nationalization, and included American citizens in
its hunt for deserters.
Madison and Jefferson gave James Monroe and Maryland
Federalist William Pinkney

responsibility

for

reaching

a

settlement with Great Britain. Madison hoped to secure the
rights

asserted

in

the

Examination into

policy.

Madison

continued to assume that interest would force Great Britain to
open its West

Indian trade.

The West Indian trade was a

"permanent object of the United States,” with geographical
proximity and economic necessity in the West Indies working in
60 B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 104-106; Reginald Horsman.
The Causes of the war of 1812 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 27-29; James Fulton Zimmerman.
Impressment of American Seamen (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1925), 18-21.
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the

United

States's

favor.^

Monroe

and

Pinkney

began

negotiations on August 27, 1806, and soon realized that the
British government would not concede on the vital issues. On
November 11 the envoys informed Madison that there was no
chance of a settlement of the impressment issue. The two sides
signed a treaty on December 31 that re-established trade
relations and ignored impressment. "We are sorry to add that
this treaty contains no

provision against the impressment of

our seamen," the envoys wrote to Madison on January 3, 1807.
They hoped an informal agreement would curtail the practice,
even if Great Britain did not renounce the right of search. To
Monroe and Pinkney the treaty seemed to be the only protection
for American commerce in a world torn by Anglo-French war.
Napoleon's Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806, declaring Great
Britain in a state of blockade, removed any safe haven for
American commerce.®^
The

Jefferson

impressment.
response

administration

took

a

hard

The cabinet met on February 2,

to Monroe

and

Pinkney's

letter

of

line

1807

on

and in

November

11

unanimously agreed to reject any treaty silent on impressment.
Madison wrote Monroe and Pinkney the next day with a new set
^ James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, May
17, 1806, in WJM, 7:391-392.
Henry Adams, History, 3:407-409; Horsman, Causes of the
War of 1812, 76-92; Burton Spivak. Jefferson's English
Crisis: Commerce, Embargo and the Republican Revolution
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979), 6265; James Monroe and William Pinkney to James Madison, in
ASP:FR, 3:137-140, 146.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of instructions, putting repeal of impressment at the top of
the list,
further

followed by the rights of colonial trade and a
definition

of

a

legal

blockade.®^

When

administration received the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty,
naturally

a

disappointment.

Pinkney on May
treaty.

20,

Madison wrote

to

the

it was

Monroe

and

explaining why Jefferson rejected the

Impressment was the leading issue. The president

"laments more especially, that the British Government has not
yielded to the just and cogent considerations which forbid the
practice of its Cruizers in visiting and impressing the Crews
of our vessels, covered by an independent flag, and guarded by
the laws of the high seas, which ought to be sacred to all
nations," Madison w r o t e . T h e

Monroe-Pinkney Treaty might

have preformed the same function for the Republicans as the
Jay Treaty did for the Federalists, to buy time, build up
forces, and prepare for a more vigorous defense of American
rights. Madison did not assume, as Jay had done, that the
United States was in an inferior position.

Madison again

argued that economically Great Britain needed the United
States too much to risk war.®-’

^ Thomas Jefferson. The Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson.
Franklin B. Sawvel, ed. (New York: The Roundtable Press,
1903), 251-252; James Madison to James Monroe and William
Pinkney, February 3, 1807, in WJM, 7:397-404.
64 James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, May
20, 1807, in WJM, 7:415-416.
65 James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, May
20, 1807, ibid., 7:444-445.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260
Contrary to Madison's hopes, Great Britain was undeterred
in its quest for command of the seas. Both Great Britain and
France

combined

to decree

neutral

shipping out of

legal

existence. The British Order-in-Council of January 7, 1807
made all trade with French or French-allied ports subject to
capture. An Order of November 11,

1807 required that all

neutrals obtain British licenses. Napoleon responded with the
Milan Decree of December 17, 1807, which subjected to capture
any neutral ship with a British license.*’®
The Chesapeake affair of June 22,

1807, in which the

British frigate Leopard attacked and seized four sailors from
the unprepared American ship, was the strongest example of
British high-handedness on the impressment issue. "The brand
seethed and hissed like the glowing olive-stake of Ulysses in
the

Cyclops'

Cyclops,

eye,

until

the whole

American

people,

like

roared with pain and stood frantic on the shore,

hurling abuse at the enemy, who taunted them from his safe
ships," Henry Adams wrote to describe the American reaction.®7
James

Madison

helpless

did

not

as Henry Adams

believe

the

suggested.

united
The

States

was

as

Chesapeake affair

brought out Madison's answer to British pretensions on the
high seas. It was the same answer Madison had for the Orders
of

1793

and

1794,

the mercantile

houses

of

Glasgow and

®® Henry Adams, History, 3:416, 103; Horsman, Causes of the
War of 1812, 121.
®7 Henry Adams, History, 4:27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

261
Edinburgh,

and the Townshend Duties and the Stamp Act. On

December 22, 1807, Jefferson signed the Embargo Act, which
prohibited American ships from clearing out of American ports.
Combined

with

a

non-importation

act,

the

Embargo

closed

American trade to the world.68
Madison's

efforts

to

apply

republican

thought

to

diplomacy convinced him that the Embargo was the republic's
ultimate weapon. It marked a rejection of classical martial
virtue in favor of the yeoman virtue of economic independence,
which would prevent creating a military organization and
consequently an internal threat to civil liberty.

It also

risked little except a branch of trade that Madison did not
believe to be compatible with a yeoman political economy. The
Embargo would have the domestic effect of reorienting American
political

economy back

toward

agriculture

by

effectively

killing the domestic carrying trade and forcing France and
Great

Britain

agricultural

to

bid

produce.

for
The

the
Embargo

right
was,

to

buy

American

however,

another

example of the gap between theory and practice. In Federalist
#10 Madison

had

listed the numerous

reasons

that caused

factions. In explaining the actions of nations, particularly
Great Britain, Madison narrowed those reasons down to rational
economic interest. He had not appreciated the role of British
pride, political anti-Americanism or other factors in Anglo-

68 Brant, JM, 4:397-402; Ketcham, JM, 457; Spivak,
Jefferson's English Crisis, 68-71, 103-110.
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American diplomacy. By 1807 Great Britain believed it was in
a death struggle with Napoleon,

and that American actions

aided France. No amount of economic data could change that
perception.

Madison

was

certainly

aware

of

non-economic

factors, and noted that only the "pride of the Cabinet" made
Great Britain resist economic pressure.Nevertheless, such
observations did not influence Madison's diplomacy.
From

the

beginning

Madison

saw

the

Embargo

as

an

offensive rather than a defensive measure, although he was
careful not to portray it as a war measure. Madison wrote in
the National Intelligencer on December 23, 1807, that "war
cannot be the result" and that the "embargo violates the
rights of none." The Embargo was designed to protect Americans
from misfortunes on the ocean,

"where no harvest is to be

reaped but that of danger, of spoliation and of disgrace."70
The Embargo was also a weapon that would punish Spain by
cutting off its food supply, France by removing American ships
from the French colonial trade, and Great Britain by cutting
off

supplies

to

its

colonies

and

by

not

buying

its

manufactures.7* Madison completely discounted the possibility
of Canada and the maritime provinces acting as alternate

60 James Madison to William Pinkney, May 1, 1808, William
Pinkney Papers, Princeton University.
70 National Intelligencer, December 23, 1807.
71 Ibid.
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suppliers for the British West Indies.72
In his second essay Madison described the Embargo as a
sword that "may be drawn at a moment's warning," and discussed
its domestic effects. He believed that the only American group
vulnerable to the Embargo would be those merchants involved in
the Atlantic carrying trade, or those who would dare risk
violating the

act.

"We are certain that the farmer,

the

planter and the mechanic will approve it from the security it
offers to the public interest," Madison wrote,

"and if the

merchants be honest and enlightened, as we trust they are,
they will perceive the indissoluble connection between their
solid and permanent prosperity and the general welfare."7^ In
other words, merchants who dealt primarily in delivering
American goods to market would be protected. Those who gambled
on John Randolph's "fungus of war" were on their own.
The Embargo ultimately failed as a coercive policy. It
had no effect on France, and did little economic damage in
Great Britain, serving only to convince the British government
that the United States would not fight. The Embargo did far
more damage to the American economy and nearly drove New
England into revolt. Madison attributed disaffection to the
"artificial excitements" stirred up in New England.74 Madison
72 James Madison to William Pinkney, October 21, 1807,
William Pinkney Papers, Princeton University.
7^ National Intelligencer, December 25, 1807.
74 Ketcham, JM, 462; North, Economic Growth, 55-58; Horsman,
Causes of the War of 1812, 142-143; Spivak, Jefferson's
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informed William Pinkney that the Embargo "created a zeal for
homespun"

and

speculated

that

the

United

States

might

encourage a large-scale manufacture of cotton goods.75 Madison
probably had not acquired

a new found love

for domestic

manufactures, but expected that Pinkney, as minister to Great
Britain,

would

pass

along

American manufactures

to

the

the

twenty-year-old

British

threat

government.

of

Madison

always believed in the Embargo, but its aftermath left him in
a weak position as he entered the presidency.
government
failed.

had

Madison

deployed
had

to

its

mightiest weapon

find

a

Republican
and

politically

it

had

acceptable

replacement.
Circumstances forced Madison to accept unpalatable policy
and personnel choices. On March 1, 1809 Congress approved the
Non-Intercourse Act as a replacement for the repealed Embargo.
The act barred French and British ships from American ports
after May 20 and allowed the president to revoke the ban if
either power changed its policies toward the United States.
Madison

attributed

the

act

to

"aversion

inconveniences by or charged on the embargo,

to

war,

the

the hope of

favorable changes in Europe, the dread of civil convulsions in
the East, and the policy of permitting the discontented to be
reclaimed to their duty by losses at sea." Madison had little
English Crisis, 200-201; James Madison to William Pinkney,
Jan. 3, 1809, in WJM, 8:42.
75 James Madison to William Pinkney, July 21 and July 3,
1808, William Pinkney Papers, Princeton University.
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faith in the act and believed "it seems to be as little
satisfactory

out

of

doors,

as

it

was

within.”76

Dissatisfaction with the Embargo and the growing rift in the
Republican party forced Madison to alter his plans for the
cabinet. Madison had intended to shift Albert Gallatin from
the treasury to the state department, but the Smith-Giles-Leib
faction in the Senate made it clear that they would vote to
reject Gallatin. Madison left Gallatin at the treasury, where
he did not need to be reconfirmed, and appointed Robert Smith,
brother of Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland,

secretary of

state.77 The first days of the Madison administration revealed
that Madison did not have Jefferson's power over Congress or
his own party and therefore that his policy options would be
more limited.
Like each of his three predecessors in office, Madison
pledged to defend American neutrality. "Indulging no passions
which trespass on the rights or the repose of other nations,
it has been the glory of the United States to cultivate peace
by observing justice, and to entitle themselves to the respect
of the nations at war, by fulfilling their neutral obligations
with the most scrupulous impartiality," Madison said in his
first inaugural address.78 Privately, Madison considered Great

76 Brant, JM, 5:38-39; James Madison to William Pinkney,
March 17, 1809, in PJM:P, 1:56.
77 Brant, JM, 5:23-25.
78 First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1809, in PJM:P, 1:16.
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Britain the worse threat to the United States and believed
that most of the country,

especially the South and West,

shared his view. Even "the calculating & commercial spirit of
N. England" should recognize "the disadvantage of renouncing
the trade with all the world beside G.B. for the portion which
her single market would afford."7®
David Erskine offered a republican solution to the AngloAmerican crisis. The new British minister to the United States
hoped to reach an agreement and was willing to violate his
instructions

to

do

so.

Foreign

Minister

George

Canning

instructed Erskine to promise a repeal of the Orders-inCouncil, but only if the United States enforced commercial
restrictions against France and formally accepted the Rule of
1756. Erskine knew that the United States would never accept
Canning's

terms.

Two

days

after

Erskine

received

his

instructions Madison observed that the minister "has not yet
opened much of his budget to Mr. Smith." Madison detected fear
in the British envoy and proof that the Embargo had worked.
"Private letters from individuals in England, leave no doubt
that

a great dread prevailed of our perseverence in the

Embargo," Madison wrote to Jefferson.®® Madison and Smith
agreed with Erskine to reopen trade and offered to relinquish
the direct trade between France and its colonies in exchange
7® James Madison to Elbridge Gerry, March 14, 1809, ibid.,
1:1:44.
O A

Henry Adams, History, 5:71-72; James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson, April 9, 1809, in PJM:P, 1:107.
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for a treaty

legalizing

indirect colonial

trade.

Erskine

agreed to drop the demand for British enforcement of American
commercial laws. Erskine and Smith signed a note on April 18
that would act as conditional agreement pending the arrival of
a special envoy to negotiate a formal treaty. On April 19
Madison issued a proclamation announcing that Great Britain
had agreed to repeal its Orders on June 10, and that trade
with Great Britain could resume at that time.81
"You will see that it [the agreement] puts an end to the
two immediate difficulties with G.B. and has the air of a
policy in her to come to a thorough adjustment,” Madison wrote
to his brother-in-law.8^ For Madison, the note with Erskine
provided

a

full

if

belated

vindication

of

republican

diplomacy's greatest weapon, the Embargo. "It remains now to
be seen what course will be taken by France,” Madison wrote to
William

Pinkney,

"whether

it will

be

prescribed

by

her

interest & duty, or by her pride & her anger.”88 Madison was
fully attuned to the role of pride and anger in domestic
politics, but strangely deaf to it in diplomacy. He had little
doubt that France, if not "bereft of common sense,” would
pursue the logical course of repealing its decrees. "Besides

81 Ketcham, JM, 492-493; Proclamation of April 19, 1809, in
PJMiP, 1:125-126.
82 James Madison to John G. Jackson, April 21, 1809, in
PJMtP, 1:128.
88 James Madison to William Pinkney, April 21, 1809, ibid.,
1:128.
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the general motive to follow the example of G.B. she cannot be
insensible

to

the

dangerous

tendency

commercial suffering of her Allies,

of

prolonging

the

particularly Russia,"

Madison explained to Jefferson, "all of them already weary of
such a state of things, after the pretext for enforcing it
shall have ceased.”84
Unlike John Adams at a similar stage in his career,
Madison continued to see other nations's interests in terms of
American interests. Neither Great Britain nor France followed
what Madison believed was the only logical course. The British
government

received

the Erskine

agreement

on May

21

and

rejected it, even though the United States already considered
it operational. Canning replaced Erskine with Francis Jackson,
who did not share Erskine's sympathy for the United States.
Madison was not willing to let go of a republican solution to
the Anglo-American conflict without a fight. Madison drafted
Robert Smith's October 19, 1809 letter to Jackson, arguing
that the British government had not shown sufficient reason
for disavowing the treaty. Madison also restated the American
case against the Orders-in-Council. Madison wrote to Pinkney
in

October

complaining

of

Jackson's

conduct,

especially

Jackson's "mean & insolent attempt to defraud the U.S. of the
exculpatory explanation dictated by the respect due them, and
particularly . . . the insinuation in Jackson's answer that

84 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 24, 1809, ibid.,
1:135.
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this

Govt,

colluded with
qc

instructions."0-1
instrument

of

"Jackson

his

Patron

Mr.

E[rskine]

is

proving

in violating
himself

Canning," Madison

a

his

worthy

remarked

to

Jefferson.88 By early November Madison concluded that the
United States could no longer negotiate with Jackson. In his
Annual Message Madison described the collapse of negotiations
and

recommended organizing

the

militia.87 Relations

with

France were no better. On March 23, 1810, Napoleon issued the
Rambouillet Decree, subjecting all American ships in French
ports to capture.88
The Erskine fiasco set Anglo-American diplomacy back to
the beginning and left Madison in the same position as a year
before,

but with

the

added

embarrassment

of

the

failed

agreement. Some in Congress had grown tired of commercial
diplomacy and settled on war. "But I prefer the troubled ocean
of war, demanded by the honor and independence of the country,
with all its calamities, and desolations," Henry Clay told the
House

of

Representatives

on

February

22,

1810,

"to

the

85 B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 220-221; Robert Smith to
Francis James Jackson, Oct. 19, 1809, in ASP:FR, 3:311-314;
James Madison to William Pinkney, October 23, 1809, PJM:P,
2:27-28.
88 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, November 6, 1809, in
PJM:P, 2:55.
87 James Madison's draft of Robert Smith to William Pinkney,
ca. November 9, 1809; Annual Message, November 29, 1809,
ibid., 2:65-67, 91-93.
88 B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 244-245.
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putrescent pool of

ignominious

peace."89 Madison had not

decided on war and believed that most of the country had not
either. Madison also ruled out the other extreme of submission
to Great Britain. Political considerations ruled out a revival
of

the

Embargo,

legislation

the

labeled

president's
Macon's

Bill

preferred
#2

seemed

solution.
to

offer

The
an

alternative. The bill barred French and British ships from
American ports, like the expired Non-Intercourse Act. Macon's
Bill allowed American ships to trade with

any nation, but if

one belligerent repealed its decrees against neutral shipping
the president could re-impose non-intercourse on the other
power.90 Madison still mourned the loss of the Embargo and was
skeptical of lesser measures. "G. Britain may indeed conceive
that she now has a compleat interest in perpetuating the
actual state of things, which gives her the full enjoyment of
our trade, and enables her to cut it off with every other part
of the World; at the same time that it increases the chance of
such resentments in France at the inequality, as may lead to
hostilities with the United States,” Madison complained to
Pinkney. Madison conceded that the scheme could work if it led
France to "turn the tables on G. Britain, by compelling her
either to revoke her orders, or to lose the commerce of this
89 Speech of February 22, 1810, in Henry Clay. The Papers of
Henry Clay, 11 vols. James F. Hopkins, Mary M. W.
Hargreaves, et al., eds. (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1959-1993), 1:449.
q

n

B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 239-242; James Madison to
William Pinkney, January 23, 1810, in PJM:P, 2:195.
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country."9 *
France offered at the bait in August. Word of Macon's
Bill reached Paris by July. Unfounded rumors of war with the
United States and hopes of promoting Anglo-American conflict
led Napoleon to take the opening Macon's Bill provided, and
hint that he might revoke French decrees. On August 5, 1810
the Duke of Cadore informed Minister John Armstrong that
France would

revoke

the

Berlin

and Milan

Decrees

as

of

November 1 if Great Britain repealed its Orders-in-Council, or
if

the

United

States

reimposed

non-intercourse

on

Great

Britain as Macon's Bill required. Napoleon had little to risk
and much to gain in offering a reversal of policy. Madison, on
the other hand, risked much in accepting the Cadore letter as
a statement of French policy.92
Madison's defenders have generally absolved him of the
charge of naivete in accepting the Cadore

letter without

further proof that France intended to repeal its decrees.
Irving Brant wrote that, "Madison took a logical position, but
with no other evidence to support it," and Clifford Egan
argued that Madison did not act out of

"ignorance,

fear,

timidity or wishful thinking.1,93 Madison did act out of a

91 James Madison to William Pinkney, May 23, 1810, in PJM:P,
2:348.
92 Clifford L. Egan. Neither Peace nor War: Franco-American
Relations 1803-1812 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1983), 121-124.
93 Brant, JM, 5:214; Egan, Neither Peace nor War, 122-123.
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certain

desperation

to

preserve

what

he

considered

a

republican form of diplomacy. Madison accepted the Cadore
letter because his political system required that the letter
be an accurate representation of French policy. "It promises
us, at least an extraction from the dilemma, of a mortifying
peace, or a war with both the great belligerents," Madison
wrote to Caesar A. Rodney.9<* French action would at least
force the British hand regarding the Rule of 1756 and the
"Mock-Blockades."

"I do not believe

that Congs.

will

be

disposed, or permitted by the Nation to a tame submission,"
Madison wrote to Jefferson, "the less so as it would be not
only perfidious to the other belligerent, but irreconcilable
with an honorable neutrality."9^ Madison's target was always
the entire British maritime policy regarding trade, blockades
and impressment, which demanded atonement.9^ Acceptance of the
Cadore letter promised a return to the full use of the one
weapon the United States had —

its trade. Madison did not

think in terms of war and would not for another year. For
Madison,

the

intransigence

Cadore
gave

letter

political

and
cover

anticipated
for

a

return

British
to

the

Embargo, at least against Great Britain, a policy that Madison

9^ James Madison to Caesar A. Rodney, September 30, 1810, in
PJM:Pf 2:565.
95 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 19, 1810,
ibid., 2:585.
9^ James Madison to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810,
ibid., 2:604.
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always believed was the proper weapon of a republic and only
answer to British naval tyranny.
On November 2, 1810, Madison announced that he would
reimpose non-intercourse on Great Britain under the terms of
Macon's Bill #2. The wait for official French word of repeal
became longer and increasingly embarrassing.

In his second

annual message, Madison told Congress that the government had
received no word on the
Decrees,

repeal of

the Berlin

and Milan

and therefore Great Britain would not repeal its

Orders-in-Council.97 "On the whole our prospects are far from
being very flattering," Madison wrote to Jefferson,

"yet a

better chance seems to exist than, with the exception of the
adjustment with Erskine, has presented itself

for closing the

scene of rivalship in plundering & insulting us, & turning
into a competition for our commerce & friendship.1,98 For
Madison's diplomacy to work, he had to believe that the Berlin
and Milan Decrees had been repealed; the success of republican
diplomacy depended on Napoleon's being a man of his word. The
French government continued to seize American ships under
municipal regulations, and Madison himself realized that it
was "extremely difficult to keep the public mind awake to the
distinction between the decrees relating to the trade of the

97 Presidential Proclamation, November 2, 1810, ibid.,
2:612-613; Second annual message, December 5, 1810, in WJM,
8:123-124.
98 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 18, 1811, ibid.,
8:135.
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U.S. with England,

& those relating to the trade with F.

herself. "99
Not everyone in the government shared Madison's optimism.
Robert Smith told the British charge’* that he doubted the
French

had

repealed

their

decrees,

prompting

Madison

to

replace Smith with James Monroe. Smith's firing reopened the
rift in the Republican party that his hiring was meant to
h e a l .

*00

New

England was another source of irritation, showing

"much impatience" with the renewal of commercial warfare.
"Whether the appeal be to the sword,

or interruptions or

modifications of customary intercourse," Madison warned the
inhabitants of New Haven, "an equal operation on every part of
the Community can never happen."*01
Most important,

the British themselves did not share

Madison's faith in the good will of the French government. The
foreign

minister

warned

Augustus

John

Foster,

Jackson's

replacement in Washington, that "no Extremity can induce His
Royal Highness to relinquish the ancient and established Rules
of Maritime War, the maintenance of which is indispensable not
only to the Commercial Interests, but to the Naval strength,

0^ Egan, Neither Peace nor War, 141; James Madison to
Richard Cutts, May 23, 1811, in PJM:P, 3:315.
100 Brant, JM, 5:273-275; Ketcham, JM, 487-490.
*°* James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 11, 1811 and
James Madison to the inhabitants of New Haven, May 24, 1811,
in PJM:P, 3:329, 317.
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and to the National Honor of Great Britain."102 poster was no
less

unyielding

than

any

other

minister

except

Erskine.

Madison's meetings with Foster, combined with a deteriorating
domestic political situation, produced a belligerent annual
message for 1811.^°^ On November 5, 1811, Madison admitted to
Congress and to himself that France had not revoked the Berlin
and Milan Decrees, and therefore that Great Britain would not
repeal its Orders-in-Council. Madison moved on to suggest the
option he had been dreading and that he hoped commercial
diplomacy would replace. The president recommended raising a
regular army and a short-term additional army, purchasing
cannon and other ordnance, and increasing the navy.104
The next seven months were a countdown to war at three
different speeds. Henry Adams wrote that Madison "stood midway
between the masses of his followers," that is, the Republicans
with Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun and Felix Grundy pushing the
president to bolder action,

and John Randolph of Roanoke

Marquis Wellesley to Augustus John Foster, April 10,
1811, in Bernard Mayo, ed. "Instructions to the British
Ministers to the United States, 1791-1812." Annual Report of
the American Historical Association for the Year 1936, Vol.
3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 317318.
10^ Brant, JM, 5:374; Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 78-81; Roger
H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964), 33-35; Julius W. Pratt, The
Expansionists of 1812 (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1925), 50.
104 Third annual message, November 5, 1811, in WJM, 8:158160, 162.
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trying to block any war measure.

Madison held out no hope

for a change in British policy. Madison wrote Jefferson on
February 7 that

"all that we see from G.B.

indicated an

adherence to her mad policy towards the U.S."^** Two months
later Madison wrote that Great Britain seemed to "prefer war
with us, to a repeal of the Orders in Council 1" "We have
nothing left, therefore, but to make ready for it," Madison
concluded."lO?
On June 1, 1812, Madison delivered the war message that
had been seven months, if not seven years, in coming. Madison
declared that the diplomacy of a republic must match its
domestic institutions. To accept British tyranny on the high
seas was incompatible with independence or republicanism.
Madison began with impressment, a "crying enormity" that no
nation

could

blockades,

tolerate.

He

moved

on

to

the

"pretended

without the presence of an adequate force and

sometimes without the probability of applying one," which the
British used as an excuse to seize American commerce. "Whether
the

United

States

should

continue

passive

under

these

progressive usurpations and these accumulated wrongs, opposing
force to force in defence of their national rights," was the
ultimate question, which Madison reluctantly decided could be
Henry Adams, History, 6:175.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, February 7, 1812, in
Republic of Letters, 3:1687.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 3, 1812, ibid.,
3:1691.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

277
answered only with a declaration of war.108

In the end,

Madison concluded that war, even with all of its dangers, was
safer for republican government than submission.
Most commentators correctly state that Madison went to
war because the dignity of republican government demanded
it.*88

Madison

differed

from

the

younger Republicans

in

Congress in that the so-called War Hawks warmly embraced the
classical martial tradition, whereas Madison followed the
eighteenth-century

Opposition

fear

of

war.110

Madison's

application of republicanism to diplomacy led him into a
disastrous contradiction. Madison made the dismantling of the
British maritime program his sine qua non and, in doing so,
touched on the one sacrosanct issue in British politics. War
was

almost

republicanism

inevitable.
prevented

At
him

the
from

same

time,

building

the

Madison's
military,

especially the navy, and denied the United States any real
weapon against Great Britain.

"In a state of military and

psychological unpreparedness," Bradford Perkins wrote,

"the

United States embarked upon a war to recover the self-respect

108 Special Message to Congress, June 1, 1812, in WJM,
8:192, 194, 199-200.
109 See especially Roger H. Brown, Republic in Peril, 14-15;
Ketcham, JM, 530-533; Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War
and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 160.
8 Watts argues that the War Hawks overcame a classical
fear of war. Republic Reborn, 240-246.
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destroyed by Republican leaders."HI
As the Senate debated a declaration of war, Great Britain
removed the ostensible cause, repealing the Orders-in-Council
on June 16. Repeal was not, however, a disavowal, and Great
Britain still claimed the rights it momentarily chose not to
exercise.

Furthermore,

the

repeal

said

nothing

about

impressment, resolution of which for Madison had always been
necessary for a settlement. "Although a repeal of the orders
susceptible

of

explanations

meeting

the

views

of

this

Government had taken place before this pacific advance was
made to Great Britain, the advance was declined from an avowed
repugnance of impressment during the armistice," Madison told
Congress

in

intimation

his

fourth

annual

message,

"and without

that the arrangement proposed with

seamen would be accepted.

respect

any
to

"On the issue of the war are

staked our national sovereignty on the high seas and the
security

of

an

important

class

of

our

citizens,

whose

occupation give proper value to those of every other class,"
Madison said in second inaugural, marking a shift since 1792
in his opinion of sailors. In January Madison endorsed the
Seaman's Bill, excluding foreigners from the American merchant
marine if Great Britain gave up the right of search, as a
basis for settlement, despite the fact that Great Britain had

m

B. Perkins, Prologue to War, 437.

112 stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 115-119; Fourth Annual
Message, in WJM, 8:226.
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already rejected a similar proposal.1-13
Madison hoped to conduct the war in a republican manner.
His model was the first years of the American Revolution,
which supposed an armed and patriotic citizenry could defeat
Great Britain with a few quick thrusts, particularly against
Canada.

He was

quickly

disappointed

on

both

counts.

By

September 1812 Madison concluded that only "high bounties &
short

enlistments,

however

objectionable,

will

fill

the

ranks.”11^ Hopes for a successful campaign against Canada,
which Madison saw as the weak link of empire and the most
convenient target, were dashed by a number of factors. The
timidity of General William Hull in the Northwest; squabbling
among generals Stephen Van Renssalaer, Daniel Tompkins and
Alexander Smyth at Niagara; and the refusal of the militia to
cross the border with General Henry Dearborn at Plattsburgh
conspired to keep Canada in British hands.115
Madison was not opposed to an early and honorable end to
the war, and Russia promised to provide such an ending. On
March

8,

1813,

Minister

Andrei

de

Daschkov

offered

his

government's services as mediator. "We shall endeavor to turn
113 Second Inaugural Message, March 4, 1813, in WJM, 8:236;
Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 295-296.
11^ James Madison to James Monroe, September 21, 1812, James
Monroe Papers, Library of Congress, Series 1, reel 5.
115 Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 4-7, 201-205; Harry L. Coles,
The War of 1812 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1965), 38-39; Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten
Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 7275, 81-84, 86-88.
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the good will of Russia to the proper account,” Madison wrote
to Jefferson two days later."^^ Not only did the Russian
offer promise the chance to end a war that had already lasted
longer than Madison planned, it was also an opportunity to
force Great Britain to negotiate over maritime rights. "We are
encouraged in this policy by the known friendship of the
Emperor Alexander to this country; and the probability that
the greater affinity between the Baltic and American ideas of
maritime law, than between the former and G.B. will render
this interposition as favorable as will be consistent with the
character

assumed

by

him,"

Madison

explained

to

John

N i c h o l a s . M a d i s o n informed Congress that he accepted the
mediation on May 25,

and nominated Albert Gallatin,

John

Quincy Adams and James A. Bayard as commissioners. British
Foreign Minister Lord Castlereagh suspected that Russia would
favor a neutral rights agenda and rejected the mediation,
offering

instead

to

negotiate

with

the

United

States

directly.118
By the time the Madison administration received word of
Castlereagh's offer in January 1814, the military balance had
Andrei de Daschkov to James Monroe, March 8, 1813, in
ASP:FR, 3:624; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 10,
1813, in James Morton Smith, ed., Republic of Letters,
3:1718.
Brant, JM, 6:155-163; James Madison to John Nicholas,
April 2, 1813, in WJM, 8:243-244.
^ 8 Message to the special session of Congress, May 25,
1813, in WJM, 8:244-247; Henry Adams, History, 7:343; Stagg,
Mr. Madison's War, 299-302.
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tilted in Great Britain's favor, in Europe and America. The
American cause was implicitly linked with Napoleon's success.
Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in October 1813, combined with
British victories in Spain spelled the beginning of the end
for the French emperor. Allied troops entered Paris on March
31,

1814,

potential

freeing thousands of battle-hardened troops for
use

against

the

United

States. General

George

Prevost crossed into American territory on August 31, but was
stopped at Plattsburgh. The British army had better success in
other areas, burning Washington on August 27 and occupying
eastern Maine on September l.119
Madisonian diplomacy had previously been impervious to
battlefield results. As the Royal Navy took control of the
Chesapeake, Madison began to moderate his diplomatic demands.
The cabinet met on June 23 and 24 to discuss impressment. The
whole cabinet,

except for Attorney General Richard Rush,

agreed not to insist on the a solution of the issue of
impressment as a peace ultimatum. The cabinet also determined
not to accept a treaty completely silent on impressment,
except for Secretary of War John Armstrong and Secretary of
the Navy William Jones. The cabinet agreed to accept a treaty
that referred impressment to a separate treaty, except for
Rush, who wanted to wait on dispatches from Europe. After
dispatches from Gallatin and Bayard arrived, the cabinet met

119 Hickey, War of 1812, 158, 182-183, 190-203; Stagg, Mr.
Madison's War, 369-372, 382-386.
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on

June

27

and

agreed

to

accept

a

treaty

silent

on

impressment, as long as American diplomats did not surrender
American claims on the matter or admit British claims.120
Initial dispatches from Ghent, indicating a British hard line,
led Madison to the unorthodox step of making negotiations in
progress

a

matter

of

congressional

debate

and

public

record.121
On February 18, 1815, Madison transmitted the Treaty of
Ghent to Congress. By most accounts, that treaty signalled the
end of the first party system. Madison himself signed a bill
chartering the second Bank of the United States. He advocated
a

system

of

internal

improvements

but

vetoed

a

bill

establishing a fund for that purpose on his last day in
office.122 For Madison, the War of 1812 was a vindication of
republican government. "The war has proved moreover that our
free Government, like other free governments, though slow in
its

early

movements,

acquires

proportional to its freedom,

in

its

progress

a

force

and that the union of these

states, the guardian of the freedom and safety of all and each
is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to the test,"

120 Cabinet memorandum, June 23-24, in LOWJM, 3:408.
121 ASP:FR, 3:695.
122 Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 301; Brant, JM, 6:403;
Ketcham, JM, 604-605; Watts, Republic Reborn, 300-301;
Seventh annual message, December 5, 1815 and Veto message,
March 3, 1817, in WJM, 8:342, 386-388.
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Madison wrote in his

fifth

annual message.12^

«It was

a

struggle due to the Independence of the present and to the
security of

future

generations," Madison wrote

after the

war. 124
The war was also in Madison's view a vindication of
republicanism as applied to diplomacy. Contrary to John Adams,
who left office convinced that the world would never adopt
American maritime principles, Madison's optimism never dimmed.
"If a purification of the Maritime Code ever takes place, the
task seems to be reserved for the United States," Madison
wrote to Charles J. Ingersoll in 1814. "Under such auspices,
truth,

justice,

inculcated

with

humanity,
an

and

advantage

universal
which

must

good,

will

gradually

be
and

peaceably enlist the civilized world, against a Code which
violates all these obligations," Madison concluded.125 Madison
wrote in 1827 that the United States would become the world's
dominant sea power and would act with more justice than Great
Britain.*2®
The public careers of John Adams and James Madison ran on
parallel tracks with each ending in a war crisis. Adams's

123 fifth annual message, December 7, 1813, in WJM, 8:274.
*2^ James Madison to Thomas Charlton, June 29, 1815, in
LOWJM, 2:607.
125 James Madison to Charles J. ingersoll, July 28, 1814, in
WJM, 8:285.
^■2^ James Madison to C.C Cambreleng, March 8, 1827, in
LOWJM, 3:567.
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ability to combine republican thought with diplomatic practice
allowed him to uphold American rights on the ocean without
entering a formal war that might have torn the nation apart.
Madison's inability to do the same led the United States into
a war which it nearly lost, and nearly divided the union. It
is perhaps the highest irony that John Adams, who had the most
right to condemn Madison as a failure, concluded that despite
"a

thousand

Faults

and

blunders,

his

Administration

has

acquired more glory, and established more Union, than all his
three Predecessors, Washington Adams and Jefferson, put
together."127

1 97

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, February 2, 1817, in
Adams-Jefferson Letters, 508.
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CHAPTER 8: THE EDUCATION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

John Quincy Adams, like John Adams and James Madison,
received an early introduction to politics, war and diplomacy.
At the age of eight he watched the Battle of Bunker Hill from
Penn's Hill, near his home. "I saw with my own eyes those
fires,

and

Bunker's

heard

Hill,"

Britannia's
John

Quincy

thunders
Adams

in

later

the

Battle

recalled,

of

"and

witnessed the tears of my mother and mingled them with my own,
at the fall of [General Joseph] Warren, a dear friend to my
father, and a beloved Physician to me."* Young Adams later
accompanied his father on his diplomatic missions to Europe,
"in

the

Quadruple

capacity

of

Interpreter,

secretary,

Companion and Domestic."2 From early on John Quincy Adams was
acquainted

with

the

republican

principles

of

diplomacy,

reliance on a balance of power, the idea that free ships make
free goods, and the necessity of a political separation from
Europe. These principles were at the center of Adams's career
as a diplomat during the wars of the French Revolution. He
combined his father's notion of a republican realpolitik with
1 John Quincy Adams to Joseph Sturge, March 1846, in MJQA,
1:5.
2 John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, April 13, 1779, in PJA,
8:33.
28J
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his mother's sense of Christian and moral duty throughout the
course of his diplomatic career.
Both parents trained John Quincy Adams for his career as
a republican statesman. Abigail Adams gave her son moral and
religious instruction, writing him that "the only sure and
permanent foundation of virtue is Religion."3 John Adams gave
his son political instruction, complemented by John Quincy
Adams's own study. John Quincy Adams served as Francis Dana's
secretary in Russia in 1781 and 1782, and spent much time in
St. Petersburg's English library,

reading Hume,

Catherine

Macaulay and Adam Smith.4 When Adams returned home to attend
Harvard, he feared that others might doubt his attachment to
republican government, "but I find on the contrary that I am
the best republican here."5 As an undergraduate and later a
law

apprentice,

Adams

studied

Vattel,

Burlamaqui

and

3 Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, Oct. 19, 1780 in AFC,
3:310; Joseph Illick, "John Quincy Adams: The Maternal
Influence," The Journal of Psychohistory, Vol. 4 no. 2 (Fall
1976), 191; Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic:
Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 283; George
Lipsky, John Quincy Adams: His Theory and Ideas (New York:
Thomas A. Crowell Company, 1950), 75-77; David F. Musto,
"The Youth of John Quincy Adams." Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 113 no. 4 (August
1969), 270, 280.
4 Diary entries for Jan. 27, 1782, Feb. 25, 1782 and March
22, 1782, in John Quincy Adams, Diary of John Quincy Adams,
2 vols to date. David Grayson Allen, Robert J. Taylor, et
al., eds. (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1981), 1:103, 108, 115.
5 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 30, 1786, in
WJQA, 1:29.
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Montesquieu.6
John Quincy Adams devoted his

life to what he later

called "the cause of Christian improvement," meaning the full
use of God-given talents and resources for the moral and
material benefit of mankind, linking his view of republicanism
and natural law to a specifically Christian purpose.7 He
viewed all political and economic questions as moral problems.
The right to own property, for example, was a natural and
moral right. Adams believed that the land belonged to those
who cultivated or otherwise improved it and therefore accepted
the

Puritan

doctrine

of

vacuum

domicilium.

"Their

[the

Indians'] cultivated fields, their constructed habitations, a
space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence, and whatever
they

had

annexed

to

themselves

by

personal

labor,

was

undoubtedly by the law of nature theirs," Adams argued at
Plymouth in 1802. He denied that hunting conferred title to
lands. "Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues
and enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he controul
the civilization of a world," Adams asked.® In a republic of
6 Diary entries for Oct. 24, 1786, Jan. 6, 1787, and Sept.
22, 1787, in DJQA, 2:118, 146, 292.
7 Diary entry, Nov. 12, 1842, in MJQA, 11:267-268.
p
John Quincy Adams, An Oration, Delivered at Plymouth,
December 22, 1802, at the Anniversary Commemoration of the
First Landing of our Ancestors, at that Place (Boston:
Russell and Cutler, 1802), 21, 23; Harold John Callanan,
"The Political Economy of John Quincy Adams" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1975), 14-15; Greg
Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of
Diplomacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 2-
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individuals, Adams believed each individual "lies under the
obligation of attending to and promoting that common interest
to the utmost of his power, compatibly with the discharge of
his

more

immediate

duties

of

self-preservation

and

preservation of his kind."9
Trade was also a moral obligation. Adams fully endorsed
Hume's and Ferguson's view that society passed through four
stages of development, but unlike Madison, Adams believed that
the fourth stage, commerce, was best suited to republican
government. "To commerce considered as the broker and carrier
of agriculture (for Mr. Jefferson's epithet of handmaid I do
not

approve)

still

higher

importance

and

more

extensive

protection is due," Adams wrote. Adams tended to distrust
merchants as a political class, but as he wrote to his father,
"to commerce

. . .

as

holding the

great

link of

human

association between the great vehicle of civilization and
science, the most distinguished favor and liberal protection
ought to be given."10 Adams's reaction to the Opium War in
1841 reveals the connection he drew between religion and
3; Alden T. Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and
Indians 1620-1675, 3rd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1995), 110-112.
9 Diary entry, Aug. 21, 1809, draft of a letter to his sons,
in MJQA, 2:12-13.
10 John Quincy Adams, "Society and Civilization," American
Review: A Whig Journal of Politics, Literature, Art and
Science, Vol. 2 no. 1 (July 1845), 81; John Quincy Adams to
John Adams, Oct. 14 and 31, 1811, in WJQA, 4:243, 267;
Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American
Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 49.
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diplomacy, as well as his independence of mind. Adams, usually
no friend of Great Britain, argued that it was in the right to
force Chinese ports open.

Adams believed he saw parallel

duties in Vattel's argument that nations should engage in
commerce

and

Jesus's

command

to

love

one's

neighbor

as

oneself. Adams argued that the best way to love one's neighbor
was to provide for his needs, that is, to engage in trade
which might be mutually beneficial.

By refusing to trade

openly, China was in violation of both Christian and natural
law.** Adams saw American expansion in part as a Christian
duty, as seen in his diplomacy at Ghent and after.
Both training and temperament usually made John Quincy
Adams's politics,

at

least in the

1790s,

similar to his

father's. Adams shared his father's suspicions of the French
Revolution, writing that "the National Assembly in tearing the
lace from the garb of government, will tear the coat itself
into a thousand rags."*^ As "Publicola," Adams argued for a
balanced government, as his father did. "Distribute the whole
of your power in such a manner as will necessarily prevent any
one man,

or body of men,

or any possible combination of

individual interests, from being arbitrary," Adams wrote in
his

seventh

letter,

"but

do

not

incumber

your

own

** John Quincy Adams, "On the Opium War," Massachusetts
Historical Society, Proceedings, Vol. 43 (1909-1910), 307312.
*2 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Oct. 19, 1790, in WJQA,
1:64.
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representatives

with

shackles

prejudicial

to

your

own

interests.1,13 jn hiS eighth letter, Adams congratulated the
American people for founding their republic "upon an equality
really existing among them,

and not upon the metaphysical

speculation of fanciful politicians, vainly contending against
the unalterable course of events, and the established order of
nature.1,14 Upon reading these essays, James Madison concluded
that John Quincy Adams, "may have been made the Editor of his
father's doctrines."15
The Genet affair and the war between Great Britain and
France brought Adams's pen back into service in defense of
Washington's policy of neutrality and executive control of
diplomacy. Writing as
Centinel,

Adams

"Marcellus"

argued that

in the Boston Columbian

"to advise us to voluntarily

engage in the war, is to aim a dagger at the heart of this
country."16 In his third essay, Adams attacked every possible
basis for adhering to the 1778 treaties. The United States
signed the treaties with the king, and the French themselves
declared that the French king no longer existed. Furthermore,
the French no longer controlled their West Indian islands. On
moral grounds, the United States was not obliged to aid French

13 "Publicola," Letter VII, July 2, 1791, ibid., 1:92-93.
14 "Publicola," Letter VIII, July 9, 1791, ibid., 1:98.
15 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, July 13, 1791, in PJM,
14:46.
16 "Marcellus," #2, May 4, 1793, in WJQA, 1:142.
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tyranny there. The most important argument was that France was
at war with almost every major power in Europe, and the United
States should not be dragged along by the 1778 treaties.17 Six
months later, Adams wrote as "Columbus” and defended the works
of Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf, whom Genet claimed to have
read

but

Madison's
affairs.

forgotten.

Adams

"Helvidius,"
"But

the

for

further
executive

Constitution

has

argued,

contrary

primacy
not

in

said,

to

foreign
that

the

President shall perform no function which in its consequence
might be productive of war," Adams wrote. "Such a provision
would have been tantamount to a declaration that the President
should have no powers at all."18
From 1794 to 1801 Adams served as a participant in the
making of Federalist diplomacy, first as Washington's minister
to the Netherlands, then as John Adams's minister to Prussia.
In both positions, Adams acted unofficially as his father's
eyes in Europe and sent as many reports to his father as to
the secretary of state.19 As a diplomat, Adams took a part in
implementing Washington's

system of

neutrality,

which

if

adhered to, would "place the United States among the most

17 "Marcellus," #3, May 11, 1793, ibid., 1:142-146.
18 "Columbus" #3, Dec. 7, 11 and 13, 1793 ibid., 1:165, 175.
1Q

Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations
of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1949), 38-41, 50-52, 58-62, 90-92.
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powerful and opulent nations on earth."20
When

France

became

the

greater

threat

to

American

neutrality, Adams supported his father's policies and choice
of weapons. "Let us put on the shield and the helmet, and even
draw the sword," Adams wrote to William Vans Murray,

"but

never cease to hold out the olive branch, and carefully keep
the odium of aggression upon the enemies s h o u l d e r s . " F r a n c e
is forcing upon us a navy," Adams wrote several weeks later,
"and I wish that all or nearly all of our regular public force
may take that direction."22 Adams did not share Madison's
faith that the value of American

trade would protect it

without a naval force and criticized the Republicans

for

wanting to keep American commerce "altogether defenceless." "A
naval establishment they fear will strengthen the Executive,
an object of great terror to them," Adams continued.23
The

successful

conclusion

of

the

Quasi-War

and

the

unsuccessful conclusion of John Adams's bid for re-election
led John Quincy Adams to draw some lessons from his experience
in Federalist diplomacy. John Quincy Adams, like his father,
believed that the American reputation in Europe rested on the
20 John Quincy Adams to Sylvanus Bourne, Dec. 24, 1795, in
WJQA, 1:467.
2* John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, June 7, 1797,
ibid., 2:301.
22 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, July 22, 1798,
ibid., 2:344.
23 John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, April 11, 1798,
ibid., 2:344.
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strength of the American navy. "At any rate we must have ample
experience to prove that between England & France, we must
expect to be in friendship with both, only when . . . we are
in a better state for resistance against injustice at sea,"
Adams wrote to Rufus King.24 unlike his father, John Quincy
Adams

never

substitute

believed

for

that

political

commercial

relations.

relations

Commercial

would

contacts

inevitably brought political contacts, not only with Great
Britain and France, but with all the naval powers of Europe.
The only way to manage this contact was to be in a position to
prevent both French and British attempts to draw the United
States

into

war.26

For

John

Quincy

Adams

there

was

no

agonizing period of adjustment between republican theory and
diplomatic practice, as the two had been intertwined from his
youth.
John Quincy Adams entered the United States Senate in
1803 as a committed Federalist. He later recalled he shared
Federalist dislike of Thomas Jefferson, "aggravated by a deep
sense of his

injustice and a profound conviction of his

perfidity in his personal relations with my father."26 By the
24 John Quincy Adams to Rufus King, Feb. 8, 1800, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 134.
26 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Jan. 31, 1798, in WJQA,
2:251.
26 Robert R. Thompson, "John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From
'Outrageous Federalist' to 'Republican Exile,' 1801-1809,"
Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 11 no. 2 (Summer 1991),
161; John Quincy Adams, "Reply to the Appeal of the
Massachusetts Federalists," 1829, in Henry Adams, ed.
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end of John Quincy Adams's senatorial term his conflicts with
Federalist leaders over Louisiana and relations with Great
Britain drove him from the party.

"I never was converted,

never pretended to be converted,

from the Federal to the

Republican Party," Adams wrote in 1829. "I changed no opinion;
I denounced no associate.”27 The Federalists had retreated
into sectionalism, and followed Francophobia to Anglophilia.
The Federalism of 1808 was incompatible with Adams's creed,
the Federalism of 1793.28
"It seems as if there was something providential in the
turn of all those events,"

Adams wrote of the Louisiana

Purchase in 1837.29 "The great service of Mr. Jefferson's
administration was the acquisition of Louisiana, and this was
rather the effect of good fortune than of design," Adams wrote
in 1829.®® Adams's support for the Louisiana Purchase flew in
the face of the growing anti-expansionist trend in New England
Federalism. While nationalist-minded Federalists such as John
Adams

and Alexander Hamilton

supported the purchase,

the

Documents Relating to New-England Federalism (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1877), 153-154.
27 "Reply to the Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists,"
1829, in Henry Adams, ed., New-England Federalism, 139.
28 Thompson, "John Quincy Adams, Apostate," 183.
29 Diary entry, April 25, 1837, in MJQA, 9:351.
30 John Quincy Adams, Parties in the United States. Charles
True Adams, ed. (New York: Greenberg, 1941), 36-37; see also
John Quincy Adams, The Lives of James Madison and James
Monroe (Buffalo, N.Y.: Geo. H. Derby and Co., 1850), 83.
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leaders of New England Federalism feared the power of the
slave South and the rise of the West.31- John Quincy Adams saw
the

Louisiana

downplayed

question

the

in

sectional

terms

of

national

conflict.

"There

power

is

no

and
real

opposition of interests between any one part of this union and
another," Adams wrote in 1809.32
Adams did object to Jefferson's policy regarding the
organization and government of the new territory. "I believed
that the annexation of Louisiana to the union transcended the
constitutional powers of Congress, and that it required the
express consent of the people of Louisiana," Adams wrote in
1829, separating the power to purchase territory from the
power

to govern

November

25,

the

1803,

inhabitants
Adams

moved

of

that territory.33
an

amendment

to

On
the

Constitution specifically giving Congress the authority to
purchase

and

govern

new territories. "We must

amend

the

constitution before we can legislate for that country —

And

it is our duty to amend it without delay," Adams argued in the
Senate.3^ Adams opposed the Louisiana Government Bill as a
31- James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The
Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in
Massachusetts 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970),
110-114.
32 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 119-120; John Quincy
Adams, American Principles. A Review of the Works of Fisher
Ames, compiled by a number of his Friends (Boston: Everett
and Munroe, 1809), 37.
33 Russell, JQA and Public Virtues, 35-36; John Quincy
Adams, "Reply," in New-England Federalism, 156.
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violation

of

government.

the

fundamental

principles

of

republican

"All the power in a republican government is

derived from the people,” Adams argued on February 18, 1804.
"The

people

of

that country

have

given

us

no

power

or

authority to us to legislate for them."'*5 "I considered that
France could cede only her right of property to the territory,
and that the right of sovereignty inherent in the people of
the country, when the jurisdiction of France had ceased by the
cession, could be ceded only by some act of their own, and
acquired by some act of the people of the United States,"
Adams wrote in 1811.3® Adams objected to the Two Million
Dollar Act as simply bad policy. "West Florida I consider as
our own —

we have bo't & paid for it," Adams told the Senate.

"Our Country will never be content to purchase the same land
twice —
to

They ought not."37 The distinction between the right

purchase

territory

and the

right to

govern

it would

reemerge in Adams's response to the Texas question in the
1830s and 1840s.
Louisiana opened the rift between Adams and the main line
of New England Federalism;

maritime issues made the rift

unbridgeable. Throughout the first decade of the nineteenth
3^ Amendment to the Constitution, Nov. 25, 1803, in ffJQA,
3:20-21; Speech of Dec. 5, 1803, in Plumer, Memorandum, 73.
35 Speech of Feb. 18, 1804, ibid., 143-144.
35 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1811, in WJQA,
4:204.
37 Speech of Feb. 3, 1806, in Plumer, Memorandum, 413.
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century, the Essex Junto was willing to hide from Napoleon
behind the Royal Navy and to ignore British depredations on
American shipping.

In

1808 Adams visited his law mentor,

Theophilus Parsons. "The only protection of our liberties, he
thinks, is the British navy," Adams noted in his diary.38
Adams completely agreed with Madison's attacks on the Rule of
1756, and called the Examination of the British Doctrine an
"unanswerable vindication of the neutral cause." "To abandon
the right to this colonial trade therefore is to sacrifice not
only one of the best rights of an independent nation, but the
peculiar and most precious interests of New-England," Adams
argued in his review of Fisher Ames's works.39 In response to
the Chesapeake affair, Adams offered a resolution condemning
the attack. Massachusetts Federalism did not share Adams's
public rage,

and Adams later recalled that the Chesapeake

resolutions were his "unpardonable offense to Federalism."^8
Adams's preferred solution was to build up the navy, as
his father had done in 1798. "Had Mr. Jefferson partaken the
opinions,

and preserved the system of policy respecting a

navy, of his immediate predecessor, he probably never would
have been compelled to resort to embargoes and non-intercourse

38 Diary entry, May 10, 1808, in MJQA, 1:534.
39 John Quincy Adams, American Principles, 18-19.
Motion of July 16, 1807, in WJQA, 3:161-162; John Quincy
Adams, Parties in the United States, 66-67.
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against British orders in council," Adams wrote in 1829.4*
Even with an embargo, Adams believed that Jefferson should
have increased the navy and allowed merchant ships to arm.42
Adams

did

not

believe

republican weapon of

the

Embargo

coercion,

to

be

the

as Madison did,

ultimate
but as a

measure of defense supported it on those grounds. "The Embargo
was the only shelter from the Tempest —

the last refuge of a

violated Peace," Adams wrote to Harrison Gray Otis.43 Adams
always understood the Embargo as a defensive measure, and its
greatest use was to take American property off the high seas,
and out of harm's way. in December 1808 Adams believed the
Embargo should be repealed, and replaced with other measures,
both

because

the

Embargo

had

succeeded

in

protecting

commercial and naval resources and because it was creating a
rift

between

New

England

and

the

union.44

The

Embargo

completed Adams's journey out of the Federalist Party. He met
with the Republican caucus on January 23, 1808. In response,
the Massachusetts legislature elected James Lloyd a year ahead
4* John Quincy Adams, "Reply," in New-England Federalism,
328.
42 John Quincy Adams to Ezekiel Bacon, Nov. 17, 1808, in
WJQA, 3:249.
43 John Quincy Adams, A Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray
Otis, a Member of the Senate of Massachusetts, on the
Present State of our National Affairs; with Remarks on Mr.
Pickering's Letter to the Governor of the Commonwealth
(Newburyport, Mass.: W. & J. Gilman, 1808), 11.
44 John Quincy Adams to James Sullivan, Jan. 10, 1808; John
Quincy Adams to Ezekiel Bacon, Dec. 21, 1808, in WJQA,
3:186, 279.
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of schedule to fill Adams seat. Adams resigned on June 8,
1808.45
After leaving the Senate,

Adams was not long out of

office. In 1809 Madison appointed him minister to Russia in
place of William Short, whom the Senate had rejected. On the
eve of Adams's departure he speculated that the mission was
"perhaps the most important of any that I have ever in the
course of my life have been engaged in.”4® Relations with
Russia would concern trade,

maritime rights

and American

neutrality generally. All were issues Adams believed to be at
the heart of republican diplomacy. Secretary of State Robert
Smith

issued Adams

the

instructions

intended

for

Short,

directing the new minister to seek a commercial treaty with
Russia and secure Russian protection for American shipping.47
Although in 1781 Adams had described the Russian government as
"entirely despotical,"

and upon

his

return observed that

Russia "has undergone perhaps the least change of any [nation]
in Europe since I saw it," he continued, "that change has been
for the better" and described Czar Alexander as, "a character
highly distinguished among the sovereigns of the world."48

45 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 143-149.
46 Ibid., 159; Diary entry, Aug. 5, 1809, in MJQA, 2:4
47 James Madison to William Short, Sept. 28, 1808, in WJQA,
3:322-328.
48 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Sept. 10, 1783; John
Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, Feb. 14, 1810, in
WJQA, 1:10, 3:398.
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Moreover,

Russia

sought

closer relations with the United

States. Adams wrote the secretary of war that "the disposition
of the Emperor of Russia affords a happy contrast with those
of France and England."49 Adams met frequently with Count
Rumiantzev, Chancellor of the Empire, who assured Adams of
Russia's

good

States,"

Rumiantzev

obstinate

than

intentions.

you

told
are

"Our

attachment

Adams,
aware

"is

of.,,50

to

the

obstinate
Given

United

—

the

more

Russian

attitude, Adams reported to Secretary of State Monroe in 1811
that he fully expected to sign a commercial treaty.51
Treaty or no treaty, trade between the United States and
Russia boomed in the years before the War of 1812. Boston
merchants plunged into Indian trade in Russian North America,
to the point where Russian officials stepped in to control
trade within Russian territory. Adams tried to find out the
extent

of

Russia's

claim

in North

America,

but

Russian

evasiveness ended negotiations on that subject.52 Trade with
Russia itself increased as Great Britain and France tried to
49 John Quincy Adams to William Eustis, Feb. 28, 1810,
ibid., 3:403.
50 Diary entry, Oct. 9, 1810, in MJQA, 2:180.
51 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, April 29, 1811, in
WJQA, 4:62-63.
52 David W. McFadden, "John Quincy Adams, American
Commercial Diplomacy, and Russia, 1809-1825," New England
Quarterly, Vol. 66 no. 4 (July 1985), 615-616; John C.
Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States
with Russia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1906), 48-52; Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 172-175; MJQA,
2:178-185.
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close off all neutral trade. By June 1811 Russia was glutted
with American goods, as American ships often had no place else
to go.
Adams

"American vessels are pouring in on us in floods,"
told

his

father.

In

July

1811

Adams

reported

to

Secretary Monroe that some 200 ships had put in at Russian
ports, with more expected. Adams believed that the unsettled
political situation between Russia and Great Britain, Russia
and France, and Great Britain and the United States would
prevent

a formal agreement,

although

that same political

instability encouraged American trade with Russia. In October
Adams told an American diplomat in London that 130 ships had
called at Kronstadt alone. Trade continued despite the 60-day
embargo passed by Congress on April 4, 1812, as Adams told his
brother that 40 ships had called at Kronstadt by July of
1812.53
As important as Russian-American relations were in their
own

right,

they were

only

a part of

a larger political

situation, shaped by Franco-British conflict. Adams's mission
was to observe and report on that war, just as he had in the
1790s as minister to the Netherlands and Prussia. Just as in
the 1790s, Adams hoped to keep the United States out of the
war. "To the policy of neutrality we have greater reason than

53 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, June 25 and July 11,
1811; John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, July 22 and Aug. 9,
1811, in WJQA, 4:117-118, 142, 148-152, 170-174; John Quincy
Adams to Jonathan Russell, Oct. 23, 1811; John Adams to
Thomas Boylston Adams, July 4, 1812, Adams Family Papers,
Letterbook, reels 136 and 139; Hickey, War of 1812, 39.
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ever to adhere," he wrote to his brother. "The only object for
which we could engage in war would be commerce, and the moment
war would take place our commerce would be annihilated."54
Adams told Benjamin Waterhouse, "the general policy of all the
American

states

since

the

acknowledgement

of

their

independence has been peace with all the world, and seclusion
from the political system of Europe."55
From 1809 to the eve of the War of 1812 Adams entertained
the hope that the United States could avoid war. He did not
believe that Napoleon could enforce his Continental System
without

Russian

cooperation,

comparing

the

effort

to

an

attempt to "exclude the air from a bottle by hermetically
sealing up the mouth, while there was a great hole in the
side."56 When Napoleon

appeared to repeal the Berlin and

Milan Decrees in 1810, Adams warned against a possible French
trap intended to provoke "war with England, which England most
richly deserves, but which on our part would more than ever be
impolitic at this time."57 Great Britain and France were
playing into each other's hands. "The more they [the British]
continue the war, the more universally will they establish the

54 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 175; John Quincy Adams to
Thomas Boylston Adams, May 13, 1811, in WJQA, 4:69.
55 John Quincy Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse, Aug. 28, 1811,
ibid., 4:197.
56 Diary entry, Dec. 30, 1809, in MJQA, 2:91-92.
57 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, April 29,
1811, in WJQA, 4:65.
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control of France over the continent of Europe," Adams wrote
his father in 1810. "On the other hand the demonstration is
equally plain, that the longer France and her dependencies
adhere to what
continued,

they call

the continental

system," Adams

"the more easily will England . . . secure to

herself the monopoly of commerce throughout the world."68
Adams believed that Great Britain and France would ultimately
have to permit American commerce in Europe,

for their own

survival. "Their necessities will do more for the restoration
of our rights than we could do by the exertion of our own
forces," he argued,

in an uncharacteristically Madisonian

tone.59
Adams

was

leery

of

war

not

because

he

shared

the

traditional Whig fear of armies and taxes but because the
United States was woefully unprepared to protect the commerce
that such a war would be waged to defend. The Republicans had
already thrown away the navy, the weapon Adams considered best
suited to a republic. "The prospect of a war with England has
been so long approaching us," Adams remarked in 1811, "that we
ought to have been better prepared for it than we are."60 In
March of 1812 he wrote his mother that the United States would

58 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Sept. 2, 1810, ibid.,
3:482.
59 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Jan. 1, 1812, ibid.,
4:286.
60 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, July 31,
1811, ibid., 4:160-161.
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be fully justified in declaring war against Great Britain to
defend

its

rights.

maintaining them,

"But

before

we

resort

to

force

for

we must be in possession of the force

itself," he continued, "and really with our army of five or
six thousand men, and our navy of ten or twelve frigates, to
talk of maintaining by force any right whatsoever against such
a power as Great Britain is too ridiculous."6*
When Adams heard that Great Britain had repealed the
Orders-in-Council

that

applied

to

American

shipping,

he

continued to hope that "we shall not be compelled to plunge
into the fatal vortex of European

W a r s . " 6^

Adams's hopes were

dashed on August 6, 1812, as he noted without further comment
in his diary that the United States had declared war on Great
Britain on June 18. Although Adams had not wanted war, he
supported the war when it came. As he told Count Rumiantzev,
the United States probably would not have declared war had
Congress known about the British repeal, "yet war once being
declared, there were other points of collision upon which an
accommodation became essential for the restoration of peace;
upon which the chief of these, the impressment of seamen from
our merchant vessels, it appeared the British government would
listen to nothing."63 "Our war is the sailor's war," Adams

6* John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, March 30, 1812,
ibid., 4:302.
63 John Quincy Adams to Jonathan Russell, July 28, 1812,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 136.
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told his mother. Like Madison, Adams drew on the classical
martial tradition at the crucial moment. "There are great and
glorious qualities in the human character which as they can
unfold themselves only in times of difficulty and danger seem
to make war from time to time a necessary evil among men,"
Adams wrote. "A nation long at peace seldom fails to become
degraded. Symptoms of this spirit of corruption were very
visible in our country."^ Adams had not been a War Hawk, once
war came he determined to make the best of it.
While Adams watched the coming of the American war with
Great Britain from afar, he had a much closer view of the
approach of hostilities

between France and Russia.

After

Russia's persistent refusal to enforce the Continental System,
Napoleon declared war on June 22, 1812, and marched a 600,000man army toward Russia. On June 29 Adams reported the outbreak
of war in Poland. Napoleon's army took Smolensk in August and
entered Moscow on September 14. Napoleon found a deserted
city, and soon after the French arrived the Muscovites who
remained behind set the city on fire. Napoleon waited for the
czar to treat but gave up on October 19 and began his retreat.
At no point did Russia consider the United States an ally of
France,

de facto or otherwise. At the moment of greatest

danger to Russia, the czar offered to mediate between Great
63 Diary entries, Aug. 6 and Dec. 7, 1812, in MJQA, 2:396,
428-429.
John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Feb. 18, 1813, in
WJQA, 4:436-437.
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Britain and the United States.®® By October Adams believed the
tide had turned against Napoleon, writing that Napoleon was
"hemmed in between four Russian armies over whose bodies he
must either advance or retreat; two thousand miles distant
from his capitol; having lost one half of the forces with
which he commenced the war."®® "Russia has henceforth nothing
to fear from France," Adams reported to Monroe as Napoleon
approached the Russian frontier. "She must henceforth be the
predominating power on the continent of Europe."®7
In 1813 Albert Gallatin and James A. Bayard joined Adams
in St. Petersburg as peace commissioners under the proposed
Russian mediation. For months the trio waited for a British
response. In January 1814 Madison learned that Great Britain
rejected mediation but would engage in direct talks. Madison
accepted

and

added Massachusetts

Republican

and

diplomat

Jonathan Russell and House Speaker Henry Clay to the peace
commission.®8 Secretary Monroe instructed the commissioners to
reach some settlement on impressment and to make an attempt to

®5 Charles Bruenig, The Age of Revolution and Reaction,
1789-1850, 2nd. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.,
1977), 110-112; Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations, 58-60;
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, June 29, 1812; John Quincy
Adams to James Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812, in WJQA, 4:360, 389391.
®® John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Oct. 4, 1812, ibid.,
4:395.
®7 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Dec. 16, 1812, ibid.,
4:418.
68 Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 299-302, 369-374.
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acquire Canada. The British, however, sought to press their
military advantage. Lord Castlereagh appointed a second-rate
set of delegates —

admiralty lawyer Dr. William Adams, Vice-

Admiral Lord Gambier, and colonial official Henry Goulburn —
but he issued an ambitious set of instructions. Castlereagh
ordered his negotiators to avoid any formal statement on
impressment, to seek an adjustment of the Canadian boundary in
Britain's favor, to expel the United States from the North
Atlantic fisheries,

and to make some arrangement for the

northwestern Indians, possibly establishing a buffer state.
"Between Castlereagh's ideas and those of Madison no
relation existed," Henry Adams wrote.70 John Quincy Adams
learned how wide was the division on the first meeting between
the British and American commissioners at Ghent in August
1814. Adams hoped to address maritime issues, and the British
did list impressment as a topic for discussion. The British,
however, were more interested in an Indian buffer state and
the Canadian boundary. The British attempted to put the United
States on the defensive, arguing that the American invasion of
Canada

indicated that territorial expansion was

the real

object of the war.7* Adams had previously written to his
69 Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the
United States 1812-1823 (Berkeleys University of California
Press, 1964), 55-69.
70 Henry Adams, History, 9:10.
7* Protocols of the Conference of August 8-9, 1814; The
British Commissioners to the American Commissioners, Sept.
2, 1814, Albert Gallatin Papers, New York University, reel
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brother that "the acquisition of Canada . . . was not and
could not be an object of this war," and in a meeting with
Goulburn on September 1 Adams ignored his instructions and
denied that the United States wished to annex Canada.72 Adams
did generally approve of the course of American expansion,
arguing that the United States had a "moral and religious duty
to settle cultivate and improve" the Indian territory of the
old Northwest. His colleagues generally agreed, although Clay
and Russell

refused to call

it a religious

duty.73 Such

fundamental conflicts with the British convinced Adams that
the conference would break up without a settlement. "I have
never for an instant believed that peace would be practicable
by the negotiation here," Adams wrote to William H. Crawford,
"Mr. Clay is the only one among us who has occasionally
thought it might be."74
Emboldened by the burning of Washington and the surrender
of Nantucket and parts of Maine, the British ministry came to
believe that a settlement on the basis of uti possedetis would
secure Canada better than an Indian buffer state could. On
October 18, Castlereagh ordered the British commissioners to
27.
72 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, Nov. 24,
1812, in WJQA, 4:407; Diary entry, Sept. 1, 1814, in MJQA,
3:24-29.
73 Diary entry, Sept. 25, 1814, ibid., 3:41-42.
74 John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, Aug. 23 and
Sept. 23, 1814; John Quincy Adams to William H. Crawford,
Oct. 5, 1814, in WJQA, 5:90-92, 143-145, 152.
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retain Fort Niagara and the northern and eastern portions of
7S

Maine.With

the Indian issue gone,

the Americans hoped

merely to retain their territory and rights under the 1783
peace treaty. Gallatin and Adams each wrote draft treaties
that would renew the 1783 articles granting American access to
the North Atlantic fisheries in return for allowing British
navigation of the Mississippi, to which Clay objected. "He is
willing to leave the fisheries as a nest egg for another war,"
Adams wrote in his diary, adding that Clay believed "that a
renewal of the British right to navigate the Mississippi would
be giving them a privilege far more important than we would
secure in return."7** Adams himself lobbied for New England's
interest in the fisheries. The British would not object so
strenuously, Adams argued, if the fisheries were unimportant.
Adams was alone. Gallatin and Clay were ready to give up the
fisheries, and even Massachusetts resident Jonathan Russell
would not demand them. The British government, having decided
that the American war was more trouble than it was worth,
spared Adams the choice between peace and the fisheries. On
December 22 the British commissioners agreed to a peace that
was silent on the major issues, and the two sides signed a
treaty on December 24, 1814.77

7^ B. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 105-106.
Diary entry, Dec. 10, 1814, in MJQA, 3:99.
77 Diary entries, Dec. 13, 22 and 24, 1814, ibid., 3:113114, 120-122, 127.
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"We have obtained nothing but peace, and we have made
great sacrifices to obtain it," Adams wrote to his wife. "But
our honor remains unsullied; our territory remains entire."78
The treaty said nothing about the major issues,

including

impressment, the ostensible cause of the war. Adams, however,
never expected a formal settlement of impressment.

As

he

explained to his father in February 1814, the only solution
was "to leave the situation where it was, saying nothing about
it [impressment]." Adams was also not surprised that the two
sides

could

reach

no

agreement

on

the

fisheries.

If

Massachusetts objected to the lack of an explicit guarantee
for the

fisheries,

she

had

only

herself

to

blame.

"Had

Massachusetts been tru to herself and to the Union." he wrote
two days after signing the treaty, "Great Britain would not
have dared to hinge the question of peace . . . upon the
privileges of Massachusetts fishermen."79
Like his father, John Quincy Adams followed a successful
peace mission with an appointment to Great Britain. And like
his

father,

Adams's

main

John

Quincy Adams

goals

were

to

accomplished

resolve

impressment and the fisheries,

the

very

issues,

little.
such

left undone at Ghent.

as
The

changed political situation in Europe made those issues less
urgent. "The Political atmosphere both in Europe and America
78 John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, Jan. 3,
1815, in WJQA, 5:261.
79 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Feb. 17 and Dec. 26,
1814, ibid., 5:22, 253.
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for the first time within my remembrance presents the aspect
of almost
arriving

total

calm,"

in London,

Adams wrote

Adams

his mother.®®

Before

reported to Monroe that as he

expected no new maritime war, that the impressment issue "may
be suffered to slumber until the occasion shall rise when real
interests will again be affected by them." Adams discussed the
issue with Castlereagh in May 1815, but dropped it, telling
Castlereagh that "it was not the disposition of the American
Government or

nation to apply the

force of

arms

in the

maintenance of any abstract principle."81 Adams periodically
raised the question of the fisheries as well, but did not
expect any movement on that issue either.82
Two tours as a diplomat and one term in the Senate proved
to Adams that the survival of the American republic depended
above all on a separation from European politics. This belief
led Adams to support a hybrid of Federalist and Republican
diplomacy. Adams did not believe the war was a vindication of
Republican policy, but rather hoped that the United States had
been "cured of a reliance on embargoes" and argued that "an
efficient revenue and a growing navy" alone could guarantee

Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 227-228; John Quincy Adams
to Abigail Adams, Nov. 7, 1815, Adams Family Papers,
Letterbook, reel 142.
81 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Feb. 23, 1815, in
F/JQA, 5:282; Diary entry, May 29, 1815, in MJQA, 3:202-203.
82 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Sept. 19, 1815, in
WJQA, 5:377-388.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

312
O O

peace.OJ He would have none of the self-congratulation that
followed the War of 1812. The war had improved the American
standing in Europe, but Adams hoped that Americans would also
remember "how much we suffered by want of adequate preparation
for war before it was undertaken, how much for the want of a
more

efficient

naval

force;

how

much

by

the

miserable

condition of our army; how much by our unreasonable reliance
on militia soldiers and militia officers, how much by our
undigested and unsuitable system of finances; and above all,
by disaffection, by disunion [in New England]."84
As a Republican, Adams cheered expansion, which would
remove European colonies as neighbors. He went beyond Madison
by pronouncing American expansion a divine command. Adams had
no fear of a decline in New England's influence, as the new
territories "are rapidly peopling with Yankees." "The relative
proportion of power between the different members of this
Union is as insignificant, as the same question between the
North End and the South End [of Boston]," Adams wrote to his
father.85 For John Quincy Adams, union was the measure of
republican government.

"Union is to me what balance is to

88 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1815, ibid.,
5:361.
84 John Quincy Adams to Joseph Hall, Sept. 9, 1815, ibid.,
5:375.
85 John Quincy Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse, Oct. 24, 1813;
John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1811, ibid.,
4:526, 209.
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you," Adams wrote to his father in 1811.®® The battle of the
revolutionary generation over balanced government had been
won;

the

battle

Convention was

to preserve

the

any indication,

was

union,

if

the

Hartford

far from settled.

For

Adams, union was the main goal of expansion and diplomacy, and
the bedrock of republican government. "The whole continent of
North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to
be peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing
one general system of religious and political principles, and
accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs,"
Adams wrote in 1811. "For the common happiness of them all,
for their peace and prosperity,

I believe it indispensable

that they should all be associated in one Federal Union."87

8® John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Oct. 31, 1811, ibid.,
4:267.
07

John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Aug. 31, 1811, ibid.,
4:209.
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CHAPTER 9: REPUBLICS AND EMPIRES

When John Quincy Adams took office as secretary of state
in 1817,

he entered a political and diplomatic world far

different from the one he had left in 1809. The great struggle
of his father's generation, to establish the republic, was
over.

After

the War of

1812

the

survival

of

republican

government seemed assured.1- Adams's generation faced the task
of preserving the republic, and to Adams that meant the wise
use rather than the limitation of government power. Adams did
not share the revolutionary generation's fear of power and
blurred the distinction between liberty and power. "Individual
liberty is individual power,” Adams wrote in 1822, "and as the
power of a community
power,

the

nation

is a mass compounded of individual

which

enjoys

the

most

freedom

must

necessarily in proportion be the most powerful nation."2
Adams's unionism found domestic expression in his Report upon
Weights and Measures, where he linked a uniform system to the
general

improvement

of

mankind.3

Adams

believed

that

1 Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, 302; Watts, Republic
Reborn, 316-321.
2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 60-63, 69-70; John Quincy
Adams to James Lloyd, Oct. 1, 1822, in WJQA, 7:312.
314
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government that could use power abroad should also do so at
home. In 1821 he chided Attorney General William Wirt, and
Virginia Republicans generally, for opposing the creation of
a national bank or a system of internal improvements, while at
the same time approving the Louisiana Purchase, which Adams
believed was "in substance a dissolution and reconstruction of
the whole Union."4
Union also formed the core of Adams's conception of a
republican foreign policy. Adams further departed from the
world of the founders by calling for a continental union,
removing any restrictions on the size of a republic. Unlike
Jefferson,

Adams

believed that Americans

should not only

spread republican institutions to the whole continent, but
that the political jurisdiction of the United States must
follow.5 The main diplomatic enemy of the union, and therefore
of

republican

monarchical

government,
practice.

was

The

European

colonization,

non-colonization

a

principle

enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine was therefore the best
expression of the republican diplomacy that Adams pursued as
secretary of state and president. Adams opposed colonization
on

three

levels; removing

the European empires

in North

^ John Quincy Adams, Report upon Weights and Measures
(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1821), 134.
4 Diary entry, Nov. 21, 1821, in MJQA, 5:401.
5 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. Empire of
Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 159-160.
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America

that

blocked

American

expansion,

preventing

the

introduction of European politics among the newly-independent
nations

of

Spanish

America,

and

attacking

the

maritime

pretensions of Great Britain, which Adams considered to be the
colonization of the seas.
"The great European question of the last twenty-five
years

has

been solved,

at least for the

present,"

Adams

observed soon after taking office, "but another cannot fail to
offer itself."® The passing of the problem of revolutionary
France brought the new problem of reassembling Europe on
monarchical principles. In 1814 Talleyrand, staying one step
ahead

of

political

legitimacy,
standing.

change,

put

forth

the

principle

of

a presumption in favor of governments of long

Legitimacy was the fundamental principle of the

Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and
Austria, and the Holy Alliance, which did not include Great
Britain.

The Quadruple Alliance was

a

political alliance

formed to preserve the territorial boundaries set at the
Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance, dominated by Russia,
Prussia and Austria, was a personal league of monarchs pledged
to defend the principles of Christianity, but posited that the
cause

of

Christianity

monarchies.

could

be

served

At the Congress of Troppau

only
in

by

absolute

1820 the Holy

Alliance claimed the right to interfere with the internal

® John Quincy Adams to John Adams Smith, Oct. 8, 1817, in
WJQA, 6:212.
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politics

of

other

alienate

Great

nations,

Britain

from

an

assertion

the

rest

which

of

the

began

to

Quadruple

Alliance.7
A presumption in favor of established governments over
new experiments was not alien to American thought, indeed, it
was

a

fundamental

article

of

British

and

American

conservatism, forming the basis for Burke's critique of the
French Revolution,
Alexander

Hamilton,

not to mention
John

Adams

similar critiques

and

John

Americans across the political spectrum,

Quincy

from

Adams.®

however,

had no

sympathy for the pretensions of the Holy Alliance. The Holy
Alliance was a constant editorial target in newspapers ranging
from the Daily National Intelligencer, the voice of official
Republicanism, to the North American Review, a leading journal
of New England Federalism.® Adams noted the gulf between
American and European political principles on the eve of his
departure
governments

from
of

London.
Europe

"There
a

strong

is

already

prejudice

in

all

against

us

the
as

7 W. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study
of the European Alliance, 1813-1823 as an Experiment in the
International Organization of Peace, 2nd ed. (Londons
Longman's, Green and Co., Limited, 1920), 88-89, 207-210;
Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827:
England, the Neo-Holy Alliancef and the New World (London:
G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925), 4-5.
® Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot.
7th rev. ed. (Chicago: Regnery Books, 1986), 64-70.
® Edward Howland Tatum, Jr., The United States and Europe
1815-1823: A Study in the Background of the Monroe Doctrine
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936), 29-34.
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Republicans, and as the primary causes of the propagation of
those principles," Adams wrote, "which still make the throne
of every European monarch rock under him as within the throes
of an earthquake."1°
The new questions in European politics affected American
foreign policy most directly in the problem of the collapse of
the Spanish Empire and eventually the Spanish government,
which encouraged other powers on both sides of the Atlantic to
seek their own advantage. Adams observed the opening stages of
the Spanish American revolutions from St. Petersburg, and told
the Russian foreign minister that all of the colonial systems
in North America were doomed. 11 Adams did not mourn their
loss, and in 1822 told Stratford Canning, the British minister
to

the United

States,

that

"the whole

system of

modern

colonization was an abuse of government, and that it was time
that it should come to an end."12 Adams objected to the
American Colonization Society's request that the government
purchase

land in Africa on

the grounds

that,

"the plan

obviously imports the engrafting of a colonial establishment
upon the Constitution of the United States, and thereby an
accession of power to the National Government, transcending

1® John Quincy Adams to William Plumer, Jan. 17, 1817, in
WJQA, 6:141-142.
11 Diary entry, Jan. 23, 1811, in MJQA, 2:217.
12 Diary entry, Nov. 25, 1822, ibid., 6:104.
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all other powers."13
Adams believed the Spanish colonial establishment to be
the immediate problem. The questions of the Floridas and the
boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase were unresolved when
Adams took office, and Adams considered settlement vital to
the preservation of the union and republicanism.

Foreign

possession of the Floridas, either by Spain or another power,
threatened the safety of American commerce coming out of New
Orleans.

More

generally,

the

Florida

question

had

the

potential of dragging the United States into European wars.
Negotiation of the Adams-Onis Treaty with Spain consumed most
of Adams's first two years as secretary of state to the point
where "almost all other business runs in arrear."14 Don Luis
de Onis,

the Spanish minister to the United States,

had

started negotiations with Secretary Monroe in 1815, demanding
that

the

United

States

return

West

Florida

and

prevent

American citizens from aiding rebel movements in the Floridas.
Monroe rejected Onis's terms. By January 1817 Onis was willing
to

cede

the

Floridas

in

exchange

for

an

equivalent

consideration west of the Mississippi.15
Adams began negotiations with Onis in December 1817, and
the two diplomats moved in opposite directions. Onis hoped to
13 Diary entry, March 12, 1819, ibid., 4:292-293.
14 Diary entry, Feb. 12, 1819, ibid., 4:253.
15 Don Luis de Onis to James Monroe, Dec. 30, 1815 and Jan.
16, 1817; James Monroe to Don Luis de Onis, Jan. 19, 1816,
in ASP:FR, 4:422-426, 438.
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use the Floridas as a bargaining chip, and keep the western
boundary of the United States as close to the Mississippi as
possible.

Adams

assumed

a

Florida

cession

was

almost

inevitable, and pushed the border farther and farther west.
Onis denied that the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida
to the Perdido River but was prepared to back away from the
Mississippi, suggesting a boundary at the Mermento River, a
few miles west of the Mississippi, northward to the Missouri.
Adams countered on January 16, 1818, demanding a cession of
the Floridas and a boundary at the Colorado River of Texas
(about 50 miles west of modern-day Houston) to its source, and
northward along the Rocky Mountains. Onis responded on January
24 by giving up the Floridas and moving the western boundary
between the Mermento and Calcasieu Rivers, within the state of
Louisiana.^ Early negotiations led Adams to believe there
would be no quick settlement.17

in April, Onis sought further

orders from his government. Adams instructed George W. Erving,
the United States minister to Spain, to warn Spain that the
offer of the Colorado would not last indefinitely. Adams wrote
that "the impression upon the public opinion of this country,
of our unquestionable right to the Rio Bravo as the western

16 Don Luis de Onis to John Quincy Adams, Dec. 29, 1817,
Jan. 5, 8 and 14, 1818; John Quincy Adams to Don Luis de
Onis, Jan. 16, 1818, ASPsFR, 4:452-456; William Earl Weeks,
John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 73-74.
17 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, March 9, 1818, in
WJQA, 6:301.
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boundary, is from day to day becoming stronger."*8
Andrew Jackson broke the logjam. In January 1818 Jackson
urged decisive action against the Seminoles in East Florida.
Jackson's orders did not explicitly prohibit him from pursuing
Seminole raiding parties into Spanish territory, and in March
he led 5000 troops against the Seminoles. Jackson captured St.
Marks and executed two Britons,

Robert C. Armbrister and

Alexander Arbuthnot, whom Jackson accused of aiding Seminole
attacks

on

American

territory.

Jackson

then

marched

on

Pensacola, and seized the seaport on May 24.19 Adams noted in
his diary that Jackson's dispatches from St. Marks arrived on
May 4. Adams did not immediately approve of Jackson's actions.
"Crawford some time ago proposed to send Jackson to give no
quarter to any white man found with

the

Indians," Adams

observed. "I objected to it then, and this day avowed that I
was not prepared for such a mode of warfare."20
Six weeks later Monroe and the cabinet learned of the
fall of Pensacola, which Adams feared "makes many difficulties
for the Administration."2 * Onis lodged a formal protest on
July 8. The same day Adams met with Baron Hyde de Neuville,
the French minister and unofficial intermediary between Adams

18 John Quincy Adams to George W. Erving, April 20, 1818,
ibid., 6:306-307.
*9 Weeks, JQA and American Empire, 109-112.
20 Diary entry, May 4, 1818, in MJQA, 4:87.
21 Diary entry, June 18, 1818, ibid., 4:102.
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and Onis. Adams told Hyde de Neuville that he expected Monroe
would

approve Jackson's

Neuville told Adams

conduct.

Two days

that Spain was

later Hyde de

prepared to cede the

Floridas if the United States assumed American shipping claims
against Spain. The French minister urged Adams to accept the
Sabine River as the western boundary, which Adams rejected.22
Adams met Onis on July

11,

and saw that Onis was

"more

tractable on the subject of Pensacola." Onis proposed to give
up the Floridas entirely and let mutual shipping claims cancel
each other out if the United States accepted a boundary from
the Mermento and Calcasieu Rivers north to the Missouri and
along

the

Missouri

to

its

source.

Adams,

sensing

his

advantage, rejected the new boundary and for the first time
suggested a line running to the Pacific, which would safeguard
the American claim to the Columbia River. On July 16, Adams
proposed through Hyde de Neuville a line from the Trinity
River to the Red River, along the Red to the source of the Rio
Grande, along the mountains and then to the Pacific.23
Adams could not exploit Spain's weakened position if
Monroe disavowed Jackson's campaign. "The President and all of
the members of the Cabinet, except myself, are of the opinion
that

Jackson

acted

not

only

without,

but

against,

his

22 Don Luis de Onis to John Quincy Adams, July 8, 1818,
ASP:FR, 4:496-497; Diary entries, July 8 and 10, 1818, in
MJQA, 4:105-106.
23 Diary entries, July 11 and 16, 1818, in MJQA, 4:106-107,
110; Weeks, JQA and American Empire, 119-122.
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instructions,” Adams wrote in his diary for July 15. Secretary
of War John C.

Calhoun seemed

"personally offended." The

constitutional question hung on the power of the president to
conduct hostilities without a declaration of war. "There is no
doubt that defensive acts of hostility may be authorized by
the Executive," Adams argued, "but Jackson was authorized to
cross the Spanish

line in pursuit of the

Indian enemy."

Hostilities were directed against the Seminoles, not Spain. In
Adams's mind, the power to repel sudden attacks included the
right to pursue the enemy across international borders.24 On
July

21

Adams

told

Monroe

that

a disavowal

would

be

a

confession of weakness, a dangerous abdication of power, and
an injustice to Jackson.2^ Adams carried the day, and in his
note to Onis of July 23 threw the blame onto Spain for failing
to control the Indians within its territories.2^
Adams took the same argument to the Spanish government,
and from there to the rest of Europe. Adams's instructions to
George W. Erving of November 28, 1818, which Samuel Flagg
Bemis called "the greatest state paper of John Quincy Adams's
career," completed the transformation of Jackson's creative
reading of his orders into an act of self-defense.27 Adams
24 Diary entry, July 15, 1818, in MJQA, 4:108; Weeks, JQA
and American Empire, 113-116.
25 Diary entry, July 18, 1818, in MJQA, 4:115.
2^ John Quincy Adams to Don Luis de Onis, July 23, 1818, in
ffJQA, 6:383-394.
27 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 326.
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told Erving to remind the Spanish foreign minister that Spain
was responsible for sheltering hostile Indians, giving Jackson
no choice but to seize St. Marks and Pensacola. Adams further
warned Spain that "the right of the United States can as
little compound with impotence as with perfidity," and that
the United States would continue to act in defense of its own
borders,

with

or

without

Spain's

cooperation.28

Adams's

vigorous, if not ruthless, defense of Jackson demonstrated the
gap

between

his

republicanism

and

that

of

the

previous

generation. Unlike Madison in response to Mathews's 1812 raid
on East Florida, Adams did not shy away from the use of power,
which he believed was

necessary for the

survival of the

republic.29 To disown Jackson would be a dereliction of duty
by not taking a vital action.
Adams completed negotiations with Onis on February 22,
1819, when the two signed a treaty that ceded the Floridas to
the United States, and set the boundary between American and
Spanish territory at the Sabine to the Red River, along the
Red to 100 degrees west, north to the Arkansas River to its
source, north to 42 degrees north, and west to the Pacific,
trading Texas for Oregon.30 "The acquisition of the Floridas
28 John Quincy Adams to George w. Erving, Nov. 28, 1818, in
WJQA, 6:476-480, 486-487, 502; Weeks, JQA and American
Empire, 139-146.
29 Madison did approve of Jackson's raid and Adams's defense
of it. James Madison to James Monroe, Feb. 13, 1819, in WJM,
8:421.
o

n

Weeks, JQA and American Empire, 2-4.
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has long been an object of earnest desire to this country,"
Adams wrote on the day of signature. "The acknowledgement of
a definite boundary to the South Sea forms a great epocha in
our h i s t o r y ^ * A year later Adams remarked to Ninian Edwards
of Illinois that he was "the last man in the Administration to
agree to accept the Sabine for the western boundary." He did
not see the treaty as an effort that benefitted one section
over another but as an advancement of the interests of the
whole union.32 It was James Monroe who dropped Texas, for fear
that the East would come to resent the growth of the South and
West.33
After Adams removed one colonial threat to the growth of
the union, two colonial neighbors, Great Britain and Russia,
remained.

The Convention of

1818 temporarily settled the

territorial question with Great Britain by fixing the boundary
at 49 degrees north from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky
Mountains,

and

opened

the

territory

to

both

countries.

Conflict flared up only once, when Stratford Canning asserted
a British claim to the Columbia River in January 1821. Adams
denied the claim and after a heated debate snapped, "keep what
is yours, but leave the rest of this continent to us."34 In a
31 Diary entry, Feb. 22, 1819, in MJQA, 4:275.
32 Diary entry, March 31, 1820, ibid., 5:54.
33 James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, May 23, 1820, in Writings
of Monroe, 6:127-128.
34 B. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 162-167; Bemis, JQA
and Foreign Policy, 293-296; Diary entry, Jan. 27, 1821, in
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sense, Adams was speaking not only to Canning, but to all of
Europe.
Russian

pretensions

in

North

America

were

a

more

immediate problem than British claims. Czar Alexander issued
a ukase on September 16, 1821, claiming 51 degrees north as
the southern boundary of Russian North America, and asserted
an exclusive maritime right along the coast to a distance of
100 Italian miles
September

25

(115 English miles). A second ukase of

confirmed

the

Russian-American

Company's

exclusive right to trade north of 51 degrees. Russian minister
Pierre de Poletica sent a copy of the ukase to Adams on
February 11, 1822. Adams responded with a note on March 30
rejecting any Russian claims south of the settlements at 57
degrees. Poletica left for Russia in April, and promised to
present Adams's complaints to the czar.35
Non-colonization efforts aimed at Russia were subsidiary
to

the

main

colonial

issue

of

Monroe's

presidency,

the

emergence of the Spanish American republics. After the War of
1812

Americans

increasingly

turned

their

political

and

economic attention to the newly-independent Spanish American

MJQA, 5:253.
35 Hildt, Early Negotiations, 159-162; Bemis, JQA and
Foreign Policy, 494; Howard I. Kushner, Conflict on the
Northwest Coast: American-Russian Rivalry in the Pacific
Northwest, 1790-1867 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1975), 32-34, 46-50; Norman E. Saul, Distant Friends: The
United States & Russia, 1763-1867 (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1991), 96-99; John Quincy Adams to Pierre
de Poletica, March 30, 1822, in WJQA, 7:214-216.
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nations. The United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (modernday

Argentina)

emerged

first,

forming

an

independent

government in 1810 and declaring independence in 1816. South
American ports opened a new field for economic endeavor,
potentially supplanting other colonial and European markets.
Baltimore was the center of the new trade, earning fortunes
for the

city's merchants,

and owing

to

the

questionable

legality of that trade, for the city's admiralty lawyers.36
Trade was the most tangible manifestation of American
sympathy with the republican cause in Spanish America. As
secretary of state, Adams had to confront the question of to
what extent should the United States involve itself in efforts
to establish republics abroad. "There is nothing in Adams's
attitude toward the new states of South America down to 1823
that indicates a burning sympathy with them, or even much
confidence in their ability to establish the free institutions
of self-government," Dexter Perkins wrote.37 This statement

36 Frederic L. Paxson, The Independence of the South
American Republics: A Study in Recognition and Foreign
Policy, 2nd. ed. (Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1916), 5356; Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the
Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941), 115-123; Laura
Bornholdt, Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism: A Study in
the Background of the Monroe Doctrine (Northampton, Mass.:
Smith College, 1949), 3-4.
37 Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), 102; see also James
E. Lewis, Jr. "We Shall Have Good Neighbors: The American
Union and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia,
1994), 309.
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was only partially correct. Adams certainly believed that the
Spanish

Americans

were

poor

candidates

for

republican

government and saw no similarities to the American Revolution.
"Ours was a War of freemen, for Political Independence," Adams
wrote to his brother in 1818.

"Theirs is a war of Slaves

against their Masters."38 Five years later his opinion was
unchanged, as seen in a paragraph he excised from the official
instructions to Richard C. Anderson as minister to Colombia.
"The revolution of the Spanish colonies was not caused by the
oppression under which they had been held, however great it
had been," Adams wrote. "Accustomed to the combined weight of
military

and ecclesiastical

despotism,

secluded

from

all

intercourse with the rest of the world, subdued in mind and
body,

with

a people heterogeneously composed of European

adventurers, of creole natives of the country but of Spanish
descent, of aboriginal Indians and of African slaves," the
Spanish Americans did not act from a "spirit of freedom."38
Adams

also

discounted

the

possibility

of

any

permanent

economic gain from Spanish America, as the new nations most
wanted manufactured goods which the British could supply and
the United States did not.48
If Adams had no confidence that the Spanish Americans
38 John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, April 14,
1818, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 145.
38 John Quincy Adams to Richard C. Anderson, May 27, 1823,
in WJQA, 7:442-443.
40 Diary entry, June 20, 1822, in MJQAt 6:25.
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could

sustain

republicanism

as

an

internal

system,

he

sympathized with and encouraged their efforts to establish a
republican

external

system,

that

is,

a

system

of

colonization and separation from European politics.

non
"I am

satisfied that the cause of the South Americans, as far as it
consists in the assertion of independence against Spain is
just," Adams wrote to the president in 1818. "But the justice
of a cause, however it may enlist individual feelings in its
favor, is not sufficient to justify third parties in siding
with it."4* For Adams, whose career began in reaction to the
French Revolution, American response to the Spanish American
revolutions had a frighteningly familiar pattern. Adams wrote
to William Eustis in 1817 that "it is an after piece to the
french revolution in its republican phase: and Buenos Ayres
has taken the place of liberty, equality and fraternity.1,42
"And now, as at the early stage of the French Revolution,"
Adams wrote to his father four days later, "we have ardent
spirits who are for rushing into the conflict, without looking
to the consequences."43

Henry Clay was the most ardent spirit, and championed the
cause of the Spanish Americans in Congress, trying to push the

41 John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, Aug. 24, 1818, in
WJQA, 6:442-443.
42 John Quincy Adams to William Eustis, Dec. 17, 1817, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 146.
43 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Dec. 21, 1817, in WJQA,
6:275-276.
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administration into recognizing the government of La Plata at
Buenos Aires.

Adams always

found it difficult to concede

purity of motive to his opponents, and in Clay's case the
problem was compounded by the fact that Adams and Clay had not
gotten along at Ghent. After Congress defeated Clay's motion
demanding the recognition of Buenos Aires, Adams dismissed
Clay's efforts as merely a pretext for Clay to create a
personal following by picking a fight with Monroe. Without
mentioning Clay by name, Adams informed his mother that a
party, a party leader and an excuse for opposition, "all were
found, and found out each other; but the political atmosphere
was

calm

and

the

attempts

to

blow up

a

gale

were

not

successful."44 Clay was undaunted in his efforts to change
American policy toward Spanish America. On May 19, 1821, Clay
attended a public dinner in Lexington, Kentucky, and called
for an

alliance among American

nations

as a

"sort of a

Clay believed that the Spanish Americans

could form

counterpoise" to the Holy Alliance.45

republics and assumed a natural affinity between republics.
Adams was more skeptical of the Spanish American revolutions
and

believed

remaining

republican

neutral

between

government
Spain

was

and its

best

served

colonies

by

and by

44 George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1952), 270-271; Whitaker,
United States and Latin America, 244-245; John Quincy Adams
to Abigail Adams, May 25, 1818, in FTJQA, 6:338-339.
45 Henry Clay, "Toast and Response at Public Dinner," May
19, 1821, in Clay Papers, 3:80.
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keeping European nations out, particularly Great Britain and
the Russian-led Holy Alliance. Meddling in South American
politics

would

be

as

dangerous

as

meddling

in

European

politics. Adams believed that the United States "have been
neutral, with a leaning inclination on the side of liberty and
South America."4*> Yet that leaning was not to drag the United
States into war. In 1820 the Colombian agent Manuel Torres
attempted to buy arms from the United States government. The
cabinet met on March 29, 1820. According to Adams, Calhoun and
Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson wished to make the sale
if it were possible, with Secretary of the Treasury William H.
Crawford leaning in the same direction. Adams argued that the
sale was beyond the president's power. Furthermore, it was an
open act of war and a direct violation of the neutrality on
which

American

importance

to

neutrality],"

safety
adhere

Adams

depended.

"It

inflexibly

concluded.

was

to

"Between

of

that
it

the

utmost

system
and

that

[of
of

mingling in every European national war I saw no middle term;
and if once we departed from it, I saw no other prospect for
this nation than a career of washing their blood-stained hands
in blood."47
As much as Adams hoped to keep out of war with Europe, he
46 John Quincy Adams to George Washington Campbell, June 3,
1819, in William R. Manning, ed. Diplomatic Correspondence
Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, 3
vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), 1:107.
47 Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 337; MJQA,
5:46-47.
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hoped as much to keep European powers out of Spanish America.
On July 23,

1818, Adams talked Monroe out of endorsing a

British proposal to mediate between Spain and its colonies.48
In 1819 Calhoun was reluctant to act in regard to South
America without British cooperation. Adams responded with an
argument he used again in 1821 and 1823. He cautioned against
following British policy too closely and argued

"that we

should carefully preserve the advantage of taking the lead in
advancing to the recognition of the South American Governments
and, while using persuasion with England to move in concert
with

us,

take

care

to

let

her

know

that

we

will

act

independently for ourselves."48
On July 4, 1821, Adams delivered what he called his
"answer to Edinburgh and Lexington," to the Edinburgh Review’s
call for the United States to enter into European politics on
the side of liberty against the Holy Alliance and to Clay's
call for an inter-American alliance.50 Most of the address was
standard Independence Day fare: the history of political and
religious tyranny in Europe, a listing of the British acts of
oppression and the heroic American struggle against them.
Toward the end, Adams noted the republican system his father

48 Lipsky, JQA, 301-303, 307-308; Diary entry, July 25,
1818, in MJQA, 4:118.
49 Diary entry, Jan. 2, 1819, ibid., 4:207.
50 John Quincy Adams to Robert Walsh, July 10, 1821, in
WJQA, 7:117; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 356358.
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had

helped establish

in

1776,

consisting

of

republican

governments in the states and reciprocal trade abroad without
political obligations. The United States had, to its credit,
adhered to the same republican system since 1776. "She has
abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even
when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings,
as

to the last drop that

visits the heart," Adams told the

assembled crowd. He then

delivered the vital portion of his

address:
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence
has been or shall be unfurled there will her heart,
her benediction and her prayers be. But she does
not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She
is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence
of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of
her own. She will recommend the general cause by
the countenance of her voice, and the benignant
sympathy of her example. She well knows that by
once enlisting under other banners than her own,
were they even banners of foreign independence, she
would involve herself beyond the power of extrica
tion, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of
individual avarice, envy and ambition which assume
the colors and usurp the standard of freedom ...
She might become the dictatress of the world. She
would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.51
In his address, Adams restated the century-old Opposition Whig
fear of continental engagements, which now included South
America as well as Europe. To enlist with Mexico or Colombia
would

be

as

harmful

to

liberty

as

an

alliance

with

revolutionary France would have been. That the United States
51 John Quincy Adams, Address delivered at the request of a
Committee of the Citizens of Washington; on the occasion of
the reading of the Declaration of Independence, on the
Fourth of Julyf 1821 (Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force,
1821), 29.
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should plunge into any war in which it was not a direct party
would have "the most pernicious tendency to this country, and
the more pernicious because it flatters our ambition."52
By the end of 1821 the tide in Colombia, Mexico, Peru and
La Plata had turned almost completely to the rebel cause. By
early 1822 the greatest danger was not Spanish reconquest, but
interference by other powers. Once

Spain was out of the

contest, Great Britain, France and Russia might enter. On
March 8, 1822, Monroe announced that the United States would
recognize the governments established in La Plata,

Chile,

Peru, Colombia and Mexico. Adams informed the Spanish minister
on April 6, writing that the United States "has yielded to an
obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as
independent

states,

nations,

which

after

deliberately

asserting their right to that character, have maintained and
established it against all the resistance which had been or
could

be

brought

recognition was

not

to

oppose

intended

it."
as

an

Adams
act of

stressed

that

hostility

to

Spain.5^
In 1822 the Monroe administration had decided that the

52 John Quincy Adams to Robert Walsh, July 10, 1821, in
WJQA, 7:117.
5^ Charles C. Griffin, The United States and the Disruption
of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822: A Study in the Relations
of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish
Colonies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 268270; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 371-374;
John Quincy Adams to Don Joaquin de Anduaga, April 6, 1822,
in WJQA, 7:218.
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maintenance of a republican hemispheric system, that is, a
system of independent nations, depended on limiting European
interference with the new nations. Adams believed such a
system was complementary to a domestic system of continental
union. Yet the revolt of the Spanish American colonies was
incomplete. Cuba remained loyal to Spain. Cuba was also a
target of American expansion and had assumed the role in
American diplomacy previously played by New Orleans and the
Floridas as the territory the United States could not allow to
be transferred to another European power. The British seemed
the most likely to challenge the United States for the island,
as Foreign Minister George Canning believed Cuba was vital to
preserving
transfer

Great
of

Cuba

Britain's
to

Great

Caribbean
Britain

interests.54
would

be

an

"The
event

unpropitious to the interests of this Union," Adams instructed
Hugh Nelson, minister to Spain, adding that possession of Cuba
may one day be vital to preserving the union. "You will not
conceal from the Spanish government the repugnance of the
United States to the transfer of the island of Cuba by Spain
to any other power."55
By the spring of 1823 the elements that produced the
Monroe Doctrine as a statement of a republican system of
54 John A. Logan, Jr. No Transfer: An American Security
Principle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 140-142,
150-152; D. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 53-54; Whitaker,
United States and Latin America, 422-423.
55 John Quincy Adams to Hugh Nelson, April 28, 1823, WJQA,
7:372-373, 379, 381.
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diplomacy were

all

in place.

Russian

pretensions

in the

northwest and the possible transfer of Cuba from Spain to
another

power

formed

the

main

threats

to

the

union

and

therefore to the domestic system of republican government. The
recognition and appointment of ministers to the new republics
allowed

Adams

to

spell

out

the

republican

system

in

hemispheric and maritime affairs. "With relation to Europe,
there is perceived to be

only one object,

in which the

interests of the United States can be the same as those of the
South American nations, and that is that they all should be
governed

by

republican

institutions,

politically

and

commercially independent of Europe," Adams wrote to Caesar A.
Rodney,

minister

to La

Plata.

Consciously

or not,

Adams

followed Thomas Paine in thinking that South America, like
Europe, could not be at peace if too thickly planted with
kingdoms.

Buenos

Aires,
European

Adams

believed,

susceptible

to

influence.56

differences

between American and European

was

Adams

particularly
outlined

systems

the

in his

instructions to Richard C. Anderson, minister to Colombia. The
United States

approved of

the

South American revolts

as

expressions of natural right, whereas European nations had
supported

the

principle

of

legitimacy

and

sought

the

restoration of Spanish power. Adams also took the opportunity
to introduce what he considered the maritime expression of

56 John Quincy Adams to Caesar A. Rodney, May 17, 1823,
ibid., 7:426, 428-429.
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republicanism,

a

system

of

neutral

rights.

"The

armed

neutrality of the American war is a memorable example of the
testimony by almost all the civilized nations of the world to
the principle, that the protection of all property, excepting
contraband of war, on board of neutral vessels of neutral
force, is of natural right," Adams wrote.57
British alienation from the Holy Alliance provided a
wider opportunity for Adams to push for neutral rights. At the
Congress of Verona in 1822, the Holy Alliance demanded that
Ferdinand VII of Spain be restored to absolute power, and in
1823 France invaded Spain. To Canning the invasion was the
last straw, and Great Britain broke with the Holy Alliance.58
In Washington Stratford Canning met with Adams on June 20,
1823, and observed that Great Britain and the United States
were pursuing similar policies regarding Spanish America and
suggested a formal alliance. It was a day similar to July 11,
1818, when Onis revealed he was willing to cede the Floridas.
Adams's opponent showed his hand and gave Adams the chance to
push for more than he expected to achieve. Adams, of course,
restated

the

United

States's

traditional

policy

of

non

interference in the affairs of Europe. He did suggest that the
time may be ripe for agreement on the outstanding maritime
issues. "My belief was," Adams wrote in his diary, "that upon

57 John Quincy Adams to Richard C. Anderson, May 27, 1823,
ibid., 7:452, 482.
58 Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 396-397.
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all the maritime questions except impressment Great Britain
would now maintain our principles."59
Adams

had

attempted without

success

to

resolve

the

impressment question while minister to Great Britain. Richard
Rush,

his successor,

frankly hoped that the United States

would drop the issue and wait for Great Britain to raise it.5®
When

Stratford

Canning

suggested

joint

operations

in

suppressing the slave trade, which would involve the United
States accepting British doctrines on the right of search,
Adams replied that the United States had just fought a war
over that very principle and would certainly not accept it in
peacetime.5^- "Search at sea,

as practiced in war,

is the

exercise of force by the armed man of a country at war over
the

unarmed

man

of

a

nation

at

peace,"

Adams

wrote

to

Stratford Canning in 1823.62
Adams held fast against impressment and the right of
search, but for the first six years as secretary of state he
put neutral rights on hold, as he expected a war with Spain
over territorial issues that would be fought on land and sea.

59 Diary entry, June 20, 1823, in MJQA, 6:151-153; John
Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, June 24, 1823, in WJQA, 7:489498.
5® Richard Rush to William H. Crawford, Nov. 24, 1818,
William H. Crawford Papers, Library of Congress.
61 John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, Aug. 15, 1821, in
WJQA, 7:173.
52 John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, June 24, 1823,
ibid., 7:514.
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Adams wrote Rush on November 6, 1817 that "there is no nation
on the globe, which in contracting conventional engagements to
enlarge the rights of maritime neutrality would make so great
and real a sacrifice of their particular interests to the
principle of general justice, and progressive civilization, as
this.”63 By early 1823 there were no border issues between the
United States and Spain, and any power that wished to conquer
South America would have to go through the Royal Navy. Adams
was therefore free to reassert traditional American doctrines
of neutral rights. On July 24, Adams observed that "I have
been deeply engaged in preparing instructions to R. Rush on
maritime, belligerent, and natural law," and four days later
Adams discussed his draft with the president.®4 Adams's treaty
project was the child of the Model Treaty, establishing the
principle that free ships make free goods and limiting the
list of

contraband

goods

to

articles

of

war.

The

draft

included a new principle, the limitation of privateering. John
Adams had relied on privateers during the American Revolution,
but by 1823 the United States had a navy of consequence and a
broad-based

political

commitment

to maintain

it.65

Adams

enclosed the treaty project in his July 28 instructions to

®3 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Nov. 6, 1817, ibid.,
6:242, 244-245.
64 Diary entries, July 24 and 28, 1823, in MJQA, 6:164.
®5 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 436-439, 579-585; draft in
Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose
Papers, reel 462.
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Rush and noted how much the world had changed since 1817, not
to mention 1805. Both Great Britain and the United States
would

benefit

from the

establishment

of

neutral

rights.

"Maritime war itself, and all the questions connected with it,
must be affected by the downfall of the colonial system,"
Adams

wrote.

"Of

what

use,

for

example,

will

her

too

celebrated rule of war of 1756 ever again be to her, when all
the ex-colonies of Europe and the colonies yet existing, her
own included, are open to foreign commerce and shipping in
time of peace?
colonization,

The

Adams

end

of

believed,

the monarchical
could

put

system of

an end to

anti

republican maritime restrictions.
"I appealed to the primitive policy of this country as
exemplified in the first treaty with Prussia [in 1785]," Adams
told Monroe and Calhoun on July 28. "I said the seed was first
sown and had borne a single plant, which the fury of the
revolutionary tempest had since swept away.

I thought the

present a moment eminently auspicious for sowing the same seed
a

second

time."

"My

plan

involves

revolution in the laws of war —

nothing

less

than

a

a great amelioration in the

condition of man," Adams confided in his diary. "Is it the
dream of a visionary,

or is it the great and practicable

conception of a benefactor of mankind?

I believe it the

latter; and I believe this to be the proper time for proposing

66 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, July 28, 1823, in
ASPsFR, 5:531.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

341
it to the world."67 Certainly Adams had spent too many years
in diplomacy to be considered a "visionary.” Yet unlike his
father, Adams had not completely given up on reforming the
world,

or at least improving it somewhat. Adams's neutral

rights project was the fruit of his republican vision of
diplomacy, his keen observational skills in spotting the small
opening Stratford Canning had given him, and his ability to
adapt to a new diplomatic world.
Adams did not limit his neutral rights project to Great
Britain but also made it central to his diplomacy with Russia,
and

hoped

to

colonization.
Poletica's

link

maritime

issues

and

continental

non

On July 17 Adams met with Baron von Tuyll,

replacement

as Russian minister to the United

States, and "told him specially that we should contest the
right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this
continent,
American

and that we
continents

should assume distinctly that the

are

no

longer

subjects

for

any new

European colonial establishments."68 Adams instructed both
Rush at London and Henry Middleton at St. Petersburg to oppose
the Russian claim of 51 degrees.69
After Adams sent his neutral rights project to Rush, he
drafted

instructions

to

Middleton

proposing

the

same

67 Diary entry, July 28, 1823, in MJQA, 6:164-165.
68 Diary entry, July 17, 1823, ibid., 6:163.
69 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush; John Quincy Adams to
Henry Middleton, July 22, 1823, in ASP:FR, 5:731, 436-437.
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convention. In doing so, Adams linked the three aspects of his
republican diplomacy —

continental union,

Europe, and freedom of the seas —
colonization —

separation from

all expressions of non

into one system. Adams completed a draft on

August 7, in which he relied on an appeal to the ostensible
principles of the Holy Alliance, linking freedom of trade and
neutral rights as extensions of Christian principles. "Perhaps
the execution of this great design will depend on the Single
Will of the Emperor Alexander, and if one Act of his Life,
more than another could redeem with never-ending glory the
pledge given to mankind in the Holy Alliance," Adams wrote,
"it would be that the eyes of all posterity should look to him
as the Sovereign who first gave effect to the total abolition
of privateering, and private war at sea."70 Monroe dealt the
project what Adams considered a crippling blow on August 9,
when the president asked Adams to remove all references to the
Holy Alliance. "I accordingly struck it out, and thereby gave
up what I considered the mainspring of the argument to the
Emperor,"

Adams wrote

in his diary.

""I relied upon its

operation incomparably more than anything else."71
Adams's grand scheme of the summer of 1823 represented

70 Diary entry, Aug. 3, 1823, in MJQA, 6:168; Draft of John
Quincy Adams to Henry Middleton, Aug. 7, 1823 (filed under
Aug. 13), Adams Family Papers, Letters Received and Other
Loose Papers, reel 462.
71 Diary entry, Aug. 9, 1823, in MJQA, 6:170; Draft of Aug.
13 shows passages marked for removal, Adams Family Papers,
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, reel 462.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

343
nothing less than a triple play of republican diplomacy, an
attempt to secure all three aspects of non-colonization. He
intended to use the stated principles of the Holy Alliance and
traditional Russian-American accord on maritime issues

to

bring an agreement on the northwest boundary. Similarly, Adams
used a new-found Anglo-American agreement on South America and
mutual interest regarding Russia's North American claims to
introduce a neutral rights project. By August 1823, Adams had
already enunciated the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
As

Adams

American

dealt

issues,

a

with

Russia

European

and

issue,

Great
the

Britain
Greek

over

revolt,

introduced itself into American politics. The revolt against
Turkey began in 1821, and it was difficult for an American
generation raised on the Greek classics not to feel sympathy.
Throughout 1821 and 1822, pro-Greek organizations sprang up
around

the

country.

Rush

met

with

Greek

agent

Andreas

Luriottis in London on February 24, 1823, and sent a note
describing the meeting to Adams. The cabinet first discussed
the Greek question on August 15. Albert Gallatin had suggested
sending a token naval force of one corvette, one frigate and
one schooner in support of the Greeks. Crawford and Calhoun
leaned in favor of the proposal.7^
Adams had opposed intervention in the South American

72 Myrtle Cline, American Attitudes toward the Greek War for
Independence 1821-1828 (Atlanta, 1930), 20-27, 156-158;
Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, 266-267; Diary entry,
Aug. 15, 1823, in MJQA, 6:173.
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revolts, an event far closer and more important to the United
States. He was less likely to favor entering European politics
on behalf of the Greeks. "But, while cheering with their best
wishes the cause of the Greeks," Adams wrote Luriottis, "the
United States are forbidden by the duties of their situation
from taking part in the war, to which their relation is one of
n e u t r a l i t y . A d a m s could scarcely believe that Gallatin was
serious about military involvement. "Mr. Gallatin still builds
castles

in

the

air

of

popularity,

and,

being

under

no

responsability for consequences, patronizes the Greek cause
for the sake of raising his own reputation," Adams wrote in
November.74
British foreign secretary George Canning had embraced
non-interference, as it applied to South America. To a certain
extent,

Canning

supported

the

idea

of

legitimacy;

he

considered himself a disciple of Burke and he hoped that the
Spanish

Americans

would

establish

monarchies

instead

of

republics. His sympathy did not extend to the reestablishment
of absolutism in Europe or America. Canning turned to the
United States and hoped to have better luck reaching an
agreement with Rush in London than Canning's cousin had with
Adams in Washington. On August 20, Canning proposed a joint
five-point declaration to Rush, stating that: 1)Spain had no

7^ John Quincy Adams to Andreas Luriottis, Aug. 18, 1823, in
ASPsFR, 5:257.
74 Diary entry, Nov. 24, 1823, in MJQA, 6:199.
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hope of recovering its colonies, 2)the recognition of the new
states was a matter of "time and circumstances,” 3)neither
side would interfere to prevent a settlement between Spain and
its former colonies,

4)neither the United States or Great

Britain aimed at acquiring territory,

and 5)neither power

favored the transfer of any Spanish colonies to another power.
Rush replied that he did not have the authority to agree on
the spot and wrote for instructions. The delay seemed to put
Canning off, and by August 31 he was noticeably cooler on the
idea of a joint declaration.75 Rush's dispatches arrived at
Washington in October. Monroe sought the wisdom of his elders,
Jefferson and Madison,

and both former presidents advised

Monroe to accept Canning's offer.7®
Canning's proposals for Spanish America soon merged with
the increasing possibility of a Russian threat to Spanish
American independence. Baron von Tuyll gave Adams an official
note on October 16, informing the secretary of state that the
political principles of Russia and the Holy Alliance dictated
that Russia could not receive the minister Colombia had sent

75 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 35, 110-112; Bemis,
JQA and Foreign Policy, 377; B. Perkins, Castlereagh and
Adams, 316-317; Whitaker, United States and Latin America,
437-444; J. Fred Rippy, Rivalry of the United States and
Great Britain over Latin America (1808-1830) (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), 113-115.
7® Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National
Identity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 477-480.
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or receive

diplomats from any of the new republics.77 On the

same day Adams assured Tuyll that the United States would
maintain a neutral course as long as European nations did the
same. Adams added that he could not predict what would happen
if any European power violated that neutrality. Adams met with
the president on November 5, and Monroe directed Adams to meet
with Tuyll to find out what the minister meant by "political
principles." Adams raised the question on November 8, and
Tuyll replied that "he understood them as having reference to
the right of Supremacy of Spain over her Colonies."7®
The confluence of Russian and British communications
demonstrated

how

diplomatic

realism

might

coincide

with

republican principles. For Adams, the two messages offered a
chance

to

revive

the

project

that

Monroe's

caution

had

curtailed in August, that of issuing a statement of republican
diplomatic principles to the world. Calhoun inclined toward
accepting Canning's proposal, even if that meant giving up any
future claims on Texas and Cuba. Adams rejected that reasoning
on the grounds that Texas or Cuba may one day ask to join the
union.7® Adams favored answering the British offer and Russian
pretensions

at

the

same

time.

"I

remarked

that

the

77 Baron von Tuyll to John Quincy Adams, October 4/16, 1823,
in Worthington C. Ford, ed "Some Original Documents on the
Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," Massachusetts Historical
Society Proceedings, (January 1902), 400.
7® Adams's Account of his Conversation with Baron von
Tuyll," in Ford, "Some Original Documents," 395, 397-398.
7® Diary entry, Nov. 7, 1823, in MJQA, 6:177-178.
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communication recently received from the Russian minister,
Baron Tuyll,

afforded as

I thought,

a very suitable

and

convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the
Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture of
Great Britain," Adams noted in his diary. "It would be more
candid, as well as more dignified,

to avow our principles

explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock
boat in the wake of a British man-of-war."®®
Adams's naval metaphor should be taken literally as well
as figuratively. Adams had already discussed British policy
with

Stratford

Canning

in

June,

and

nothing

in

George

Canning's proposal was particularly new. Furthermore, George
Canning

presumably

knew

Adams's

price

for

any

kind

of

agreement was a neutral rights project. Canning's proposal to
Rush did not mention neutral rights,

and Adams doubtless

feared that following British policy on the recognition and
disposition of the Spanish American republics might trap the
United States behind a British attempt to impose its view of
maritime law on Spanish America. Acceptance of the British
offer was incompatible with the republican diplomacy Adams
pursued.
Over

the

next month,

Adams

inserted

his

republican

conception of diplomacy into three sets of documents —

the

response to Tuyll, instructions to Rush, and the president's
annual message. In each case Adams hoped to throw Russia and
®® Diary entry, Nov. 7, 1823, ibid., 6:179.
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Great Britain on the defensive, and force those powers to live
up to the principles they had already espoused. Adams's first
note to Tuyll stressed the duty of Christian nations to each
other and regretted Russia's refusal to receive the Colombian
minister.

Calhoun objected to the reference to Christian

nations and the Colombian "Minister of Peace" as "sarcastic."
Adams responded that "all the point of my note was in those
two words as my object was to put the emperor in the wrong in
the face of the world as much as possible." Monroe agreed with
Calhoun and had the offending words struck out.81
The Russian problem took a turn for the worse when Tuyll
showed Adams a dispatch dated August 30 from Count Nesselrode,
the Russian foreign minister. Nesselrode offered a ringing
defense of the French invasion of Spain and of the principle
of legitimacy against revolution.82 Adams declared that the
note "beard[ed] us to our faces on the monarchical principles
of the Holy Alliance," and demanded a response "to be pleaded
before the whole of mankind."82 Adams proposed to answer
Nesselrode in kind, defending the republican system of the
Western Hemisphere and warning Europe against any attempt to
restore South America to Spanish rule, or put it under any

81 John Quincy Adams to Baron Von Tuyll, Nov. 15, 1823, in
Ford, "Some Original Documents," 378-379; Diary entry, Nov.
7, 1823, in MJQA, 6:179.
82 Count Nesselrode to Baron von Tuyll, Aug. 30, 1823, in
Ford, "Some Original Documents," 402-405.
82 Diary entry, Nov. 25, 1823, in MJQA, 6:201.
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other European power. As usual, Adams wanted to make a bolder
statement than Monroe. Adams's draft stated that the United
States government was a republic in which government rested on
the consent of the people, and that each nation was the sole
judge of its own government. "The first of these principles
may be designated, as the principle of Liberty —
as the principle of National Independence —

the second

They are both

Principles of Peace and of Good Will to Men." Attorney General
William

Wirt

paragraph,"

called

and Adams

Adams's

statement

"a

hornet

of

a

himself was not surprised when the

president struck it out.84 "I had much confidence in the
effect of that paragraph," Adams wrote two days later, "first
as persuasion to the Emperor Alexander, and, if that failed,
as our manifesto to the world."85
The instructions to Rush were a less complicated matter.
On November 15 Monroe received dispatches from Rush indicating
that Canning had lost interest in a joint statement.

The

president then agreed with Adams to reject the offer.86 Adams
wrote

to

Rush

on

November

29

approving

his

conduct

in

negotiating with Canning. Adams also registered agreement with
all of Canning's points while observing that the United States
had already recognized the new governments, whereas Great

pA

Draft of John Quincy Adams to Baron von Tuyll, Nov. 25,
1823, in Ford, "Some Original Documents," 405-407; Diary
entry, Nov. 25, 1823, in MJQA, 6:199-200, 203.
85 Diary entry, Nov. 27, 1823, ibid., 6:211.
86 Ammon, Monroe, 482-483.
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Britain had not.

The next day,

Adams

instructed Rush

to

consider any meeting of the Holy Alliance to decide the fate
of the American republics as an act of hostility toward the
United States and to advise Great Britain to act likewise.®7
When Monroe presented a draft of his annual message, it
was Adams's turn to act as a calming influence. Monroe had
written a stinging attack on the French invasion of Spain and
called for Congress to appropriate money for a minister to
Greece. "This message would be a summons to arms —

to arms

against all Europe and for objects of policy exclusively
European, —

Greece and Spain," Adams told the cabinet on

November 21. Adams observed that Europe had been in turmoil
for the last thirty years, "and we had looked on safe in our
distance beyond an intervening ocean, and avowing a total
forbearance

to

interfere

in

any

of

the

combinations

of

European politics." Adams believed that Monroe's draft would
"at once buckle on the harness and throw down the gauntlet."88
The final message, as delivered to Congress on December
2, 1823, owed much to Adams. Monroe scaled down his earlier
draft to express support for Greece and Spain, while restating
the American position of non-interference, observing that "the
political system of the allied powers is essentially different

87 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Nov. 29 and 30, 1823,
in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1:210-212, 215-216.
88 Ammon, Monroe, 484-485; Diary entry, Nov. 21, 1823, in
MJQA, 6:194-195.
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in this respect from that of America."89 Adams's most direct
contribution was the passage on non-colonization in North
America. Adams prepared a sketch on foreign affairs for Monroe
to use in the message and wrote that "the American Continents
by the free and independent condition which they have assumed
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects
for future colonization by any European Powers." The exact
same wording appeared in Monroe's message.90
Adams intended his contribution to Monroe's message as a
statement of republican principle aimed at both Great Britain
and Russia. He wrote a secret dispatch to Rush on December 8
explaining the message. "The concurrence of these sentiments
with those of the British Government as exhibited in the
proposals of Mr. Canning, will be obvious to you. It will now
remain for Great Britain to make hers equally public," Adams
wrote. "The moral effect on the councils of the Allies, to
deter them from any interposition of force between Spain and
America will be complete. It is hoped that nothing more will
be necessary."9^- Eight years later, Adams acknowledged that
89 James Monroe, annual message, Dec. 2, 1823, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:217-218.
90 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 366; "Mr. Adams' Sketch,"
Nov. 1823, James Monroe Papers, New York Public Library;
Message of Dec. 2, 1823, in Richardson, Messages and
Papers, 2:209.
9* Edward P. Crapol, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe
Doctrine: Some New Evidence," Pacific Historical Review,
Vol. 48 no. 3 (August 1979), 416-417; John Quincy Adams to
Richard Rush, Dec. 8, 1823, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook,
reel 146.
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the passage on non-colonization "was my own work." Adams hoped
to convince Alexander to give up his claims below 51 degrees
"by presenting a principle which he would consider as bearing
chiefly on Great Britain," and presenting a warning to the
British, thereby preventing American policy from being tied
too closely to Great Britain.9^ Adams acted to preserve the
three-pronged system of republican diplomacy he had formulated
in July and August of 1823. That meant asking European nations
to uphold the principles they espoused which coincided with
American goals while the United States maintain an independent
course.
In 1831 Adams remarked that "with the Emperor of Russia,
[the message] was completely successful." On April 17, 1824,
Henry Middleton signed a treaty with Nesselrode setting 54
degrees 40 minutes as the southern boundary of Russian North
America.®-* Success was less tangible with Great Britain. In
October
Polignac

1823 Canning turned
Memorandum,

in

to

which

France
France

and sponsored the
considered

Spanish

recovery of its colonies hopeless and renounced any desire for
territorial

gain.

January 1824,

When

Canning

read

Monroe's

message

in

he did not approve of Monroe's emphasis on

republican ideology, nor of any American bid to become leader
John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Sept. 17, 1831, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 150.
93 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Sept. 17, 1831, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 150; Bemis, JQA and Foreign
Policy, 523-526; Kushner, Conflict on the Northwest Coast,
59-60.
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of the Western Hemisphere.

But whatever Monroe's motives,

Canning was satisfied that American policy in the Spanish
American republics matched his own. The neutral rights project
died when Canning showed no interest in negotiations.94
Monroe

partially

co-opted

the

Greek

issue

by

his

expression of sympathy. Daniel Webster's motion in the House
of

Representatives

calling

for

the

president

to

send

a

minister to Greece failed in January 1824. Adams believed that
the Greek issue had replaced South America as a vehicle to
"perplex and embarrass the Administration.”®5 Adams summed up
his feeling on the Greeks, and the operation of his entire
political system, during a chance meeting in his office on May
10,

1824. That day William Thornton of the Patent Office

called looking for subscribers to a fund for the Greeks. Adams
refused on the grounds that such an act would be a violation
of the neutrality that as secretary of state he meant to
protect.

At the same time,

Senator Thomas Hart Benton of

Missouri came in and introduced the Reverend Salmon Giddings
of St. Louis, who was raising money to build a Presbyterian
church. Adams contributed to the church fund. Adams revealed
to his three visitors the same republican system he had shown
in his public statements: neutrality in the affairs of Europe

94 Bemis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 442-444; Temperley,
Foreign Policy of Canning, 114-118, 127-129.
95 Irving H. Bartlett, Daniel Webster (New York: W.W. Norton
and Company, 1978), 100-103; Diary entry, Jan. 17, 1824, in
MJQA, 6:233.
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and the moral improvement of mankind at home.96
Moral
strengthen
presidency.

improvement
the

union

Like his

through
was

the

the

father,

use

central

Adams

of

government

goal

of

intended to

to

Adams's

act as

a

president above party, as a republicanized Patriot King. He
was hamstrung by his second-place finish to Andrew Jackson in
the Electoral College and by the popular belief that he owed
his election by the House of Representatives to a "corrupt
bargain" with fourth-place finisher and House Speaker Henry
Clay,

in which,

contrary

to Adams's

professed

political

principles, Clay traded his support for an appointment as
secretary of state.97 Clay had made his decision for Adams
long before the final vote, believing that Jackson's election
would be dangerous both for the country and to Clay's own
political position as spokesman for the West. Most of the
political differences between Clay and Adams had disappeared.
The two had always supported a system of internal improvements
and tariffs. Clay's object was political, seeing the American
System as a vehicle for giving each section a stake in the
well-being

of

the

others,

thereby

preserving

the

union.

Adams's purpose, on the other hand, was the moral uplift of
the

American

citizenry,

a

goal

to

which

Clay

had

no

pretensions. Diplomatic differences that began at Ghent and
96 Diary entry. May 10, 1824, ibid,, 6:324-325.
97 Ketcham, Presidents Above Party, 130, 134; Mary M. W.
Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1985), 37-40.
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continued throughout the Monroe administration evaporated on
December 2, 1823, when Clay told Adams that the paragraphs on
foreign affairs, Adams's work, were the best part of Monroe's
message. All that remained in 1824 were two men with vastly
different personalities who both wanted to be president. Clay
was willing to serve as secretary of state, as it seemed the
most direct route to the White House.
Adams

as

president

intended

aspects of non-colonization —

to carry out the

three

continental union, separation

from Europe, and freedom of the seas. With Florida in American
hands and Spain almost completely removed as a neighbor, the
preservation of the union was strictly a domestic matter. In
his first annual message Adams pledged himself to a system of
internal

improvements,

scientific

explorations,

and

the

creation of a national university. Adams told Congress that
"liberty is power" and "that the nation blessed with the most
liberty must in proportion to numbers be the most powerful
nation on earth." Unlike his father,

Adams believed that

liberty was cumulative and that power "shall be exercised to
ends of beneficence, to improve the condition of himself and

Bemis, JQA and Union, 33; Callanan, "Political Economy of
JQA," 4-5, 295; Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, 336-337,
340-341; Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 33-37; D. Howe,
Political Culture of the American Whigs, 138; Lipsky, JQA,
146; Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 225-232, 253-254;
Diary entry, Dec. 2, 1823, in MJQA, 6:224.
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his fellow man."99 To Adams's opponents, the president was
proposing a use of federal power in domestic affairs far
beyond anything the Constitution authorized. By early 1826 old
Republicans such as William Branch Giles and John Randolph of
Roanoke joined forces with Jacksonians and Crawfordites led by
Martin Van Buren to form an opposition better organized than
pro-Adams

forces.1°° Adams

himself

refused

to

engage

in

politicking in his own defense. "I see no reason sufficient to
justify a departure from the principle which I entered upon
the Administration, of removing no public officer for merely
preferring another candidate for the Presidency,” Adams wrote
in 1826.101 A
promote

y e a r

his

own

later, Adams wrote that using his office to
re-election

"would

be

to

establish

a

Government of party, and it would disqualify many of the most
distinguished worthies of the land.” "Such a system would be
repugnant to every feeling of my soul," Adams concluded.!02
Adams

in

difficulties.
diplomacy,

many
Adams

ways
was

had
able

the
to

reverse
fit

of

Madison's

republicanism

into

but in domestic affairs he attempted to force

political reality into a theoretical system. Adams also missed

99 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 166; John Quincy Adams,
annual message, Dec. 6, 1825, in Richardson, Messages and
Papers, 2:316.
1°° Risjord, Old Republicans, 259-261.
1°1 Diary entry, Oct. 28, 1826, in MJQA, 7:163-164.
1°2 John Quincy Adams to George Sullivan, Sept. 22, 1827,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 149.
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or chose to ignore the legitimization of party politics that
began during his senatorial career and continued during his
absence in Europe. After 1800 the Federalist party accepted
and tried to use Jeffersonian tactics, such as political clubs
and mass

meetings.

Adams,

by

remaining aloof

from party

politics, ruined any chance he had of passing his domestic
program. 103
The role of the other two legs of the republican triad,
separation from Europe and freedom of the seas, is best seen
in Adams's attempted participation in the Panama Congress of
1826. The Congress was the grand scheme of Simon Bolivar, who
envisioned

an

"Amphyctionic

confederation modelled on the

Assembly,"

representing

a

league of Greek city states in

the fifth century B. C. On December 7, 1824 Bolivar issued a
circular letter to all of the Spanish American republics for
a Congress to be held on October 1,

1825. Originally the

United States was not included, but the Mexican and Colombian
governments

sent out

feelers

in the spring

of

1825,

and

Colombia made a formal offer later in the year. The conference
was expanded to include Great Britain and the Netherlands,
since both owned Caribbean territories and had financial ties
to many of the new

r e p u b l i c s .

103 David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution in American
Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of
Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 2935, 45; Banner, To the Hartford Convention, 66.
104 semis, JQA and Foreign Policy, 544; Hargreaves,
Presidency of JQA, 148; Whitaker, United States and Latin
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That Adams was willing to consider sending a delegate to
the Congress is evidence of the influence of Clay on the
president. Adams met with Clay on April 23, 1825, and Clay
informed him that the Mexican minister had proposed that the
United States be represented at the Panama Congress. Clay
urged acceptance. That day an agenda for the Congress appeared
in the National Journal. Adams believed the Congress was "of
great

importance"

project

of

belligerent

and was

codifying
and

particularly interested in the

"-American

neutral

law,"

principles
which

was

of
"of

maritime,
infinite

magnitude." "This is a grain of mustard seed," the president
observed.105 Four days later Clay reported on his conversation
with Pablo Obregon,

the Mexican minister,

and Jose Maria

Salazar, the Colombian minister. "Mr. Clay continues earnest
in the desire that a Minister should be appointed to this
Congress," Adams noted, but Secretary of War James Barbour
"urges many objections against it."106 On May 7 Barbour came
around to favor the mission, and Adams directed Clay to inform
Obregon and Salazar that the United States would accept a
formal invitation to the Congress.107
Adams briefly mentioned that the United States would
America, 571-573; Joseph B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its
Beginnings (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), 312-313.
105 Remini, Clay, 276; Diary entry, April 23, 1825, in MJQA,
6:531.
10® Diary entry, April 27, 1825, ibid., 6:536-537.
107 Diary entry, May 7, 1825, ibid., 6:542.
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attend the Panama Congress in his first annual message.108 On
December 26 Adams sent a message to the Senate nominating
Richard C. Anderson,

the minister to Colombia and a Clay

adherent,

Sergeant,

and

John

Federalist attorney,

a

prominent

Philadelphia

as ministers to the Panama Congress.

Adams explained that the possibility of a maritime rights
convention establishing that free ships make free goods and
defining legal blockades was of the utmost importance and
could be more efficiently done at the Panama Congress than by
approaching each nation individually. Adams also hoped to use
the "moral influence" of the United States to advance the
cause of religious liberty.109 The same coalition of Jackson,
Crawford and Calhoun supporters that opposed Adams on internal
improvements opposed him on foreign affairs. In January 1826
Martin Van Buren submitted a resolution in the Senate denying
the president the right to nominate ministers

to such a

conference. The Senate defeated Van Buren's motion on March
14.110
On March 15 Adams transmitted the documents relating to
the mission to the House of Representatives,

along with a

message defending the mission. Adams stated that "the corner
stone of all our future relations with them [Latin American
108 John Quincy Adams, annual message, Dec. 6, 1825, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:302.
109 John Quincy Adams, message of Dec. 26, 1825, ibid.,
2:319.
110 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 149-152.
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nations] was disinterestedness." He denied that any alliance
was in the works and stated that the American role at the
Congress was "merely consultative" and that there would be no
agreement

unless

approved by

the

proper branches

of

the

government. Adams's most difficult task was to square American
participation

in

the

Panama

Congress

with

Washington's

recommendations against permanent alliances in the Farewell
Address.

Adams

argued that

his

policy was

no different.

Washington had drawn a line between Europe and America in
1796, as had Monroe in 1823. In 1796 the United States was the
only independent nation in the Western Hemisphere. In 1826 the
United States was the most powerful of a group of independent
nations. Adams

would

make

no

political

commitments

but

believed the new nations had more in common with the United
States than either had with Europe.111
Clay issued instructions to Anderson and Sergeant on May
8, 1826. if the decision to attend the conference belonged to
Clay, the instructions belonged to Adams. Left completely to
himself, Clay might have called for closer political ties with
the new nations. The instructions embodied the republican
diplomatic system Adams had devised in the summer of 1823 and
had inserted into Monroe's message of December 2, 1823. The
first general instruction was that the United States should
maintain

its

neutrality.

"All

notion

is

rejected

111 John Quincy Adams, message of March 15, 1826, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:331, 336-338.
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Amphyctionic Council, invested with power finally, to decide
controversies between the American States, or to regulate, in
any

respect,

their

conduct,"

Clay wrote.

The

idea

of

a

"counterpoise" to the Holy Alliance was officially dead. Clay
added that "no intention has been entertained to change the
present pacific and neutral policy of the United States."112
Much of the instructions were dedicated to the American
doctrine of neutral rights, which Adams considered vital to a
republican conception of diplomacy and believed he had saved
by rejecting Canning's offer of a joint statement on South
America. Getting nations at war to agree on a system of
neutral rights was no easier in 1826 than it had been at the
height of the Napoleonic wars. An Englishmen, Lord Thomas
Cochrane, headed Chile's navy, and brought with him British
notions of maritime law. In 1825 Brazil and Argentina went to
war over possession of the Banda Oriental (modern-day Uruguay)
and proclaimed blockades that the United States considered
illegal.113 Clay directed Anderson and Sergeant to treat with
all nations attending on maritime topics, even if the Congress
as a whole did not. The envoys were to propose "to abolish war
against private property," and to propose a definition of
112 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant, May
8, 1826, in Clay, Papers, 5:314, 316.
113 Edward Baxter Billingsley, In Defense of Neutral Rights:
The United States Navy and the Wars of Independence in Chile
and Peru (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1967), 93-96; H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the
Nineteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1960),
157-158.
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blockade suitable to neutral powers. Clay enclosed Adams's
neutral

rights

abortive"

project

with

Great

of

July

Britain,

28,
but

1823,
might

which
be

"proved

useful

at

Panama.114
Clay next turned to non-colonization and the problem of
Cuba. He reiterated the statement in the Monroe Doctrine that
the Americas were closed off from future colonization, but
that the United States would not disturb existing colonies.
Cuba and Puerto Rico provided the most tempting targets for
other powers, European and American. The United States would
prefer that Cuba were independent and able to maintain that
status. The United States would not, however, enter into any
agreement to defend Cuban independence, nor would the United
States

look

favorably on Cuba's

annexation

by Mexico

or

Colombia, since neither nation could hold the island, and it
would

most

likely

pass

to

a

European

power.

Clay

also

instructed Anderson and Sergeant to convince other nations to
renounce designs on Cuba and Puerto Rico.115
The American ministers never reached the Panama Congress.
Anderson died on June 24 at Cartegena, and Sergeant refused to
travel during malaria season. The Congress itself lasted from
June 22 to July 15, with Mexico, Central America, Peru and
Colombia

in

attendance,

and

concluded

a

treaty

of

114 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant, May
8, 1826, in Clay, Papers, 5:315, 322-324.
115 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant, May
8, 1826, ibid., 5:330-335.
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confederation,
provisions

organization

for

future

of

meetings.

a

joint

The

military,

Congress

and

voted

to

reconvene at Tacabaya, Mexico in 1827, after the signatory
nations ratified the treaties. Joel R. Poinsett, the American
minister to Mexico, replaced Anderson, and he and Sergeant
arrived at Tacabaya

in January

1827.

The Congress

never

reconvened, as only Colombia ratified the first agreement. The
British,

represented by Edward Dawkins, were hard at work

counteracting

American

influence

at

Panama,

particularly

opposing any American attempt at a neutral rights project.
Dawkins work was done for him, as Mexico and Colombia were
angered by the American position on Cuba, and opposed the
United States on neutral rights. Dawkins reported to Canning
that American influence in Spanish America was minimal.116
Despite the failure to attend the Panama Congress, Adams
did not believe relations with South America had been harmed.
Adams

informed Richard Rush that the United States would

continue to pursue a policy of

"kindness, moderation and

forbearance."117 American failure to keep British maritime
principles out of the Western Hemisphere,

however,

was

a

bitter blow and was symbolized by American diplomacy with
Brazil. Brazilian-American relations had been tense throughout

116 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 157-158; Rippy, Rivalry,
227-228, 240-246; Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 179186; Whitaker, United States and Latin America, 581-583.
117 John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, Aug. 16, 1827, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 149.
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Adams's presidency, owing to American objections to Brazil's
blockade

of

Argentina.

In

1827,

Commodore

James

Biddle,

commanding the American squadron off the coast of Brazil,
approached the Brazilian government about accepting American
rules concerning blockades. Biddle reported to Navy Secretary
Samuel Southard that

Brazil

seemed receptive until Great

Britain intimidated Brazil into accepting British rules. The
truth was that Great Britain simply accepted the Brazilian
blockade as legal.118
Southard passed Biddle's report, Anglophobia and all, to
the

president

interpretation.

in

December

"Cannon

1827.

law is

Adams

the

accepted

Biddle's

law of Great

Britain

towards other nations," Adams complained. "Belligerent, she
tramples on neutral rights; neutral, she maintains them at the
cannon's mouth; and the Brazilian courts have been awed into
submission."118 One of Adams's last acts as president was to
request the publication of Clay's instructions to Anderson and
Sergeant, for the use of future administrations.120
John Quincy Adams spent most of his career in diplomacy,
either as a minister abroad or as secretary of state, and in
118 Richard Carl Froelich, "The United States Navy and
Diplomatic Relations with Brazil, 1822-1871" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University, 1971), 59-60;
David F. Long, Sailor-Diplomat: A Biography of Commodore
James Biddle, 1783-1848 (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval
Institute Press, 1983), 136.
119 Diary entry, Dec. 19, 1827, in MJQA, 7:385.
120 John Quincy Adams, message of March 3, 1829, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:431.
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those capacities was quite successful in finding an effective
foreign policy suitable to republican government based on a
continental union and opposition to political and commercial
colonization. He also found that the skills of a diplomat did
not

necessarily

translate

into

success

as

president,

especially when that president showed no skill or taste for
the political dealings required to pass a legislative program.
Adams's own sense of republican theory doomed his project for
internal improvements.

In foreign

affairs,

Adams was

the

victim of events in South America beyond his control, perhaps
revealing the limits of the ability of the United States to
shape the world around them. Adams was at his best in a
crisis, but his presidency was the quietest of any since 1789.
Unlike John Adams and James Madison, John Quincy Adams did not
leave the presidency with any sense of accomplishment and was
not

ready

to

retire.

"The

cause

of

the

Union

and

of

improvement will remain," Adams wrote in his diary a few days
before leaving office, "and I will have duties to it and to my
country yet to discharge."121

Diary entry, Feb. 28, 1829, in MJQA, 8:100-101.
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CHAPTER 10: AN OPPOSITION WHIG

John Quincy Adams spent two years in what was at best a
fitful retirement, dividing his time between Washington and
Quincy, not ready to retire but having no office. In the fall
of 1830 he accepted the National Republican nomination to
represent the Plymouth district in Congress, winning election
on November 1, 1830.* He joined the Whig party as it emerged
out of the wreckage of the National Republican and AntiMasonic parties, and for the rest of his life, except for the
month-long

Harrison

administration,

was

a member

of

the

opposition. By the outbreak of the Mexican War, Adams was the
last remaining statesman with any direct personal connection
to the American Revolution, and the republican thought that
produced it. The republicanism that Adams learned from his
father and from English Opposition thought taught him to view
domestic and foreign policies as parts of a whole, either
efforts to preserve liberty or conspiracies against it. Adams
saw the political attempt of the slave South to preserve and
extend

slavery

expansionism,

as

the

driving

force

behind

and interpreted it within the

Democratic

framework of

1 Leonard L. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman
John Quincy Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),
7-8.
36f
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Opposition thought.^
The idea of an organized slave power was only one of the
conspiracy theories in an age awash in reactions to supposed
conspiracies, among the more prominent being anti-Masonry and
nativism. Anti-Masons and nativists saw secret societies from
abroad plotting behind closed doors to undermine American
republicanism.^ Adams's view of a slave power conspiracy had
more in common with Opposition attacks on Robert Walpole in
the 1720s and Republican criticism of Hamilton in the 1790s.
Adams perceived, a domestic conspiracy whose basic aims were
in plain view, the Opposition model of executive corruption.
Adams drew on Opposition thought to make sense of a series of
seemingly unconnected events.* His depiction of the conspiracy
came

from

overzealously

connecting

events

that

did

not

necessarily have any connection, but appeared to come from the
same source. Just as Walpole attempted to create a patronage
machine out of the fiscal revolution of the early-eighteenth
century, and Hamilton embarked on a similar program in America
in the 1790s,
concert

to

slave state congressmen generally acted in

protect

and

augment

the

political

power

of

slaveholders and their allies. Adams saw the rapid and cheap
2 Ibid., 54.
2 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American
Politics and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965), 15-23.
* Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style:
Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century." William and
Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 39 no. 3 (July 1982), 421.
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sale of public lands as the bribe the slave states offered the
West and the fuel of executive corruption. The need to acquire
more slave lands, and discourage measures that might benefit
the North, drove Democratic foreign policy.
John Adams had never thought deeply about slavery. James
Madison

had

taken

great

pains

not

to

think

about

the

implications of slavery for republican government during his
political

career,

although

the

question

tortured

him

in

retirement.5 John Quincy Adams could also ignore slavery until
the Missouri Compromise showed that slavery and territorial
expansion were inextricably linked. "I take it for granted
that the present question [of Missouri] is a mere preamble,"
Adams wrote in January 1820,

"a title-page to a great and

tragic volume."5 "Slavery is the great and foul stain upon the
North American Union," Adams wrote in his diary several weeks
later, after a conversation with Calhoun about Missouri, and
speculated that "a dissolution, at least temporary, of the
Union" might be necessary to abolish slavery. He recognized
that he was engaging in speculation and seemed to be willing
to let a future generation solve the problem.7 In discussing
the Adams-Onis Treaty with Ninian Edwards of Illinois, Adams

5 Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and
the Republican Legacy (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 253-322.
5 Diary entry, Jan. 10, 1820, in MJQA, 4:502; Richards,
Congressman JQA, 100-103.
7 Diary entry, Feb. 24, 1820, in MJQA, 4:531.
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said that if he viewed expansion only "as an Eastern man, I
should be disinclined to have either Texas or Florida without
a restriction of excluding slavery from them." Adams did not
consider himself an eastern man,
nation,

but a man of the whole

pledged to defend the interests of all sections.

Loyalty to the union outweighed any anti-slavery feeling Adams
had in the 1820s.® Adams was not firmly identified with any
side of the slavery question and in 1827 remarked that during
the election of 1824, "I was misrepresented at the South as a
restrictionist and in the Northwest as a slaveholder.1,9
Adams had no love for Andrew Jackson but did not believe
that

Jackson

Madison,

that

component

the United

interests

complicated
liberty

could erect

too

too

a tyranny.
States,

universal

to

admit

thought,

"is too extensive,

various,

and the law as well

Adams

its
as

to

institutions

with
its
too

the establishment of
establishment

of

any

despotism."10 Adams did believe that Jackson would oppose
tariffs and internal improvements.11 Initially, Adams believed
the conflict was not slavery against freedom but confederation
against union. Adams met with Supreme Court Justice Smith

8 Diary entry, March 31, 1820, ibid., 5:54.
9 John Quincy Adams to Edward Everett, April 11, 1827, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 148.
10 John Quincy Adams to Charles Hammond, April 13, 1829,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 149.
11 John Quincy Adams to Henry Clay, April 21, 1829, in Clay,
Papers, 8:33.
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Thompson in 1831 and both believed "that the leading system of
the present Administration is to resolve the Government of
this

Union

into

the

national

imbecility

of

the

old

Confederation."12
The South Carolina legislature, guided by Vice-President
Calhoun, led the way by declaring the Tariff of 1828 null and
void. Calhoun argued that the tariff was unconstitutional
because it favored one particular branch of the economy rather
than

because

it

raised

a

revenue.

Justifying

state

nullification of federal laws, Calhoun agreed with William
Blackstone that absolute sovereignty existed somewhere in
society and Calhoun placed that sovereignty with the states.
Adams attacked nullification on both fronts. He denied that
absolute sovereignty could exist in a free government, calling
the idea the

"most pernicious of political errors." "The

doctrine that Sovereign must necessarily be unlimited power is
to my mind so glaringly incompatible with

any consistent

theory of human rights," Adams wrote to John Marshall.14
In a July 4, 1831 oration at Quincy, his first public

12 Diary entry, Jan. 30, 1831, in MJQA, 8:304.
13 William w. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1965), 136-140, 161-162, 171, 173-176;
John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1988), 158.
14 John Quincy Adams to Ambrose Spencer, Sept. 14, 1831;
John Quincy Adams to John Marshall, Sept. 17, 1831, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 150.
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statement since election to the House of Representatives,
Adams defended the basis of his republican system, the union,
against the attacks of the South Carolina nullifiers. Adams
denied that the states were the fundamental political units of
the nation, arguing that "union preceded their independence."
Taking

the

Declaration

of

independence

as

the

nation's

founding document, Adams noted that the Declaration referred
to

the

United

Colonies, rather

colony.15 Adams,

than

to

each individual

echoing Federalist thought of

the

1780s,

stated that the Articles of Confederation were doomed from the
start because they were based on a false notion of

state

sovereignty and did not rest on the authority of the people.16
Adams continually recurred to the theory that the Declaration
of Independence was the foundation of the union. He argued in
1837 that the Declaration of Independence did not make the
states independent or sovereign.17 In 1839 Adams stated that
before the adoption of the Constitution, "a confederacy had
been

substituted

in

place

of

a government

and

state

sovereignty had usurped the constituent sovereignty of the

15 John Quincy Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens
of the Town of Quincy, on the Fourth of July, 1831 (Boston:
Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831), 6-7.
16 Ibid., 21, 23; Wood, Creation, 306-307, 532-533.
17 John Quincy Adams, An Oration Delivered before the
Inhabitants of the Town of Newburyport, at their Request, on
the Sixty-First Anniversary of the Declaration of
Independence (Newburyport, Mass.: Morss and Brewster, 1837),
15.
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people."I®
For Adams, the preservation of a protective tariff, which
the nullifiers denounced,

was tied to his defense of the

union. On May 23, 1832, Adams issued a report on the tariff as
chairman

of

the

House

of

Representatives's

Committee

on

Manufactures. Adams justified the protective tariff as a form
of national defense. "The common defence must be provided for
against commercial rivalry as against warlike invasion," Adams
wrote, "for the spirit of traffic, armed with power, as the
experience of mankind has proved, is more insatiate and more
grasping than all the Alexanders or Caesars that ambition has
inflicted on the race of man."*9 Adams further argued that
Congress had approved the idea of protective duties, with the
commercial
through

discrimination

the

congressmen

war
were

of

1812.

then

protective system.

laws

at

He
the

of 1789
pointed

and similar
out

forefront

that

acts

southern

in supporting

a

Adams saw the tariff as part of a general

system of national improvement, which was connected to the
conduct of foreign policy.

He noted

thatthe development of

the steamboat added to the value of

thelandgained in the

Louisiana

and

Purchase,

and

that

canals

railroads

made

18 John Quincy Adams, Jubilee of the Constitution, 38-39.
19 Callanan, "Political Economy of JQA," 141; John Quincy
Adams, "Report on Manufactures," May 23, 1832, Register of
Debates in Congress, 29 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales and
Seaton, 1825-1837), 22nd Congress, 1st session, Part 3, Vol.
3, Appendix, 81-82.
20 Ibid., 82-85.
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westward

movement

possible.

"Upon

every

part

of

this

inheritance there are obstacles to be removed, and capacities
of improvement to be exercised,” Adams wrote. "The principle
of undertaking and accomplishing these improvements by the
labor and the fiscal resources of the people of the union, has
been assumed time after time, by the Congress of the United
States."21
President Jackson, unlike Adams, separated the political
theory and goal of nullification,

opposing the idea that

states could override federal laws, but favoring a reduction
of the tariff.

In his fourth annual message,

delivered on

December 4, 1832, Jackson called for a lower tariff, attacking
the

idea

that

one branch

of

industry deserved

permanent

special protection. Jackson also supported the quick sale of
public

lands.

On

December

10,

1832,

Jackson

issued

a

proclamation denouncing nullification.22 Adams could not see
how anyone could oppose both nullification and the tariff and
attributed the "glaring inconsistencies of principle between
the message of this year and the proclamation" to personal
conflict between Jackson and Calhoun.23 The nullification
crisis was resolved by the passage in March 1833 of the Force
Bill, allowing the president to suppress insurrection in South
21 Ibid., 87.
22 Fourth Annual Message, Dec. 4, 1832; Proclamation, Dec.
10, 1832, in Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2:598-601,
640-656.
23 Diary entry, Dec. 24, 1832, in MJQA, 8:510.
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Carolina,

and

a

lower

tariff,

removing

the

reasons

for

nullification.24
Adams

could

not

quite

separate

nullification

from

slavery. In 1830 Adams observed that the "South Carolinians
are attempting to govern

the Union as they govern their

slaves, and there are too many indications that, abetted as
they are by all the slave-driving interest of the Union, the
free portion of the population will cower before them and to
their insolence."25 Jackson's vigorous use of the presidential
veto

convinced

Adams

that

"the

overseer

ascendancy

is

complete."26 The cruel irony, which Adams himself began to
see, was that the union which Adams defended was "the only
thing that can maintain their system of slavery." A union that
protected all interests would naturally protect the South.27
"Slavery

is,

in

all

probability,

the

wedge

which

will

ultimately split up this union," Adams wrote in 1833.26
The nature and motives of the Jacksonian coalition, and
the threat Adams believed they posed to republican government,
soon became clear. Upon reading Martin Van Buren's letter to
the Democratic convention in 1835, Adams observed that the

24 Donald B. Cole, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 172-175.
25 Diary entry, June 1, 1830, in MJQA, 8:229-230.
26 Diary entry, June 6, 1830, ibid., 8:231.
27 Diary entry, Jan. 10, 1831, ibid., 8:269-270.
26 Diary entry, Oct. 14, 1833, ibid., 9:23.
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"democracy
entirely,

of

the

country

is

supported

chiefly,

if

not

by slavery." A few days later Adams met with a

Wareham, Massachusetts, minister, and noted that the southern
slaveholders bought the support of the West by supporting the
rapid sale of public lands. "This is the under current," Adams
argued, "with the tide of democracy at the surface."29 Adams
repeated this thesis to Robert Walsh, editor of the National
Gazette, complaining that "State rights and negro Slavery and
agrarian rapacity, controul the current of our public
Affairs for the present and for an indefinite futurity." Adams
directed Walsh to reread Jackson's annual message of 1832.30
Adams was in the mainstream of whig thought on economic
development,

supporting

the

bank,

internal

improvements,

tariffs and domestic manufactures. In 1837 Adams wrote that a
"divorce of Bank and State," made as much sense as a "divorce
of Army and Fire-Arms.”31 As president, Adams planned to use
the

gradual

sale

of

public

lands

to

pay

for

internal

improvements, a goal he shared with Henry Clay.32 "The Sable
29 Diary entries, Aug. 18 and 25, 1835, ibid., 9:255, 259.
30 John Quincy Adams to Robert Walsh, April 16, 1836, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 152.
31 D. Howe, Political Culture of American Whigs, 18-19, 45;
John Quincy Adams to Alexander H. Everett, Nov. 7, 1837, in
Andrew C. McLaughlin, ed. "Letters of John Quincy Adams to
Alexander Hamilton Everett, 1811-1837," 2 parts. American
Historical Review, Vol. 11 nos. 1 and 2 (October 1905January-1906), 2:354.
32 John Quincy Adams to Charles W. Upham, Feb. 2, 1837, in
"Ten Unpublished Letters," 382; Remini, Clay, 380-381, 521522; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston:
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Genius of the South,

saw the signs of his own inevitable

downfall in the unparalleled progress of the general welfare
of the North," Adams wrote in 1837, "and fell to cursing the
tariff, and internal improvements, and raised the standard of
Free trade, Nullification, and State Rights."33 The capstone
of slavery's political power was the so-called Pinckney Gag of
May 18, 1836, a rule sponsored by Henry Laurens Pinckney of
South Carolina and made permanent in 1840, that prohibited the
House

of

Representatives

from

admitting

anti-slavery

petitions. Adams believed that the struggle over the right of
petition,

"is merely the symptom of a deep seated disease,

preying on the vitals of this union —

and that disease is

Slavery."34
The Texan declaration of

independence and quest

for

annexation to the United States brought out the diplomatic
implications of the Jacksonian coalition. Adams himself had
tried

to

buy

Texas

in

1827,

believing

that

the Mexican

government considered the territory worthless and hoping to
move the border with Mexico farther away from New Orleans. In
1832 Adams believed that Texas would fill up with Americans
and come into the union the same way West Florida had. The

Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 253-254.
33 John Quincy Adams to Charles W. Upham, Feb. 2, 1837, in
"Ten Unpublished Letters," 383.
34 Bemis, JQA and Union, 340; Richards, Congressman JQA,
120-121; John Quincy Adams to John Greenleaf Whittier, Jan.
26, 1837, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 153.
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problem

was

that

most

of

the

American

settlers

were

slaveholders and Mexico had abolished slavery.35 in May 1836
Adams

struck

up a correspondence with

Benjamin Lundy,

a

Philadelphia Quaker and editor of the abolitionist newspaper
The Genius of Universal Emancipation, who had assembled the
diplomatic pieces of the Slave Power conspiracy to annex
Texas. Lundy argued in The Origins and True Causes of the
Texas

Insurrection

that

a

combination

of

slave

traders,

squatters, and northern land speculators plotted to use Texas
as a bulwark for slavery.

"From the commencement of their

settlement in that Province, we must bear in mind, the most of
them anticipated its eventual separation from the government
of Mexico, and attachment to the Northern Union," Lundy wtote.
"This was early [on] resolved [by] them, . . . unless indeed
other measures

could be

adopted

for the

perpetuation

of

slavery. A full and complete understanding existed between
them and the advocates of the system in this country and
elsewhere.,,3<* Lundy further explored the conspiracy theory in
The War in Texas. " The slaveholding Interest is now paramount
in the Executive branch of our national government; and its
influence operates indirectly; yet powerfully, through that
medium, in favor of

the Grand Scheme of Oppression

and

35 Hargreaves, Presidency of JQA, 116; Diary entry, Jan. 31,
1832, in MJQA, 8:465.
3® Benjamin Lundy, The Origins and True Causes of the Texas
Insurrection, Commenced in the Year 1835 (Philadelphia:
National Gazette, 1836), 8-9.
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Tyrannical Usurpation," Lundy wrote, restating a century-old
Opposition fear of executive power."37
Lundy did not tell Adams anything he did not already know
or at least suspect. Yet Lundy did help crystalize Adams's
thinking on the nature of the slave power and connect his
critique of Democratic foreign policy with the Opposition Whig
tradition.38

Armed with Lundy's first pamphlet, Adams made

his first speech on Texas in the House of Representatives on
May 25, 1836. "The war now raging in Texas is a Mexican civil
war, and a war for the re-establishment of slavery where it
was abolished," Adams argued. "It is not a servile war, but a
war between slavery and emancipation." he continued.39 The
American desire for Texas meant war, Adams warned, certainly
with Mexico, probably with Great Britain, and possibly with
France. Annexation of Texas would stretch American boundaries
to a militarily indefensible extent. To preserve Texas, the
United States would need to conquer Cuba and Puerto Rico as
well, which would bring war with a Great Britain determined to
wipe out slavery in the West Indies.40 "Mr. Chairman, are you
ready for all these wars?" Adams asked. "A Mexican war? a war
37 Benjamin Lundy, The War in Texas: Instigated by
Slaveholders, Land Speculators, &c. for the re-establishment
of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Republic of Mexico
(Philadelphia: Merrihew and Gunn, 1836), 3.
38 Bemis, JQA and Union, 354-357.
39 John Quincy Adams, Speech of May 25, 1836, Register of
Debates, 24th Congress, 1st Session, part 4, 4041.
40 Ibid., 4043-4045.
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with Great Britain, if not with France? a general Indian war?
a servile war? and as an inevitable consequence of them all,
a civil war?"41 One of the central tenets of Opposition Whig
thought was that wars of conquest abroad led to tyranny at
home.

"I

see

no alternative

but

that

the whole

Mexican

Confederation is destined to be overrun by our Land jobbers
and Slave makers," Adams wrote to Lundy in

1 8 3 6 .4^

Adams held

the same view a year later, writing that he did not "see where
our encroachments will stop, short of Cape Horn —

but what is

to become of our Liberties? ”45 Adams believed that the cause
of Texas was the cause of tyranny, not liberty. "[The Texans]
are

fighting

slavery,

and

for

the

that

is

establishment
the

cause

of

and
the

perpetuation
South

of

Carolinian

sympathy with them," Adams wrote in December 1836.44
Andrew Jackson knew that Texas was a hornet's nest of
political difficulties, and in his message of December 21,
1836, the president did not advise the immediate annexation of
Texas. Adams was surprised, to say the least.45 Martin Van
41 Ibid., 4046.
4^ John Quincy Adams to Benjamin Lundy, June 27, 1836, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 152.
4^ John Quincy Adams to Timothy Pitkin, April 22, 1837, in
"Ten Unpublished Letters," 388.
44 Diary entry, Dec. 24, 1836, in MJQA, 9:333.
45 John M. Belohlavek, "Let the Eagle Soar! "The Foreign
Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1985), 233-235; Andrew Jackson, message of Dec. 21,
1836, in Richardson, Messages and Papers, 3:265-269; Diary
entry, Dec. 22, 1836, in MJQA, 9:330-331.
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Buren was too shrewd a politician to pick a dangerous fight
and tried to steer a middle course by opposing the annexation
of Texas and supporting the gag rule. When Adams met with
Secretary of State John Forsyth on September 16, 1837, Forsyth
assured Adams that the administration had made no offer to buy
Texas from Mexico.48 Two days later Adams moved a resolution
"that the power of annexing a people of any independent State
to this Union is a power not delegated by the Constitution of
the United States to their Congress, or to any department of
their Government, but reserved to the people." The chair ruled
the resolution out of order.47
Despite Van Buren's coolness on Texas, southern state
legislatures and congressmen pushed for annexation.

Waddy

Thompson,

a South Carolina Whig, opposed the admission of

Iowa,

any

or

other

northern

territory,

"while

northern

fanatics were pouring in petitions against the annexation to
this union of the great and glorious republic of Texas." Adams
"objected to the peculiar glory of Texas, which consisted of
having made a land of freemen a land of slaves."4® Adams
addressed the question of Texas in a long speech "cut up by
the rules of the House into driblets of a quarter hour a day,"
46 Major L. Wilson, The Presidency of Martin Van Buren
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 149-152; Diary
entry, Sept. 16, 1837, in MJQA, 9:377-378.
47 Diary entry, Sept. 18, 1837, in MJQA, 9:378;
Congressional Globe, 109 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Blair and
Rives, 1833-1873), 25th Congress, 1st Session, 38.
48 Diary entry, June 6, 1838, in MJQA, 10:11-12.
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which lasted from June 16 to July 7, 1838.49 Adams attacked
the gag on anti-slavery petitions, which "had been carried at
the dictation of the slaveholders” and "was bringing upon the
House the deepest obloquy.” The gag made a proper debate over
Texas impossible.50 Adams did not discount the possibility of
future expansion,
attempts

to

and took great pains to defend his own

purchase

Texas

as

secretary

of

state

and

president, denying that he had given up anything more than a
questionable claim on Mexican territory.51 On June 28 Adams
restated his constitutional objections to annexation,

but

added that an amendment to the Constitution and a popular
referendum in Texas and the United States would remove that
difficulty. Slavery, however, was the bar to expansion. On
those grounds, Adams could not submit to a union with Texas,
"not with a People who have converted freemen into slaves; not
so long as slavery exists in Texas."52
By the late 1830s Adams completed the Opposition Whig
framework

for

interpreting

the

Slave

Power's

drive

for

expansion, which Adams would use to explain American politics
until his death. A succession of slaveholding

(or in Van

49 John Quincy Adams to Abbot Lawrence, June 27, 1838, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 153.
50 June 22 and 26, in John Quincy Adams, Speech by John
Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, upon the Right of the People,
Men and women, to Petition (Washington, D.C.: Gales and
Seaton, 1838), 54, 63.
51 June 21, 1838, ibid., 44-45.
52 June 28, 1838, ibid., 68-69.
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Buren's case, slavedriven) presidents stood in the place of
Robert Walpole. The farmers of the South and West, whether
slaveholders or not, who demanded the sale of public lands,
played the part of Walpole's army of placemen. Adams reversed
the Jeffersonian formula of political virtue, writing that he
did not share Jefferson's "fancies that the tobacco-planters
of

the

James

continuance

of

were
the

the

chosen

present

people

of

God."55

administration

will,

"The
if

accomplished, open wide all the flood-gates of corruption,"
Adams wrote late in Martin Van Buren's term.54 The main victim
of the slave power was New England, and Adams warned his son
that "New England will ere long need sound heads and stout
hearts to save her from being made the foot-ball of the
South."55
Adams's fight against the annexation of Texas placed him
in the front rank of antislavery crusaders in Congress, but he
did not consider himself an abolitionist. In 1837 Adams wrote
in his diary that "the abolitionists generally are constantly
urging me to indiscrete movements, which would ruin me and
weaken

and

not

strengthen

them."56

The

chief

indiscreet

5 John Quincy Adams, "Reply to the Address of the Thirteen
Federalists," in Henry Adams, ed., New-England Federalism,
153.
54 Diary entry, July 25, 1840, in MJQA, 10:342.
cc

John Quincy Adams to Charles Francis Adams, April 7,
1841, Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 154.

56 Diary entry, Sept. 1, 1837, in MJQA, 8:365.
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measure in Adams mind was the abolitionist demand for the end
of slavery in the District of Columbia as a prelude to a
general

emancipation. Adams

believed

that

magnitude,

"the

sympathized

undertaking

difficulty and danger,

[is]

in

of

that

principle

such

but

tremendous

I shrink from the

contemplation of it, and much more from any personal agency in
promoting it."57 Adams was recognized as an ally, if not a
full

member

of

the

abolitionist

camp.

Adams

friend

and

colleague Joshua R. Giddings, an Ohio Whig, noted that Adams's
"views as stated would compare with those of the Abolitionists
generally, except that he declared himself not prepared to
vote

for

the

abolition

of

slavery

in

the

District

of

Columbia."5®
Adams hoped that the Whig victory of 1840 would halt the
progress of slave-driven expansion. That hope faded with the
death of President William H. Harrison, when in Thurlow Weed's
words, "the Whig party was demoralized by Tylerism."59 "Tyler
is a political sectarian, of the slave-driving, Jeffersonian
school,

principled against all improvement,

with

all the

interests and passions and vices of slavery rooted in his

57 John Quincy Adams to Charles Hammond, March 31, 1837,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 153.
5® Journal entry, Jan. 21, 1839, in George W. Julian, The
Life of Joshua R. Giddings (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and
Company, 1892), 61.
5^ Thurlow Weed, The Autobiography of Thurlow Weed. Harriet
A. Weed, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1883),
468.
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moral and political considerations,"

Adams wrote on April 4,

1841. A few weeks later Adams added, "I feel an utter distrust
of the principles of John Tyler, a Virginia nullifier, now
acting as President of the United States, and no confidence in
the principles or belief in the sincerity of the Secretary of
State."**® Daniel Webster, Adams's most prominent constituent,
earned Adams's undying hatred for remaining in office and by
implication acting as a tool of the slave power. In 1843 Adams
denounced Webster as "a heartless traitor to the cause of
human freedom."***
Despite Tyler's nominal identification as a Whig, Adams
expected that Tyler, like his Democratic predecessors, would
attempt to annex Texas and act his part as an agent of the
slaveholders. On September 17, 1842, Adams delivered a speech
at Braintree in which he gave the fullest outline to date of
the Slave Power conspiracy. Nullification was the bedrock of
Tyler's political creed,

Adams believed,

as nullification

opposed a strong central government which might curb the power
of

the

south.

In

truth,

Tyler

opposed

Calhoun

against

nullification. Tyler did oppose tariffs and the Bank of the
United

States,

positions

Adams

saw

as

tantamount

to

nullification. "Nullification, portentous and fatal as it is
to the prospects

and welfare of this Union, is not the only

60 Diary entries, April 4 and May 21, 1841, in MJQA, 10:456457, 469.
61 Diary entry, June 17, 1843, ibid., 11:383-384.
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interest of Southern domination, wielded by the Executive at
Washington," Adams continued. The other instruments included
an aggressive foreign policy that demanded Mexican territory
from the Rio del Norte to San Francisco. This policy had begun
with Jackson, and was "worthy of Machiavell[i]."®2
Texas was the focal point of the slave power's foreign
policy. "The Texas Land and Liberty jobbers had spread the
contagion of their land-jobbing —

Stock-jobbing —

jobbing —

were all hand in hand

Rights of Man-jobbing,

Slave-

sweeping over the land like a hurricane," Adams argued. "The
controlling object of this whole system of policy was, and yet
is, to obtain a nursery for the slave-holding States, to break
down forever the ascendent power of the free States, and to
fortify, beyond all possibility of reversal, the institution
of slavery," Adams continued. The public lands and internal
improvements were to be sacrificed to the slave Power, and
Adams again referred to Jackson's annual message of 1832 as
the foundation of the slave power's economic policy.®2
There was little new argument in Adams's address; most of
the arguments had appeared in his own writings or in Benjamin
Lundy's pamphlets. Adams did advance one argument he had never

62 John Quincy Adams, Address of John Quincy Adams to his
Constituents of the Twelfth Congressional District, at
Braintree, September 17, 1842 (Boston: J.H. Eastbum, 1842),
9-10; Norma Lois Peterson, The Presidencies of William Henry
Harrison and John Tyler (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1989), 19-20.
®2 John Quincy Adams, Address at Braintree, 12, 16, 22-23.
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made before, against naval spending. Adams attacked Tyler's
annual message for 1841, which called for a larger navy. By
lumping the navy with the army and other supposed instruments
of tyranny, Adams picked up on the Republican attacks on
Federalist policy in the 1790s.6^ Adams later referred to the
steam frigates as "infernal machines."66
By mid-1842 Tyler added San Francisco to his territorial
ambitions.

He and Webster devised a plan to gain British

support for a Mexican cession by giving up the American claim
to Oregon north of the Columbia River. Tyler also appointed
Waddy Thompson of South Carolina, a strong proponent of the
annexation

of

Texas,

as

minister

to

Mexico.

The

administration's plans were presumably revealed on October 19,
1842, when Commodore Thomas ap Catesby Jones seized Monterey
upon hearing a rumor that the United States and Mexico were at
war. Jones withdrew the next day, when he learned the rumor
was unfounded.66
Adams attempted to call on the president to submit the
papers and communications related to the raid to the House of
Representatives,

but

was

blocked

by

administration

supporters.67 Adams, disposed as he was to think in terms of

6^ Ibid., 35-36; John Tyler, message of Dec. 7, 1841, in
Richardson, Messages and Papers, 4:88.
65 Diary entry, March 8, 1844, in MJQA, 11:528.
66 Peterson,

Presidencies of Harrison and Tyler, 137-139.

67 Diary entries, Jan. 30 and 31, 1842, in MJQA, 11:304-305.
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whole systems, saw administration policy as shown by Jones's
raid, Democratic agitation with Great Britain over the right
of search, and Senator Lewis Linn's bill to occupy the mouth
of the Columbia, as parts of a system to dismember Mexico and
extend slavery. Adams cornered Daniel Webster at the state
department on March 25, 1843, and asked if Waddy Thompson had
been instructed to buy San Francisco. When Webster responded
that he could not say, Adams believed he had his answer.**®
Mexican weakness only encouraged "the inflexible perseverance
of rapacity of our South and West, under the spur of slavery,
to plunder

and dismember

her.”69

Jones

attacked a country that could fight

never would

have

back, and Webster and

Thompson showed a similar contempt for Mexico. "The spirit of
encroachment upon Mexico is stimulated and nourished by this
settled

and

too well

founded conviction

weakness," Adams wrote in his diary,

of

her helpless

"in conflict with the

gigantic energy of our national avarice and ambition."70 Adams
spent

several

weeks

sifting

through

Anthony

Butler's

dispatches from Mexico, plumbing the depths of theSlave Power
drive for expansion. "But Jackson was so sharp-set for Texas
from the first year of his Administration he set his twin

68 Diary entry, March 25, 1843, in MJQA, 11:345-346; David
M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon and
the Mexican Mar (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1973), 108-109.
69 Diary entry,

April 1, 1843, in MJQA, 11:351.

70 Diary entry,

April 4, 1843, ibid., 11:353.
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engines to work," Adams observed on March 29, "of negotiating
to buy Texas with one hand, and instigating the people of that
province

to

revolt

against

Mexico

with

other."71

After

completing his labors, Adams concluded that Texas policy had
run on the same track since 1829.72
As Adams confined most of his observations to his diary
no one could confront him with his own conduct regarding
Florida. If one substituted Jackson for Jones, Pensacola for
Monterey and Spain for Mexico, Adams's own actions might fall
into the same category as those he criticized in the 1840s.
There is no evidence to suggest that Adams renounced his own
expansionism, however. In 1844 Adams wrote that "the Florida
treaty was the most important incident in my life, and the
most successful negotiation ever consummated by the Government
of this Union."72
On April 22, 1844, Tyler sent a Texas annexation treaty
to the Senate. It was the capstone of slave power diplomacy,
and Adams feared that "with it went the freedom of the human
race." Even when the Senate rejected the treaty on June 8,
Adams believed the danger had not passed.74 Adams observed to
William Henry Seward that "the rapacious passion of national

71 Diary

entry, March

29, 1843,

ibid., 11:349.

72 Diary

entry, April

10, 1843,

ibid., 11:358.

72 Diary

entry, Sept.

27, 1844,

ibid., 12:78.

74 Diary entry, April 22, 1844, ibid., 12:13-14; Pletcher,
Diplomacy of Annexation, 144-149.
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aggrandizement sharpened by the whetstone of the land and
stock jobber, is even now plunging us into a desperate war for
slavery,

the

issue

of

which

can

be

no

other

than

the

dissolution of the Union, and an imperial race of Caesars,
under the name of Democracy."7^ Adams was convinced that Texas
was a prelude to greater conquests, including all of Mexico
and the West Indies, creating "a maritime, colonizing, slavetainted monarchy," and "a military government with a large
army and navy."7® Adams combined the primal Opposition Whig
fear of executive power with his fear of democracy, reversing
Madison's fear of the 1790s, that the executive would use
foreign policy to combine with the Senate against the people
at large.
Adams laid out the Slave Power conspiracy most fully to
his constituents. He addressed the Boston Whig Young Men's
Club on October 7, 1844, and argued that a "virtuous senate"
rejected the Texas treaty, placing the upper house in its
traditional role as a break on runaway democracy.77 On October
30, Adams pointed out the stages of the conspiracy. The first
stage was the preponderance of slaveholders in the White
House,

the cabinet,

the military and the Congress.

This

information, Adams said, was available to anyone with a copy

75 John Quincy Adams to William Henry Seward, May 10, 1844,
Adams Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 154.
76 Diary entries, June 10 and 14, 1844, in MJQA, 12:49, 57.
77 Niles' National Register, Oct. 19, 1844.
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of the annual Blue Book. The second stage was the gag on anti
slavery petitions, approved in 1836, made a standing rule
in 1840 and repealed in 1844. The third was the drive for
Texas.

The

Slave Power

openly

coveted Texas,

schemed to

acquire it, and would force the nation into a war to defend
slavery.78 When Congress brought Texas into the union by a
joint-resolution, Adams saw the move "as the apoplexy of the
Constitution."79
James K. Polk came into office pledging to annex Texas
and all of Oregon. Yet that program would entail war with both
Great Britain and Mexico. Adams expected Polk to sell out the
free states through a compromise on Oregon
agreement

with

Great

Britain.

Adams

had

and a tariff

not

completely

renounced expansion. "I believe slavery to be a sin before
God, and that is the reason we should refuse to annex Texas to
the Union," he said in 1838.®® Expansion into Oregon, as it
was

unfettered by slavery,

command.

Throughout

his

was

career

little short of a divine
Adams

believed

that

land

belonged to its cultivators, as shown in his 1802 oration at
Plymouth and his diplomacy at Ghent. He repeated the same
argument in an 1843 essay on the New England Confederacy of

78 Ibid., Nov. 9, 1844.
79 Diary entry, Feb. 28, 1844, in MJQA, 12:174; Peterson,
Presidencies of Harrison and Tyler, 256-257.
80 June 28, 1838, in John Quincy Adams, Speech on the Right
of Petition, 68.
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As

secretary of

state

and president Adams

had

been

willing to settle for an extension of the boundary at 49
degrees from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, but twenty
years of American migration led Adams to claim the whole
Oregon territory. On January 27, 1845, Adams argued that the
time had come to end the joint occupancy agreement. Adams
believed that Polk never should have offered to settle at 49
degrees or accept if the British offered the same line.82 In
1846 Adams cited Biblical authority,

specifically Genesis

1:26-28 and the commandm-^nt to be fruitful and multiply. "Now,
that general authority given to man

to increase, multiply and

replenish the earth, and subdue,

it,” Adams argued on the

floor of the House of Representatives," was a grant from the
Creator to man as man, it was a grant to every individual in
the human race in his individual capacity.”88
Adams suspected that Polk was far more interested in
acquiring more slave lands

from Mexico than in asserting

American claims to all of Oregon.

"It is evident that the

Oregon question will be settled by a repeal of the corn laws

ft 1

John Quincy Adams, "The New England Confederacy of
MDCXLIII" [1843] (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society,
Proceedings, 3rd Series, Vol. 9, 1846), 196-197.
82 Diary entries, Dec. 6 and 14, 1845, March 25, 1846, in
MJQA, 12:218-21, 254-255; Congressional Globe, 28th
Congress, 2nd Session, 202.
83 Speech of Feb. 9, 1846, Congressional Globe, 29th
Congress, 1st Session, 340-341.
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and the sacrifice of the American tariff,” Adams wrote in his
diary on February 20, 1846, "a bargain, both sides of which
will be for the benefit of England, and to our disadvantage;
a purchase of peace, the value of which can only be tested by
the lapse of time."84 The British government soon repealed the
Com

Laws and lowered duties on imported grain.

followed

with

the

Walker

Tariff,

reducing

Congress

duties

on

manufactured goods. The southerners, Whig and Democrat, who
clamored for Texas were not interested in Oregon, and in June,
Polk signed an agreement with Great Britain making 49 degrees
the boundary between British and American territory.85
Polk needed a settlement with Great Britain to have a
free hand in pursuing an aggressive policy with Mexico. By
early 1846 Polk's attempts to purchase territory from Mexico
had failed. He sent General Zachary Taylor into the disputed
territory between the Rio Nueces and the Rio Grande. Polk and
the cabinet hoped that American financial claims against the
Mexican government were enough cause for war. In May word of
conflict between Mexican and American troops along the Rio
Grande reached Washington, allowing Polk to ask for war and
blame it on Mexico.

88 It was the result Adams had long

84 Diary entry, Feb. 20, 1846, ibid., 12:248.
85 Pletcher, Diplomacy of Annexation, 418-419; Thomas R.
Hietala, Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late
Jacksonian America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1985), 72-73, 80-88.
86 Paul H. Bergeron, The Presidency of James K. Polk
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 74-77;
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expected.

Adams wrote one of his last letters to Albert

Gallatin,

who was one of the last living Americans

in

a

position to appreciate Adams's Opposition-based conspiracy
theory. "But the design, and the purpose to dismember Mexico,
and to annex to the United States not only Texas, but several
of her adjoining Provinces on this side of the Continent, and
the Californias on the other side, has in my opinion been what
my old Collegue Caleb Cushing calls

'a fixed fact' at least

from the year 1830 and has been pursued by means which gave to
Mexico from that time ample cause of War, in self-defence,
against the United States," Adams wrote. Adams further argued
that Polk had sent Taylor as a provocative act,

and had

usurped the war-making power.®7
Adams himself was never reconciled to the war. The last
vote he ever cast in the House of Representatives was on
February 21,

1848,

two days

before his death,

against

a

resolution thanking various generals for their services in the
campaign of 1847.88 By all accounts Adams died resigned to his
fate. His final thoughts on republicanism and diplomacy are
unrecorded,

yet doubtless he believed that his system of

Christian improvement was in ruins, and that domestic liberty
would

fall

victim

to

tools

of

diplomacy.

According

Pletcher, Diplomacy of Annexation, 373-377.
87 John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin, Dec. 26, 1847,
Adams Family papers, Letterbook, reel 155.
88 Bemis, JQA and Union, 534-535.
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Opposition thought, if the process of decay was visible it had
already gone too far to be reversed. The republic, at least
Adams's version of it, to which he had devoted his life had
met the fate of all republics, and preceded him to the grave.
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CONCLUSION

To view the world as a republican was to see politics as
a whole entity, not one divided into foreign and domestic
spheres. Republican ideology posited that the tools of foreign
policy could easily turn against domestic liberties and that
a

government

embracing

tyrannies

abroad

could

similarly

introduce tyranny at home. John Adams, James Madison and John
Quincy Adams agreed that both foreign and domestic policy were
to be judged by whether they promoted or subverted liberty; by
whether they kept the republic or destroyed it. Agreement on
the desirability of a republic did not necessarily bring
agreement

on

the precise

nature

of

a republican

foreign

policy. The stream of thought upon which Americans drew, a
two-hundred year span of writers
economists,

that

included political

constitutional and natural law theorists,

and

English polemicists, was far too broad to produce a single
republican model for diplomacy. The lives and experiences of
the three figures in this study helped produce different
versions of republican diplomacy.

There were,

of course,

common themes to the diplomatic careers of John Adams, James
Madison and John Quincy Adams.
One belief common to all three was

that a nation's

39!
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interests and diplomacy reflected the nature of its government
and society.

Americans

sought limited government and the

freedom to trade without restrictions. All three figures in
this study concluded that Americans were not on a permanent
basis a Spartan people, although they praised and demanded
such martial virtue in times of crisis. Both John Adams and
James Madison ultimately discounted martial virtue as the
foundation of the republic and believed a balanced government
could at

least

simulate virtue.

Scottish

political

economists

The Physiocrats

provided

a

and the

framework

for

constructing a republic with economic activity at its center.
John Adams and James Madison disagreed on whether the United
States should pursue manufactures and shipping as well as
agriculture. That disagreement went to the heart of what they
believed a republican diplomacy entailed. John Quincy Adams
represented a brand of republicanism arising after the War of
1812 which held that government policy could promote public
virtue through guiding economic development and undertaking
internal improvements. The Erie Canal project, for example,
was a product of that view.^ Adams's diplomacy as secretary of
state and president, as well as his positions in Congress,
reflect

a

improvement

similar

commitment

at

and through

home

to

self-defense

advancement

of

through
American

maritime principles abroad.
1 Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and
the Paradox of Progress 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang,
1996), 24-25.
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Natural law theorists such as Grotius and Vattel, writing
from the perspective of small nations, provided a moral and
legal justification for American foreign policy goals and an
analog to domestic constitutional arrangements. The law of
nations,

by emphasizing

neutral

rights

and

advocating

balance of power among nations that would limit war,

a

was

compatible with the idea of a limited government. The most
concrete example of a republican foreign policy goal taken
from the law of nations was the principle that "free ships
make free goods," which combined personal liberty, economic
freedom and limited government into one policy. John Adams
placed "free ships make free goods" at the center of American
diplomacy in the Model Treaty. As president, both John Adams
and James Madison waged wars in defense of that principle. In
1823, John Quincy Adams used "free ships make free goods" as
the glue that unified his British and Russian diplomacy. As
president, Adams saw the Panama Congress as the opportunity to
codify freedom of the seas into the international law of the
Western Hemisphere.
The

law

of

nations

provided

a

legal

and

moral

justification for American foreign policy goals, but neither
Grotius's Rights of War and Peace nor Vattel's Law of Nations
nor Madison's Examination of the British Doctrine supplied a
method for achieving those goals. For a guide to diplomacy as
well as

politics, John Adams, James Madison and John Quincy

Adams turned to the Opposition Whig school,

chiefly Lord
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Bolingbroke, Trenchard and Gordon and James Burgh. Fortunately
for Americans, the ideology they embraced was compatible with
a realistic view of foreign policy.

The Opposition Whigs

emphasized that human imperfection required balances of power
within governments and among nations. Just as Opposition Whig
thinkers provided a guide to detecting and preventing domestic
corruption and tyranny, they showed the way to

a diplomacy

consistent with liberty.
The first rule of Opposition Whig diplomacy Americans
adopted was that political and physical separation from the
hazards of continental European politics was essential to
liberty. Bolingbroke and "Cato," as contemporary critics of
Walpole's foreign policy, warned against Walpole's engagements
on the European continent, dictated in part by the Hanoverian
connection, where Great Britain had no essential interests.
The

American

situation

was

somewhat

different,

with

a

relatively weak United States trying to keep European nations
from interfering in American politics. The principle that
separation preserved republican government can be seen most
obviously in the Declaration of Independence and was the
central assumption of John Adams,

James Madison and John

Quincy Adams in their diplomacy. In 1823, John Quincy Adams's
contribution to the Monroe Doctrine restated the principle of
separation

from Europe to

apply to a hemisphere

full of

independent republics.
A rule related to physical separation was that separation
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should be
liberty.

enforced by methods

not

dangerous

to domestic

Opposition Whigs believed that the navy was the

constitutionally

safest

form

of

defense.

It

could

not

overthrow the government, as could a standing army. A navy
also paid

for itself

by protecting

overseas

commerce,

a

valuable source of economic power and a training ground for
sailors. An army created a set of people with an interest
separate from the common good, drained the public treasury and
provided a source of executive patronage and corruption.
Reliance on the navy was not as widely accepted in the
United States as was a reliance on physical separation from
Europe. Many American statesmen believed that economic power
could play the strategic role of a navy. Opposition Whigs in
Britain did not address economic coercion as a means

of

foreign policy, but suggested the idea by emphasizing the role
the American colonies played in insuring British wealth. The
careers

of

John Adams

and

James

Madison,

both

of which

concluded with maritime crises, are instructive on this point.
In 1776 Adams believed that the economic power of America,
both as a market for manufactures and a supplier of staple
goods,

could

substitute,

at

least

temporarily,

for

a

substantial navy. By the 1780s Adams gave up on economic
coercion as an effective policy. During the Quasi-War, Adams
waged a naval war in defense of commerce, particularly the
American

carrying

trade,

in

a

manner

he

believed

was

consistent with republican ideology and the lessons he had
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learned as a diplomat.
Madison,

on

the

other

hand,

went

beyond

Opposition

thought to lump a navy with a standing army as a threat to
liberty. Madison believed that a large domestic carrying trade
was inconsistent with a primarily agrarian republic. He saw
American economic power as its own defense and framed the
commercial discrimination bills of the 1790s and the Embargo
of 1807 to achieve American goals without recourse to military
force. Madison's version of republican diplomacy forced him to
believe that American commerce was more powerful than it was
in reality.
A third rule,

tied to the proper weapons of foreign

policy, was that the power of the executive, while necessary
for balance within a government and for administration, was to
be

tightly

controlled.

John

Adams

believed

in

a

strong

executive, more so than Madison, but Adams was also careful to
conduct himself as a republicanized version of Bolingbroke's
Patriot King. Adams, in defense of his own administration,
pointed out that he had preserved the republic by refusing to
follow measures Hamilton pressed on him. Madison was more
fearful of executive power than Adams, and Madison's writings
throughout the 1790s are a variation on the Opposition Whig
thesis

that

executive

tyranny

could

result

from

an

unrestrained power to conduct foreign relations. As president,
Madison may have come close to violating his own rules while
attempting to acquire the Floridas, but his circumspection may
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be evidence that he was no more comfortablewith his own use
of executive power than he

was

with that of

JohnAdams. John

Quincy Adams, as secretary of state and president, did not
seem to hold Opposition Whig fears of executive power. As a
member of Congress, however, Adams attacked Andrew Jackson and
the Democrats in the same terms as the Opposition criticized
Walpole.
The Whig party to which John Quincy Adams belonged made
freguent reference to the Opposition Whigs in the 1830s and
1840s in defense of its political positions.^ Generations
after Adams's death,

however,

saw the founding generation

itself as the source of ancient authority. In his 1931 article
"The Permanent

Bases of American Foreign Policy,"

presidential candidate John W. Davis wrote

that

former

"the first

[base] in point of time, if notin point of importance, is to
abstain as far as possible from any participation in foreign
questions in general and European questions in particular." In
support of his argument, Davis cited John Adams, John Quincy
Adams, the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, without
reference to the earlier republican ideology that had produced
those statements of policy.^
John Adams, James Madison and John Quincy Adams came to
serve the function in later American thought that Grotius,
2 D. Howe, Political Culture of American Whigs, 77-78.
^ John W. Davis. "The Permanent Bases of American Foreign
Policy." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10 no. 1 (October 1931), 1-5.
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Vattel,

Bolingbroke

and

"Cato"

served

for

the

founding

generation. Even if American statesmen no longer cited the
Opposition Whigs in debates over foreign policy, it cannot be
said that their ideas and concerns faded from the American
consciousness. "Free ships make free goods" reappeared in the
Civil War, at the Hague Peace Conferences and upon American
entry into World War I. The idea of separation from foreign
politics, put forth by the Opposition and transmitted through
the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine,
center

of

every

subsequent

debate

over

has been at

American

action

throughout the world, most obviously in the American entry
into World War I, World War II and the Cold War. Historian and
Washington biographer Curtis P. Nettels testified against the
North Atlantic

Treaty on

violated the tradition,

the

grounds

that the

agreement

laid down in the Farewell Address,

against permanent alliances.4 In 1951 Senator Robert A. Taft
echoed Opposition Whig military thought when he advocated a
defense policy based on a large navy and air force,

but

opposed the provision in NATO that committed American ground
troops to Europe.5 The concerns over the president's foreign
policy powers that Madison raised in his "Helvidius" essays
are evident in the Bricker Amendment and the War Powers Act,
to name but two examples. The question of what constitutes a
4 Lawrence Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative
Years (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 14.
5 Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1951), 19-20.
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republican foreign policy has not been answered for all time.
John Adams, James Madison and John Quincy Adams were among the
first to grapple with it. Their use of republican theory
formed the guide subscribed to by each succeeding generation
charged with keeping the republic.
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